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Chapter I - Introduction 
1 
 
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
 
Private International Law (PIL) involves the question of which law applies to a 
legal relationship in cases that have connections with more than one legal order. 
For example, how is it determined which is the law applicable to a consumer 
contract with cross-border elements? The two main methods used through the 
history to answer this type of question are the unilateral method and the 
multilateral method.1 The former consists on determining the spatial reach of a 
rule to determine its applicability, having as a starting point the norm itself. The 
multilateral method entails designating the applicable law having as a starting 
point the legal relationship and assigning it to a particular legal order through 
objective connecting factors, regardless whether the legal order designated is the 
law of the forum or a foreign law. The multilateral method gained popularity in 
Europe since the late nineteenth century.2 Nowadays, the conflict of laws system 
is characterised by the existence of a plurality of methods, since after the 1960s 
the exclusivity of the multilateral method was questioned, and the need for certain 
flexibility and adaptation to the social and legal reality of the time was 
demanded.3 Still, the current conflict of laws system is mainly based on the 
multilateral approach, and it also includes the principle of freedom of choice of 
law by the parties, the doctrine of overriding mandatory rules, and special conflict 
                                                     
1 Kurt Siehr, ‘Private International Law, History of’ in Jürgen Basedow and others (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Private International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017); Jürgen Basedow, 
‘Private International Law, Methods of’ in Jürgen Basedow and others (eds), Encyclopedia of 
Private International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017). 
2 The multilateral method had almost completely displaced the unilateral approach by the beginning 
of the twentieth century in Europe. It is shown, for example, in the deliberations of The Hague 
Conference on Private international law, which between 1893 and 1904 adopted seven international 
Conventions. During the preparatory works of the first sessions, the adoption and predominance of 
Savigny’s conflict of laws multilateral approach became obvious (HCCH Publications, Actes et 
documents de la Première à la Septième sesión (1952)). Doctrine, case law and codifications of PIL 
in Europe followed in its majority the multilateral method since the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth century. Max Gutzwiller, ‘Le Développement Historique Du Droit 
International Privé’, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, The Hague 
Academy of International Law, vol 29 (1929); Max Gutzwiller, Der Einfluss Savignys Auf Die 
Entwicklung Des Internationalprivatrechts (1923); Boris Nolde, ‘La Codification Du Droit 
International Privé’, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, The Hague 
Academy of International Law, vol 55 (1936).  
3 Julio González Campos, ‘El Paradigma de La Norma de Conflicto Multilateral’, Estudios 
Jurídicos en Homenaje al Profesor Aurelio Menéndez, vol 4 (Civitas 1996) 5239–5242; Pierre 
Mayer, ‘Le Mouvement Des Idées Dans Le Droit Des Conflits de Lois’ [1985] Droits 129; Bernard 
Audit, ‘Le Caractère Fonctionel de La Regle de Conlit’ (1984) 186 Recueil des Cours 219. 
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rules that provide special connecting factors for weaker contracting parties and 
protect them to a certain point from the risks of party autonomy.4  
After the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), 
Europeanisation of PIL has enormously intensified, and the numerous legislative 
acts enacted proof the importance acquired by PIL in the last two decades in the 
European Union (EU), contrasting with the opposite situation of the previous 
years. Regarding conflict of laws in contractual obligations, the first instrument 
unifying them was the 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations5, then replaced by the Rome I Regulation on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations6, which is now in force. However, while 
conflict of laws in contractual obligations is already regulated by the Rome I 
Regulation, including some special rules for consumer and employment 
contracts, some EU directives dealing with substantive matters include some 
rules that have implications for PIL and have a unilateral conflict of laws basis. 
The different approaches taken by the different conflict rules in these areas make 
the system incoherent. Should the EU directives provide for their own criteria of 
applicability in a unilateral manner or are the current conflict rules sufficient and 
adequate? 
In the context of the EU, there are intra-EU situations, within the Member 
States, and extra-EU cases, which involve elements from one or more non-
Member States. EU law is concerned with whether rules might impose a 
restriction or disadvantages to the internal market, while PIL traditionally serves 
international legal transactions in a wider manner and not just in the intra-EU 
context.7 The multilateral conflict of laws system was originally based on the 
equality of all legal systems.8 It makes sense that when different legal systems 
share common legal values, or even common standards, like in the case of the EU 
Member States, conflict of laws rules should promote the equality between these 
different national legal systems. 9 However, when legal systems do not share 
                                                     
4 Mathijs H Ten Wolde and Kirsten C Henckel, European Private International Law- A 
Comparative Perspective on Contracts, Torts and Corporations (Hephaestus Publishers 2012) 12–
26. 
5 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of the 19 June 1980 [1980] OJ 
L266/1, consolidated version [1998] OJ C27/34. 
6 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6. 
7 However, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which gave the EU the legislative 
competence regarding PIL (see below in this Chapter 4.2), EU PIL also serves the EU purposes, 
and does not necessarily have to follow the same logic than traditional national PIL rules. Cristina 
González Beilfuss, ‘Relaciones E Interacciones Entre Derecho Comunitario, Derecho Internacional 
Privado Y Derecho de Familia Europeo En La Construcción de Un Espacio Judicial Común’ (2004) 
4 Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional Privado 117, 118.  
8 K Boele-Woelki, Carla Joustra and Gert Steenhoff, ‘Dutch Private International Law at the End 
of the 20th Century: Pluralism of Methods’ [1998] Netherlands reports to the fifteenth international 
congress of comparative law (Conference report) 203, 205. 
9 See the ‘scale of Ten Wolde’ in MH Ten Wolde, ‘The Relativity of Legal Positions in Cross-
Border Situations: The Foundations of Private Interregional Law, Private Intra-Community Law 
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similar legal values, and important interests are at stake, such as consumer or 
employee protection, the situation is different. In this context, the case where a 
French consumer contracts with a German principal (intra-EU situation) can be 
considered different than a French consumer contracting with a Puerto Rican 
principal (extra-EU situation), as the latter situation faces the risk of non-
application of European standards that normally –in its own market- would be 
applicable to a consumer in this case. Thus, conflict rules, when regulating these 
type of situations, should be consistent and aware of the different risks for the 
protected weaker parties and correct functioning of the internal market. They 
should have as purpose legal certainty and predictability of connection, respect 
the legitimate expectations of the parties, together with finding the appropriate 
solution to the particular situation.10 
In this context, this research aims at analysing the coherence between EU PIL, 
in particular the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations, and EU secondary law instruments harmonising conditions regarding 
consumer, employment and other weaker parties’ contracts. 
 
1. Research questions 
The primary focus of this research concerns the interaction between EU private 
international law (EU PIL) -specifically conflict of laws rules- and EU secondary 
law regarding weaker contracting parties. In the last years, the relationship 
between private international law (PIL) and European Union law (EU law) has 
received a significant amount of attention by scholars.11 The rationale behind 
these two areas of law differs: while EU law is concerned with maintaining and 
developing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, for which the proper and 
                                                     
and Private International Law’, A Commitment to Private International Law – Essays in honour of 
Hans van Loon. (Intersentia 2013) 574–576. 
10 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (3rd edn, Elgar European Law 2014) 289,290; Richard 
Plender and Michael Wilderspin, The European Private International Law of Obligations (4th edn, 
Sweet&Maxwell 2015) 35; Pedro De Miguel Asensio, ‘Conflictos de Leyes E Integración Jurídica: 
Estados Unidos Y Unión Europea’ (2005) 5 Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional Privado 43, 
82,83. 
11 For example: Olivier Remien, ‘European Private International Law, the European Community 
and Its Emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 
53; Stéphanie Francq, L’Applicabilité Du Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au Regard Des Méthodes 
Du Droit International Privé (Bruylant 2005); Jürgen Basedow, ‘European Private International 
Law of Obligations and Internal Market Legislation- A Matter of Coordination’, Erauw, J., 
Tomljenovic V. and Volken P. (eds.), Liber Memorialis Peter Sarcevic- Universalism, Tradition 
and the Individual (sellier european law publishers 2006); Jan-Jaap Kuipers, EU Law and Private 
International Law: The Interrelationship in Contractual Obligations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2012); Xandra E Kramer, ‘The Interaction between Rome I and Mandatory EU Private Rules- EPIL 
and EPL: Communicating Vessels?’ in Peter Stone and Youseph Farah (eds), Research Handbook 
on EU Private International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015); Benjamin Mathieu, Directives 
Européennes et Conflits de Lois (LGDJ lextenso éditions 2015). 
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effective functioning of the internal market is essential, PIL is, in principle, not 
concerned with EU law objectives or substantive aims.12 Under the traditional 
PIL system in Europe, conflict rules generally focus on the centre of the legal 
relationship and, in the case of contractual relationships, generally designate the 
law most closely connected to the contract. This is, conflict rules will point to that 
law regardless that is the law of the forum, the law of a Member State or a foreign 
law.13 Despite the different rationales, in order to achieve the EU objectives, EU 
PIL and EU law shall be in harmony.  
On the one hand, weaker party protection, specially consumer and employee 
protection, is essential for the EU internal market, both at a social and economic 
level. The EU has enacted numerous secondary law instruments, principally 
directives, providing for substantive rules regarding consumer and employment 
contracts, as well as regarding other contracts involving weaker parties 
(insurance, agency, etc.). On the other hand, conflict of laws rules determine the 
law applicable to a legal relationship in a cross-border situation; in this case, they 
would determine the law applicable to a cross-border consumer contract or cross-
border employment contract. If as a result of the operation of the conflict rules a 
non-EU law is applicable, the substantive protective rules of the EU directives 
are not applied. Therefore, both areas of law must be coordinated.  
Thus, the main question of this research is whether EU conflict rules and EU 
secondary law are well coordinated regarding the protection of weaker 
contracting parties and, if not, how could they achieve a mutual understanding. 
As a result of this main enquiry, several other questions arise: 
(1) How do traditional principles of conflict of laws relate to the requirements 
of the internal market for the realisation of the EU objectives regarding the 
protection of weaker parties such as employees, consumers, etc.?  
The modern European PIL system is mainly based on the Savignian multilateral 
conflict of laws approach, which consists in designating the applicable law 
through objective connecting factors based on the legal relationship, regardless 
whether it is the law of the forum or a foreign law. The original Savignian model 
has been revised, methodological purity has been rejected and numerous criteria 
and principles have been added, such as the weaker party protection principle or 
                                                     
12 Kuipers (n 11) 10,11. Title V of the TFEU is devoted to the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, for which judicial cooperation in civil matters (art. 81 TFEU) is an essential part of. In this 
regard, see below 4.2.  
13 The traditional multilateral PIL approach is characterised by the neutral and rigid multilateral 
conflict rule that relates the abstract legal relationship to the law more closely connected. However, 
during the last third of the twentieth century, new adjustments in relation with material objectives 
–such as the protection of weaker contracting parties, among others- were included in order to adapt 
the traditional approach to the new needs and interests of the society and the state. Rafael Arenas 
García, ‘El Derecho Internacional Privado (DIPr) Y El Estado En La Era de La Globalización: La 
Vuelta a Los Orígenes’ [2008] Cursos de derecho internacional y relaciones internacionales de 
Vitoria-Gasteiz 19, 88.  
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the doctrine of overriding mandatory rules, but it is still the basis of our conflicts 
method in Europe.14 The Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations, which is the unified EU PIL instrument containing conflict rules to 
determine the law applicable to contracts, is mainly based on the multilateral 
conflict of laws approach.  
The influence of the Europeanisation process on PIL is relevant. With the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 the European Community acquired a 
comprehensive competence in the area of judicial cooperation in civil matters, 
including the adoption of several measures in order to promote the compatibility 
of the rules applicable in the Member States in relation with conflict of laws and 
jurisdiction. A step further was taken with the Treaty of Lisbon which in its Title 
IV, with the heading ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, allows the EU to 
act in the area of judicial cooperation in civil measures, in particular, when 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market (art. 81 TFEU). EU PIL 
cannot be seen anymore as an area outside the European legal system, and 
regardless the former tension between PIL and EU Law, they should be in 
accordance with the same objectives towards market integration. The reason 
underlying the use of the current PIL method and its adequacy for both intra-EU 
and extra-EU situations shall be studied.15 
Essential for the purposes of this research is the party autonomy principle in 
PIL, or freedom of choice of law. The principle of party autonomy is uncontested 
in the area of contractual obligations and is one of the cornerstones of the Rome 
I Regulation (recital 11 Rome I), but it is also acknowledged that the freedom of 
choice of law requires regulation, especially when it works to the detriment of 
one of the parties to the contract, like a consumer or an employee.16 EU directives 
concerning contracts involving weaker parties mainly aim at protecting private 
interests; however, it is arguable that, in some cases and up to certain extent, 
public interests are also at stake (e.g. ensuring undistorted competition). The 
Rome I Regulation ensures the application of overriding mandatory provisions, 
which are those aimed at protecting public interests, regardless the law applicable 
to the contract. This is the existent unilateral inroad in the multilateral system of 
                                                     
14 Ten Wolde and Henckel (n 4) 9–11. 
15 This topic is discussed in several occasions during this study, such as in Chapter IV.2 and 3, or 
Chapter V.2, leading to a general discussion and conclusion in Chapter VII. 
16 Recital 11 Rome I recognises that “(t)he parties' freedom to choose the applicable law should be 
one of the cornerstones of the system of conflict-of-law rules in matters of contractual obligations”. 
Regarding party autonomy in the Rome I Regulation: Helmut Heiss, ‘Party Autonomy’ in Franco 
Ferrari and Stefan Leible (eds), Rome I Regulation: The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
in Europe (european law publishers 2009); Symeon C Symeonides, ‘Party Autonomy in Rome I 
and Rome II from a Comparative Perspective’ in K Boele-Woelki, T Einhorn and S Symeonides 
(eds), Convergence and Divergence in Private International Law- Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr 
(Eleven International Publishing 2010); Felix Maultzsch, ‘Party Autonomy in European Private 
International Law: Uniform Principle or Context-Dependent Instrument?’ (2016) 12 Journal of 
Private International Law 466; Alex Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2018). 
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the Rome I Regulation and biggest limit to party autonomy. However, there is a 
large debate as to whether rules protecting weaker parties –including those 
deriving from EU directives- can fall under the definition of overriding 
mandatory rules, threatening the principle of party autonomy.17 
 
(2) When and how should PIL ensure the applicability of EU directives on 
weaker party protection? 
The introduction of a new body of law such as EU law brings back basic PIL 
questions, such as when should a EU consumer or employment directive be 
applicable in an international situation, or whether the existent multilateral 
conflict rules are adequate to determine its applicability. Directives are not 
directly applicable, but need to be implemented into the national law of the 
Member States. In the majority of the cases, directives are minimum harmonising 
directives, which means that they set minimum standards that Member States can 
choose to improve when implementing them into their national law. As a result, 
there is a minimum EU common standard set by the directive that all Member 
States respect, and still different standards among Member States, since they can 
improve the minimum. From a EU point of view, it can be distinguished between 
intra-EU situations, where the situation is only connected with Member States, 
and extra-EU situations, where the situation is not only connected with the EU 
but also with some third country or countries.18 It is in the latter situation where 
it should be determined when and how should PIL ensure the international 
applicability of a specific directive. It is in this specific regard where EU law and 
PIL seem to have not reached an understanding. On the one hand, according to 
our current PIL understanding, the Rome I Regulation determines the law 
applicable to a contract in a cross-border situation; if this law is the law of a 
Member State, the protection of the relevant directive is applicable as 
implemented by the law of that Member State. On the other hand, some EU 
directives –specially the second generation of EU consumer directives- include a 
so-called scope rule that interferes with PIL. Scope rules generally provide for 
the application of the protection provided by the directive when the situation is 
closely connected with the EU. The technique used by these rules affects PIL 
because they seem to adhere to a unilateral PIL approach to determine the 
applicability of the directive by determining the applicability of the instrument 
without referring to foreign law, clashing with the multilateral nature of the Rome 
I Regulation. In addition, the existence of scope rules spread around directives 
disrupts the aim of unifying conflict of laws of the different Member States 
                                                     
17 This topic will be object of discussion during this book, and it is specifically addressed in Chapter 
III.3.1. 
18 Ten Wolde, ‘The Relativity of Legal Positions in Cross-Border Situations: The Foundations of 
Private Interregional Law, Private Intra-Community Law and Private International Law’ (n 9) 577–
579; Kuipers (n 11) 222. 
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regarding contractual obligations in one instrument –the Rome I Regulation–.  
Moreover, these rules refer to the application of the directive and not national 
law, but Member States have to implement these rules into their national 
legislation; the broad drafting of scope rules gives place to different 
interpretations when implementing these rules among the national laws of the 
Member States, adding more uncertainty to the situation.19 Finally, not all 
directives contain scope rules, but some are silent about their applicability and 
others refer to the Rome I Regulation. While many PIL scholars defend that the 
application of the directives should depend on the operation of the Rome I 
Regulation, the fact that certain directives intend to cover a broader scope of 
application should be taken into account to consider whether the current drafting 
of the existent conflict rules needs to be more EU-focused. 
 
(3) Are the current EU PIL conflict of laws rules and PIL method adequate 
to ensure the EU objectives regarding weaker contracting parties, or is there 
a call for a different PIL method? 
Under a PIL multilateral approach, a consumer contract between a Dutch 
consumer and a German professional is not different than a consumer contract 
between a Dutch consumer and a Brazilian professional. However, from the point 
of view of EU law, the situations completely differ from each other: while in the 
first case the application of the EU standards is generally ensured, in the second 
case there is the possibility that the EU standards are not applied when the EU 
intended to, disrupting the well-functioning of the internal market. The Rome I 
Regulation provides for mechanisms on weaker party protection, especially 
regarding consumer and employment contracts, which are governed by special 
provisions. However, they are considered in some cases insufficient to ensure the 
applicability of EU mandatory provisions contained in directives. While the 
doctrine of overriding mandatory rules has been defended for those cases, it is 
questionable and dangerous to generalise the use of overriding mandatory rules 
as a mechanism to ensure the application of provisions deriving from EU 
directives protecting weaker parties. Such general use would jeopardise the 
current PIL system. A balance and mutual understanding between all the interests 
and principles involved, both from PIL and EU law, is necessary, taking into 
account the PIL values, the need of protection of weaker contracting parties and 
the special needs of the internal market. In this regard, it has to be noticed that 
regarding the PIL method, methodological purity (i.e. purely multilateral method 
                                                     
19 The problematic around the existence of scope rules in directives is discussed in detail in the 
context of EU consumer directives in Chapter IV.1. 
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or unilateral method) is not realistic nor desirable; no contemporary conflict of 
laws system is purely multilateral or purely unilateral.20 
 
2. Research method(s) 
The present research does not make use of a singular research method, but, in 
order to fully achieve the research aims, several approaches are used. This is, a 
mixed methodology is used, essential to discern the proposed research questions 
involving issues of private international law, EU secondary law and substantive 
matters.  
The main approach used for this research is the so-called ‘black-letter 
approach’, consisting on the study of laws, case law and academic writings. This 
is considered the traditional method followed in legal research.21 Indeed, in order 
to analyse and understand the questions at hand, a thorough study of the legal 
instruments involved, the case law derived from them and the ongoing academic 
commentaries and debates regarding those is necessary. Specially, the rules, case 
law and academic writings regarding the Rome I Regulation and the EU 
directives regarding weaker contracting parties are object of deep analysis. 
Regarding the latter, instead of an individual analysis of the applicability of each 
of the directives involved, a cross-sectional analysis is generally followed. In 
most of the cases, a case-by-case study is not necessary for this research, despite 
the fact that this technique can be less specific with the diversity of the areas 
covered by the directives. In order to avoid repetition, only when the differences 
are meaningful for this study these are explained and, when necessary, specific 
directives are analysed independently. However, generalisation is justified since 
the purpose is to find a common pattern among EU secondary law and research 
is conducted from a PIL perspective.  
A legal historical method is also essential for this study, since it allows a full 
understanding of the history, nature and objectives of the current provisions, 
which is crucial to understand the possible problems and propose new solutions. 
In this study, in order to understand the current conflict of laws method and its 
adequacy to the present legal scenario, the historical development of PIL theory 
and methods is analysed. The historical development of the Rome I Regulation 
and some EU directives also prove relevant for this research in order to assess the 
existent rules and envisage possible future developments.  
To a lesser extent, a comparative legal method is also used. This approach is 
inherent to the field of PIL. PIL deals with cross-border situations and lies on the 
basis of legal diversity between different national laws. Although the Rome I 
                                                     
20 Symeon C Symeonides, ‘Accommodative Unilateralism as a Starting Premise in Choice of Law’ 
in H Rasmussen-Bonne and others (eds), Balancing of Interests: Liber Amicorum Peter Hay 
(Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft GmbH 2005) 433–434. 
21 Chris Ashford and Jessica Guth, The Legal Academics Handbook (Palgrave 2016) 135. 
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Regulation unifies the conflict rules on contractual obligations in the EU, and EU 
directives harmonise substantive law, the latter allow for differences between the 
national laws of the Member States. In addition, this research also takes into 
account extra-EU situations. In order to stress the need of coordination at a 
conflict of laws level in the protection of weaker parties in the EU, comparison is 
made between the laws of Member States and, in some occasions, reference to 
laws of non-Member States is also made. These comparisons, more than 
consisting on an extensive substantive study of the laws, consist more on specific 
examples on specific areas showing the existent disparities and the incoordination 
caused by the current situation object of study.  
 
3. Structure of the Book 
In order to analyse the coordination between EU PIL and EU secondary law on 
the protection of weaker contracting parties, this Book is divided in seven 
chapters: 
 The first chapter, which is the current chapter, provides an introduction to the 
research topic, research questions and research methods, addressing the objective 
and importance of this research. Also, this chapter contains an overview of the 
historical evolution of PIL theory and methods, and of the current context of EU 
PIL, in order to better understand the inconsistencies concerning conflict of laws 
and the protection of weaker contracting parties in the EU. 
The second chapter includes an analysis of the rationale behind weaker party 
protection in EU PIL. First, it is necessary to identify which are those referred to 
as ‘weaker contracting parties’ in the context of PIL, and then explain why are 
they in need of special protection in substantive law and PIL. After, it will be 
argued why ordinary traditional conflict rules do not respond to the specialities 
of contracts involving weaker parties, which are principally consumer contracts 
and individual employment contracts. In this regard, the importance of the 
principle of party autonomy will be highlighted, as well as the need to limit such 
a principle in order to prevent an eventual abuse from ‘stronger’ counterparties. 
The need for special connecting factors in conflict rules dealing with these special 
contracts is also explained. In addition, a comparison of the existing possible 
mechanisms of protection of weaker parties in PIL is conducted, discussing the 
different manners legal systems have in order to deal with party autonomy and 
special connecting factors regarding weaker contracting parties. Finally, the role 
of the EU regarding consumer and employee protection is studied to the extent 
that it affects the current EU PIL rules. 
The third chapter focuses on the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations and its mechanisms of protection of consumers and 
employees. The provisions that determine the law applicable to consumer 
contracts (article 6 Rome I) and employment contracts (article 8 Rome I) are 
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object of analysis, as well as the relevant case law. Moreover, the mechanism of 
overriding mandatory rules (article 9 Rome I) is examined. Relevant questions 
such as whether overriding mandatory rules can be used as a mechanism of 
protection of weaker contracting parties, or whether, as a result, the rules deriving 
from the EU consumer and employment directives can be considered as having 
overriding mandatory character, will be analysed. In addition, the provision 
introduced in order to avoid the circumvention of application of EU mandatory 
law by a choice of law of a third country law (article 3(4) Rome I) will also be 
studied. 
The fourth chapter deals with the relationship and coordination between the 
EU consumer directives and the Rome I Regulation. In order to do that, the 
existent inconsistencies and gaps regarding the interaction between EU consumer 
directives and the Rome I Regulation are described. Then, intra-EU conflicts of 
laws between Member States in relation with the implementation of the EU 
consumer directives are discussed, to later focus on EU consumer directives and 
extra-EU conflicts of law, especially referring to the international scope of the 
EU consumer directives in PIL terms. This Chapter aims at answering how to 
achieve a better consumer protection in the EU while respecting PIL values. The 
available PIL methods and their convenience are discussed. 
Similarly, the fifth chapter focuses on the relationship and coordination 
between the EU employment directives and the Rome I Regulation. A similar 
analysis to the previous chapter regarding the scope of application of the 
directives in the context of the current EU PIL is conducted. This chapter will 
focus on the Acquired Rights Directive, which contains a ‘scope rule’ similarly 
to some of the EU consumer directives. In addition, it will deal with the law 
applicable to employment contracts in the context of a temporary posting of 
workers. The Posted Workers Directive will be analysed, in relation to which 
overriding mandatory provisions play an important role. Again, the available PIL 
methods and their convenience are discussed. 
The sixth chapter examines which is the situation regarding other weaker 
contracting parties and the Rome I Regulation. To a lesser extent than regarding 
consumers and employees, EU PIL, and specifically the Rome I Regulation, 
extends the protection to passengers and some insurance policyholders. In 
addition, other contractual parties can often have a weaker contracting position 
in their contract (such as franchisees, distributors or commercial agents). This 
Chapter aims to analyse the interaction between special (and less protective) 
conflict rules and general conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation with the EU 
secondary law instruments that contain mandatory provisions protecting weaker 
parties other than consumers and employees.  
Finally, a seventh chapter includes the reflexions and conclusions resulting 
from this research. 
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4. History and evolution of EU PIL  
This section intends to provide the historical and current context regarding 
European private international law in order to better understand the 
inconsistencies concerning conflict of laws and the protection of weaker 
contracting parties in the EU. The interaction of conflict of laws rules and EU 
law, and the adaptation of the traditional approaches of PIL to the internal market 
requirements for the realisation of the EU objectives (especially regarding the 
protection of weaker parties such as employees, consumers…), are a difficult 
task. Thus, in order to understand the existing gaps and contradictions in the 
current conflict of laws system that this study aims to point out, the analysis of 
the historical circumstances and reasoning surrounding the different approaches 
to solve conflicts of laws developed through the history becomes of essential 
importance, together with the Europeanisation process that took place during the 
last decades and has a tremendous impact on the current development of PIL in 
Europe. 
Through the history, several methods and a rich accumulation of ideas were 
developed, which are still of importance in the current theory and practice. 
Among other theories, the main conflict of laws approaches are the unilateral 
approach (which consists in determining the spatial reach of the local rules to 
determine their applicability) and the multilateral approach (which consists in 
designating the applicable law to a cross-border transaction through objective 
connecting factors based on an abstract legal relationship, regardless whether the 
law designated is the law of the forum or a foreign law). These methods have in 
common that they determine the applicability of a particular law, although they 
completely differ in their point of departure. A third method would be the 
substantivist method, which would consist in creating a specific set of substantive 
rules to deal with cross-border situations, but the main discussion in Europe is 
among the unilateral and multilateral method, since our understanding of conflict 
of laws is mainly based on the idea of determining an applicable law.22 
The modern European PIL system, regarding conflict of laws or applicable 
law, is principally based on a multilateral conflict of laws approach. The current 
approach to PIL in Europe is referred to as “eclectic method” or 
“methodpluralism”, as a consequence of the different doctrines and principles 
that live together with the multilateral approach developed by Savigny, such as 
the principle of party autonomy or freedom of choice of law, the principle of 
                                                     
22 Giesela Rühl, ‘Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective’ (2006) 24 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 801; Basedow, ‘Private International Law, Methods of’ (n 
1) 1401–1407. 
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protection of structural weaker parties such as consumers or employees, the 
doctrine of overriding mandatory rules, etc.23  
Each method developed through history has its advantages and its downsides. 
A unilateral approach, that determines the reach of the national substantive law, 
is condemned to be a forum-centred approach. Furthermore, the main 
disadvantage is that the result can be that the laws of more than one state claim 
application, or none of them do. However, being a forum-centred approach, it 
would ease the task of the judge, who would deal less often with unfamiliar 
foreign laws. On the other hand, the multilateral approach requires a choice 
between the different state laws by connecting the legal relationship to the law of 
a state according with objective criteria. With this approach, equality between the 
forum law and foreign law is promoted, as well as predictability and respect for 
the expectations of the parties involved. This approach aims to achieve uniformity 
of results. However, a system completely based on value-free conflict rules is not 
always sufficient in order to protect certain values essential for the forum. 
Therefore, an idea of the evolution of the conflict of laws methods through history 
becomes necessary in order to understand the rationale underlying the current 
European conflict of laws system and its problems. Although mainly based on a 
multilateral approach, conflict of laws in Europe has and needs some unilateral 
inroads.24 
On the other hand, the creation of the EU has had a tremendous impact on the 
conflict rules of the Member States, to the point that most of our PIL is EU PIL 
(i.e. it is harmonised by different European regulations). The relationship 
between EU law and PIL had endured a difficult start, even though it would seem 
expectable a major interest of the EU in PIL taking into account the problems that 
might derive from the diversity among the different national laws in respect of 
the functioning of the internal market. However, during the last years, PIL has 
acquired a major importance in the EU legislation, and many regulations have 
been passed. Nevertheless, the EU PIL regime might result inconsistent due to 
the inconstant process of Europenisation. PIL has been developed in the EU first 
in the form of conventions, and then in regulations, directives and case law; 
furthermore, some EU instruments that primarily deal with substantive law also 
contain conflict rules. Moreover, the interaction of conflict of laws rules and EU 
law is a difficult task, considering that while EU law is concerned with whether 
rules might impose disadvantages to the internal market, and thus aiming to 
protect it, the traditional approach of conflict of laws was only concerned with 
finding the “seat” of the abstract legal relationship in order to apply the law of 
                                                     
23 Ten Wolde and Henckel (n 4) 12–26; Boele-Woelki, Joustra and Steenhoff (n 8); Jean-Michel 
Jacquet, ‘La Aplicación de Las Leyes de Policía En Materia de Contratos Internacionales’ (2010) 
10 Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional Privado 35, 36. 
24 It can be advanced here that multilateral rules are not always suited, for instance, for those parts 
of a legal system characterised by the growing regulatory ambitions of contemporary welfare states. 
Basedow, ‘Private International Law, Methods of’ (n 1).  
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the place most closely connected to the case, and thus considering all legal 
systems as equal. Therefore, the struggling of the EU legislator to deal with PIL 
issues can also be result of the different starting points PIL and EU law have. 
This section aims to provide the background reasoning necessary to 
understand the current inconsistencies in the EU legislation regarding the 
coordination between conflict of laws and protection of weaker contracting 
parties, which will be object of study in the following chapters. In order to do 
that, first, an overview of the historical evolution of PIL methods in Europe is 
provided. It has to be kept in mind that the evolution of PIL and the different 
theories developed are very closely related to the developments and changes in 
the political and legal organisation in Europe, and, when relevant, references are 
made to the historical context in which the theories are developed.25 Second, the 
process of Europeanisation of PIL is described. 
 
4.1. Historical evolution of the Private International 
Law method 
Why, when and how should foreign law be applied? Which method is more 
adequate to serve the aims that private international law pursues? And which are 
those aims? Through the history, scholars have developed and defended different 
systems aimed to solve conflicts problems. The main theories of private 
international law have aspired to give answer to those questions by laying down 
different criteria in order to determine the law applicable to an international 
dispute: 
 
4.1.1. A brief reference to conflict of laws before the twelfth century 
Conflict of laws, as we understand it nowadays, originated in the twelfth century 
in Northern Italy. However, in earlier times, when states were developed enough 
to have a legal system and relate with other societies with other legal systems, 
conflict of laws problems must have existed, and thus some solutions to them. 
Although the historical record is incomplete and not clear enough, some authors 
defend the conflict problem was already addressed in Greece.26 An existing 
evidence is, for instance, a decree issued in Hellenistic Egypt circa 120 B.C. 
which read that when contracts were written in Greek, Greek courts would have 
jurisdiction and Greek law would be applicable, and when contracts were written 
in Egyptian, Egyptian courts would have jurisdiction and Egyptian law would 
                                                     
25 Arenas García, ‘El Derecho Internacional Privado (DIPr) Y El Estado En La Era de La 
Globalización: La Vuelta a Los Orígenes’ (n 13) 23. 
26 In this opinion: Symeon C Symeonides, Choice of Law (Oxford University Press 2016) 47. Also, 
Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 6, 
citing Vinogradoff. 
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apply.27 Some even consider this ancient rule as an implicit manner of recognising 
party autonomy, as parties could choose the court and applicable law just by 
choosing the language of the contract; however, some maintain that the decree 
would have just been inspired by political reasons, to give Egyptian tribunals 
some business.28 It is curious how they addressed the jurisdiction and applicable 
law problems in the same rule. 
Regarding Roman law, only few references to foreign law can be found in it, 
and whether it contained actual conflict of laws rules as we understand them today 
is also very uncertain. However, they did develop a ius gentium that dealt with 
multistate disputes, as well as special tribunals. Roman law designated a special 
official (praetor peregrinus) to deal with litigation over disputes involving 
foreign citizens, but did not refer to the question of which law should govern these 
disputes. As the ius civile was only applicable to Roman citizens, the praetor 
peregrinus developed a body of law to deal with these foreign cases: the ius 
gentium. Thus, instead choosing among the different laws related to the case, they 
created a body of substantive law applicable to disputes involving non- Roman 
citizens. Afterwards in history, this substantivist method has been rejected, and 
the understanding of the subject of conflict of laws has led to the conclusion that 
the only manner to solve a multistate problem is to select one of the involved laws 
as applicable.29 
The ius gentium was eventually incorporated within the ius civile, and they 
were both codified in the Digest of Emperor Justinian in the 533 A.D. It has to be 
noticed that by that time much of the commerce and trading world was part of the 
Roman Empire, and Roman law already granted citizenship to most of its 
inhabitants; therefore, it seems that, as legal relations between citizens and 
foreigners did not seem frequent, there was no need for conflict of laws 
provisions, which are indeed absent in the Corpus Juris of Justinian.30 
 
                                                     
27 Symeonides, Choice of Law (n 26) 47; Hessel E Yntema, ‘The Historic Bases of Private 
International Law’ (1953) 2 The American Journal of Comparative Law 297, 300,301. 
28 See for this discussion Juenger (n 26) 8. 
29 Since the early stages of conflict of laws, the study has been focused on the determination of the 
applicability of an existing law, and through the centuries it was not considered the possibility of 
creating a substantive body of law with special rules for international disputes. However, in the 
twentieth century, several authors, especially American authors, revived this possibility. Among 
them, we can highlight Friedrich K. Juenger's ‘best law’ approach: he considered that courts should 
not decide between the application of existing laws, but rather aim for the application of the best 
law. In order to do that, he argued that courts should have the right to an ad hoc construction of 
new substantive rules especially designed for international cases, as national law was not suitable 
for dealing with international issues. See Juenger (n 26). 
30 An exhaustive study of conflict of laws in Ancient Greece and Rome is contained in: Hans 
Lewald, Conflits de Lois Dans Le Monde Grec et Romain (Athene: Zacharopoulos, 1946). See also 
Miguel Gardeñes Santiago, ‘Reflexiones Sobre Los Orígenes Históricos Del Derecho Internacional 
Privado’ (2003) 3 Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional Privado 107. 
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4.1.2. The Italian School: the origin of the statutist doctrine 
The initial stages of study of conflict of laws took place in Italy in the Middle 
Ages, where two essential conditions for its development were met. First, it was 
necessary that people of different territories with different laws established legal 
relations among them, leading to a conflict of laws. Second, the interest of jurists 
and scholars in finding a solution to such conflict was also essential. During the 
twelfth and following centuries, the Italian city-states such as Milan, Venice, Pisa 
or Modena were growing in commerce, industry and, therefore, wealth, resulting 
in frequent relations among different territories. These city-states of Upper Italy 
were independent entities and enjoyed their own local laws, their statutes or 
statuta, that differed from the common Roman law and also from the statutes of 
other cities. As a result of the flourishing commerce and growing of diverse legal 
relations between the citizens of different city-states, conflicts appeared both 
between the statutes and the common Roman law, and between the different 
statutes. These conflicts needed to be solved, and called the interest of the Italian 
jurists, who were by that time reviving the study of the Roman law, carefully 
analysing the Corpus Juris of Justinian.31  
The statutes did not provide any specific term or reference from which it was 
possible to determine its applicability, and, as a result, the glossators and 
commentators of the Italian universities had the task to interpret it. First, it had to 
be considered whether the statutes that contradict the common Roman law should 
be valid and, in case they were, which would be the relation between these 
statutes and Roman law. Of course, not all the jurists agreed on their thoughts, 
although in general they rejected those statutes that contradicted the general and 
essential principles of Roman law; moreover, they considered the valid statutes 
as exceptions to the general rule.32 Second, and more important for the 
development of the statutist theory, it had to be discerned which would be the 
relation between the different statutes, how to solve these “intermunicipal” 
conflicts. For example, if a citizen from Milan concluded a contract in Venice 
with a citizen from Modena, and sued him later in Milan, it had to be discerned 
which was the law applicable to the dispute. It was rapidly rejected the idea of 
absolute territoriality, meaning that every city would impose in its jurisdiction its 
own statutes to every person and thing. A solution which favoured the commerce 
and respected the equitability of Roman law, and therefore took into account the 
possible applicability of a foreign law, was preferred. In this way, the subject of 
                                                     
31 A detailed explanation of the historical, social and political context that gave rise to the 
development of the Italian statutist theory is contained in: Armand Lainé, Introduction Au Droit 
International Privé Contenant Une Étude Historique et Critique de La Théorie Des Statuts et Des 
Rapports de Cette Théorie Avec Le Code Civil (I, Librairie Cotillon 1888) 75–77. 
32 ibid 102. 
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private international law as we understand it nowadays was born, through the 
development of the so-called theory of the statutes.33 
The authors of the Italian school took as a starting point of their theories the 
lex cunctus populus, the first terms of the title De summa Trinitate in the Justinian 
Corpus Juris, as in that period the Holy Roman Empire was still in existence and 
the Italian jurists, later known as glossators, were analysing the Corpus Juris 
word by word. As a result, and despite that it did not actually contained conflict 
rules, the glossators interpreted a passage contained in the Corpus Juris as such. 
It was in fact an imperial decree concerned with religion addressed to “all peoples 
under the empire of Our Graciousness” (cunctos populos quos nostrae clementiae 
regit imperium), that read “all peoples who are subject to our merciful sway, we 
desire them to live under that religion which the divine apostle Peter has delivered 
to the Romans” (“Cunctos populos, quos clementiae nostrae regit 
temperamentum, in tali volumus religione versari, quam divinum Petrum 
apostolum traditisse Romanis”).34 It is clear that this sentence had nothing to do 
with conflict of laws, but as the emperor referred only to the people under his 
power, it was interpreted as a limitation of his power, and thus an implicit 
delimitation of the scope of Roman law in relation to foreign law. Also, following 
the same reasoning, as the power of the emperor was limited to his subjects, the 
power to legislate of the Italian city-states was similarly limited. Accursius, in a 
gloss on the lex cunctus populus, explained that if a person from Bologna makes 
a contract in Modena he may not be adjudged according to the statutes of Modena, 
to which he is not subject, because “quos clementiae nostrae”.35 
It was Magister Aldricus, in the twelfth century, who is known to be the first 
one recognising the problem of conflict of laws in this period, assuming that to 
solve a conflict of laws it was required to choose among the competing laws. He 
then considered that the selection should favour the better and more appropriate 
law.36 Nevertheless, his successors took a different approach, taking as a starting 
point the spatial reach of the local law. In that manner, scholars began the 
discussion related to the extraterritorial application of the local statutes to citizens 
                                                     
33 It is necessary to clarify that indeed the statutes were municipal laws (or costumes) from the 
Italian cities. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted to make use of the terms “statutes” and “conflict 
between statutes” when referring to any local conflict of laws within a country. ibid 75. 
34 Codex 1.1.1. 
35 Accursius ad C.1.1.1 vo quos (Venice 1488), fol. 4va: “Argumentum quod si Bononiensis 
conveniatur Mutinae non debet iudicari secundum Statuta Mutinae quibus non subest, cum dicat: 
quos nostrae clementiae”. Nikitas Emmanuel Hatzimihail, ‘Bartolus and the Conflict of Laws’ 
(2007) 60 Revue Hellenique de Droit International 12, 13,14; Juenger (n 26) 11–13; Arthur 
Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law (Oxford University Press 1943) 11; Bernard 
Audit, Droit International Privé (6th edn, Economica 2010) 71. 
36 None of the works of Aldricus have been preserved; however, Neumayer and other historians of 
private international law identify him as the first jurist recognising the issues of a conflict of laws 
and proposing a scientific approach to it. Pietro Franzina and others, ‘Aldricus’, Encyclopedia of 
Private International Law, vol 1 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 48.  
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abroad, and the application of the forum’s laws to foreign citizens. 37 This kind of 
approach to the conflicts problem would be later known as unilateral conflict of 
laws approach. 
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the post-glossators developed the 
statutist theory, giving answer to the questions of how and when the statutes 
would apply. Great jurists and famous statutists of that period, such as Bartolus 
de Sassoferrato (1314-1367)38 and his pupil Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400), 
separated the statutes into different categories: some of them territorial or real, 
which concerned general legal relationships related with immovable property and 
were applicable within the territory; and some of them personal, which concerned 
at large legal relationships between persons and were applicable to the citizens of 
the territory wherever they were.39 It is clear thus that they focused on the reach 
of substantive rules, the root of unilateralism.  
Therefore, they used a “selective” method to solve a conflict of laws, which 
implies the choice among the competing laws, rather than creating a substantive 
body of law as the praetor peregrinus developed in Roman law.40 The selective 
method used by the statutists, as said, is a unilateral method, which determines 
whether a case falls within the scope of one law or another.41  
Bartolus insisted that it was the literal wording of the statute what would 
determine its reach, taking this approach to its extreme. An extreme example of 
Bartolus reliance on the wording of the statute is shown in his reasoning of the 
famous quaestio angelica, answering whether an English rule on primogeture 
applied to real property left outside England. The famous jurist argued that when 
English law provided “the possessions of deceased persons (Italics provided by 
author) shall pass to the firstborn”, this statute was real and therefore the lex rei 
sitae was to be applicable. However, if the words were “the firstborn (Italics 
provided by author) shall succeed”, the statute would rather be personal, and the 
law applicable would be determined by answering whether the first born was 
English or not.42 Of course, this is an extreme example that does exaggerate 
Bartolus view. Furthermore, this problem could be solved just by changing the 
                                                     
37 Juenger (n 26) 12. 
38 Bartolus ad C.1.1.1 (Venice 1602) fol. 4ra-7rb (believed to be a reliable edition of the works of 
Bartolus in 11 volumes). Hatzimihail (n 35). A complete English translation of the work of Bartolus 
on the conflict of laws can be found in: Joseph H Beale, Bartolus on the Conflict of Laws 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1914). 
39 Juenger (n 26) 14–15; Battifol and Lagarde, Droit International Privé (I, Librerie générale de 
droit et jurisprudence 1981) 261–262; Nussbaum (n 35) 12. 
40 See above 4.1.1. 
41 Much later in history, it would be introduced the multilateral method (or bilateral method as some 
authors refer to it), which determines the applicable law on the basis of the legal relationship at 
stake, by means of allocating the international legal relationship to a particular jurisdiction based 
on objective criteria. 
42 Bartolus ad C.1.1.1 (Venice 1602), fol. 4ra-7rb: Beale (n 38) 44–47; Juenger (n 26) 14; Nussbaum 
(n 35) 11. 
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interpretative method. In fact, this correction took place later by the hand of Guy 
de Coquille (1523– 1603), who proposed that the classification of statutes should 
be based on their purpose rather than their wording.43 
Furthermore, many other contributions to the subject of conflict of laws, still 
existent nowadays, are set by these early conflict jurists. An important 
classification that is said to appear chronologically first is the distinction between 
form and substance: the judge applies his own law (lex fori) in matters of form or 
procedure, and it is only the substance that can be subject to the application of a 
foreign law. This important division was first announced by Jacobus Balduini 
and then further developed and settled by Bartolus.44 
At the same time, the Italian statutists also examined the scope of application 
of local laws depending on the legal category, distinguishing between contracts, 
damages, wills, property, and other legal relationships. In fact, these distinctions, 
which we still preserve nowadays, can be considered of more importance than 
the complicated personal and real statutes categorisation.45 These medieval jurists 
also acknowledged some connecting factors really familiar in the present. For 
example, in the case of contracts, the early statutists of the Middle Ages defended 
the application of the lex loci celebrations (law of the place where the contract is 
concluded), which was justified by the fact that the acts celebrated in the territory 
were to be regulated by the law of that territory. In that period, most of the 
“international” contracts were celebrated in markets, fairs or ports, and therefore 
the place of celebration of the contract was predictable.46 However, it could also 
happen that the parties did not know previously the place of celebration. Bartolus 
introduced the application of the lex loci executionis (law of the place of 
performance); he considered that the formation and effects of the contract should 
be governed by the lex loci celebrationis and the irregular consequences of the 
contract, e.g. in case of breach of contract, should be governed by the lex loci 
executionis.47 As it can be seen, important connecting factors known nowadays 
had already their origin with the Italian statutists.  
Finally, another contribution of the Italian statutists, first developed by 
Bartolus, was the distinction between “favourable” statutes and “odious” statutes: 
in the same manner that the application of foreign rules currently can be rejected 
for reasons of public policy because of their content, the Italian jurists already 
                                                     
43 Guy de Coquille, Les Coûtumes du Païs & Comté de Nivernois, enclaves & exemptions d'iceluy, 
avec les Annotations de Maître Guy Coquille, sieur de Romenay (v. 1590).  
44 Battifol and Lagarde (n 39) 259. 
45 Lainé (n 31) 113. Indeed, to our current conflict of laws system, I consider that those distinctions 
depending on the legal category are essential. 
46 Javier Carrascosa González, ‘Contratos Internacionales, Prestación Característica Y La Teoría de 
La Stream-Of-Commerce’ in Alfonso Luis Calvo Caravaca and Blanco-Morales Limones (eds), 
Globalización y Derecho (Colex 2003) 88–91; Francisco José Grob Duhalde, ‘La Ley Aplicable a 
Los Contratos Internacionales En Ausencia de Elección de Ley Por Las Partes’ (2014) 41 Revista 
Chilena de Derecho 229, 230–232. 
47 Beale (n 38) 17–20. 
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recognised the rejection of application of certain statutes because they were 
“odious”. To illustrate this distinction with an example, we can refer again to the 
famous quaestio angelica, to which Bartolus concluded that the rule of 
primogeniture was "odious", and therefore it could not be applied 
extraterritorially to real property of an Englishman left outside England (in this 
case, in Italy).48  
Baldus and other Italian disciples and successors of Bartolus continued to 
develop and improve his theories. It is true that the works of the statutists of the 
Italian school were still obscure and confusing, with a dubious legal basis and 
even poorly developed. Yet, the remarkable accomplishments of these authors 
have to be highlighted, as they were able to develop an original method to solve 
multistate problems, and proposing solutions regarding the applicability of the 
competing laws. It cannot be much criticised the fact that, trying to base their 
theories on the authority of the elders, they filled their works with references to 
Roman law and previous authors, and following the scholastic method they 
abused of technical distinctions, divisions or sub-divisions. It is understandable 
that they could not develop a completely new theory without any roots in Roman 
law and, regardless the basis they use to justify their methods, they did an 
outstanding work.  Although highly formalistic and rigid in their analysis, typical 
of the scholastic method of that period, the Italian statutists classification of 
statutes was the first comprehensive attempt to delimit the scope of the law, and 
set the basis for the study of conflict of laws. 
To sum up, in this period the problem of conflict of laws is posed, the 
application of foreign law is acknowledged and the first conflict rules appear. In 
other words, they set the basis of conflict of laws as we understand it nowadays. 
As it has been explained above, they hit upon what we now know as unilateral 
conflict rules, which are still in use. Moreover, some authors claim that they also 
came close to multilateralism, although the multilateralist approach would have 
had to wait long in history to be successful, as the essence of the statutist method 
is the focus on the reach of substantive rules.49   
Finally, it has to be noticed that, although these authors were initially 
concerned with conflicts between local statutes, the same statutist method was 
apparently applied with respect to international conflicts, as it is shown for 
example by the aforementioned famosissima quaestio argued by Bartolus, 
involving English law versus Italian law. They assimilated therefore that inter-
territorial conflicts and extra-territorial conflicts could be solved in the same 
manner, i.e. determining the reach of their application depending on their 
classification.50 The method and the categorisations used by these authors was so 
accepted that it started to take a universal character, and there was a certain kind 
                                                     
48 Juenger (n 26) 14; Battifol and Lagarde (n 39) 263. 
49 In this regard, Juenger (n 26) 13. 
50 Siehr (n 1) 1398. 
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of uniformity on the approach legal scholars continued to solve conflict 
questions.51 Of course, the Italian school and its authors is just the place of initial 
emergence of the statutist theory, and numerous legal scholars from different 
places and periods would further develop and improve the statutist method, in a 
process that would continue up to the nineteenth century. 
 
4.1.3. The French School: statutist doctrine and territoriality of laws 
The French scholars took the lead in the conflict of laws development in the 
sixteenth century.52 As it happened in Italy in the late Middle Ages, the political 
and social scenario played a major role on this development. However, the 
situation in Upper Italy and France differed strongly: whilst in the city-states of 
Italy feudalism had disappeared, the economy in France was marked by feudal 
relations. The French provinces were still ruled by feudal lords and at the same 
time they were being integrated in a unified state (later the absolute monarchy). 
Moreover, Roman law did not enjoy the role of law in force as it did in Upper 
Italy. Even though the supremacy of the crown was established, France was 
divided in two major parts: Northern France, the pays de coutume based on 
Germanic regional customs, and Southern France, the pays de droit écrit based 
on Roman law. The law varied from province to province, and conflicts existed 
both between these two different parts and between the different regional 
customs. Furthermore, in the sixteenth century, the resentment amid the feudal 
territorial principle and the existent Italian conflicts doctrine, since in France 
feudalism had deeper roots while Roman law had less, led also to the emergence 
of the French doctrine.53 In other words, admitting the rule of a foreign 
sovereignty by accepting the application of foreign laws would have clashed with 
the meaning of feudalism, which is why the French School defended as a general 
rule the territoriality of laws.54 
As a broad overview, and setting aside for a moment the different opinions of 
the authors, the French doctrine divided the statutes in real and personal. As a 
general rule, all statutes were classified as real, with territorial scope, and the 
existence of personal statutes with extra-territorial scope was an exception. 
Furthermore, the exceptional classification of a statute as personal was based in 
an idea of justice. Indeed, not all scholars shared the same belief in this matter. 
The main of them, that is to say Charles Dumoulin (1500-1566), Bertrand 
                                                     
51 It has to be noticed, however, that this was not the only method used to solve international 
conflicts, as the flourishing trade and commerce of upper Italy also gave place to the use of a lex 
mercatoria by fair and market courts. Juenger (n 26) 16. 
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previous centuries, but their work is considered to belong within the framework of the Italian 
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53 Juenger (n 26) 16; Lainé (n 31) 287; Pavel Kalenský, Trends of Private International Law (Brill 
Archive 1971) 64. 
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D’Argentré (1519-1590) and Guy De Coquille (1523–1603), acknowledged 
different points of view. While Dumoulin continued with the theory of the 
statutes resembling the work of his Italian predecessors in a modern fashion, 
D’Argentré completed and amplified the distinction between real and personal 
statutes, and is the one defending territorialism as a fundamental principle. On his 
part, De Coquille has as main contribution the defence that the reach of a statute 
should not be based on its wording or any other random reason, but on its 
purpose.55 The achievements and theories of these authors deserve a closer look, 
which would help to understand the role of the French School in the development 
of the conflict of laws theory. 
 
(a) Charles Dumoulin (1500-1566) 
Charles Dumoulin is considered one of the important authors of the French 
doctrine, although most of his work resembles that from Bartolus and his Italian 
successors. In the same manner as the Italian glossators and post-glossators did, 
he related his conflicts reasoning with the lex cunctus populus, and distinguished, 
for example, between favourable and odious statutes like Bartolus.56 However, 
he is still considered the first representative of the French school because of his 
contribution to the general classification of real and personal statutes that would 
have later become the framework of the French conflicts system. It is true that 
this system had yet to be completed by D’Argentré, but it was initiated by 
Dumoulin’s work.  
Dumoulin elaborated an exhaustive study of the costumes in France, following 
the methods of his Italian predecessors, but his original contribution is related to 
the recognition of some statutes which application depends on the choice made 
by the parties. On a commentary on the Custom of Paris57, he referred to the will 
of the parties in order to determine the law applicable to international marriages 
according to the law of the habitual residence of the husband, rather than where 
the marriage took place. Dumoulin reasoned that the matrimonial regime should 
be regarded as a tacit contract and, in the specific case he was referring to, the 
spouses were supposed to have submitted this contract to their marital home. It 
has to be noticed that most of the authors defend that Dumoulin was just referring 
to the will of the parties as an argument to apply the law of the place of 
performance and not as an independent connecting factor as we understand it 
                                                     
55 A description of the French statutist doctrine with reference to the mentioned authors can be 
found in: Juenger (n 26) 16–19; Battifol and Lagarde (n 39) 264–266; Pierre Mayer and Vincent 
Heuzé, Droit International Privé (8th edn, Librairie générale de droit et jurisprudence 2004) 45–
48; Lainé (n 31) 269–338; Kalenský (n 53) 64–69. 
56 Juenger (n 26) 16–17; Battifol and Lagarde (n 39) 264. 
57 Charles Dumoulin, Gilles Fortin and Jean Marie Ricard, La Coustume de Paris, conférée avec 
les autres coustumes de France et expliquée par les notes de Me Charles Du Molin, Jean et René 
Guignard (eds.) (Paris 1666). 
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nowadays.58 Still, it is clear his influence on the establishment of party autonomy 
as a conflict rule for contracts, as if the law of the place of conclusion applies 
because desired by the parties, they might want to submit the legal relation to 
another law as well.59 
In any case, although Dumoulin’s work had some tendency to territorialism 
due to the feudal context in France, and apart from the contribution to the now 
known as party autonomy principle, his work was still attached to the lex cunctus 
populus and much of his writing followed Bartolus' commentary.60 
 
(b) Bertrand D’Argentré (1519-1590) 
Therefore, the true development of the French doctrine came by the hand of 
Bertrand D’Argentré. D’Argentré was a jurist from Brittany, who was keen on 
defending the power of the feudal figures against the central royal authority. This 
nobleman defended the autonomy of Brittany and its local costumes, and, as a 
result, he developed his theory based on the territoriality of the statutes. Although 
territoriality was the key of the conflicts system created by D’Argentré, he did 
not exclude completely the application of foreign laws or costumes, making it 
therefore a truthful conflict of laws system.61  
The French author opposes all theories and authors who claimed a broad 
application of the personality principle and a unified system of law; he defended, 
unlike Dumoulin, the feudal system and the juridical independence of the 
provinces, criticising the Italian authors and their scholastic method.62  
He deeply denied the intrusion of foreign elements on local costumes, as he 
shows in his classification of the statutes. On his commentary on art. 218 of the 
Collection of Legal Customs of Brittany63, he differenced between real, personal 
and mixed statutes. The majority of statutes were to be classified as real 
regardless they involved obligations, rights in rem or succession, and they would 
be applicable in the place where the thing was located (i.e. territorially). Property 
would be also governed by the law of the place where it is located (lex rei sitae). 
The existence of personal statutes was highly exceptional, and involved only 
those ones concerning persons, not including those cases regarding persons 
related with property. The latest would be regarded as mixed statutes, and were 
                                                     
58 See Pierre Mayer and Vincent Heuzé, Droit international privé (8th edn. Librairie générale de 
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also applicable territorially.64 D’Argentre summed up his theory in two main 
principles: 
 “[…] regarding the things attached to the territory, that is, the immovable 
property or inheritance, on view of the disposition or acquisition of these things 
and when located in different places, the question of which law should apply to 
them is resolved by using the most certain method: the law to follow, in each 
place, is the local law. Each place to its laws, statutes and costumes; it is necessary 
to observe them in the context of the territory and separately; immovable property 
could not be governed by other law than the territorial law. The same applies for 
contracts, the same for wills, the same for every act; nothing, regarding 
immovable property, can be decided by virtue of private autonomy or at the same 
time be judged against the law of the place where they are located. 
But it must be different regarding personal law, to which movable property 
should be attached, which is alike: people and with them their movable property, 
are governed by the law of their domicile.”65 
However, these two rules are not of equal importance; the second is 
subordinated to the first one like an exceptional rule to the principal rule. The 
principal rule corresponds to the long-established principle in France, and which 
Loisel, in his Institutions coutumières, expressed in the following terms: «les 
coutumes sont réelles» [costums are real].66 
To sum up, as a general rule, costumes were real, and in case of doubt they 
would be considered real as well. The meaning of personal statute would be 
interpreted restrictively.  His preference for the application of the lex fori also led 
to the rejection of the “tacit” will of the parties or “tacit contract” defended by 
Dumoulin. Therefore, the judge would always apply its local law with the only 
exception of those foreign local laws or costumes classified as personal, that 
would enjoy extra-territorial character.67  
Although in the moment his theory was not revolutionary in the French 
jurisprudence, it is important to highlight its later influence. D’Argentré 
understood that the normal case must be that the judge applies his own law, and 
the application of foreign law is an exception. First, it is true that the intervention 
of foreign law in a legal system might affect its coherence, and second, the judge 
is more familiar with its own law. These arguments have had, and still do, a 
persistent influence and presence in the jurisprudence regarding conflict of 
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laws.68 In the same manner, D’Argentré’s thinking would influence modern 
conflict scholars, like Wächter, who defended a forum-centred conflicts 
approach.69 
 
(c) Guy de Coquille (1523–1603) 
Finally, it is also necessary to highlight the contribution of Guy de Coquille to 
the statutist theory and to our subject, mainly collected on his commentary on the 
Coutumes de Nivernais.70 Coquille was of the opinion that French authors abused 
the territoriality principle; he did not consider territoriality as a general rule. He 
considered that his French colleagues mistakenly treated French costumes as 
Italian authors treated the Italian statutes, which was wrong because Italian 
statutes are local on the basis that Roman law is the common law of all Italian 
city-states; that is, Italy had a shared common law (ius commune) which would 
apply unless a local statute was applicable in that specific case. Nevertheless, 
French civil law was composed by both law and costumes at the same time, and 
provinces did not share such a common law.71 In fact, as Lainé points out and has 
been explained above, the abuse of the territoriality principle by the French jurists 
was in fact due more to the feudal context, but yet De Coquille noted the 
difference between those legal scenarios.72  The distinction between these 
situations is still relevant in our current legal environment (e.g. regarding 
harmonised areas of law in the EU).  
Even if De Coquille differed from the French trend regarding the generality 
of territoriality of costumes, he did not completely follow the Italian statutists 
system either. Taking features from both doctrines, he distinguished between real 
and personal statutes, and more importantly, he claimed this shall be done not 
looking at the words, style or significance, but on the basis of the presumed reason 
of those who enacted the statute or costume.73 In other words, he maintained that 
the reach of a statute can be determined by its own purpose, statement that 
represents an important advance in the statutist doctrine. 
 
4.1.4. The Dutch Doctrine: The notion of Comity 
A renewed conception of the theory of the statutes was developed in the 
Netherlands during the seventeenth century, marked again by the historical, 
economic and social circumstances of the country. After fighting for their 
liberation from Spain from 1568 until 1648, the Netherlands signed their 
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independence on the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Indeed, the spirit of 
independence and state sovereignty had its reflection on their conflict of laws 
theories. At the same time, the country was composed by different provinces, 
where different laws applied, which of course gave rise to interregional conflicts. 
Furthermore, the Netherlands was growing in commerce and wealth, and became 
to play in that period a major role in international commerce, which also gave rise 
to international conflict of laws.74 It can be noticed that, although different from 
the Italian and French context, the circumstances for the development of conflict 
theories are comparable. 
The work of D’Argentré and the French territorialism had a strong influence 
among the early Dutch authors, like Burgundus (1586-1649), Rodenburgh (1618-
1668) or Stockmans (1608-1671), but it was not until the Dutch independence 
was granted that the Dutch statutist theories were developed by the hands of 
Paulus Voet (1619-1677), Ulrich Huber (1636-1694) and Johannes Voet (1647-
1714).75 These authors also find some inspiration in the theories of D’Argentré; 
however, their work would not be confined to follow and further develop them, 
but they will give the statutist theory a new character. An important point of view 
was introduced: the idea of a universal private international law started to fade. 
From their idea of application of foreign law based on sovereignty of states and 
international comity, it followed that there are as many private international laws 
as legal systems. Thus, conflict of laws started to be seen as international instead 
of just inter-regional.76  
Another important characteristic of the Dutch doctrine came from the feeling 
and idea of independence, which led to the exaltation of the notion of state 
sovereignty. It seems that, in an international commercial and financial scenario, 
they sought to ensure the application of domestic law.77 The Dutch doctrine did 
not accept the universal character of the statutists theory, and, for the first time, 
they questioned why should the courts of a sovereign state apply a foreign law. It 
was actually in this conflictual context where the term “conflict of laws” 
(conflictu legum) was first introduced.78 But, at the same time, in an era of 
increasingly international relations the concept of strict territoriality and complete 
rejection of foreign law would lead to hinder cross-border relations.79 Therefore, 
                                                     
74 A more detailed description of the circumstances that surrounded the development of the new 
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the Dutch jurists of that time faced the question of how the principle of territorial 
sovereignty could live together with the need to acknowledge foreign law, and in 
their answers lies the specialty that defines the Dutch doctrine: the notion of 
comity. 
 
(a) Paulus Voet (1619-1677) and Johannes Voet (1647-1714): 
Paulus Voet was the first author who introduced the concept of comity.80 
Paulus Voet maintained the classification of the statutes in real, personal and 
mixed, according to their purpose rather than their wording. Having as a priority 
the concept of state sovereignty, he justified the recognition of extra-territorial 
effects of foreign statutes on the basis of comity. He suggested that the application 
of a foreign law could be accepted ex comitate; there was no legal obligation for 
a state to apply or recognise the effects of a foreign rule, but its application would 
be based on the courtesy that equal sovereign states were supposed to have with 
each other.81 Thus, states would not have the obligation to apply other state law, 
but this would be done as a gesture of good will (i.e. comity).82  
His son Johannes developed and explained further this reasoning.83 Although 
the original idea was introduced by Paulus Voet, Johannes organised and further 
developed his thoughts in an extensive and coherent manner.84 Johannes still 
classified the statutes according to their real, personal or mixed nature, following 
his predecessors, based on the objective of the statute, and defended to the 
extreme the concept of territoriality.85 On the basis of the absolute sovereignty of 
the state, foreign statutes should not have any effect on the forum state. Real 
statutes were already considered territorial, having effects on every person but 
only within the limits of the territory. However, personal statutes were considered 
as having extra-territorial effects, “following” the person to whom they are 
applicable. Johannes Voet criticised the extraterritoriality of personal statutes, 
and explained that if the real statute is empty of authority outside the territory, 
the same should happen for the personal statute, as they do not differ in their 
background since they both real and personal have authority for those who are in 
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the territory, even momentarily, and only for those in it.86 The same reasoning 
applied to mixed statutes. According to the author, inherent to the sovereignty of 
the states, the power of legislature of the states and its effects were limited to their 
own territories. Nevertheless, Johannes recognised that the unconditional 
submission to territoriality would lead in some cases to the mutual abolishment 
of legal acts from one state to another and therefore would harm the interests of 
those part of the concerned state. Still, he claimed that regardless the negative 
consequences of a strict territoriality, they would never be as serious as to require 
mandatorily the recognition of the consequences of a foreign law. The possible 
detriment caused to the subjects of the state, which is inconvenient, would 
however justify the recognition of extra-territorial effects of a foreign law in the 
basis of comitas or international courtesy, but not as a legal obligation.87 Thus, he 
defended the recognition of the effects of foreign statutes in the forum state on 
the basis of international comity, a reciprocal concession made between 
sovereign states, but to which states were not legally bound.  
 
(b) Ulrich Huber (1636-1694): 
Ulrich Huber is the most influential author of the Dutch school. He definitely 
broke with the Italian statutist tradition by leaving behind the distinction between 
real, personal and mixed statutes and building a conflict of laws system based on 
the concepts of sovereignty and comity.88 According to Huber, laws are 
territorial, and the application of a foreign law by a court is on the basis of comity 
rather than an obligation.89 In fact, the idea of comity was the cornerstone of his 
theory. The application of foreign law by the national judge is a concession, and 
it is not the result of civil law or natural law, but derives from a tacit consent of 
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sovereign nations.90 Conflict rules, according to Huber, are legally binding and 
impose the legal obligation in the state to apply foreign law.91  
Huber developed his theory in his treatise, “De Conflictu Legum Diversarum 
in Diversis Imperiis”92, comprising just ten pages. His treatise on the conflict of 
laws contained three main axioms. First, he claimed that the laws of a state bind 
all subjects to it and within the limits of the territory, and not beyond. Second, the 
subjects to the law of a state are all the persons within the limits of that 
government, regardless they live there on a temporary basis or permanently. 
These first two axioms reflect the ideas of territorialism and sovereignty. Third, 
he introduced the concept of comity, explaining that by way of comity a sovereign 
state would recognise the force of the rights acquired within the limits of a foreign 
state as long as they do not prejudice the rights or powers of the state or its 
subjects. The first two axioms reflect the ideas of territorialism and sovereignty. 
The third axiom provides that sovereign states should reciprocally allow the 
application of foreign law within their territory, unless it goes against the rights 
and powers of the country recognising that foreign law. Huber’s notion of comity 
differs from the concept developed by Paulus Voet and Johannes Voet, since, 
according to Huber, states would have a reciprocal international obligation to 
apply foreign law and comply with the conflict of laws rules, derived from the 
mutual agreement and tacit consent between nations. Therefore, the state should 
recognise the effects of foreign law on the basis of comity and it could only refuse 
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to recognise those acquired rights when these would prejudice the rights of the 
forum. 93   
It has to be recognised that, although the notion of comity has been criticised 
as vague or illusory, the theory of Huber had numerous contributions to private 
international law.94 Huber’s theory was fundamental for the development of 
conflict of laws in English and American law.95 Moreover, he also referred to 
what we now know as public policy exception when providing that the forum 
could reject the application of the rights acquired abroad when it goes against the 
rights or powers of the forum state. However, the idea that private international 
law has its basis on comity did not succeed for a long time. In Europe, that 
assuming had already started to decline before Savigny, and by the time of the 
national codifications of private law the separation between private international 
law and public international law was consolidated.96 
The Dutch theory of the statutes, which main recognition is the influence on 
the development of conflict of laws in English and American law, much more 
important than in continental Europe, did also lay down the basis for the 
understanding of the subject, since Huber was the first author providing and 
explaining that countries are legally bound to conflict rules and application of 
foreign law.97 Finally, it has to be noticed that, eventually, the ideas of state 
sovereignty and international comity, the pillars of the Dutch doctrine, brought 
into the idea that each country has its own national private international law, and 
therefore there are as many private international laws as legal systems.98  
 
4.1.5. The German authors: The end of the statutist theories. From unilateralism 
to multilateralism 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, the European continental countries followed 
the statutist theories. That one was the approach taken when dealing with conflict 
problems even in the first codifications of private law of different countries 99 
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Nevertheless, in the middle of the nineteenth century, two German authors 
changed the development of the conflict of laws approach in Europe. Although 
these two authors developed completely different views in the subject, they did 
lay away to rest the statutist doctrines and shift to the development of modern 
theories of private international law in Europe.  
(a) Wächter (1797-1880) 
During 1841 and 1842, the German jurist Carl Georg von Wächter published his 
lengthy essay in a German law journal in which he demolishes the theory of the 
statutists.100 Besides harshly criticising the statutist theories developed until the 
moment, Wächter also claimed the vested rights theory felt in a circular 
reasoning, since the recognition of the protection in the forum of rights created 
abroad according to foreign law presupposes something that has not yet been 
determined, meaning that the legal relationship has still to be judged according to 
foreign law, and not to the law of the forum. He also condemned the notion of 
comity as irrelevant in the conflict of laws solving.101 Instead, Wächter 
anticipated an ethnocentric, forum-centred approach; he proposed a unilateral 
approach based on the primacy of the lex fori.102 In his essay “On the Collision 
of Private Laws of Different States” (Über die Collision der Privatrechtsgesetze 
verschiedener Staaten) he announces the three ‘Guiding principles’ of his 
conflicts theory: 
“I. There can be no doubt that for the question which law shall apply in each 
state the state’s own law is exclusively decisive, that is, if and so far as the law of 
the own state provides for the question what law shall govern a legal relation (…) 
of course the judge must proceed accordingly. 
II. If our law does not give such a determination, an attempt must be made to 
find and establish it from the spirit of our law and from its general principles and 
the nature of the legal relation. For these are the considerations according to 
which the judge must proceed generally in the case of gaps in the law of his state. 
 III. When, however, no decision on the subject can be deduced from these 
considerations, then the general principle enters into play that, in the case of 
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doubt, the judge must apply the law of his state also to the international 
relation.”103 
The German author assumed that the judge is an instrument of the legislative 
will, and that is why, in his first principle, he claimed that the judge must follow 
the provisions of the law of the forum that expressly designate the law applicable. 
Secondly, whenever the lex fori did not expressly determine the applicable law, 
the judge should examine whether the “spirit” of the law intended to claim its 
application. And finally, when the aforementioned principles left any doubt, the 
judge should decide the law of the forum as applicable.  
It is true that in continental Europe Wächter’s conflict of laws forum-centred 
approach did not have that much influence.104 Yet, his critical discussion of the 
precedent conflict jurists’ work was of great help to Savigny in the development 
of his theory.105 Furthermore, even if his approach did not have supporters in 
Europe, it is remarkably similar to some theories developed in the twentieth 
century in the United States by the modern unilateralists, specifically to the lex 
fori approach of Albert Ehrenzweig and the interest analysis theory of Brainerd 
Currie.106 
 
(b) Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861) 
Friedrich Karl von Savigny played a definite role in the development of private 
international law in the European continent. The German jurist made his great 
contribution to the subject in the eighth and last volume of “System des Reutigen 
Römischen Rechts” (“System of Modern Roman Law”). 107 The Romanist author 
divided this volume, published in 1849, in two chapters: the first one dealing with 
conflict of laws (“Oertliche Gränzen der Herrſchaft der Rechtsregeln über die 
Rechtsverhältniſſe” -“local limits of the authority of the rules of law over legal 
relations”-)108, and the second one with inter-temporal conflicts (“Zeitliche 
Gränzen der Herrſchaft der Rechtsregeln über die Rechtsverhältniſſe” -“limits in 
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time of the authority of rules of law over legal relations”-).109 His decisive 
contribution put an end to the predominance of unilateralism and the statutist 
theories in Europe and is regarded as the basis of our current system of private 
international law. 
First of all, it has to be clarified that even though Savigny included the volume 
on conflict of laws within his work on Roman law, and defended the universal 
validity of Roman law, he did not base the application of foreign law on Roman 
law as the Italian statutists did, and he considered that conflict of laws, a subject 
of “peculiar nature”, received a really modest influence of Roman law.110 Savigny 
believed in a universal system of rules to solve conflict of laws  and this 
universality might have been the reason why he included conflict of laws within 
his work on Roman law.111  
For Savigny, the origin of law is not on the legislator but it is the product of 
the consciousness and spirit of the people.112 The origin of the law is found in the 
Volksgeist, which means the will or manifestation of the spirit of the people 
(traditions, customs, beliefs, etc.). Legal relationships are a reflection of the 
Volksgeist, which, in Germany, was the spirit of the German society, founded on 
roman and catholic heritage.113 As a result, statutes were interchangeable, being 
possible to determine the ‘seat’ of the legal relationship in question, since all 
relevant statutes would consider this relationship and its scope in similar ways.114 
To solve a conflicts problem, Savigny explained there are two modes of 
procedure. The first one would be the demarcation of the limits of the diverse 
positive laws; this is what we know by unilateral method, as it seeks to find the 
scope of the different legal rules. The second one would be to find the conflict 
rule to which a legal relation is subject; this refers to the multilateral method, as 
it answers which legal relationships do conflict rules affect.115 The German jurist 
considered that the two manners only differed in their starting point, but they both 
aimed to solve conflict problems and the solution should be the same in the two 
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cases.116 However, when developing his theory, he clearly rejected the first 
method. It is the second method which correspond with his ideas about the origin 
of law. 
In contrast to the unilateral approach and the statustists theories, Savigny took 
as a starting point the legal relationship to solve a conflict of laws situation instead 
of the legal rule. That is, he started from the legal relationship examining which 
legal norm would be accordingly applicable. In this way, in order to solve the 
conflict of laws, it would be necessary to allocate each legal relationship to the 
territory where it has its seat, or, in Savigny’s words, “to discover for every legal 
relation (case) that legal territory to which, in its proper nature, it belongs or its 
subject (in which it has its seat)”.117 According to him, this responds to an 
“international common law of nations having intercourse with one another”.118 
The common interest of nations and individuals calls for a reciprocity in dealing 
with cases, a equality when dealing with foreigners and natives.119 Thus, he based 
his system in the equality between forum law and foreign law, and explained that 
the more active the relation between nations, the more need for equality and 
reciprocity rather than sovereignty of states.120 Therefore, he considered that the 
aim of private international law rules should be to achieve ‘international 
uniformity of results’: no matter the forum where a case is adjudicated, the result 
should be the same, because if all countries adopted the same principles, then 
international uniformity of result would be ensured.121 As it can be seen, he 
clearly rejected the unilateralist method of the statutists and the forum-centred 
approach proposed by Wächter.  
However, Savigny did recognise that the equality between forum law and 
foreign law had to be limited in certain cases due to the peculiar nature of the law 
in question. In this regard, he recognised two classes of exceptions. The first 
exception concerns “laws of a strictly positive, imperative nature which are 
consequently inconsistent with that freedom of application which pays no regard 
to the limits of particular states” (a similar concept to what we now know as 
overriding mandatory rules).122 According to Savigny, these type of rules were 
absolute rules involving moral grounds or public interests such as politics, police 
or political economy, and that is the reason why they conform an exception to the 
multilateral method.123 Therefore, in these cases, the question was not which rule 
is applicable to a certain legal relationship, but rather whether a legal rule of the 
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forum law should be applicable to a case involving foreign elements where 
foreign law is applicable. The second exception to multilateralism that Savigny 
recognised refers to the public order exception (“legal institutions of a foreign 
state, of which the existence is not at all recognised in ours, and which, therefore, 
have no claim to the protection of our courts”).124 Those legal institutions were 
not legally valid in the forum country, and he referred to slavery as a clear 
example.125 
Furthermore, it has to be noticed at this point that Savigny considered the 
formula of ascertaining the seat of every legal relation both applicable for inter-
state conflicts and international conflicts.126 As a result of the equality in the 
treatment between the law of the forum with foreign law, resulting from the 
common interest of individuals and of nations, the same treatment should be 
given to cases of conflicts between the different laws of a same state than to cases 
of conflicts between the laws of different states.127 Moreover, the exceptions of 
overriding mandatory rules and public policy would generally be applicable to 
conflicts between different states, but yet Savigny explained that, even if rare, 
these cases could also happen within the frontiers of one state and therefore those 
exceptions also apply to inter-state conflict of laws.128  
In order to ascertain in which territory is the “seat” of every type of legal 
relationship, Savigny tried to link persons and legal relations with the territory 
where they belong by focusing on different connections. In order to do that, he 
divided legal relationships in different broad categories, and proposed four 
possible connecting factors which would connect each category with its seat. 
Accordingly, Savigny classified the different legal relations in the following 
categories: 
I. Status of the person in itself (capacity for rights, and capacity to act.)  
II. Law of things. 
III. Law of Obligations. 
IV. Succession.  
V. Family Law.  
      A. Marriage.   
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      B. Paternal Power.  
      C. Guardianship.129 
The four connecting factors were: 
-The domicile of any person concerned in the legal relation. 
-The place where a thing which is the object of the legal relation is situated. 
-The place where a juridical act, which has been or is to be done. 
-The place of the tribunal which has to decide a law-suit.130 
At this point, it only remained to ascertain the appropriate connection that 
would bring every legal relationship belonging to each category to the territory 
where it “belongs”. In order to do that, Savigny developed different choice of law 
rules and principles. For example: legal capacity and matters of personal status 
would be governed by the law of the domicile;131 relations of legal property would 
be governed by the lex rei sitae;132 the relations of the category of law of 
obligations would be governed by the law of the place of performance;133 in cases 
of succession, the law of the testator’s domicile at the time of death would be 
applicable;134 in cases of family law, he referred to the law of the husband’s or 
father’s domicile,135 etc. It has to be noticed that most of the connections proposed 
by Savigny were already existent.136 For example, the situs rule and the locus 
regit actum rule were widely known and used. However, as it has been said above, 
the importance of his theory rests on the starting point, the concept of legal 
relationship and seat, rather than on the specific choice of law rules. 
Even though there are some that hesitated from the novelty of Savigny’s work, 
it has to be highlighted that he “laid the methodological foundation of 
multilateralism”.137 Even if he maintained that his work was “merely in state of 
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growth, incomplete and unfinished”138, he developed and explained in an 
organised manner his seat theory. He considered the aim of conflict of laws was 
to achieve uniformity of results, decisional harmony, and thus he gave practical 
support to the multilateral approach. Moreover, Savigny gave an organised and 
pragmatic explanation of the legal relationships classification and the 
corresponding connecting factors. He developed a coherent system of conflict 
rules that enhanced the equality between the foreign law and the domestic law. 
Savigny’s multilateral approach has been of undoubted influence in the 
consecutive doctrine, case law and private international law codifications. 
Nowadays, Savigny’s theory is considered the basis of most modern conflict of 
law systems, especially in the European states, which refer to it as the traditional 
conflict of laws system. His ideas changed the manner in which the subject of 
private international law was approached, and turned in a predominance of 
multilateralism that persists until today.  
 
4.1.6. Other modern authors: Mancini (1817-1888) and the nationality principle 
An Italian scholar, Pasquale Stanislao Mancini (1817-1888), also deserves a 
mention in this section, since he is considered one of the most important jurists 
of the nineteenth century.139 Mancini considered the nationality principle as the 
foundation of private international law.140 Like Savigny, he rejected the statutist 
theories, criticised the comity doctrine and defended the equality between forum 
law and foreign law. However, he developed a conflict of laws scheme with the 
basis on the principle of nationality, although he also included the concepts of 
party autonomy and the public policy exception. Unlike the statutist theories, 
Mancini did use nationality as a connecting factor rather than domicile; moreover, 
different than the Dutch comity doctrine, he did consider that the application of 
foreign law was an obligation of the state. More importantly, he did not take a 
unilateral approach of determining the spatial reach of the law in question, but, 
as Savigny, he took the legal relationship as a starting point to then determine the 
law applicable according to the nationality or the will of the parties, i.e. a 
multilateral approach.141  
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According to Mancini, private law was primarily personal, intended for 
individuals and not for a territory, while in public law it was the authority of the 
nation that governed the individuals. Consequently, private law would be 
governed by the principle of nationality and the principle of freedom, whereas 
public law would be governed by the principle of sovereignty.142  
Then, in order to build his conflicts system, Mancini divided private law in a 
mandatory part and a facultative part. The mandatory part referred to the personal 
part of law, i.e. legal status and capacity of the person, family and succession, and 
it should be governed by the principle of nationality rather than domicile as it was 
done traditionally. Furthermore, the sovereign state would be under the obligation 
to apply the law of their nationality both to nationals and foreigners.143 On the 
other hand, the facultative part referred to contracts, obligations, assets and 
property, and parties should have freedom to choose the law applicable to their 
legal relationship.144 Therefore, Mancini recognised the principle of party 
autonomy, although he admitted an exception: in the aforementioned facultative 
areas of private law, parties to a legal relationship could choose the law applicable 
to it unless it went against the public policy of the forum.145 Thus, Mancini was 
of the idea that every country should promote legal equality by both respecting 
the law of nationality of the parties involved in the particular legal relationship, 
and by allowing the parties to choose the law applicable to their legal 
relationship.146 
Mancini’s approach had a remarkable influence on private international law 
in Europe, especially the principle of nationality. The notion of nationality instead 
of domicile as a connecting factor became successful among the European 
countries, and most of them adopted it in their private law codifications, e.g. 
Italian Codice civile 1865, German EGBGB 1896, etc. Although the nationality 
principle results attractive in the sense that it promotes the equality between 
forum and foreign law at the same time it respects the individual’s identity, 
nowadays it does not always respect the closest connection between a legal 
relationship and a territory. Domicile as a connecting factor results more 
adequate, since proceedings are usually brought where the parties live, and 
therefore the domicile as connecting factor would favour the application of the 
law of the forum, rather than involving excessive foreign elements as the 
nationality principle could do.147  
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Among other achievements, Mancini promoted the conclusion of international 
treaties and conventions with the objective of achieving harmony and uniformity 
of results in private international law. 148 Thus, he shared the opinion of Savigny 
that the aim of private international law is to achieve decisional harmony. Another 
important accomplishment is the recognition of party autonomy as an 
independent connecting factor. It is said to have been explicitly recognised as a 
connecting factor in private international law in the sixteenth century by Charles 
Dumoulin.149 Nevertheless, it is argued that Dumoulin was just referring to the 
will of the parties as an argument to apply the law of the place of performance 
and not as an independent connecting factor as we understand it nowadays. In the 
same way, several authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth century used the 
currently known as party autonomy concept as an argumentative aid in their 
reasoning.150 Also, Savigny referred to the place of performance as the ‘seat’ of 
contractual obligations, but pursuant to the parties’ ‘voluntary submission’. On 
the contrary, Mancini recognised party autonomy as superior, as an independent 
connecting factor, allowing the parties to deviate from the other connecting 
factors established by the legislator, being public policy the only restriction. 
Together with the economic and political liberalism on the late nineteenth century 
and beginning of the twentieth century the freedom of choice of law proved to be 
successful.151 Although the political climate during the war periods in the 
twentieth century led to an increased regulation of the sovereign State, and 
therefore to a decline of the liberal concept of party autonomy, it became well 
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accepted again together with the increase of international trade.152 Freedom of 
choice of law was generally accepted in contractual obligations among the 
European countries and worldwide since the middle of the twentieth century, and 
is without any reservation one of the most important achievements in the 
development of private international law in the twentieth century. 
Although more theories were developed in Europe since the twentieth century, 
it seems appropriate to already end the historical discussion with the contribution 
of Mancini, as the main historical inputs regarding the method of private 
international law in Europe have already been discussed.153 Of course, the role of 
the European Union in the twentieth century and the current system of conflict of 
laws nowadays will be subject of study below. 
 
4.1.7. Reflexion and observations 
An evolutionary process in European conflict of laws took place, in the manner 
that a unilateral conflict of laws approach shifted to a multilateral one.154 Indeed, 
unilateralism is the oldest of both systems, and even if there are authors that 
defend the existence of multilateralism in the Italian statutist theories, their basis 
was clearly unilateral.155 The Italian and French statutists focused on determining 
the reach of substantive rules, and divided them according to their personal nature 
or real nature; personal statutes would be applicable to citizens wherever they 
were, and real statutes would apply to persons and things just within the territory.  
Even the Dutch doctrine, which introduced the notion of comity to justify the 
application of foreign law, also determined the scope of substantive law, 
defending the territorial application of the forum law, and justifying the 
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application of foreign law on the concept of comity, being either a simple gesture 
of good will by the state, as explained by Paulus and Johannes Voet, or an 
obligation as defended by Huber. But in the nineteenth century Wächter’s 
criticism of the previous conflict scholars eased the way for Savigny, who is 
known as the founder of the multilateral method. Savigny understood private law 
as an expression of the people rather than the states, and thus developed the idea 
that each legal relationship had a territory where it belonged, a seat, and it was 
the task of conflict rules to determine that rightful place. This seat of a legal 
relationship would be the same, and therefore the applicable law too, irrespective 
of the place where the action was brought; in that manner, decisional harmony, 
which he considered the aim of private international law, would be achieved. 
Hence, Savigny’s conflict of laws rules system consisted in assigning a legal 
relationship to a determinate legal order, which means that he rejected the 
unilateral method used by the statutists consisting on defining the spatial reach of 
substantive rules. Savigny’s multilateral method would be later recognised as the 
traditional method of conflict of laws. 
However, it also has to be mentioned that the PIL approach and objective 
claimed by Savigny has been object of many critics. The main arguments against 
Savigny’s approach argued that his method was utopian and could even become 
harmful because it did not take into account the interests of the parties or 
legitimate policy considerations.156 Also, Savigny’s proposal was criticised 
because he assumed in his analysis of the nature of legal relations as the 
foundation of a universal solution of conflict of laws that legal relations are 
uniform among legal systems. However, during the next decades of national 
codifications and detailed legislation, it was submitted that the nature of a legal 
relation is variable and is conditioned by the law that defines it.157 Although the 
majority of these critics mainly originated on the other side of the ocean, Europe 
also had to adapt the Savignian model to the legal reality, including the 
progressive distinction, flexibilization and materialization of conflict rules.158 
Savigny substituted the references to realities, to the specific cases, by conceptual 
considerations, resulting in conceptualism and formalism, and this rigidity was 
later adapted.159  
It has to be kept in mind that the development of PIL during the second half 
of the nineteenth century until the middle of the twentieth century was 
characterised, on the one hand, by the monopoly of the states as legislators –also 
of PIL-, and, on the other hand, by the wishes, especially from the doctrine, to 
                                                     
156 Trevor C Hartley, ‘The Modern Approach to Private International Law: International Litigation 
and Transactions from a Common-Law Perspective’ (2006) 319 Recueil des Cours 9, 29,30. 
157 Yntema (n 27) 312,313. 
158 Basedow, ‘Private International Law, Methods of’ (n 1).  
159 Domínguez Lozano (n 154) 115,116. By the end of the twentieth century, however, conflict rules 
became less rigid and gained flexibility. The phenomenon of globalisation is the context of the 
current PIL. Arenas García, ‘El Derecho Internacional Privado (DIPr) Y El Estado En La Era de La 
Globalización: La Vuelta a Los Orígenes’ (n 13); Siehr (n 1). 
Chapter I - Introduction 
41 
keep a degree of universalism of PIL and avoiding the imposition of the 
systematic application of the lex fori, which would hinder the objectives of PIL.160 
Savigny’s universalism was very relevant since, without it, rather than 
international harmony of decisions, the result could lead to an isolation of the 
different national PIL legislations. Therefore, the use of multilateral conflict 
rules, generally supported and spread across the borders by the doctrine, 
promoted that similar conflict rules were adopted in different national 
legislations.161 That approach enables that similar solutions are reached 
regardless the forum country, and it promotes the adoption of international 
instruments unifying the rules. In a world divided in sovereign states, multilateral 
conflict rules ensured a uniform regulation of cross-border private legal 
matters.162 In Europe, the use of the multilateral method displaced the unilateral 
approach, which was not able to fulfil the aforementioned objectives. By the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the multilateral method had almost 
completely displaced the unilateral method. This is shown for example in the 
deliberations of The Hague Conference on Private international law, which 
between 1893 and 1904 adopted seven international Conventions, later 
substituted by more modern instruments.163 In the preparatory works of the first 
sessions, the adoption and predominance of Savigny’s conflict of laws 
multilateral approach became clear.164 
However, the success of Savigny’s multilateral method does not mean that the 
unilateral method was completely rejected. In fact, the unilateral method always 
had followers in the American conflicts doctrine, and constituted the basis of the 
so-called American conflicts revolution, with the “governmental interest 
analysis” as main conflict of laws theory.165 Furthermore, some unilateral 
elements can be seen in the current European conflict theories, as it will be 
discussed later. Moreover, the statement that the modern conflict of laws method 
in Europe is still mainly based on Savigny’s theory does not mean that the system 
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has not evolved since then. After the 1960s, the exclusivity of the multilateral 
method is questioned and a plurality of techniques correcting the downsides of 
the traditional approach arise.166 New principles and doctrines have been added, 
making the system more flexible, such as the doctrine of overriding mandatory 
rules, or the inclusion of substantive policies in the design of conflict rules, such 
as the protection of employees or consumers.167 The current EU PIL method is in 
fact a pluralism of methods.168 
It is certainly true that, so far, no single method is perfect and able to solve all 
conflict problems. Unilateralism only considers the application of foreign law 
once it was concluded that forum law is not applicable. In that sense, it can be 
considered a forum-centred system. On the other hand, multilateralism is deemed 
as a forum-neutral system, and it is indifferent to the content of the substantive 
law of the different legal systems involved; it aims to achieve international 
uniformity, yet in reality it leaves to each country to define how. It will be seen 
that the current legal practice has proved that the two methods are not as 
antagonist as Savigny claimed but together may achieve a better system than 
either method itself in actual practice.169 Yet again, the problem arises regarding 
the most appropriate manner to combine them, and which factors should be taken 
into account. 
Another important point of discussion thought the history refers to the reason 
for the application of foreign law: why should the forum judge apply foreign law? 
What reasons justify the burdensome task of applying an unfamiliar foreign law 
by the judge of the forum? The Italian and French statutists did not consider the 
question, as at the beginning it was considered to be inherent in the Justinian 
Corpus Juris, and then it was regarded as a consequence of the limits of the 
territorial reach of the substantive law. Furthermore, they mainly developed their 
theories regarding inter-state conflicts. Later, the Dutch authors based the 
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application of foreign law in the concept of comity, as gesture of comity 
reciprocal among sovereign nations. The common interest of nations and 
individuals calls for a reciprocity in dealing with cases, an equality when dealing 
with foreigners and natives, and therefore an equality between foreign law and 
national law, in order to achieve decisional harmony. This was the approach 
defended by Savigny. If one considers the goal of conflict of laws is to achieve 
decisional harmony, international uniformity of decisions, as Savigny claimed, 
then this goal would require in some situations the displacement of forum law in 
favour of the appropriate foreign law.  
Another observation regards the treatment of international conflicts and inter-
state conflicts, and the question would be whether these different situations 
should be solved by the same conflict rules. It is true that, traditionally, the focus 
was on inter-state conflicts, as due to the historical circumstances, the main 
conflicts arose between the different Italian city-states and later between the 
different French provinces. In general, the Italian and French statutists extended 
their statutist theory to international conflict of laws. It has to be noticed that the 
statutists did not expend much effort in differencing this type of situations. On 
the contrary, Savigny distinguished between “conflicting territorial laws in the 
same state” and “conflicting territorial laws in different states”, but, since he 
believed in the equality between different national legal systems, he also 
considered that these two types of conflicts should in general be solved in the 
same manner. However, should be treated the same a situation where two legal 
systems do not share similar legal values, and important interests are at stake, 
than a situation where similar legal values are shared and therefore not 
threatened?170 This consideration is of fundamental importance when dealing 
with intra-state and international conflicts, and, in the context of this study, intra-
EU and extra-EU conflicts of law (e.g. is it the same a consumer contract between 
a French consumer and a German principal than a contract between a French 
consumer and a Mexican principal?). 
Therefore, this historical overview shows us the problems that conflict of laws 
aroused since its early development, the main solutions and trends that authors 
followed in order to solve them, and the main conflict of laws methods that have 
been existing since the Middle Ages. While disagreement between authors have 
always existed on which would be the best manner of dealing with conflict of 
laws, there is a general agreement nowadays that no single method is perfect. I 
consider the current purpose would be to combine legal certainty and 
predictability of connection, together with finding the appropriate solutions to the 
                                                     
170 Ten Wolde, ‘The Relativity of Legal Positions in Cross-Border Situations: The Foundations of 
Private Interregional Law, Private Intra-Community Law and Private International Law’ (n 9). 
According to the ‘scale of Ten Wolde’, countries without relationship between them which do not 
share legal values would be in one end of a sliding scale, while territories with a very close 
relationship and with similar or same legal values would be at the other end of the scale; the latter 
countries would be more neutral to the application of foreign or forum law, while the the first ones 
would apply forum law. 
 44 
particular situation, and taking all the aforementioned considerations into 
account. Again, the problem lays in finding the appropriate coherent manner of 
doing so.  
 
4.2. The implementation of Private International Law 
by the European Union: Europeanisation of PIL 
Over the last decades, the development of PIL in Europe has been characterised 
by the works of the European Union; today, our private international law is to a 
large extent EU PIL.  
After the national codification movement in the nineteenth century, attempts 
to unify PIL at the European level have been made in the twentieth century with 
the creation of the European Community. This trend derives from the necessity 
of reconciling the differences of the diverse national substantive law of the 
Member States. By creating uniform conflict rules, Member States keep their 
national substantive law and at the same time “international uniformity of 
decisions” is promoted within the EU. Already Mancini in 1874 considered that 
the adoption of an international convention establishing uniform PIL rules would 
be fundamental in order to achieve international uniformity of decisions, which 
Savigny considered as the purpose of PIL.171 In that manner, PIL could better 
overcome the legal uncertainty that derives from the differences between the 
diverse national legal systems involved in cross-border transactions.  
One of the main objectives of the EU is to maintain and develop an Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, for which the proper and effective functioning of 
the internal market is essential, and, in this context, PIL proves to be a relevant 
tool in order to achieve the free movement of judgments within the EU, and 
consequently a genuine EU judicial area. However, the founding treaties did not 
provide the EU legislator with a specific legislative competence in the area of 
private international law. Thus, Member States were only able to harmonise their 
conflict rules through international conventions. This situation changed in 1999, 
when the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force, and endowed the European 
legislator with a competence to legislate private international law issues, which 
led to the enactment of numerous legislative measures in the field. This trend 
continued after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, and receives 
the name of Europeanisation of private international law.  
Three periods can be distinguished in the above-named Europeanisation 
process: the beginnings of PIL in the European Community before the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1957-1999), the accelerated evolution after the Treaty of 
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Amsterdam (1999-2009), and the current period after the Treaty of Lisbon (2009-
-). 
 
4.2.1. Before the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999: intergovernmental 
cooperation 
The relationship between EU law and PIL had not an easy start. The content of 
the original EEC Treaty, the Treaty of Rome172 signed in 1957, did not suggest 
any radical change of the national rules on private international law of the 
Member States. It was an agreement focused on the progressive free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital across the borders of the Member States, 
and, so far as possible, rules discriminating according to nationality or origin were 
to be abolished. The Treaty of Rome merely did a marginal reference to PIL. 
Article 220 ECC Treaty (later 293 EC and repealed by the Treaty of Lisbon) 
basically stated that Member States could negotiate between them, so far as 
necessary, in order to simplify the recognition and enforcement of judicial 
decisions, and lacked any reference to jurisdiction or conflict of laws. It seemed 
that harmonisation of private international law issues was not the responsibility 
of the Community, but of the Member States with each other in strictly 
intergovernmental negotiations.173  
Still, article 220 ECC served as legal basis for the 1968 Brussels Convention 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments on civil 
and commercial matters174, since the free movement of judgments required 
harmonisation of rules on jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the 1980 Rome Convention 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations175 lacked a specific legal basis on 
the original ECC Treaty, and it was just indirectly related, through its connection 
with Brussels Convention, to article 220 ECC. In this sense, it was deemed as 
necessary that after the creation of common rules regarding jurisdiction, the risk 
of forum shopping required the creation of common rules on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations.176 Also, it was considered that the free movement of 
persons, goods, services and capital among the Member States would be impaired 
by the lack of unified conflict rules and differences between national systems.177  
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The Rome Convention mainly followed the traditional conflict of laws 
approach determined by Savigny. It allowed the choice of the applicable law by 
the parties, but in absence of choice, it provided for multilateral rules containing 
connecting factors that would determine to which country the contract was most 
closely connected. Moreover, the Rome Convention used objective criteria in 
order to determine the applicable law, which could refer to the forum law or to a 
foreign law.  
However, the use of a convention as a way of unifying the conflict of laws 
among the states had many inconveniences. With each new accession of a 
Member State to the Community, the Rome Convention had to be adjusted and 
ratified again by every Member State, a process that was burdensome and slow.178 
But the actual problem was on the fragmentation of the conflict rules by the 
legislator: besides the rules of the Rome Convention, there were diverse 
provisions interfering with conflict of laws spread among other community 
instruments, especially in the directives dealing with specific areas of substantive 
law, like consumer protection.179 An international convention was not able to 
respond to the needs arising from the directives. The existence of these 
fragmentation of conflict rules within the Community made the system 
unpredictable and sometimes inconsistent. The consequence is an increasing 
labyrinth between the Rome Convention, the directives and the diverse national 
laws implementing the latter.180 This situation was calling for a new approach that 
would concentrate the responsibility of regulating conflict of laws at the 
Community level in a consistent and coherent manner. 
The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) broadened the competences of the 
Community in PIL.181 The Treaty of Maastricht (Maastricht TEU) introduced the 
so-called Third Pillar for matters relating to “justice and home affairs” (Title VI). 
Article K.1 mentioned among the areas of common interest for the Member States 
the “judicial cooperation in civil matters”, and together with article K.3 they 
provided for the legal basis for the adoption of PIL conventions. Again, the 
negotiation and adoption of PIL measures was predominantly intergovernmental, 
and the term judicial cooperation was criticised as ambiguous, since the Treaty 
did not provide for any new instrument in order to achieve that aim.182 Thus, the 
                                                     
178 Basedow, ‘The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam’ (n 
173) 688. 
179 In this regard, see Chapter IV. 
180 In fact, this belongs to the focus of study of this dissertation, and it will be object of analysis in 
the following chapters. Tamas Dezso Czigler and Izolda Takacs, ‘Chaos Renewed: The Rome I 
Regulation vs Other Sources of EU Law. A Classification of Conflicting Provisions.’, Yearbook of 
Private International Law, vol 14 (sellier european law publishers & Swiss Institute of Comparative 
Law 2012) 540–541; Basedow, ‘The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty 
of Amsterdam’ (n 173) 688–690. 
181 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992 OJ C325/5. 
182 Basedow, ‘The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam’ (n 
173) 691; Alegría Borrás Rodríguez, ‘La Comunitarización Del Derecho Internacional Privado: 
Chapter I - Introduction 
47 
international convention was still the only possible manner of regulating conflict 
of laws, with the inconvenience of having to be ratified by the Member States. 
The only instrument negotiated on the basis of article K.3 was the Brussels II 
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters, although it never entered into force because it did not 
receive sufficient ratifications by the Member States.183 Therefore, the Treaty of 
Maastricht provided for a legal basis for the adoption of PIL conventions, 
although any project succeeded in this period. 
 
4.2.2. After the Treaty of Amsterdam 1999: “Communitarisation” of PIL 
It was with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 when the European Community 
acquired a comprehensive competence in the area of judicial cooperation in civil 
matters, including the adoption of several measures in order to promote the 
compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States in relation with conflict 
of laws and jurisdiction.184 This competence was transferred from the former 
Third Pillar to the First Pillar, allowing thus the EU institutions to legislate in the 
area of PIL and leading therefore to the “communitarisation” of PIL.185  
The Treaty of Amsterdam had a title IV on “Visas, asylum, immigration and 
other policies related to the free movement of persons” (articles 61-69). Article 
61 gave a list of areas in which the Council and the Member States shall adopt 
measures “in order to establish progressively an area of freedom, security and 
justice”. Within this list, “measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil 
matters as provided for in Article 65” were included. Article 65 referred to 
“judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications”, and 
named a list of measures to take “insofar as necessary for the proper functioning 
of the internal market” for:  
“(a) improving and simplifying: 
- the system for cross-border service of judicial and extrajudicial documents; 
- cooperation in the taking of evidence; 
- the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial cases, 
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183 Council Act of 28 May 1998, drawing up, on the basis of Art. K.3 TEU, the Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters, O.J. 1998, 
221/1. Basedow, ‘The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam’ 
(n 173) 691. 
184 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts [1997] OJ C340/1. 
185 Basedow, ‘The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam’ (n 
173); Michael Wilderspin, ‘The Rome I Regulation: Communitarisation and Modernisation of the 
Rome Convention’ [2008] ERA Forum 259. 
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including decisions in extrajudicial cases; 
(b) promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States 
concerning the conflict of laws and of jurisdiction; 
(c) eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, if 
necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure 
applicable in the Member States.” 
Then, the procedure for adopting these measures was described in Article 67 
EC. According to this article, during the period of five years after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council would act unanimously, upon the 
recommendation of the Commission or in initiative of a Member State; however, 
after that period, the Commission had the sole right of initiative. Thus, with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, the Community was awarded with the competence to 
legislate in private international law, and what previously was an 
intergovernmental coordination regarding civil law matters, turned into a 
Community policy.186 However, the communitarisation of PIL resulted 
incomplete, since three Member States (Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom) 
did have their reservations to the legislative acts based in those articles, which 
did not bind the named Member States.187  
Since the Amsterdam Treaty empowered the EU to create rules in the field of 
private international and international procedure law, the Community made an 
extensive use of its new acquired competences, being the regulation the preferred 
legislative instrument. The most important development of PIL in Europe in this 
period was regarding the adoption of numerous regulations. First, the Brussels 
Convention and the Rome Convention were transformed into regulations: 
Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, now replaced by 
the so-called Brussels I recast Regulation 1215/2012), and Rome I Regulation 
(Regulation 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations). However, 
the EU also regulated PIL in other areas: insolvency proceedings (Regulation 
1346/2000); service of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or 
commercial matters (regulation 1348/2000; then Regulation 1393/2007); 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial 
matters and parental responsibility (Brussels II bis Regulation, 2201/2003); 
European enforcement order for uncontested claims (Regulation 805/2004); 
European Small Claims Procedure (Regulation 861/2007); the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (Rome II Regulation, 864/2007); jurisdiction, 
                                                     
186 Ansgar Staudinger and Stefan Leible, ‘Article 65 of the EC Treaty in the EC System of 
Competencies’ (2001) Issue 4-2000/01 The European Legal Forum 225, 225,226. 
187 These reservations were provided by article 69 EC Treaty. Nevertheless, the UK and Ireland 
could still inform of their wish to participate in the measures taken (opt-in), according to the article 
3 of Protocol 4 to the Treaty of Amsterdam. On the other hand, according to article 7 of the Protocol, 
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applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in 
matters relating to maintenance obligations (Regulation 4/2009).188  
Nevertheless, these regulations did not constitute the only sources of PIL, 
since many other PIL provisions were still found among other EU instruments, 
e.g. directives on consumers, labour law, insurance contracts, etc. Thus, the 
practice of including conflict of laws provisions within instruments related to 
other issues was still used. In the area of contract law, the rules on applicable law 
are contained in the Rome I Regulation, which follow in its majority the 
traditional Savigny PIL approach; at the same time, provisions on secondary law, 
especially regarding consumer law, addressed the international scope of 
application of the instrument, approach that differed from the traditional method.  
 
4.2.3.  After the Treaty of Lisbon: current situation of EU private 
international law 
With the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force the 1st December 2009, the 
trend of Europeanisation of PIL continued. Two treaties were adopted, one 
including the provisions regarding issues of institutional nature, Treaty of the 
European Union (TEU)189, and one containing the provisions on the policies of 
the European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU)190. Also, according to art. 1 TEU, the European Union has replaced and 
succeeded the European Community.  
The most important change regarding PIL is the widening of the EU 
competences. Title IV on visas, asylum, immigration and other policies has been 
replaced by Title V on “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. The Lisbon 
Treaty substituted article 65 of the Treaty of Amsterdam by article 81 TFEU, 
which is nowadays the legal basis for the taking of measures on PIL. Article 81 
TFEU provides: 
 “1.  The Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having 
cross-border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of 
judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such cooperation may include 
the adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States.  
                                                     
188 For a more detailed description of the new PIL competences acquired with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, see: Remien (n 11); Fernández Rozas, ‘Comunitarización Del Derecho Internacional 
Privado Y Derecho Aplicable a Las Obligaciones Contractuales’ (n 176); Basedow, ‘The 
Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam’ (n 173); Staudinger 
and Leible (n 186). 
189 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2010] O.J. C 83/01. 
190 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] O.J. C 
115/47. 
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2.  For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, 
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt 
measures, particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal 
market, aimed at ensuring:  
(a)    the mutual recognition and enforcement between Member States of 
judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases;  
(b)  the cross-border service of judicial and extrajudicial documents;  
(c)   the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning 
conflict of laws and of jurisdiction;  
(d) cooperation in the taking of evidence;  
(e)  effective access to justice;  
(f)    the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings, 
if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure 
applicable in the Member States;  
(g)   the development of alternative methods of dispute settlement;  
(h)  support for the training of the judiciary and judicial staff. 
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, measures concerning family law with cross-
border implications shall be established by the Council, acting in accordance with 
a special legislative procedure. The Council shall act unanimously after 
consulting the European Parliament. The Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission, may adopt a decision determining those aspects of family law with 
cross-border implications which may be the subject of acts adopted by the 
ordinary legislative procedure. The Council shall act unanimously after 
consulting the European Parliament. The proposal referred to in the second 
subparagraph shall be notified to the national Parliaments. If a national 
Parliament makes known its opposition within six months of the date of such 
notification, the decision shall not be adopted. In the absence of opposition, the 
Council may adopt the decision.” 
Thus, according to the new article 81 TFEU, the European Parliament and the 
Council may adopt the above mentioned measures “particularly (italics provided 
by the author) when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market”, 
and therefore they do not depend exclusively on the internal market requirement. 
Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon adds new grounds for the taking of measures, 
i.e. art. 81 (2), (e), (g) and (h). Measures taken on basis of article 81 TFEU are to 
be adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure, except regarding family matters, 
for which article 81 (3) TFEU provides for a special procedure and a passarelle 
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clause.191 Regarding the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the normal preliminary 
procedure of Article 267 TFEU is also applicable to Title IV, and therefore every 
national court may request a preliminary ruling, which makes it possible to 
guarantee a uniform interpretation of regulations and directives.192 Finally, with 
regard to the position of Denmark, UK and Ireland, Denmark had the possibility 
to notify the other Member States that it would enjoy a more flexible position, 
similar to the opt-in position of the UK and Ireland.193 
As a result, the so-called Europeanisation of PIL has without any doubt 
intensified, making domestic PIL in the Member States more residual, and 
making possible the existence of a new legal field: EU Private International Law. 
The numerous legislative acts proof the importance acquired by PIL the last years 
in the EU, contrasting with the opposite situation of the previous years. Therefore, 
PIL is nowadays an important pillar of EU law, and recognized as a tool to 
achieve an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
However, the Europeanisation process and the complexities around the 
subject of PIL, especially regarding conflict of laws, led to some difficulties and 
inconsistencies in the European regulation on PIL, e.g. problems related with the 
various sources of PIL, inconsistent technique of legislation, lack of coordination, 
or use of different PIL methods.194 The European legislator first focused on a 
sectoral approach to unification of some areas of substantive law, and enacted 
specific legal acts regarding specific areas of law, e.g. directives regarding 
weaker parties. The problem arises when this is done narrowly, regardless the 
regulations in other areas, resulting in inconsistent rules that deal with the same 
problem in different manners.195  
In this sense, art. 81 TFEU is not the only legal basis the European Union may 
use to regulate conflict of laws, as some directives also contain provisions 
addressing their international scope of application. Some directives ensure and 
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regulate the conditions to make possible that consumers can shop in the different 
Member States, and employees can move to a Member State and enjoy 
advantageous conditions, which indeed fulfil the aim of the internal market.196 
Thus, the international applicability of the provisions of these directives should 
be unambiguous. However, the approach taken by the European legislator in this 
regard is not clear.  
On the one hand, Savigny’s multilateral approach is the starting point of the 
European conflict of laws system as we understand it nowadays. Of course, as 
previously mentioned, his traditional model has been revisited and other 
principles play a role as well.197 European choice of law rules still contain abstract 
connecting factors which link the legal relationship to the jurisdiction to which is 
factually most closely connected (e.g. the habitual residence of the parties, the 
location of the real property, etc.). However, next to these rules, there are also 
rules based on the notion that some areas of substantive law deal with important 
social values, such as in contract law the protection of employees and consumers, 
and therefore refer to the country which should have the strongest interest in the 
application of its law (e.g. choice of law rules that refer to the law of the habitual 
residence of the party whose interests are protected against the other party).198 
Furthermore, the principle of party autonomy has become increasingly accepted, 
especially in the area of contract law, which means that another connecting factor 
is the one that refers to the law of the country the parties have chosen (which, in 
some cases such as those involving weaker contracting parties, needs to be limited 
to avoid abuse). In addition, numerous legal principles have been added, such as 
the doctrine of overriding mandatory rules. All the aforementioned concepts will 
be object of further analysis in the context of the Rome I Regulation on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations in the following chapters.  
On the other hand, some provisions addressing the international scope of 
application contained in directives diverge from that traditional approach, and do 
not determine the law most closely connected to the situation or take into account 
the legitimate expectations of the parties, but rather focus exclusively in the needs 
of the own legal order. These rules are difficult to coordinate with the existing 
conflict of laws mechanisms.199 However, when some special interests are at 
stake, like in the case of consumers or employees, it might be necessary to take 
more into account the needs of the own legal order (or, in this specific case, the 
interest of the internal market and the EU legal order). Thus, the necessity of these 
unilateral provisions and the better manner to adapt these special interests in the 
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conflict of laws order are open to debate. What is more clear is that a more 
coherent and coordinated approach to this matter should be possible. 
 
4.2.4. Reflexion and observations 
The Europeanisation process leaves some inconsistencies in the regulation of EU 
PIL. The PIL regime has been developed in the EU first in the form of 
conventions, and then in regulations, directives and case law; however, the 
existence of EU instruments that primarily deal with substantive law but also 
contain PIL rules, and the diverse principles and methods employed, make the 
current EU PIL system lack the consistency needed.  
The struggling of the EU legislator to deal with PIL issues can also be result 
of the different starting points PIL and EU law have. The traditional approach of 
PIL since Savigny and until nowadays was to solve a conflict of laws by bringing 
the legal relationship home, with a neutral conflict rule that would find the legal 
systems most closely connected to the legal relationship. In that manner, 
international harmony of decisions would be achieved, meaning that the outcome 
would be the same regardless the jurisdiction where the proceedings were 
brought, which would prevent limping legal relationships and would promote 
legal certainly for the parties involved. Thus, conflict rules were considered as 
neutral, value-free. Therefore, in the EU context, they would not be concerned 
with the European integration purpose. PIL serves international legal transactions 
in a wider manner, not only in the intra-EU context. Consequently, while EU law 
is concerned with whether rules might impose a restriction or disadvantages to 
the internal market, traditional conflict rules were concerned with finding the seat 
of the legal relationship, in order to apply the law of the place where the legal 
relationship “belongs”, considering all the legal systems as equal. 
However, in such a context, the increasing importance of EU law in private 
relations overlapped with the traditional conflict rules. Whereas Savigny 
postulated the equality of all legal systems, EU PIL also might need to adapt to 
the needs of the internal market, and sometimes tends to prefer the application of 
the law of the Member States rather than a non-EU law. This is specially the case 
when dealing with weaker contracting parties, such as consumers and employees, 
for which the EU legislation, mainly through directives, guarantees some 
minimum standards common for all Member States in order to guarantee the 
protection of these market participants. These market participants need to be 
protected against the possible abuse of their “stronger” counter-party, abuses that 
can be done through the application of a less favourable (non-EU) law. 
Consequently, value-neutral conflict rules would not fulfil this task, and that is 
why EU PIL contains in its regulations special rules favourable to these weaker 
parties. However, the protection granted by these special rules might not always 
be sufficient, and at the same time are not sufficiently coordinated with the 
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directives dealing with substantive law that establishes the standards, which 
might establish unilaterally their own international scope of application. 
Finally, the development of EU PIL, or Europeanisation of PIL, is beneficial, 
as all the regulations in the subject containing common conflict rules (and also 
rules on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement) contribute to achieve a truly 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and help to overcome the differences 
between the substantive laws of the different Member States. However, as a result 
of the different phases of the Europeanisation process, and the different 
approaches and objectives PIL and EU law have, the existing rules are not always 
coordinated and sometimes lead to incoherencies that are difficult to reconcile. 
  





CHAPTER II - THE RATIONALE BEHIND 
THE PROTECTION OF WEAKER 
CONTRACTING PARTIES IN EU PIL 
 
Modern PIL instruments generally contain a special regulatory regime regarding 
weaker contracting parties, specifically regarding consumers and employees, 
which are generally seen as the typical structural weaker parties in a contract. 
These special PIL rules are more favourable to the interests of consumers and 
employees than to those of their counterparties. 
The history of weaker party protection in PIL can be described as short and 
easy in comparison with the lengthy and complicated history of PIL in general. 
In fact, the special PIL rules are a reflection of the existing legal framework in 
national substantive law that has been adapted to ensure that any advantage of the 
contracting party with the strong position in the contract will remain without 
effect.200 Substantive national laws only started to introduce special weaker party 
rules in the last century.201 The state started to increasingly intervene in certain 
areas limiting party autonomy based on several reasons. The main reason, 
although not the only one, consisted on correcting the imbalance of contracts 
containing weaker parties.202 Since most of the special substantive law on weaker 
party protection constitutes mandatory law, PIL rules also need to be adjusted in 
order avoid their circumvention. But who are these weaker parties in need of such 
a special protection? Why are they considered to be in a weaker position than 
their contractual counterparty?  
Both national law of the Member States and EU law provide for mandatory 
rules on weaker party protection. In addition to the substantive national law 
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regarding consumer and employment contracts that Member States have 
developed since the twentieth century, the EU has enacted numerous legal 
instruments in that regard. Thus, the EU has developed its own consumer and 
employment policy, which is implemented into the legal framework of the 
Member States.203 Consumer contract law, both at the domestic and EU level, has 
been developed in an incremental manner, until the point that it has become an 
increasingly dense and intricate body of law in which cross-border consumer 
contracts are the more complex part. In the area of EU PIL, the fundamental 
problem of inconsistency of the EU consumer acquis with the conflict rules of 
the Rome I Regulation remains to be solved. The European Commission has 
made numerous efforts to make the European consumer acquis more coherent. 
Specifically, the European Commission has been especially active regarding 
harmonisation of consumer law: there are over 90 EU directives dealing 
with consumer protection matters. Since the majority of the directives are of a 
minimum harmonising nature, several calls of the European Parliament in favour 
of a European Civil Code incited an animated academic debate. The discussion 
over unification or full-harmonisation of EU contract law or, in other cases, of 
EU consumer law, has been intense and literature over it is extensive.204 The role 
of PIL would be seriously reduced if unification of substantive law would happen. 
However, apart from the unlikeliness of this situation, PIL would still be 
necessary regarding extra-EU situations. In fact, it will be argued in this chapter 
that EU PIL rules are at least as adequate as unified substantive law in order to 
regulate cross-border consumer contracts in the EU. 
The situation regarding employment law differs in the sense that Member 
States are more reluctant to confer legislative freedom to the EU because of the 
wide diversity existent regarding regulatory techniques and objectives among 
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employment issues in the different countries.205 Thus, some important areas of 
employment are left to domestic law, such as the protection against unfair 
dismissal, and other areas are directly outside the competence of the EU, such as 
payment, right of association or right to strike.206 Leaving aside the areas of 
fundamental rights, fundamental freedoms and equality, EU employment law is 
mostly laid down in secondary legislation, especially in directives, which, besides 
having a minimum harmonisation approach, do not cover all areas of employment 
law. Still, overall, EU employment law is considered as a ‘coherent whole’, since 
it does cover large areas of regulatory employment law.207 
EU PIL needs to respond both to the necessities of these weaker parties and, 
at the same time, to the necessities of the EU internal market in that regard. Are 
ordinary traditional conflict rules able to respond to the specialities of contracts 
involving weaker parties? Party autonomy is one of the cornerstones of EU PIL 
regarding contractual obligations.208 As the stronger party, a company or an 
employer would be able to introduce in the consumer contract or individual 
employment contract a choice of law clause unilaterally. This clause might 
indicate a law with a low standard of protection for consumers or employees. 
Weaker contracting parties need some mechanism of protection against the 
threats that party autonomy brings.209 The law applicable in absence of choice 
should neither be determined by the general connecting factors, but adequate and 
protective connecting factors need to be designated. Around the globe, we find 
different PIL mechanisms that offer protection to weaker contracting parties, 
ranging from completely prohibiting party autonomy to a more flexible approach 
like providing for the more protective law, as well as a variety of connecting 
factors in absence of choice of law. Which mechanism seems to respond better to 
the necessities of these special contracts? 
In this context, this chapter will: 
- First, identify which are the contracting parties that are considered weaker 
in EU PIL. It will be analysed why consumers and employees are in need of 
                                                     
205 The existent legal diversity is due to the unique social, political economic and cultural roots of 
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special protection in substantive law and PIL. A definition of what is understood 
by consumers and employees in need of special protection in EU PIL will be 
given. Also, a reference to other possible contractual weaker parties will be made. 
- Second, it will be argued why ordinary traditional conflict rules do not 
respond to the specialities of consumer contracts or individual employment 
contracts. Party autonomy is a well-established principle in EU PIL according to 
which parties are free to choose the law applicable to their contract. Freedom of 
choice of law brings numerous advantages to the contractual relationship. 
However, when one of the parties to the contract is in a clear weaker contracting 
position, such as consumers and employees, party autonomy needs to be limited. 
In addition, it will also be explained that, when parties have not chosen the law 
applicable to their contractual relationship, the regular connecting factors are not 
completely adequate regarding consumer and employment contracts. 
- Third, the role of the EU regarding consumer and employee protection will 
be analysed to the extent that it affects the EU PIL rules in this regard. An 
overview of the EU policies and strategies concerning consumer and employee 
protection will be given, as well as a summary of the development of the EU 
legislation and competences in that respect. The specialty of EU PIL rules on 
consumer and employment contracts lies on the fact that, besides ensuring certain 
mandatory rules of the Member State in question, they also need to adapt to the 
EU necessities. Most EU legislation regarding consumer and employment 
contracts is laid down in EU directives that have a minimum harmonising nature, 
which means that Member States have to transpose the minimum protection 
standard required by the specific directive but can also improve that standard. As 
a result, the rules and the protection standard differ from one Member State to 
another. At the same time, there is a minimum EU protection standard versus a 
third country potentially lower standard. Therefore, EU PIL rules need to be 
aware of the EU consumer and employment strategies and substantive legislation. 
On the other hand, this chapter will also make reference to the debate regarding 
the unification of EU contract law, and will defend unified and coherent EU PIL 
rules as a better alternative. 
- Finally, this chapter will analyse the different mechanisms of protection of 
consumers and employees in PIL existent among some different jurisdictions 
around the world. This is, it has been submitted that party autonomy needs to be 
limited, but how and to which extent? Not all jurisdictions use the same 
mechanism. In the same way, the different existing protective conflict rules to 
deal with the law applicable in absence of choice of law in consumer and 
employment contracts will also be object of analysis. The advantages and 
disadvantages of the existing mechanisms will be described in order to ascertain 
which ones can be considered the more adequate for the protection of weaker 
contracting parties in PIL. 
 




1. Identification of weaker contracting parties in 
EU PIL 
The EU PIL instruments regarding contracts on civil and commercial matters (i.e. 
Brussels I bis Regulation210 regarding jurisdiction and recognition and 
enforcement, and Rome I Regulation211 regarding the applicable law) provide for 
specific rules for special categories of contracts involving presumable weaker 
parties. Section 4 (articles 17-19) of the Brussels I Regulation regarding 
jurisdiction and enforcement and article 6 Rome I Regulation regarding the law 
applicable contain special rules concerning consumer contracts, having as a 
principal objective the protection of the consumer in cross-border situations. In 
the same manner, Section 5 Brussels I bis Regulation (arts 20-23) and article 8 
Rome I Regulation contain specific rules referring to individual employment 
contracts, with the main aim of protecting the employee as the weaker party of 
the contract.  
Consumers and employees are considered as the paradigmatic example of 
weaker party in a contract. The information asymmetries between the parties to 
the contract, and the economic or social dependence of the weaker party towards 
his or her counterparty are the characteristic reasons that justify the mandatory 
character of substantive consumer and employment law of the Member States and 
also at EU level. EU PIL ensures that the application of mandatory consumer or 
employment law is not circumvented due to the stronger contractual position of 
the professional or the employer. 
EU PIL instruments also contain special rules regarding insurance contracts 
and contracts of carriage. The protection is extended to passengers and some 
insurance policy holders, although to a lesser extent. Moreover, it is also possible 
to identify some contracting parties which could be regarded in some cases as 
having a weaker bargaining position in a contract but do not enjoy special 
protection under the EU PIL rules. This can be the case of franchisees, 
distributors, commercial agents, and even some small businesses.212 However, 
this study is principally focused on consumer and individual employment 
                                                     
210 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (OJ L 351/1). 
211 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ L 177/6). 
212 Generally, commercial parties are more reluctant to be considered as having a weaker position 
in the market because of the fact of being commercial, and often lack special legal protection. A 
paradigmatic example is, in the context of carriage of goods by sea, the existence of obvious 
bargaining disparities between ship owners and carriers, which have the majority of bargaining 
power, and, on the other hand, cargo owners and receivers, which are in need of special protection 
despite being commercial parties. In this regard: Juan Alberto Salmerón Hernríquez, Freedom of 
Contract, Bargaining Power and Forum Seletion in Bills of Lading (Ulrik Huber Institute for 
Private International Law 2016). 
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contracts, since consumers and employees are evident weaker parties in need of 
substantive and PIL rules ensuring their rights. 
Below, an overview of the rationale behind the need for protection of 
consumers and employees will be given, as well as a general definition of 
consumer and employee in EU PIL terms and a reference to other possible weaker 
parties: 
 
1.1. The necessity of protection of consumers 
1.1.1. Rationale behind consumer protection 
Consumer protection policies and consumer rights are nowadays established in 
most of the contract law of the countries around the world. The concept of 
consumer protection became generalised in the second half of the twentieth 
century as a necessary limit to freedom of contract, and it was recognised in the 
majority of national laws. In the majority of Western and Nordic European 
countries, the concept of ‘welfare state’ became popular in the 1960s and 1970s 
and led to an interventionist approach concerning consumer protection. The 
interests of consumers were taken into consideration as necessary to achieve 
satisfactory market conditions.213 In general, consumers are seen as vulnerable 
market participants that need to be protected against the market forces, and 
although this approach might differ between European countries (e.g. France  
traditionally with a more paternalistic approach vs. the Netherlands with a more 
free market approach), they all agree on the necessity of consumer protection and 
the need to correct the imbalance between professionals and consumers in the 
market.214 For example, the former different treatment of protection from 
standard contract terms in consumer contracts among Member States illustrates 
the very different approaches existent before the drafting of a uniform EU 
legislation (Unfair Contract Terms Directive)215. This is also a paradigmatic 
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example of the need of consumer protection. When the European countries started 
to recognise the need of consumer protection and the necessity of controlling 
standard contract terms in the seventies, legislation and practices differed very 
much amongst them.216 Besides different legislative techniques, one of the main 
discussions concerned the scope of application of the control over unfair contract 
terms: in general, some countries opted for the choice that all contracts between 
consumers and professionals should be object of control, while others considered 
that all the contracts containing standard contract terms should be object of 
control.217 While the first ones focused on the concept of consumer, the second 
ones had to focus on the concept of standard contract terms.218 The debate 
consisted on which is the adequate scope to apply the legislative control. The 
control of standard contract terms or potential unfair contract terms constitutes a 
limitation to freedom of contract, which is essential, and thus the legislative 
control has to be proportionate and justifiable.219 Freedom of contract is based on 
free and voluntary consent. If a contract clause is standard and not negotiated, the 
consumer is not freely giving its consent. Voluntary consent is a necessary part 
of freedom of contract. A consumer is not expected to read the small letter of the 
contract.220  
In consumer law, the national legislator seeks to protect consumers from an 
abuse of freedom of contract, resulting from the inequality in bargaining power 
between the consumer and the professional. In order to do that, substantive 
consumer rights are reflected in mandatory consumer contract regulations. 
Consumer law consists of mandatory rules that guarantee that the contracting 
parties will not circumvent the legislative rules to the detriment of the consumer, 
the obligation of information disclosure, measures regarding safety and quality 
controls of goods and services, indebtedness, dispute resolution, etc.221 In a cross-
border situation, those consumer rights also need to be protected, and that is why 
the concept of consumer protection is also present in PIL. 
Why are consumers considered “weaker” than their counter-party? 
Traditionally, the weaker position is explained through the inequality in the 
                                                     
216 A comparative analysis of the different legislations and practices of the Member States and 
several other European states before the implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive is 
found in: Ewoud Hondius, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Molengraaff Instituut voor 
Privaatrecht 1987). 
217 Jesús Alfaro Águila-Real, ‘Cláusulas Abusivas, Cláusulas Predispuestas Y Condiciones 
Generales’ [1998] Anuario Jurídico de La Rioja 53, 54. 
218 ibid. 
219 ibid 56. 
220 Besides that, even in the case contract terms were negotiated individually, it does not guarantee 
that the consumer has the sufficient knowledge of the market and of the possible terms. This is, 
individual negotiation of a contract would not ensure consumer protection neither, but only a 
transparent market would. Thus, the consumer does not need protection only against unfair terms, 
but also against other possible inequalities. ibid 58,59. 
221 Cseres (n 213) 156. 
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bargaining power of the consumer, who is in an inferior position to defend his 
interests against the professional. The disparities found in the consumer-
professional relationship regard bargaining power, knowledge/information and 
resources.222 Consumers know less about contracts and about the products and 
their quality than the professionals do, and therefore they find themselves in a 
weaker bargaining position. Information asymmetries consist on the impossibility 
or difficulty of acquiring relevant information for the transaction, and in the case 
of consumers, difficulty to assess the conditions and quality of the product or 
service before the conclusion of the contract. In addition, consumers do not have 
the economic capacity to individually asses every contract they enter into.223 
Moreover, when talking about cross-border transactions, the consumer might 
be in more need of protection than in domestic cases, since the language, the other 
party, or the rules might be foreign to the consumer.224 Regarding the latter, there 
are costs related to the legal fragmentation in international transactions; this is, 
costs associated to the fact that different legal systems are involved. While 
entering into transactions in an international market brings many benefits and 
possibilities to consumers in comparison with their national market, being able to 
have more opportunities to find the most satisfactory options for themselves, it 
also brings ‘risks of internationality’, as Garcimartín refers to (‘riesgos de 
internacionalidad’).225 A party to an international transaction does not have the 
security that the rights deriving from its own legal system are the same as the 
ones deriving from other foreign legal systems, or the security that the rights 
derived from a legal system can be recognised and implemented in others. The 
risks involve to have to go to a foreign country to start legal proceedings, to obtain 
evidence, to ask for the recognition or enforcement of a decision or to have to 
gather information and adapt the conduct to a foreign law. These risks have to be 
assumed by one of the parties to a cross-border contract.226 PIL normally allocates 
the costs derived from these risks to one of the parties. In the case of consumer 
contracts, when the risks of internationality are created by a foreign professional 
when approaching the consumer in the consumer’s country, those risks and costs 
should be borne by the professional.227  
In order to achieve economic efficiency in the market, professionals should 
engage in fair competition, provide consumers with information about the 
products, ensure quality and safety standards and offer compensation to 
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consumers if problems arise. At the same time, consumers would act reasonably 
and acquire products with the quality required and at the best price, be well 
informed about those products or services and be aware of the remedies 
available.228 Nevertheless, this is not the case in practice. On the professional’s 
side, they will do what is better for their business, even if it sometimes that 
requires some abuse from their weaker counterparty. On the consumer’s side, 
although it is normally expected that the consumer has given preferences and 
makes rational choices, it is not expected that a consumer will review standard 
contract terms or fully understand them. Moreover, consumer behaviour is 
complex, and while the traditional approach is the rational-choice model, on 
which economics and law have based their theories on consumer protection for 
many years, a more psychological-based approach has been introduced in the last 
years which deviates from the standard economic theory and introduces the 
notions of bounded rationality, bounded willpower and bounded self-interest.229 
In general, the rational-choice model presumes that individuals act in a manner 
that benefits and maximizes their own welfare, and therefore they compare the 
costs and benefits of an action before taking a decision, they look for the 
necessary information, they are able to process and understand such information 
and, finally, they have stable preferences.230 However, it has been shown in 
several studies that consumers’ behaviour is not often rational and factors such 
as emotions, overconfidence or the context itself might have an influence and 
make the behaviour of the consumer ‘irrational’.231 Therefore, it is argued that 
consumers are in need of protection not only because of their lack of information, 
but also because there are cases on which they do not act rationally, and it would 
be irrational to act rationally (e.g. reading the terms and conditions before every 
purchase). 
In addition to the objective of economic efficiency in the market, consumer 
protection measures, when achieving bargaining equality between consumer and 
professional, contribute to social justice. In a contemporary society, consumer 
rights are part of the social rights individuals are entitled to.232   
Regarding consumer transactions in PIL, the weaker position of the consumer 
is evidenced in view of the law applicable to the consumer contract. While 
professionals are normally aware of which law will benefit them, consumers do 
not know which law the professional wishes to apply. Professionals will invest in 
gathering information regarding the expected benefits of the application of certain 
law, while consumers will know about the quality of the law only after the 
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problems occur, after the conclusion of the contract.233 It might be of little use 
protecting the consumer with national (or EU) substantive law if a professional 
can, by inserting a jurisdiction or choice of law clause, escape the application of 
such protective provisions of the consumer’s law.  
As it has been described in Chapter I, the traditional PIL method, the 
multilateral method proposed by Savigny, rests on value-free connecting factors: 
the conflict rule designates the law of a particular country where the legal 
relationship should be localised through objective (value-free) connecting 
factors, regardless of the interests of the parties, the difference in power balance 
of the parties, or the substantive value of the law designated. This method, 
contrarily to the situation in Europe, was never a complete success in the US.234 
In the US, since the 1950s, promoting justice and defending substantive policies 
became the aim of conflict rules. The so-called conflict of laws revolution 
changed the previous approach in the US.235 However, it did not contain specific 
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235 One of the main authors of the modern American conflict of laws approaches was Professor 
Brainerd Currie (1913–1965) and his governmental interest analysis (Brainerd Currie, Selected 
Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Duke University Press 1963). He considered that a conflict of laws 
should be solved on the basis of whether the states involved would have an interest in applying their 
law to the dispute, or, in other words, whether these states have a “governmental interest” in the 
outcome of the case. In order to ascertain that interest, it would be necessary to examine the content 
of the substantive law and then determine whether, according to the purpose of the rules, there is a 
wish for that law to be applicable. Currie proposed a modern version of the unilateral method in 
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reference to consumer protection as such. They were the European countries who 
took the lead in considering consumer protection in PIL.236 Although there was 
no clear event such as conflict of laws revolution in Europe, the growth of the 
consumer society and the development of the protection of human rights after the 
war had also its reflection in PIL. Since the 1960s, the law started to pay special 
attention to regulate and protect the rights of the consumer, and gradually 
consumer law became a separate area from other areas of commercial law, which 
led to having separate PIL rules for this area as well.237 The first EU PIL 
instrument, the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters238, did not originally contain any 
special jurisdiction rule concerning consumer contracts. In the first version of the 
Convention in 1968, section 4 referred to ‘jurisdiction in matters related to 
instalment sales and loans’. It was not until the reform of the Convention in 
1978239 when section 4 became ‘Jurisdiction over consumer contracts’ and 
introduced special jurisdiction rules for consumer contracts. Thus, it can be seen 
that, by the time the Brussels Convention was drafted, countries did not yet 
conceive special jurisdiction rules for consumer contracts, but they already 
included specific regulations regarding specific special areas, such as instalments 
sales, where the buyer was perceived as being in a weaker position.240 Regarding 
special rules concerning applicable law, the first conflict rules regarding 
consumer contracts were enacted in the decade of the seventies: § 41 of the 
Austrian Act on Private International Law241 and Article 5 of the 1980 
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US followed, at least in part, a unilateral approach (although note that the Restatement (Second) of 
conflict of laws (1971) contains a combination of both multilateral and unilateral approaches). 
Symeon C Symeonides, ‘The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years after Currie: An End and a 
Beginning’ (2015) 2015 University of Illinois Law Review.  
236 Zheng Sophia Tang, Electronic Consumer Contracts in the Conflicts of Laws (Hart Publishing 
2009) 5. 
237 ibid. 
238 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters [OJ (1972) L 299/32]. 
239 Council Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation 
by the Court of Justice (Signed on 9 October 1978) (78/884/EEC). 
240 Rafael Arenas García, ‘Tratamiento Jurisprudencial Del Ámbito de Aplicación de Los Foros de 
Protección En Materia de Contratos de Consumidores Del Convenio de Bruselas de 1968’ (1996) 
48 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 39, 41,42.  
241 Gesetz über das internationale Privatrecht – IPR-Gesetz [Federal Act on Private International 
Law], of 15 June 1978, BGBl. No 304/1978: “§ 41. (1) Verträge, bei denen das Recht des Staates, 
in dem eine Partei ihren gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt hat, dieser als Verbraucher besonderen 
privatrechtlichen Schutz gewährt, sind nach diesem Recht zu beurteilen, wenn sie im 
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Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 
Convention)242 included a separate provision regarding applicable law for 
consumer contracts.243 Other national codifications around Europe soon followed 
them (e.g., in the 1980s, Article 120 of the new Swiss Act on Private International 
Law244). Nowadays, consumer protection conflict rules are present in many of the 
legal systems around the world.245 In the EU, article 6 of Rome I Regulation on 
the law applicable to contractual oblgations is the special protective conflict rule 
regarding consumer contracts.  
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It is true that consumer law is characterised by the lack of cases, since most of 
the disputes arising out consumer contracts are small claims and thus parties 
consider unreasonable to bring the dispute to court. Of course, if parties do not 
bring the case to court, PIL issues do not have to be considered. However, first 
of all, this is not always the case, and some contracts might involve a large value 
(e.g. contracts regarding timeshares, package holidays, credit sales, etc.).246 More 
importantly, law must ensure legal certainty and ensure that the expectations of 
the parties are met, regardless the number of claims. Also, law plays a role in 
preventing disputes to arise. The consumer policy of the company will in part 
depend on the legal pressure. This means that when it is difficult for the consumer 
to sue, the company will have less pressure to provide for a favourable consumer 
policy, while if PIL rules favour the consumer and put the company in risk to be 
sued and the application of a law favourable and familiar to the consumer is 
ensured, then the company will be eager to provide good customer service in 
order to solve the dispute before going to court.247  
 
1.1.2. Definition of consumer in the EU PIL context 
There is no international or uniform legal definition of consumer. Different legal 
regimes draw the limit between a commercial contract and a consumer contract 
and between customer and consumer in diverse manners. For our purpose, we 
will define the term ‘consumer’ in the context of EU law; more specifically, in 
the context of EU PIL, where ‘consumer contract’ is to be defined as an 
independent and autonomous concept. According to the ECJ, the terms consumer 
and professional must “be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation 
throughout the Union…, and in order to ensure compliance with the objectives 
pursued by the European legislature in the sphere of consumer contracts, and the 
consistency of European Union law, account must be taken, in particular, to the 
definition of ‘consumer’ in other rules of European Union law” .248 
Since the existence of a special provision for consumer contracts is based on 
the inequality between the parties to the contract, the characteristics of the parties 
are relevant to identify a contract as a consumer contract. In EU PIL, for a contract 
to be considered as a consumer contract, the consumer must be an individual 
acting outside his trade or profession, while his counterparty (the professional) 
should be acting within the course of his business or profession.249 These type of 
contracts are normally referred to as business-to-consumer contracts (B2C 
contracts): 
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a. The consumer acting outside his trade or profession: 
There is no common definition of consumer in EU law, and there are also 
differences amongst the definitions used in the national law of the Member States 
(partly as a result of the transposition of EU consumer directives into national 
legislation).250 However, the vast majority of the definitions of ‘consumer’ found 
in EU legislation, despite being phrased in different manners, refer to the 
consumer as a natural person who is acting for a purpose outside the scope of his 
trade or profession.   
The origin of this wording is to be found in art. 13 of the Brussels Convention 
after the revision of 1978, later reproduced in art. 5(1) Rome Convention and 
from there it spread into the European consumer acquis.251 Nowadays, this is the 
notion found in the majority of EU consumer directives and in the Brussels I bis 
Regulation and the Rome I Regulation. It is a negative definition, since it requires 
that a consumer acts outside the scope of a business.252  
It is clear that in the context of EU PIL, the consumer shall conclude the 
contract for a purpose outside his trade or profession. However, it is necessary to 
clarify some uncertainties arising from this concept: 
- Although in some legal instruments it is admitted that the consumer can be 
a legal person, in the context of EU PIL it is clear that only a natural person or 
individual can be a consumer. In Benincasa v. Dentalkit253, the ECJ already held 
that the term consumer in art.13 Brussels Convention covered only a private final 
consumer and “consequently, only contracts concluded for the purposes of 
satisfying an individual’s own needs in terms of private consumption come under 
the provisions designed to protect the consumer as the party deemed to be the 
weaker party economically”.254 In Idealservice255, in the context of Directive 
93/12 on unfair contract terms in consumer contracts, the ECJ clearly stated only 
natural persons could be consumers. This approach is now clarified by the 
definitions of consumer given in the Brussels I bis and the Rome I Regulations, 
which refer to the consumer as a ‘natural person’.  
- Another uncertainty regarding the concept of consumer acting outside his 
trade or profession consists on whether a party who contracts outside his trade or 
                                                     
250 Since a large part of the EU consumer directives follow a minimum harmonisation approach, 
many Member States extended the scope of their consumer protection law beyond the definition of 
consumer under EU Law. 
251 Article 5(1) Rome Convention reads: “This Article applies to a contract the object of which is 
the supply of goods or services to a person ('the consumer`) for a purpose which can be regarded 
as being outside his trade or profession (…)” (emphasis added). 
252 On the contrary, art. 2(a) CISG, for instance, gives a positive definition of the consumer by 
excluding sales “of goods bought for personal, family or household use”. 
253Case C-269/95 Benincasa v Dentalkit [1997] ECR I-3767. 
254Benincasa v. Dentalkit, para 17. 
255 Joined Cases C-541/99 Cape Snc v. Idealservice Srl and C-542/99 Idealservice MN RE Sas v. 
OMAI Srl [2001] ECR I-09049. 




profession at the time of concluding the contract but uses the object of the contract 
for his trade or profession in the future is a consumer.256 The ECJ also addressed 
this issue in Benincasa v Dentalkit, in the context of art. 13 Brussels Convention, 
where it was held that a consumer should conclude the contract outside any trade 
or professional activity or purpose, whether present or future.257 Even if one of 
the parties, at the time of concluding the contract, is in an weaker position than 
its counterparty, it is not sufficient to receive protection as a consumer. The ECJ 
held that “[t]he specific protection sought to be afforded by those provisions is 
unwarranted in the case of contracts for the purpose of trade or professional 
activity, even if that activity is only planned for the future, since the fact that an 
activity is in the nature of a future activity does not divest it in any way of its 
trade or professional character”.258 Thus, a consumer should be understood as 
someone contracting for a purpose outside his trade or profession at the moment 
of contracting and also outside the trade or profession he would have as a result 
of the contract.  
Doubts arise regarding profit contracts that are concluded by a person acting 
outside his trade or profession. For example, the case involving the purchase of 
frozen stallion sperm for the purposes of breeding horses by a person whose 
normal profession is a gardener. This was a case brought against the Austrian 
courts259, where the court did not question the fact that it was not the normal 
professional activity of the purchaser. Since it is a contract for a profit, the 
consideration of such a contract as for private purposes as required by the ECJ 
the Benincasa judgment is very doubtful.260 
- On the other hand, the situation of a customer partially acting within and 
outside its trade or profession might also create doubts. Contracts with a ‘mixed 
purpose’ (i.e. for a goods or services to be used both inside and outside a person’s 
trade or profession) pose the question of whether the customer can be regarded 
as a consumer. This occurs especially in cases of self-employed persons who 
purchase objects for dual purposes (e.g. a computer). The ECJ took a specific 
approach in this regard in the Gruber v Bay Wa AG case261 in the context of the 
Brussels I Regulation. In this case, a farmer, Mr. Gruber, bought building 
materials for the replacement of the roof of his farm house, where he also lived 
with his family (62% of the floor for family use and the 38% left for business 
purposes). The ECJ took a restrictive approach by classifying contracts with 
mixed purposes as non-consumer contracts, with the exception that the business 
purposes are so minor as to be insignificant. Only those in a weaker position 
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should be afforded protection, and the general weaker position of the buyer does 
not exist when he buys for his trade or profession, even partially.262 In its 
reasoning, the ECJ emphasises the weaker position of the consumer (“inasmuch 
as a contract is entered into for the person’s trade or professional purposes, he 
must be deemed to be on an equal footing with the other party to the contract, so 
that the special protection reserved by the Brussels Convention for consumers is 
not justified in such a case”)263, as well as the restrictive interpretation that the 
negative definition of consumer implies.264 In order to determine when the 
purpose for trade or profession is to be regarded as negligible, the ECJ suggests 
to take into account the content, nature and purpose of the contract, and the 
circumstances in which it was concluded.265 This approach contrasts with the 
traditionally understanding, according to which the predominant purpose of the 
contract was considered as decisive.266 Nowadays, this predominant purpose test 
is to be found in other instruments of EU consumer law, such as in the Consumer 
Rights Directive.267 However, the ECJ approach is considered more consistent 
with the requirements of predictability and certainty regarding jurisdiction and 
applicable law.268  
More recently, in the Schrems case269, the ECJ confirms the restrictive 
interpretation of the aforementioned judgments and, on the basis of this 
interpretation, determined whether Mr. Schrems, a Facebook user with habitual 
residence in Austria, was to be considered a ‘consumer’ and thus fall under art. 
15 Brussels I Regulation (now art. 17 Brussels I bis Regulation).270 Mr. Scherms 
used Facebook account only for personal purposes under a false name, using it 
solely for his private activities. However, he later also opened a Facebook page 
in order to report to internet users on his legal proceedings against Facebook 
Ireland, his lectures, his participation in panel debates and his media appearances, 
as well as to call for the donation of funds and to publicise his books (about legal 
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proceedings against alleged infringements of data protection by Facebook). The 
ECJ explained that, taking into account the nature and objective of the contract, 
a user of digital social media can rely on his status as a consumer “only if the 
predominately non-professional use of those services, for which the applicant 
initially concluded a contract, has not subsequently become predominately 
professional”.271 Since, on the basis of the previous case law (such as Gruber and 
Benincasa), a ‘consumer’ is defined by contrast to an ‘economic operator’, 
regardless his knowledge or information, the expertise acquired by the consumer 
regarding those services or his assurances given for representing the rights and 
interests of the users of those services cannot deprive him from the notion of 
consumer; otherwise, this would prevent an effective defence of the rights of the 
consumer.272 Therefore, the ECJ concluded that “ (…) the activities of publishing 
books, lecturing, operating websites, fundraising and being assigned the claims 
of numerous consumers for the purpose of their enforcement do not entail the loss 
of a private Facebook account user’s status as a ‘consumer’ (…)”. 
- In addition, it is questionable whether it is necessary that the supplier knows, 
or ought to have known, the status of the consumer. To the question of whether 
it is necessary that the professional has been aware of the purpose for which the 
contract was concluded, the ECJ in Gruber held that the court seized, when 
determining if a contract was concluded outside the purpose of trade or 
profession, “(…)must not take account of facts or circumstances of which the 
other party to the contract may have been aware when the contract was concluded, 
unless the person who claims the capacity of consumer behaved in such a way as 
to give the other party to the contract the legitimate impression that he was acting 
for the purposes of his business”.273 According to the ECJ, a person cannot claim 
the status of consumer if they have negligently created the impression that they 
were acting in the course of a business (e.g. by using a company letterhead or 
address). In such cases, the ‘consumer’ is renouncing to the special protection 
afforded to him by the EU PIL provisions.274  
- Finally, the ECJ in a recent case clarified that the requirement of a consumer 
acting outside its trade or profession can be fulfilled regardless the knowledge or 
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expertise about the subject matter of the contract.275 In the context of article 17(1) 
Brusses I bis Regulation regarding jurisdiction, the Czech Supreme Court 
referred to the ECJ the question whether a natural person acting outside her trade 
or profession who engages in trade on the FOREX (foreign exchange) market can 
be regarded a consumer within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the Brussels 
Regulation or whether, by reason of the knowledge and expertise required to 
engage in that trade, the complex nature of the contract at hand (‘financial 
contract for differences’ or ‘CFD’), and of the risks involved, that person should 
not be considered a consumer. The ECJ replied that the natural person must be 
classified as a consumer within the meaning of that provision if the conclusion of 
that contract does not fall within the scope of that person’s professional activity, 
and the special factors above named are irrelevant in that regard. In addition, The 
fact that that natural person would fall under a different term other than a 
consumer under EU directives because of those other factors (in this case, that 
person is a ‘retail client’ within the meaning of Article 4(1)(12) of Directive 
2004/39/EC), and the fact that contracts involving financial instruments fall 
outside the scope of article 6 Rome I Regulation regarding the law applicable to 
consumer contracts, are both in principle irrelevant in terms of the concept of 
consumer under artice 17 Brussels I bis.  
 
b. The status of the other party: the professional acting within the 
course of his trade or profession: 
 
To be determined as a consumer, it is necessary that the counterparty of the 
consumer is acting within the course of his trade or profession. This is, the 
consumer would not be in a weaker position against the seller if the latter is acting 
outside his trade or profession (e.g. a person selling second hand his or her old 
phone to another person, both presumably with the same bargaining position and 
information). Contrarily to the definition of consumer, this is a positive definition, 
since it is of relevance that the provisions protecting the consumer are applicable 
only when the person is in the position of a professional and, therefore, knowing 
the existence of determinate risks involved due to the application of mandatory 
consumer protection rules.276 
The counterparty of the consumer is referred to with different terms around 
EU legislation (e.g. ‘trader’, ‘supplier’, ‘seller’, ‘vendor’, etc.). Thus, unlike the 
term consumer, the counterparty of the consumer has no established terminology 
within the consumer acquis. Since the EU consumer directives used these variety 
of terms, which might create confusions, it was suggested that the conceivable 
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formulations to refer to the consumer’s counterparty are ‘business’ or 
‘professional’.277 The Rome I Regulation uses the term ‘professional’. 
Regardless the terminological incoherence, the meaning of the concept in the 
EU consumer acquis does not change: the professional is a person acting in the 
exercise of his trade or profession. Therefore, a private individual which is selling 
his bicycle second hand to another individual is not considered a professional. In 
such a contract, both parties are outside the course of their trade or profession, 
which means that none of them is a professional and neither a consumer under 
EU PIL.  
As in the case of the concept of ‘consumer’, the ECJ must make an 
independent autonomous interpretation according to the EU PIL instruments and 
having regard to alternative descriptions of the consumer counterparty described 
in other EU consumer law instruments, unless there are strong signs that it would 
not be appropriate.278 In contrast to the consumer, the professional can be a 
natural or legal person. 
The definition of professional requires to determine which was the trade or 
profession at the time of concluding the contract and whether the contract was 
concluded on the course of such a trade or profession. In most of the cases, it is 
clear what constitutes the trade or profession of a person. Both commercial (e.g. 
merchants, craftsmen, etc.) and professional activities (such as lawyers, 
architects, etc.) are covered by the definition, while the economic activities of the 
employees are excluded. However, individuals also sell things or provide services 
while this does not constitute their ‘official’ profession, and sometimes it is 
difficult to draw the line regarding whether this might constitute a (maybe part-
time) commercial or professional activity. It is generally suggested, following the 
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)279, that the decisive criterion is the 
exercise of an independent or self-employed activity.280 The avocational business 
should then be delineated from a simple hobby, being decisive the overall 
impression of the appearance at the market, and taking into account as well the 
durability or economic sustainability.281 For example, a person that sells some 
second-hand items on the internet from time to time would not constitute a 
professional; however, if that person sells a substantial amount of used products 
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and on a regular basis it could indeed be considered a professional.282 The 
regularity of trade or the accumulation of stock may indicate the existence of a 
commercial activity. It is not necessary the intention to make a profit. Thus, a 
lawyer working on a pro bono basis, or a non-profit organisation offering goods 
or services in the market to compensate the loss created by a non-commercial 
activity, can be considered as professionals.283 The key factor in these cases is the 
appearance in the market in the role of a business. Moreover, the professional 
does not necessarily have to receive money in return for his products or services 
to be considered a professional (e.g. an internet provider that offers information 
or other services to consumers for free –but who is still rewarded indirectly by 
selling consumer information to other parties, for instance).284  
On the other hand, the fact that a client (subjectively and mistakenly) believed 
that he was dealing with a professional in the exercise of his trade or profession 
when he was not, has no relevance, except if it was due to the misleading conduct 
of the other party. If the ‘non-professional’ claimed to be operating in the course 
of his trade or profession (maybe because he wanted to benefit from avoiding his 
‘amateur’ position) he may have to face the consequences of being considered as 
a professional.285  
 
1.2. The necessity of protection of employees 
1.2.1. Rationale behind employee protection 
“In its inception it is an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of 
subordination, however much the submission and the subordination may be 
concealed by that indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the ‘contract 
of employment’. The main object of labour law has always been, and we venture 
to say will always be, to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of 
bargaining power which is inherent and must be inherent in the employment 
relationship.”286 
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This is the iconic definition that Kahn-Freund provided in 1967 for the 
employment relationship, and still referred to  nowadays in employment law 
manuals.287 This definition evidences the consequences derived from a liberal 
model where employment protection law did not exist: submission, subordination 
and inequality of bargaining power.  
As to the inequality of bargaining power, the employer generally has superior 
resources (larger capital, legal advice, experience in the market, etc.). While this 
is also a characteristic feature of the relationship between professional and 
consumer, in the case of employment contracts there is also the factor that 
workers would normally require immediately an income while employers can 
generally wait for a better offer with only a risk of reducing profits. Although that 
is not always the case, and an employer might need urgently workforce or an 
employee have unique skills, the most common situation is that the employer 
offers work on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.288 Employees find themselves in a 
situation of economic and/or social dependence of the employer. First, 
employment is their source of income and, second, employment is also relevant 
regarding the personal development and social status of a person.289 As to the 
submission feature, employees submit to the standard terms of the employment 
contract, to which they do not pay enough attention or simply do not understand, 
giving more importance to issues such as working environment or promotion 
opportunities, absent in the contract. As to the subordination aspect, this is the 
key feature of the employment relationship. The employment contract has an 
authority structure, in which, in return for payment, the employer bargains for the 
right to issue directives and direct the employee to perform productively. The 
employee gives the consent to obey the employer’s instructions.290 Thus, the 
aforementioned characteristics of the employment relationship require special 
legislation for employment contracts.  
Freedom of contract would generally lead to unfavourable employment terms 
for employees due to the imbalance between employer and employee in the 
labour market, and that is why substantive law contains mandatory provisions 
aimed to protect the employee as a weaker contracting party (rules regarding 
minimum remuneration, maximum working hours and minimum rest periods, 
minimum paid annual holidays, health and safety, equality, etc.). In the nineteenth 
century, with the rise of freedom of contract, employment contracts were 
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understood as general contracts, in which the contracting parties would be equal 
before the law and would exercise their free will. However, it seems nowadays 
obvious that this treatment did not bring equality, but put in evidence the 
inequality in the bargaining power of the parties, due to the socio-economic 
dependence of the employee towards the employer.291 Special regulation of the 
contract of employment was demanded. Some justified this necessity on the lack 
of equality of bargaining power of workers with employers, which led to a market 
failure. However, some claim that the difficulty bargaining in which workers 
entered was in fact due to the operation of a competitive labour market, rather 
than the result of a market failure.292 The purpose of national systems to regulate 
contracts of employment was not designed to intensify the competitive nature of 
the labour market, but rather to prevent the outcome of competitive market by 
serving distributive purposes and protect workers.293 Legal systems approached 
this distributive regulation of contracts of employment in two ways: the first 
approach consisted on legislation imposing compulsory terms and obligations on 
contracts of employment (e.g. minimum wage rules, maximum working hours, 
etc.); the second approach consisted on restructuring the labour market through 
the creation of collective bargaining, which strengthened the bargaining position 
of the employees and thus resulted on an improvement on the terms of the 
employment contracts. The second approach is a type of self-regulation, which in 
fact might lead to the setting of higher standards than the ones imposed my 
legislative measures and adapt to the precise circumstances of the business or 
sector. Member States have used both techniques to different extents and in 
diverse manners. This study will not enter into the regulation of collective 
agreements. It will only focus on the regulation of individual employment 
contracts. 
During the twentieth century, an autonomous concept of employment contract 
was developed, together with protective legislation. With the main goal of 
compensating the imbalance of the employment relationship, European countries 
developed their national legislations on labour law. In addition, the modern 
European legal regulation regarding employment aims to integrate economic and 
social policies.294 In the last decades, the internationalisation of markets led to a 
continuous increase in the existence of employment contracts with cross-border 
elements. Transnational employment relationships are nowadays common: 
workers commuting to a place of work in their neighbouring country, employers 
posting workers to a foreign place of work, companies seeking out employees 
abroad, or even workers whose job is of a cross-border nature (lorry drivers, 
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aircrew members, offshore installations, etc.). In those cases, PIL needs to 
respond to the needs of substantive employment law. Substantive employment 
law aims to achieve a balance between the private interests of the parties to the 
employment contract, but also pursues social policy goals, containing thus rules 
of public character. However, I will focus on the private dimension of 
employment protection, whose peculiarities are to be reflected on PIL rules.  
As it has been already mentioned, PIL aimed to be ‘neutral’: the traditional 
multilateral approach proposed by Savigny decided which law was applicable 
through the abstract legal relationship and connecting factors, finding the legal 
system to which the legal relationship ‘belonged’.295 Thus, under Savingny’s 
traditional approach, which enjoyed exclusivity in Europe until the second half 
of the twentieth century, the protection of employees was a task of the applicable 
substantive law. In Europe, the evolution of European conflict rules for 
employment contracts started with the publication of the Draft Convention on the 
law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations in 1972296, which 
provided that, in absence of choice of law, the law applicable to employment 
contracts would be the law of the country of habitual place of work, and that the 
choice of law could not undermine the mandatory rules of that law.297 It is 
remarkable that the Draft Convention did not include a similar provision 
regarding consumer contracts.298 Also, at the same time, a proposal for a 
Regulation on the law applicable to employment relationships was published in 
1972, amended in 1976, and intended to determine the law applicable for 
employment contracts performed within the European Economic Community.299 
However, a Convention establishing uniform rules on the law applicable to 
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contractual obligations, including employment contracts, was preferred to a 
regulation only covering intra-Community cases. The Rome Convention on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations was signed in 1980, including in article 
6 a specific rule for employment contracts, regardless whether the place of work 
was inside or outside the ECC. Nowadays, modern PIL instruments contain 
special rules regarding employment contracts based on the objective of protection 
of employee as weaker contractual party. Recital 23 Rome I Regulation declares 
that regarding contracting parties considered as weaker, they should be protected 
by conflict rules more favourable to their interests than general rules. Thus, the 
objective is to achieve justice and fairness in international employment contracts 
by favouring the interests of the employee as a weaker contracting party.300 In the 
EU, article 8 Rome I Regulation is currently the special protective conflict rule 
regarding individual employment contracts. 
 
1.2.2. Definition of employee in the EU PIL context 
In broad terms, individual employment contracts are contracts between an 
employee and an employer, under which the employee needs to perform the 
service promised, while the employer gives a remuneration in return. The term 
‘individual employment contract’ excludes any provisions of collective labour 
law (e.g. collective bargaining agreements).  
The characterisation as employment contract depends largely on the 
interpretation of the term ‘employee’. Among the national laws of the Member 
States, the classification of contract of employment differs and reflects diverse 
notions of the concept of employee, which can also vary depending on the nature 
of the substantive law protection involved. However, the differences are not that 
big and, in a comparative perspective, many common characteristics can be found 
on the definition of employee among the Member States.  
In Europe, a distinction is made between employee and self-employed person 
or, in other words, a distinction is made between those who are employed and 
provide their work under a contract of employment, and those who are ‘self-
employed’ who enter into contracts to perform work or services for others. It is 
characteristic of numerous Member States that the relevant criteria of the notion 
of employee are to be found on the case law, rather than providing for a statutory 
definition. While German case law considers an employee as personally 
dependent from his employer, who has the right to issue directives, French courts 
emphasise on a relationship of legal subordination, and the UK defines the 
employee by questioning whether he worked under the counterparty’s ‘control’ 
(the so-called ‘control-test’).301 A big common element for many Member States 
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is the criterion of the employer having the right to issue directives, as well as the 
element of subordination. The ECJ considers that an employment relationship is 
an employment contract but, if the subordination requirement is not satisfied, then 
it is a contract of services: ‘any activity which a person performs outside a 
relationship of subordination must be classified as an activity pursued in a self-
employed capacity for the purposes of Article 52 of the Treaty’.302 
In the case of EU PIL, the term ‘employee’ must be defined autonomously, 
taking into account the intention of the regulation involved and EU law. That is, 
the definition must be consistent with the instruments of EU PIL (Rome regime 
and Brussels regime), and aligned with other relevant provisions of EU law and 
the case law of the ECJ.303 The case law developed an autonomous interpretation 
derived from the Lawrie-Blum case304, in the context of article 45 TFEU on the 
free movement of workers. The Court held that “the essential feature for an 
employment relationship (…) is that for a certain period of time a person performs 
services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he 
receives remuneration”. This definition has been widely adopted in other areas of 
labour law among EU directives (e.g. Working Time Directive305) and case law 
(e.g. Martínez Sala case306 regarding equal pay). It has to be noticed that the ECJ 
also stated that the definition of worker in EU law varies depending of the area 
the definition is to be applied.307 However, it is likely that the main features of 
the definition of employee in the sense of art. 45 TFEU, defining the employee 
as a person who performs services for and under the direction of another person 
for a certain period of time in return for a remuneration, are to be considered in 
the context of EU PIL regulations.  
Therefore, it is submitted that an employee in the EU PIL context is a natural 
person performing services, for and under the direction of another person, for a 
period of time, and in return of remuneration. Also, services should be real, 
genuine and have some economic value.308 An employee is to be under the 
direction and control of his or her counterparty and there is a relation of 
subordination between them rather than consisting on a commercial transaction 
with an independent service provider. Thus, the broad definition from the Lawrie-
Blum case should be applied to the concept of individual employment contract in 
the Brussels I bis and Rome I Regulations. By following a broad definition rather 
than a narrow one it is ensured that anyone covered by the national mandatory 
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legislation as an employee would also be likely to be covered by the special EU 
rules on jurisdiction and applicable law. Also, by taking a too narrow approach, 
the special PIL rules might lose their purpose since it could allow employers to 
avoid their protection.309 The ECJ in the context of the Brussels Convention, 
although it did not define the term employee as such, seems to support this broad 
definition : “(…) contracts of employment, like other contracts for work other 
than on a self-employed basis, differ from other contracts – even those for the 
provision of services – by virtue of certain peculiarities: they create a lasting bond 
which brings the worker to some extent within the organisational framework of 
the business of the undertaking or employer, and they are linked to the place 
where the activities are pursued, which determines the application of the 
mandatory rules and collective agreements”.310 The ECJ did not define in that 
case the term ‘employee’, but gives some guidance. It refers to the subordination 
between the employee and employer, and the bond of the employee with the 
business of the employer. It refers to work done other than on a self-employed 
basis, which seems to exclude those genuinely self-employed.311  
A broad definition would ensure that the ‘false self-employed’ is considered 
as an employee in terms of application of the protective EU PIL rules. ‘False self-
employed’ persons have been defined as ‘employees who are disguised as self-
employed in order to avoid the application of some specific legislation (for 
example, labour or fiscal regulations) which is considered unfavourable by the 
employer. Another example is the case of self-employed persons who are 
economically dependent on a sole (or main) customer.’312 This description has 
been given by the General Advocate Wahl and confirmed by the ECJ, who held 
that:  ‘On a proper construction of EU law, it is only when self-employed service 
providers who are members of one of the contracting employees’ organisations 
and perform for an employer, under a works or service contract, the same activity 
as that employer’s employed workers, are ‘false self-employed’, in other words, 
service providers in a situation comparable to that of those workers, that a 
provision of a collective labour agreement, such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, which sets minimum fees for those self-employed service providers, 
does not fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.’313  
Although the existence of an authority relationship is an important factor to 
distinguish an employee or a ‘false self-employed’ person from a self-employed 
person, there are other important elements to take into account. In comparison to 
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an employee or a ‘false self-employed’ person, a self-employed person is 
characterised by the freedom and flexibility in determining his time schedule, 
place and contents of his work.314 Another characteristic is that a self-employed 
person runs a commercial and financial risk, while employees and ‘false self-
employed’ persons do not. Moreover, forming part of the employer's economic 
unit is of relevance to be considered an employee (or ‘false self-employed’ 
person). Therefore, the relevant elements to determine whether a person is an 
employee, self-employed or false self-employed are whether there is legal 
subordination between the parties, whether there is financial and commercial risk 
and whether the person is involved or forms part of the business of the 
employer.315 
 
1.3. Other weaker parties in a contract 
While consumers and employees constitute the paradigmatic example of weaker 
contracting parties under EU PIL, the protection afforded by the EU PIL rules is 
not limited to them. Although to a lesser level, the protection is extended to 
passengers and some insurance policy holders. Moreover, even when special 
rules protecting a weaker contracting party in the EU PIL rules in civil and 
commercial matters only include consumers, employees, insurance policy holders 
(or other beneficiaries) and passengers, other contractual parties can be 
considered weaker parties in need of protection (such as franchisees or 
commercial agents). European legal instruments harmonising substantive rules of 
contract law protect other individual private parties’ interests by setting a 
minimum common level of protection among the Member States, and thus cover 
other (weaker?) contractual parties that do not enjoy a special protection under 
EU PIL rules.316 
 
1.3.1. Passengers 
In the case of a contract of carriage of passengers, passengers are considered a 
weaker party. A special protective rule is provided regarding the law applicable 
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to these contracts (article 5(2) Rome I Regulation), although regarding 
jurisdiction and enforcement the general rules apply. The recognition of 
passengers as a weaker party in EU PIL is recent, since before the Rome I 
Regulation there was not a special conflict rule for contracts of carriage of 
passengers, since no difference was made between carriage of goods and carriage 
of passengers. At the same time, they were excluded from the special provision 
for consumer contracts on the basis that contracts of carriage of passengers 
‘cannot adequately be dealt with by application of the law at the consumer’s 
habitual place of residence: Cross-border carriage, especially for the conveyance 
of passengers, usually involves a large number of consumers from different 
countries. Therefore, application of the consumer’s law would require the carrier 
to comply with different protective laws at the same time. It is evident that this is 
neither feasible nor desirable’.317 However, the passenger might as well be in the 
same weaker position as a consumer (the passenger is a consumer in the general 
meaning of the term), and it is considered as a weaker party. The difference lies 
on the emphasis on the interests and expectations of the carrier. Although the 
enactment of a special provision protecting the passenger is driven by a wish to 
protect him as a consumer, the position of the commercial carrier is respected and 
plays a big role in it. The Rome I Regulation tried to reach a compromise between 
the interests of the passenger and the interests of the carrier.318   
The rationale behind the protection of passengers is the same as the rationale 
behind the protection of consumers: they are in a weaker position in respect of 
their counterparty due to an imbalance regarding bargaining power, 
knowledge/information and resources. In fact, passengers can generally be 
regarded as consumers, although in EU PIL terms they are excluded from the 
special rules on consumers. The same goes for some insurance contracts. Recital 
32 Rome I Regulation provides that: “Owing to the particular nature of contracts 
of carriage and insurance contracts, specific provisions should ensure an adequate 
level of protection of passengers and policy holders. Therefore, Article 6 
[regarding consumer contracts] should not apply in the context of those particular 
contracts.” 
In the same manner as between consumers and professionals, information 
asymmetries exist between passengers and carriers. It is difficult for the 
passengers to acquire relevant information about the conditions and quality of the 
service of transport before the conclusion of the contract. Moreover, in cross-
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border cases, the language, the other party, or the applicable law might be foreign 
to the passengers.319 In the case of the law applicable to the contract, carriers will 
be aware of which law will benefit them: they can invest in gathering information 
regarding the expected benefits of the application of certain law. On the other 
hand, a passenger will know about the quality of law only after the problems 
occur after the conclusion of the contract.320 The application of general EU PIL 
rules can lead to the circumvention of mandatory rules that protect the passenger 
in substantive law and which application is in accordance to his legitimate 
expectations. 
 
1.3.2. Insurance policy holders (or other beneficiaries) 
Insurance policy holders are not always a weaker party in an insurance contract. 
EU PIL distinguishes between contracts where the policy holder needs special 
protection and contracts where there is no need for such protection. Specifically, 
a distinction is made between contracts on large risks, contracts on mass risks and 
mandatory insurance contracts. Only the two latter categories are considered to 
need special EU PIL rules regarding weaker parties’ protection. On the other 
hand, contracts for large risks, as defined in the EU legislation, are mostly 
relevant for B2B contracts, as they normally regard large industrial and transport 
business operations. Therefore, it is assumed that the policy holders insuring large 
risks are not in need of special protection, since they have sufficient bargaining 
power, capacity and resources to negotiate the terms of the contract.  
Contracts that do not qualify as contracts for large risks are referred to as 
contracts for mass risks. Both B2C and B2B contracts and of different types of 
insurance can fall within this category. Customers ensuring smaller risks are more 
likely to be in a weaker position, since it is unlikely that they will have the 
necessary information, resources or capacity to negotiate the terms of the contract 
and to deal with foreign laws. Thus, special EU PIL rules are necessary in order 
to avoid a potential abuse from the insurer and a circumvention of the mandatory 
law protecting the policy holder. 
EU PIL rules offer an extra degree of protection and mandatory character in 
the case of mandatory insurance contracts, namely when Member States impose 
an obligation to take out insurance. In that case, the protection is not only in the 
policy holder’s interest, but mainly for overriding public policy reasons which 
underpin the decision to impose a mandatory insurance cover in the first place. 
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1.3.3. Other (possible) weaker parties not covered by EU PIL rules  
As referred to above, the term weaker party in EU PIL generally regards 
consumers and employees and, to a lesser extent, insurance policy holders and 
passengers. However, there are other parties which could be regarded as having 
a weaker bargaining position in a contract. This can be the case of franchisees, 
distributors, commercial agents, and even some small businesses. National 
substantive rules, and even EU legal instruments harmonising or unifying 
substantive rules of private law, offer protection to some of these other parties’ 
interest.  
Therefore, these parties can be regarded as weaker parties in the substantive 
level, and thus enjoy special protection, but this special protection is not reflected 
at the EU PIL level, which means that the ‘strong party’ of the contract could 
intentionally avoid the application of that special protection in a cross-border 
situation as a consequence of the operation of the general EU PIL rules. It is not 
very clear why protection is afforded to some weaker parties and not to others 
who in other contexts are viewed as weaker parties as well.  
For instance, in the case of commercial agents, it is true that where consumers 
and employees must be protected against a choice of law and its negative 
consequences, it is argued that the need for protection of agents becomes less 
obvious. Firstly, agents are usually better informed and experienced. Secondly, 
in the current international practice, commercial agents are often organised as 
corporate bodies having more than one principal. Nevertheless, when the 
commercial agent is a natural person having only one principal, his situation is 
highly comparable as the one confronted by an employee, and therefore subject 
to possible abuse from the principal.321 Due to the possible imbalance on the 
bargaining power between the agent and its principal on the agency contract, the 
principal may impose the terms of the contract, including a choice of law clause. 
The principal, aware of the legal diversity in this area, may wish to elude the 
national legislations which afford a level of protection to the agent, in order to be 
more economically efficient and become more competitive within its operating 
market. Therefore, the agency contract may contain a choice of law clause 
referring to a non-Member State law which does not set the minimum standards 
of protection in favour of the agent as the Commercial Agents Directive322 does. 
As a consequence of this behaviour, it can be considered that the internal market 
may suffer a negative impact, as it promotes distorted competition. Furthermore, 
the direct consequence would be for the commercial agents, as they will be 
unprotected against eventual abuses from their principal. As it has been said, 
these were precisely the negative effects the Commercial Agents Directive aimed 
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to eradicate. However, commercial agents do not enjoy special EU PIL protective 
rules.323 In the majority of the cases a commercial agent will not be in need of 
protection, but rather will act as a corporation in equal bargaining position as its 
principal. 
The same arguments can be used in the cases of franchisees, distributors and, 
specially, small business: although in some cases they might be in an imbalanced 
position in the contract, it is argued that in general they would be better informed 
and experienced than the protected consumers and employees, and therefore in 
those cases the principle of party autonomy would prevail over their need of 
protection. 
 
2. EU PIL principles and weaker parties: the 
importance and “dangers” of party autonomy 
and the need of special protective connecting 
factors 
This section aims to explain why ordinary traditional conflict rules do not respond 
to the specialities of consumer contracts or individual employment contracts. 
First, the unequal position of the parties questions the adequate application of 
party autonomy in contracts involving one weaker party. Party autonomy is one 
of the most important principles in modern EU PIL, and the freedom of the parties 
to choose the law applicable to their contract is generally acknowledged. 
However, it is thought that, as the stronger party, a company or an employer 
would be able to introduce in the consumer contract or individual employment 
contract a choice of law clause unilaterally. This clause might indicate a law with 
a low standard of protection for consumers or employees. 
On the other hand, when parties do not choose the law applicable to the 
contract, the general conflict rules apply, which traditionally would determine the 
law applicable based on the existence of certain connections between the case 
and the territory. The use of objective connecting factors ensures that the law 
applicable would be the law of a country that has a substantial (and, ideally, the 
closest) connection with the dispute. However, the application of that law might 
be against the interests of the consumer, since, in general, the law having the 
closest connection to the contract would be the law of the place of establishment 
of the company. The neutral and objective connecting factor is not suitable for 
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consumer contracts. In the same manner, the use of the general objective 
connecting factors might not lead to the adequate applicable law to employment 
contracts. 
Thus, this section will first highlight the importance of party autonomy in PIL, 
especially regarding contractual obligations, and then refer to some necessary 
restraints on the use of these freedom of choice of law by the parties, especially 
regarding consumer and employment contracts. Then, the need for special 
connecting factors regarding the law applicable to these special contracts in the 
cases where parties did not choose the law applicable will be explained. 
 
2.1. The importance of party autonomy and the need of 
limits 
Party autonomy, as the power of individuals to arrange their legal relationships 
according to their own interests, stands nowadays as a basic principle for 
international contracts worldwide. It encompasses in the area of PIL the notion 
that parties to a contract have the freedom to choose the law governing their legal 
relationship, and it is considered one of the leading concepts in contemporary 
PIL.324 Accordingly, in the contemporary conflicts theory, it is believed the 
applicable law should be determined by the will of the parties.325 The law agreed 
by the parties will therefore replace the law otherwise applicable to the contract.  
To a large extent, the European systems of PIL rest on the attitude that legal 
systems are equivalent.326 Party autonomy rests on the same theoretical premises, 
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as in an increasingly international society it has to be respected that legal systems 
provide for different values, and especially in the area of contract law where 
parties enjoy a general freedom of disposition, it can be said that “no jurisdiction 
has a monopoly of excellence in contract law”.327 
Although the concept of party autonomy has evolved over the time, it is said 
to have been explicitly recognised as a connecting factor in PIL in the 16th century 
by Charles Dumoulin.328 Nevertheless, it is argued that Dumoulin was just 
referring to the will of the parties as an argument to apply the law of the place of 
performance and not as an independent connecting factor as we understand it 
nowadays. In the same way, several authors of the 16th and 17th century used the 
currently known as party autonomy concept as an argumentative aid in their 
reasoning.329 It was Mancini (1817- 1888)330 who claimed party autonomy as an 
independent principle of PIL, and together with the economic and political 
liberalism on the late 19th century and beginning of the 20th century it proved to 
be successful.331 Although the political climate during the war periods in the 20th 
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century led to an increased regulation of the sovereign State, and therefore to a 
decline of the liberal concept of party autonomy, it became well accepted again 
together with the increase of international trade.332 Freedom of choice of law was 
generally accepted in contractual obligations among the European countries 
already in the 1960s, and it was definitely recognised with its incorporation in the 
Rome Convention. Article 3(1) Rome Convention allowed the parties to choose 
the law of any state to govern their contract, and its success led to maintain party 
autonomy in the Rome I Regulation as the cornerstone of its conflict of laws 
mechanism.333 Party autonomy is without any reservation one of the most 
important achievements in the development of PIL in the 20th century, being its 
strengthening and development one of the current and future tasks of PIL, both 
in Europe and worldwide.334 Moreover, the role of party autonomy in European 
PIL is nowadays well rooted and goes beyond the area of contractual obligations. 
The European PIL instruments are increasingly accepting party autonomy in 
areas where it used to be excluded, and therefore recognising its importance in a 
wider way Member States traditionally did.335 
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This is due to the undeniable advantages that encompasses and the prominent 
role it plays in the globalized world: 
First of all, the use of party autonomy provides legal certainty and 
predictability to the legal relationship in question, avoiding at the same time the 
unforeseability that sometimes arises from the determination of the applicable 
law based on the objective application of the conflict of laws rules, and preventing 
the possibility that different courts may answer the question of the applicable law 
in different ways, which could lead to an unexpected result and create legal 
uncertainty in comparison to the precision of what could have been freely agreed 
by the parties.  
Secondly, the parties, by exercising their freedom of choice of law, are able to 
pursue their more convenient interests, and are able to agree on what is more 
satisfactory for themselves or their legal relationship. In the context of 
international trade, there are countless situations that may lead the parties to be 
interested in a law apparently not related with the contract. Factors as familiarity, 
neutrality, reputation, or simply the most convenient law for their transaction, 
may be decisive for the parties to choose the law applicable to their contract. Party 
autonomy therefore allows a proper regulation of individual cases.336  
Thirdly, as a natural consequence from that legal certainty, a great economic 
efficiency is achieved by reducing the costs of determining the applicable law, as 
well as preventing any possible costs arising from a possible unexpected solution 
to their controversies.337  
All the aforementioned has to be placed in the context of the ideological, 
economic and political environment of today’s globalized society and the idea of 
welfare state.338 Freedom of choice of law is commonly seen as the conflict of 
laws expression of the freedom of contract.339 In national law it is accepted that 
parties should freely determine the terms and content of their contracts, within 
the limits on the mandatory laws of the country. Thus, if parties can decide on 
their contractual obligations in national law, it makes sense that they can also do 
so on the international level.  In fact, parties enjoy more autonomy on an 
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international level, since no state can effectively control international contracts.340 
Parties have the possibility to choose the court and the law applicable, and avoid 
the applicability of the rules that they do not wish to be applied to their contract. 
They can even manipulate the situation to avoid otherwise applicable mandatory 
law, even when the possibility to choose the applicable law is limited. This is, 
parties can manipulate the connecting factors by for example choosing the place 
of conclusion of the contract, place of performance, etc. In these cases, since 
states cannot control de facto international contracts, they would have to 
recognise it de iure.341 In addition, the forum legislator cannot impose the forum 
law to an international contract with relevant connections to other laws in the 
same manner as he will apply his law to a contract that has exclusive connections 
to the forum. In these situations, a restraint in the regulatory authority is 
necessary, and thus private parties should enjoy a larger autonomy to regulate 
their contract on an international plane that an exclusive national one.342   
Therefore, throughout party autonomy the parties would create the appropriate 
legal framework for the development of their activities, endowing at the same 
time their legal relationship with legal certainty, predictability and economic 
efficiency, and adapting their behaviour to that chosen law. As a consequence, 
international trade becomes more attractive and international harmony of 
decisions, by making sure every court will decide upon the chosen law, is also 
promoted.343 It should also be noted that, apart from the direct advantages to the 
parties, party autonomy is also an incentive to national legal orders to ensure their 
rules are attractive for the parties and thus prevent them to avoid the applicability 
of their rules by choosing a more favourable law; therefore, party autonomy 
enhances competition between legal orders.344 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations (Rome I Regulation) states in its recital 11 that “the 
parties' freedom to choose the applicable law should be one of the cornerstones 
of the system of conflict-of-law rules in matters of contractual obligations”. This 
instrument provides in article 3(1) that the contract shall be governed by the law 
chosen by the parties, and therefore recognises the freedom of choice of the 
parties in similar words than its predecessor, the Rome Convention.345 Parties are 
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completely free to choose any State law, it is not necessary a specific relation 
between the chosen law and the contract; that is, party autonomy, in principle, 
operates in its entirety.346  
According to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), party autonomy is essential 
for the correct functioning of the internal market, being a significant concept for 
the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and persons, as it was 
determined in the judgment Alsthom Atlantique from January 24, 1991.347 
Besides all the advantages that party autonomy entails, the exercise of party 
autonomy may sometimes become problematic, as parties choose the law most 
suitable to their interests, regardless the existence of some higher interests at 
stake.348 Therefore, legislators need to impose restrictions on the exercise of party 
autonomy in some situations. For example, the European legislator imposes 
several restrictions on party autonomy in the Rome I Regulation: 
Firstly, there is the evident limitation regarding public policy, in article 21 
Rome I, which introduces the so called exception de ordre public. According to 
this provision, the court can avoid the application of any provision of the law 
designated by the parties when it is contrary to the public policy of the forum. It 
is only where essential legal values of the forum are undermined that the public 
policy exception will be justified.349  
Secondly, due to the importance of the public interests at stake, article 9 Rome 
I ensures the application of the so-called overriding mandatory provisions, which 
must be of internationally mandatory application regardless the law applicable to 
the contract, was this the result of the choice of the parties or not, as in the case 
of the public policy provision. Overriding mandatory provisions are defined in 
article 9 (1) as “provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a 
country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or 
economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation 
falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the 
contract under this Regulation”. Therefore, these provisions express a national 
public interest in a wide sense, and are to be enforced regardless the otherwise 
applicable law in international situations. It must be noted that legal certainty and 
party autonomy could be seriously undermined if Member States indiscriminately 
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consider their domestic mandatory rules as internationally mandatory in order to 
take precedence over the law chosen by the parties and therefore this limitation 
should be interpreted narrowly.350 
Thirdly, there are two special situations where the European legislator deals 
with the scope of party autonomy. These are the purely internal situations and 
intra-EU situations, in articles 3(3) and 3(4) Rome I respectively.351 These both 
provisions have a clear purpose of fighting against the abuse of law.352 In both 
cases the aim is to avoid parties to artificially relate the contract to any country to 
which it lacks any connection when they do it with the only intention to avoid the 
application of the mandatory national or European provisions. Pursuant to article 
3(3) Rome I, when a situation is only connected to one single Member State, the 
choice of a foreign law by the parties should not affect the application of the 
domestically mandatory provisions of the national law. In the same manner, 
pursuant to article 3(4) Rome I, if the situation is only connected with one or 
several Member States, the choice of a non-Member State law by the parties will 
not affect the application of mandatory EU Law. This provision is also a potential 
vehicle regarding the safeguarding of the interests of contractual parties, as they 
will be prevented from avoiding the applicability of mandatory provisions 
originated in European directives in intra-EU situations, and consequently the 
proper functioning of the internal market is ensured. The non-application of that 
rules would precisely frustrate the main objective of European directives which 
is to harmonise the rules regulating the transactions between market participants 
operating within the EU.353 
Finally, special safeguards are imposed in order to guarantee the protection of 
the considered as contractual weaker parties. Of course, there is a big risk that 
parties abuse their autonomy in the detriment of the party with less bargaining 
power, who sees a choice of law imposed to him. In the Rome I Regulation, within 
this classification, we find consumer contracts (article 6 Rome I), individual 
employment contracts (article 8 Rome I), both already protected in the Rome 
Convention, and –to a lesser extent- also transport contracts (article 5 Rome I) 
and insurance contracts (article 7 Rome I). The limitations are imposed in the 
manner that, in the former two categories, the parties can make a choice of law in 
a conditioned manner, meaning that it cannot deprive the consumer or employee 
of the protection afforded to them by the mandatory provisions of the law which 
would have been applicable in absence of choice. In the two latter categories, 
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parties only have the option to choose the applicable law to their contract among 
several pre-established options.  
As it has been submitted, the protection of the contractual party with a clearly 
weaker bargaining position is recognised in most contemporary legal systems. 
The intention of limiting party autonomy when one of the parties in the contract 
is considered as weaker is to avoid the “strong” party to abuse from its position 
by imposing a law that eventually would be disadvantageous for the other party. 
While professionals will be aware of which law will benefit them, consumers 
do not know which law the professional wishes to apply. Professionals will invest 
in gathering information regarding the expected benefits of the application of 
certain law, while consumers will know about the quality of the law only after 
the problems occur after the conclusion of the contract.354 In the case of consumer 
contracts, a choice of law clause will most probably be contained in the general 
terms and conditions of the professional, and that choice will usually always be 
the law where the professional has his habitual residence (familiarity with the law 
is one of the principal reasons to choose for a certain law). However, it can also 
be a law with lower consumer standards chosen in purpose. National instruments 
of consumer and employee protection are usually mandatory contract law (parties 
cannot change it by agreement, and thus freedom of contract is limited), and 
differs among states. When the national legislator enacts consumer law or 
employment law protecting consumers or employees from an abuse from 
contractual freedom, the substantive rights established in form of national 
mandatory law should also be protected in a cross-border situation in certain 
occasions. 
In addition to the rationale behind special PIL rules, which aim to ensure the 
applicability of substantive protection of the objectively applicable law, the Rome 
I Regulation also needs to adapt to the needs and objectives of the internal market. 
While PIL rules around the world limit party autonomy in order to protect weaker 
parties from a possible abuse, EU PIL faces a different situation. Part of the 
national consumer and employment mandatory rules are the transposition of EU 
directives. Directives clearly distinguish between intra-EU situations and extra-
EU situations: a consumer or employee operating within the internal market, or 
with strong connections with the Member States, is different than a consumer or 
employee with non-relevant connections to the EU, and not operating within the 
internal market. However, the special conflict rules for consumer and 
employment contracts of the Rome I Regulations do not make such a distinction. 
Mandatory rules at a EU level are increasing, and it will be seen that the 
‘neutrality’ of PIL does not always respond to the requirements of the internal 
market. 
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Although the increasing of mandatory regulation in the private arena is 
notorious both at national and European level, it is generally agreed that party 
autonomy is still the basic principle of international contracts. Party autonomy is 
the rule and its limitations and safeguards are the exceptions.355 Nevertheless, it 
is also true that the stressing mandatoriness of the EU directives may threaten the 
prevalence of the will of the parties, promoting the application of mandatory EU 
law serving the necessities of the internal market.356 
 
2.2. The law applicable in absence of choice of law: the 
need of especial connecting factors for weaker 
parties 
Many times, discussions about conflict of laws in contractual obligations focus 
on the principle of party autonomy and its limits. However, it is also necessary to 
refer to the principles governing where the parties have not chosen the law 
applicable to their contract. Mandatory rules protecting the weaker parties that 
cannot be deviated from by agreement belong to the law applicable in absence of 
choice.  
The Rome Convention embodied the principle of the closest connection in 
order to determine the law applicable to a contract in absence of choice of law.357 
Article 4 Rome Convention provided as a general rule, in absence of choice, for 
the applicability of the law with the closest connection to the contract, and 
contained a general presumption according to which it was to be assumed that the 
law with the closest connection was the law of the party who rendered the most 
characteristic performance of the contract (i.e. the party that delivered the goods 
or rendered the service, for instance).358 Concerning the justification of this 
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presumption, in the Giuliano-Lagarde report it was stated that ‘the idea that this 
performance refers to the function which the legal relationship involved fulfils in 
the economic and social life of any country. The concept of characteristic 
performance essentially links the contract to the social and economic 
environment of which it performs part’.359 In addition, the aim of the presumption 
was to improve the predictability of the law applicable to the contract, identifying 
the country most closely connected.360 This approach, in principle, disregards the 
possible regulatory interests of the country of performance of the contract and 
rather focuses on the personal effects of the contract on the parties (such as the 
obligation to render performance or pay damages in case of breach of contract).361 
The use of the connecting factor of the place of the party rendering the 
characteristic performance of the contract is especially useful when the mutual 
obligations created by a contract were to be performed in different countries, 
avoiding the uncertainty.362  
By following this approach, the ‘risk of internationality’ is generally assumed 
by the purchaser of goods or services, or the party receiving the characteristic 
performance. This is the party that will have to deal with the application of a 
foreign law. The general costs deriving from the ‘internationality’ of the contract 
referred to above in this Chapter are reduced when the law of the party performing 
the characteristic performance is applicable.363 First, the party rendering the 
characteristic performance is more affected by the law applicable to the contract, 
since, in general, legal systems impose specific regulations with regard to the 
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characteristic performance (e.g. special contractual regimes for sales of goods, 
loans, etc.). Delivering goods or provision of services can be complicated 
performances that require specific and detailed regulations, while the 
performance of payment is a simple transaction.364 Besides more specific 
regulation, the characteristic performance is more often object of public law 
measures, and the application of both private and public law of the same country 
to a contract reduces possible adaptation or coordination costs.365 In addition, the 
party carrying out the characteristic performance would tend to conclude more 
than one contract (e.g. a business) for the same purposes. Applying different laws 
for every contract will strongly disturb that party. The connecting factor of 
‘habitual residence of the party rendering the characteristic performance’ 
promotes efficiency, since that party will be able to conduct its trade or business 
under the same legal regime. Also, it is not generally necessary for a business to 
insert a choice of law clause, since the law applicable in absence of choice already 
leads to its national law.366  On the other hand, the application of the law of the 
party rendering the characteristic performance results in a reduction of the general 
costs of legal information, since this party would also require more legal 
information for the transaction.367 
Article 4 Rome I Regulation follows a similar rationale than its predecessor. 
However, in order to address the concerns about legal certainty and with the aim 
of providing for highly foreseeable rules, article 4(1) Rome I introduces specific 
rules with different connecting factors for eight different types of contracts, most 
of which correspond to the result which would have been reached applying the 
characteristic performance approach. In most of the cases, the objective 
connecting factor is the habitual residence at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract of the party designated by the rule, which is normally the one rendering 
the characteristic performance of the contract (exceptions: place where 
immovable property is located or place where an auction takes place). Thus, in 
practice, courts were already generally following these rules in the context of the 
Rome Convention.368 Article 4(2) Rome I then states that when the law applicable 
to the contract cannot be designated by the previous specific rules, the law most 
closely connected to the contract is applicable, and then article 4(3) Rome I 
introduces an escape clause for situations where there is a manifest closest 
connection with other law. Art. 4(1) Rome I lays on the assumption that the 
designated law is generally the law most closely connected to the contract.369 The 
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rules of art. 4(1) Rome I are not rigid rules, since art. 4(3) Rome I allows the 
judge to apply a different law if it is manifestly closer connected to the contract. 
However, the approach followed by art. 4 Rome I is not considered to be 
appropriate for all categories of contracts, and there are a number of categorical 
exceptions for which the application of the law of the party rendering the 
characteristic performance is not suitable. The typical exception concerns 
consumer contracts and employment contracts, since in contracts involving 
weaker parties the application of that general connecting factor structurally 
favours the economically stronger party.370 To counter-balance the difference 
between the bargaining position of the parties, specific connecting factors are 
provided. 
In the case of consumer contracts, consumers are generally protected in most 
jurisdictions by the application of the law of the country where the consumer has 
his habitual residence. In the Rome I Regulation, article 6(1) provides for the 
application of that law in absence of choice. If the general rule of article 4(1) 
Rome I was applicable, the connecting factor will be or the habitual residence of 
the seller or of the provider of services. The mandatory rules of the consumer 
habitual residence would therefore not be applicable. The same can be said as in 
a situation of choice of law: when the national legislator enacts mandatory 
consumer law protecting consumers, the substantive rights established in form of 
national mandatory law should also be protected in a cross-border situation.  
A similar system for the protection of the weaker party is provided with regard 
to individual employment contracts. However, in this case, the employee is the 
party effectuating the characteristic performance, and thus application of the 
objective connecting factor would lead to the application of the law of habitual 
residence of the employee. In the Rome I Regulation, article 8 primarily refers to 
the law of the country in which the employee habitually carries out his work. The 
place of habitual work is considered as most closely connected to the employment 
contract, and, in general, both employee and employer are familiar with it. 
Moreover, the place where the employee habitually carries out his work will often 
coincide with his habitual residence. The country where the employee habitually 
carries out his work has the most interest in applying his mandatory rules ensuring 
employment rights and conditions.371  
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2.3. Protection of consumers and employees in the 
cases of pre-contractual liability 
It is necessary to mention a special situation where consumers or employees can 
also lose their protection due to the applicable law. Articles 6 and 8 Rome I do 
not include cases outside the material scope of the Regulation. Art. 1(2)(i) Rome 
I excludes from the scope of the Regulation cases arising out of pre-contractual 
negotiations. Which is the law applicable to the obligations arising from pre-
contractual dealings in case of consumer and employment contracts? 
For example, pre-contractual obligations may arise when a consumer receives 
a post or email from a foreign company stating that he is the winner of a prize, 
and then a contract is not successfully concluded, or when the professional, before 
the conclusion of a contract, does not fully disclose the necessary information. Or 
when a person receives a very promising job offer in a different country, but when 
he has quit his current job, moved and bought a house in the new country, the 
new employer decides not to conclude the new employment contract. This type 
of cases would fall under the category of pre-contractual liability or culpa in 
contrahendo.372 Pre-contractual liability or culpa in contrahendo is a liability 
arising due to a harmful conduct that occurs during the formation period or 
negotiation phase of a contract.373 The law applicable in a cross-border situation 
becomes very relevant, since it is not an harmonised area and the legislations 
differ among Member States, being possible that the professional or employer 
would be liable according to the law of a country and not liable according to a 
different national law. 
In continental Europe, the concept of culpa in contrahendo is not unified and, 
depending on the country, it covers different situations. Pre-contractual liability 
might be caused by several circumstances, which generally consist on: 
infringement by one of the parties of information duties, or false information or 
omission of essential information about the object of the contract during the 
preparatory negotiations; negligently generation by a party of physical injury to 
the other party’s person or property during the course of the negotiations; 
dropping off negotiations without just cause causing the other party important 
patrimonial or business damages; or invalidity of the contract caused by one of 
the parties.374 Normally, in the case of consumer and employment contracts, pre-
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contractual liability would be related to information duties or breaking-off 
negotiations.   
The categorisation of pre-contractual liability as a contractual or extra-
contractual matter differed among the different national legislations. Nowadays, 
pre-contractual liability has been qualified by the EU legislator as an extra-
contractual matter. Already the ECJ dealt with this problem of categorisation in 
the context of the 1968 Brussels Convention in the Tacconi judgment.375 In the 
Tacconi decision, the ECJ held that actions covered by article 5(3) Brussels 
Convention (actions based on tort, delict or quasi-delict) could be distinguished 
from actions covered by article 5(1) Brussels Convention (actions based on 
contract) by answering whether an obligation was assumed freely by one party 
towards another.376 The ECJ stated that there was not a freely assumed obligation 
in the case of a breach of a rule that required the parties to act in good faith during 
the negotiations and, as a result, understood the action concerning pre-contractual 
liability as a matter relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict of art. 5(3) Brussels 
Convention.377  
Thus, the law applicable to pre-contractual liability is determined by the Rome 
II Regulation on the law applicable to extra-contractual obligations.378 The Rome 
I Regulation, in Recital 10, makes clear that “obligations arising out of dealings 
prior to the conclusion of the contract are covered by Article 12 of Regulation 
(EC) No 864/2007. Such obligations should therefore be excluded from the scope 
of this Regulation”. The Rome II Regulation introduced article 12 as a novelty, 
clarifying the law applicable in such cases, which before the entering into force 
of the Regulation were solved by case law and doctrine.379 The EU legislator 
decided to introduce a specific conflict rule in the Rome II Regulation on the law 
applicable to extra-contractual obligations as an autonomous concept.380 In this 
regard, recital 30 Rome II refers to two examples of culpa in contrahendo: 
violation of the duty of disclosure and breaking off contractual negotiations. 
Article 12 Rome II reads: 
“1.   The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of 
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract, regardless of whether the contract 
was actually concluded or not, shall be the law that applies to the contract or that 
would have been applicable to it had it been entered into. 
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2.   Where the law applicable cannot be determined on the basis of paragraph 
1, it shall be: 
(a) the law of the country in which the damage occurs, irrespective of the 
country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective of 
the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event 
occurred; or 
(b) where the parties have their habitual residence in the same country at the 
time when the event giving rise to the damage occurs, the law of that country; or 
(c) where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the non-
contractual obligation arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a 
contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that 
indicated in points (a) and (b), the law of that other country.” 
Focusing on the first paragraph, the provision refers us to the law that applies 
or would have been applicable to the contract if concluded. Therefore, in the cases 
of breaking-off negotiations of a consumer contract or individual employment 
contract, or violations of the duty of disclosure, for example, art. 12 Rome II 
allows the application of the laws designated by articles 6 and 8 Rome I. 
Therefore, the special conflict rules protecting certain consumer and employment 
contracts extend their protection to the pre-contractual negotiating period of the 
contract. Thus, weaker contracting parties are granted protection also before the 
conclusion of the contract, in accordance with national legislations that provide 
for protection to consumers and employees during the pre-contractual phase.381 
However, in practice, it can be under some circumstances difficult to predict 
whether the situation would fall under the special circumstances of a specific 
provision or not. For example, in the case of consumers, it could be that, at the 
time of the breaking-off negotiations, the circumstances required by art. 6 Rome 
I to be considered a protected consumer contract are not present in the case. 
However, while in the context of article 5 Rome Convention the requirements 
resulted more problematic in this case, the requirements of article 6 Rome I can 
be easily fulfilled prior to the conclusion of the contract. This is, one of the cases 
where article 5 Rome Convention became applicable was when, in the country of 
habitual residence of the consumer, the conclusion of the contract was preceded 
by a specific invitation addressed to the consumer or by advertising, and the 
consumer had taken in that country all the steps necessary for the conclusion of 
the contract. Before the conclusion of the contract, the latter requirement could 
have not been determined. However, the requirements of article 6 Rome I do not 
provide for circumstances that cannot be predicted as such before the conclusion 
of the contract.382 
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3. Consumers and employees in the EU internal 
market 
EU Member States have provided, in different degrees, for consumer protection 
in their domestic law since the 1960s. Following a similar policy, and in order to 
prevent the existent disparities between national laws from becoming an 
impediment to achieve the internal market, the EU started to enact directives 
harmonising national laws. Until recently, these EU consumer directives have 
generally followed a minimum harmonisation technique, leaving the option to 
Member States to grant a more beneficial and extensive protection to consumers. 
Thus, they set minimum consumer standards in the internal market. Although 
these directives approximate national laws, they do not solve the problem of 
disparities of national legislation. This is one of the reasons why the Consumer 
Rights Directive383 has adopted a maximum harmonisation approach, and this 
seems to be the new trend of the EU legislator. Thus, in the current EU consumer 
acquis, there are a big number of directives regulating topics such as unfair 
contract terms, distance selling, package travel, consumer rights, etc., following 
minimum and maximum harmonisation approaches, and establishing mandatory 
consumer provisions at a EU level. 
The EU attitude towards employee protection differs from the consumer 
protection approach, since the ‘social’ dimension –rather than the competition 
and economic integration one- is of major importance.  The main purposes of EU 
employment legislation have been the removal of obstacles to the free movement 
of workers, elimination of discrimination and prevention of potential negative 
consequences to the creation of a common market (e.g. social dumping or a 
regulatory race to the bottom).384 Nowadays, the Treaty of Lisbon emphasises the 
social dimension. The EU lays down numerous directives in the diverse areas 
regarding employment (e.g. protection from discrimination, health and safety, 
protections during business changes, posting of workers, etc.) 385 Besides having 
a minimum harmonisation approach, directives do not cover all areas of labour 
law. Thus, domestic regulation of cross-border employment remains still of major 
importance. Because of the importance of the interests involved, and the 
disparities existent between the laws of the Member States, these are more 
reluctant to agree on EU common rules in the area of labour law. 
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EU PIL rules on consumer and employment protection need to be aware of 
the existing EU substantive legislation and policies in that regard in order to be 
coordinated with it, and vice versa. The fact that directives take a minimum or 
maximum harmonisation approach, or the debate regarding unification of EU 
contract law, indeed affect EU PIL.  
Therefore, in order to ascertain the role of the EU regarding consumer and 
employee protection and how it affects PIL, this section will briefly define the 
EU policies and strategies concerning consumer and employee protection, as well 
as a summary of the development of the EU legislation and competences in that 
respect, to then discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the unification of EU 
contract law versus the operation of PIL rules. 
 
3.1. The EU consumer and employment legislation and 
policy: an overview 
3.1.1. An overview of EU consumer policy 
The vast part of the legislative activity regarding consumer contracts conducted 
by the EU has been pursued towards economic integration in the internal market 
and achieved by harmonising the laws of the Member States. In the subject areas 
where Member States transfer their regulatory competence to the EU for the 
harmonisation of the subject matter, the EU chooses the standards of consumer 
protection. But what regulatory technique is the most appropriate? Should there 
be a level playing field left to the Member States to set stricter rules than the ones 
provided by the directives? By shortly reviewing the development of the 
consumer policy of the EU, a better understanding of the consumer protection 
objectives of the EU, and of the current situation, can be achieved.  
Under the Treaty of Rome, which was agreed in 1957 and entered into force 
in 1958, there was no specific legal base regarding consumer protection, and only 
few incidental references were made to the position of the consumer in the EEC 
legal framework.386 These explicit references did not constitute an attempt to 
develop a structure of consumer rights, but rather it was understood that the 
consumer would simply benefit from a more efficient market that the process of 
integration would develop.  
In the 1970s, Member States had already developed different consumer 
protection laws. Those with a French law basis focused on consumer information 
and consumer contract law. Common law countries rather focused on the law of 
product safety and competition law. German law-oriented countries just covered 
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specific areas of consumer protection, while the Nordic countries had already a 
well-developed consumer protection law.387  
Following the trend, from the 1970s onwards, and despite lacking a specific 
type of consumer policy or legal basis for consumer protection at a EEC level, 
initiatives in the field of consumer protection were taken by the EEC. The 
inauguration of a consumer protection policy in the EEC came with the Council 
Resolution of 14 April 1975 on a preliminary programme of the European 
Economic Community for a consumer protection and information policy.388  In 
the Programme for consumer protection and information policy of 1975, it was 
recognised by the Commission that consumers are a weaker party, and their 
interests must be protected. The need of providing detailed information to the 
consumers was emphasised, and some basic consumer rights were demanded: the 
right to protection of health and safety; the right to protection of economic 
interests; the right of redress; the right to information and education, and the right 
of representation. It was proposed that it was necessary to intervene and end the 
equality of contracting parties in consumer sales. The rationale followed by the 
Commission was based on the paradigm of the rational consumer who only 
requires adequate information to achieve his adequate role in the market. In the 
second Programme in 1981389, the same approach was confirmed by the 
Commission, and, in addition, consumer protection was recognised as a means to 
achieve the objectives of the internal market.390 A third Council Resolution took 
place on June 1986391, regarding the future policy for the protection and 
promotion of consumer interests, expressed within the context of internal market 
policy.392 The Commission considered that national consumer laws affected 
market integration, and thus must be taken into account for ECC policy.  
Later, in 1987, consumer protection became an independent policy objective 
with the adoption of the Single European Act of 1987.393 Even though it still did 
not provide for a specific legal basis, it considered consumer policy as a 
complement to the process of market integration and required the Commission to 
take action to ensure a high level of protection in the areas of health, safety, the 
environment and consumer protection. A consolidation of the former policies was 
attained in the 1989 Council Resolution regarding future priorities for 
relaunching consumer protection policy.394 
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During that period, not only soft law measures were taken. Several consumer 
directives were adopted during the mid-eighties on the basis of article 100 EC 
(subsequently Article 94 EC, now Article 115 TFEU), which had as requisite a 
direct link with the common market, with the intention to safeguard the economic 
interests of the consumers: Directive 84/450 on misleading advertising395, 
Directive 85/374 on product liability396, Directive 85/577 on contracts negotiated 
away from business premises397 and Directive 87/102 on consumer credit398. 
Once the Single European Act entered into effect, the then Article 100a 
(subsequently Article 95 EC, now Article 114 TFEU), used for the adoption of 
measures approximating national laws with the objective of establishing the 
internal market, became the legal basis for the subsequent consumer law 
directives. Thus, much of EU consumer law is tied to the internal market. 
The Maastricht Treaty 1992 incorporated a specific legal basis for consumer 
protection measures. The Treaty contained a special title on consumer protection 
(Title IX). Its article 129a (later 153 in the Treaty of Amsterdam, now article 169 
TFEU) provided that: "The Community shall contribute to the attainment of a 
high level of consumer protection through: 
(a) measures adopted pursuant to Article 100a in the context of the completion 
of the internal market; 
(b) specific action which supports and supplements the policy pursued by the 
Member States to protect the health, safety and economic interests of consumers 
and to provide adequate information to consumers". 
Thus, it was for the first time recognised that the Community had the power 
to act in order to protect consumers either as an internal market policy or as a 
supporting policy of the Member States’ actions.  
The Amsterdam Treaty brought an important revision of the title on consumer 
protection. Article 153 Treaty of Amsterdam (now 169 TFEU) largely modified 
and improved its predecessor. Article 153 recognised consumer rights (instead of 
consumer interests), applicable both to internal and non-internal market 
measures. Specifically, it was required that the Community contributed to 
promoting the right of consumers to information, education and to organize 
themselves in order to safeguard their interests. Also, consumer protection 
requirements had to be taken into account in defining and implementing other 
Community policies and activities. Moreover, the Community was required to 
take measures both supporting the internal market objective and supporting and 
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monitoring the policy pursued by the Member States.399 The Treaty of Nice 
maintained the changes adopted by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
During this second phase, in which the need to protect the consumer became 
linked to the establishment of the functioning of the internal market, a big number 
of directives regarding consumer protection were enacted, such as Directive 
90/314/EEC on package travel400, Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair contract 
terms401, Directive 94/47/EC on timesharing402, Directive 97/7/EC on distance 
selling403, Directive 98/27/EC on injunctions404, Directive 99/44/EC on the sale 
of consumer goods and associated guarantees405, or Directive 2002/65/EC on 
distance marketing of financial services.406 These directives are generally 
characterised by taking information disclosure measures as a means to protect the 
consumer and having a minimum harmonisation approach, meaning that they set 
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a minimum standard for the development of consumer policy, allowing Member 
States to adopt more protective rules. 
Traditionally, Member States have followed a more interventionist approach 
regarding consumer policy than the EC, which until that point opted for a less 
paternalistic line based on information disclosure as the most important 
mechanism for consumer protection.407 It seems so far that the EC focused on 
market integration and therefore the market and competition issues acquired more 
importance than social issues. Meanwhile, the Member States’ consumer law was 
more based on the concept of social welfare, and the consumer was considered 
the weak party who needs to be protected by national regulation. The EC did not 
put such an emphasis on the consumer as the weaker party, but on the 
responsibility of both market parties, and thus it provided for the adoption of 
information provisions rather than corrective legal measures.408 This information 
model is based on the existence of a rational and independent consumer, who is 
reasonably informed and able to act according to his or her interests, and who can 
facilitate the establishment of the internal market.409 
The string of directives adopted up to this period are of a minimum 
harmonising nature (except Directive 2002/65/EC on distance marketing of 
financial services). This means that directives allow Member States to adopt rules 
more favourable to the consumer than the ones provided in the directive itself. As 
it is already known, directives need to be transposed into national law, and when 
doing so Member States have the choice in deciding the means to achieve the 
results required by the directive, as well as providing only the protection 
established by the directive or improving it. The result of this minimum 
harmonisation approach is that instead of creating a uniform EU consumer law, 
there are as many consumer laws as Member States. Minimum harmonisation 
approximates national rules and diminishes the differences between national 
consumer law of the Member States, creating a minimum threshold of protection 
for the consumer, adjusting the degree of diversity existing between the consumer 
regulations of the different Member States. The reasoning behind this approach 
towards EU consumer law lays on two main arguments. Firstly, in a cross-border 
situation, even in an intra-EU situation, two or more national laws collide, and 
one has to govern the transaction. In this context, consumer law is in its majority 
considered as mandatory law, and thus national or EU consumer law cannot be 
circumvented by choosing the law of another country as applicable to the 
transaction. The differences existing between the consumer laws of the Member 
States could be an obstacle to cross-border transactions within the internal 
market, since the parties, especially the traders, might not be aware of the levels 
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of protection their customers might enjoy.410 Secondly, on the side of the 
consumers, the differences between the consumer laws of the Member States 
create a lack of confidence when contracting across the border, due to the 
uncertainty regarding the protection they might receive when purchasing goods 
or contracting services abroad.411 Harmonisation of the main areas of consumer 
law helps to remove, or reduce, these obstacles to cross-border transactions 
within the internal market. 
However, the Consumer Policy Programme for 2002-06412 encouraged the 
minimisation on the variations in the consumer protection rules among the 
Member States that ‘create fragmentation of the internal market to the detriment 
of consumers and business’, and thus provided for the review and reform of the 
existent EU consumer directives. The Commission increasingly considered 
minimum harmonisation as inadequate and promoted a shift towards maximum 
harmonisation, where the EU would have the regulatory responsibility in the field 
covered by the particular measure and Member States would not be able to set 
stricter standards. The debate between the adequacy of minimum or maximum 
harmonisation as a means to regulate consumer law protection in the EU has been 
intense and is still object of discussion. Since it brings direct consequences to the 
EU PIL regulation of the law applicable to consumer contracts, as a conflict rule 
would become useless in an intra-EU cross-border situation in the case of a 
maximum harmonisation scenario, the debate between minimum and maximum 
harmonisation will be object of study in a separate section.413 
Nevertheless, the shift on the intended consumer policy has not resulted on a 
maximum harmonisation approach on all EU consumer directives enacted since 
then. There have been some directives enacted with a maximum harmonisation 
approach, such as the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive414, the Consumer 
Rights Directive415 (although its material scope was reduced in order to accept its 
maximum harmonisation scope) and the new Package Travel Directive.416 
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However, the Consumer Credit Directive417 or the Timeshare Directive418, for 
example, were enacted with a minimum harmonisation approach. The 2002-06 
and 2007-13 consumer policy strategies included as their main objectives high 
common level of consumer protection, effective enforcement and involvement of 
consumer organisations in EU policies, empowering consumers, enhancing 
welfare and protection from risks that consumers cannot cope with individually.  
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the current primary law for consumer protection 
policy in the EU are articles 4(2)(f), 12, 114(3) and 169 of TFEU and article 38 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. article 169 TFEU, titled Consumer 
Protection, states: 
“1. In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high 
level of consumer protection, the Union shall contribute to protecting the 
health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to 
promoting their right to information, education and to organise 
themselves in order to safeguard their interests. 
2. The Union shall contribute to the attainment of the objectives 
referred to in paragraph 1 through: 
(a) measures adopted pursuant to Article 114 in the context of the 
completion of the internal market; 
(b) measures which support, supplement and monitor the policy 
pursued by the Member States. 
3. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt the measures referred to in 
paragraph 2(b). 
4. Measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 3 shall not prevent any 
Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective 
measures. Such measures must be compatible with the Treaties. The 
Commission shall be notified of them.” 
Article 169 supplements Article 114 of the TFEU, which contemplates the 
adoption of measures approximating national laws with the objective of 
establishing the internal market, and indicates that regarding consumer protection 
the Commission will take as a base a high level of protection. Most of EU 
consumer directives are in fact enacted on basis of the latter provision, rather than 
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on the former one. Consumer protection requirements must be taken into account 
in defining and implementing other EU policies and activities according to article 
12 TFEU, and Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union provides that Union policies shall ensure a high level of consumer 
protection.419 
In 2012, the Commission adopted the European Consumer Agenda, which 
explains the EU consumer policy to follow up to 2020. Among its objectives we 
find  maximisation of consumer participation and transactions in the market, and 
its key points include improving consumer safety, enhancing knowledge of 
consumer rights, strengthening the enforcement of consumer rules, or integrating 
consumer interests into the key sectoral policies.420 
Regarding the existent EU secondary law, there are nowadays more than 90 
EU directives that deal with issues related to consumer protection. The consumer 
acquis is complex and occasionally inconsistent. Although for this study we only 
refer to the directives that have a bigger impact regarding cross-border consumer 
contracts, the current scenario of directives dealing with consumer matters 
includes both minimum and maximum harmonisation directives, with different 
regulatory techniques and regarding cross-border issues or not necessarily.421  
The most common regulatory technique used by EU consumer directives 
consists on requiring that the consumer should be provided with specified 
information about the eventual transaction. This approach is aimed at improving 
transparency in the pre-contractual phase and is frequently complemented by the 
requirement of a ‘cooling off’ period within which the consumer is allowed to 
exercise his or her right to withdraw from the contract.422 This approach 
minimises the intervention with private autonomy, since it does not interfere in 
the substance of the contract. This technique promotes an ‘informed consumer’ 
without diminishing the choice. It supports the consumer in the pre-contractual 
and post-contractual phase, and attempts to improve the bargaining process: the 
consumer, with a clearer appreciation of what is on offer, will be able to negotiate 
a deal closer to his preferences. Cooling-off periods offer a fall-back protection. 
However, these procedures are funded on the rational consumer rationale, 
assuming that the consumer has the capacity to process the information that is 
supplied to him and react rationally to it, and that is not always the case. 
Moreover, another criticism lies on the failure to address substantive unfairness. 
Even if the consumer is supported by mandatory information disclosure, he might 
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not be able to get a fair deal due to the imbalance of bargaining power. This 
regulatory approach is followed by the Consumer Credit Directive, Payment 
Services Directive, Timeshare Directive, Package Travel Directive, or Consumer 
Rights Directive. 
Another regulatory technique would consist on using the law to address the 
fairness of the contract. Although freedom of contract is restricted, the purity of 
contractual freedom is not consistent with current modern market conditions. 
This technique is used, for example, in the Directive on Unfair Contract Terms, 
Directive on Consumer Sales and guarantees or in the Consumer Rights 
Directive. 
Thus, we can observe there is no comprehensive and consistent regime for EU 
consumer contract law. The EU rules supplement national consumer law, which 
evolves unaffected by the EU in the areas not covered by the EU directives or 
even in those areas covered by directives with a minimum harmonisation nature. 
The scenario is at least chaotic, consisting on several directives dealing with 
specific types of contracts, directives in the context of cross-border commercial 
transactions and some others not necessarily (e.g. off-premises contracts, credit). 
In addition, not all directives follow the same regulatory regime.  
It has to be kept in mind that EU has its own agenda on which Member States 
do not always agree. In addition, the development of EU consumer law previously 
mentioned is characterised by a massive production of consumer directives, 
which also affects the current scenario. In this regard, according to Weatherill, 
the consumer law acquis is chaotically shaped because of political accident.423  
 
3.1.2. An overview of EU employment policy 
EU employment law has been developed in different phases, from a market liberal 
approach to the current system of social accommodation. The need to 
complement economic integration with a ‘social dimension’ and the acquisition 
of competences by the EU characterise the development of the EU employment 
legislation and policy.  
Since the Treaty of Rome until the seventies, the body of EU employment law 
consisted mainly of few rules of primary law (provisions on free movement and 
equal pay between men and women) and some supplementary secondary 
legislation.424 These measures were based on the liberal approach which 
considered that the building of a common market would bring economic progress, 
from which consumers and employees would benefit. The employment provision 
on equal pay, for example, was not motivated by social policy reasons, but rather 
by competition reasons: companies from Member States which payed women the 
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same wages as men could suffer from a competitive disadvantage within the 
market.425 By the end of the seventies, concerns about structural imbalances in 
Europe led to the rise of a social dimension to the internal market. In 1974, the 
Council adopted the first Programme of Social Action.426 
The first sex discrimination directives were enacted during the seventies, as 
well as the first directives on collective redundancies, transfer of undertakings 
and employer insolvency. The Single European Act (SEA) 1986 introduced 
provisions for the harmonisation of health and safety conditions at work. During 
the eighties, the need for a social policy accompanying the economic integration 
project was recognised. This policy change was reflected on the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 1989427, which, albeit not legal binding, 
it was of considerable importance for the upcoming legal development; in fact, a 
vast part of EU employment legislation enacted since then has referred to the 
Community Charter.428  
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, Member States agreed 
on the Social Policy Protocol, which provided for additional competences in the 
area of social policy and thus made it possible to implement the Social Charter.429 
The Council was endowed with the power to adopt directives laying down 
minimum requirements in several new sectors, which would then be binding on 
all Member States (except the UK who opted out). 
The Treaty of Amsterdam integrated the Social Policy Protocol into the EC 
Treaty with some minor changes, making it thus applicable to the UK as well. 
Important new directives, such as the Directive 2000/43/EC on equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin and Directive 2000/78/EC 
on a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, were 
soon adopted.  
With the turn of millennium, a shift of policy can be appreciated: focus was 
placed on the combination of ideas of flexibility in the labour market and 
employment security as means to achieve economic efficiency and 
competitiveness. Legal instruments on part-time, fixed-term, temporary agency 
or telework were enacted. In the 2006 Green Paper ‘Modernising labour law to 
meet the challenges of the 21st century’ the EU presented that approach as 
‘Flexicurity’, which was not well received and therefore not further pursued.430  
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The Treaty of Lisbon allowed for further progress in consolidating the social 
dimension of European integration. The Treaty of Lisbon emphasises social 
objectives. The Charter of Fundamental Rights is given the same binding force 
as the Treaties. The Charter recognises rights such as workers’ right to 
information and consultation, as well as the rights to collective bargaining, fair 
and just working conditions, social security and social assistance.  
Sources of EU employment law are both primary and secondary law of the 
EU. The EU Treaty (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) ensure, since the Treaty of Lisbon, an internal market where the 
fundamental freedoms, open market economy and free competition are 
guaranteed (art. 3(2) and 3(3) TEU and 119 TFEU). Among the fundamental 
freedoms, the free movement of workers is the most important for EU 
employment contract. However, freedom of services and freedom of 
establishment are also of relevance (e.g. when a national labour law affects those 
rights). Also, free movement of goods can play a role (e.g. when a labour dispute 
restricts cross-border commerce). Article 157 TFEU containing the principle of 
equal pay is also relevant. 
Leaving aside the areas of fundamental rights, fundamental freedoms and 
equality, EU employment law is mostly laid down in secondary legislation, 
especially in directives. As it is known, directives lay down goals, usually as 
minimum standards, which have to be achieved by the Member States. Domestic 
implementations differ among the Member States, which can normally improve 
the minimum standards provided by the respective directive. For example, the 
European Working Time Directive entitles workers to receive an annual paid 
leave of 20 days, but some Member States have adopted a more beneficious 
regime for the workers. In accordance with article 153 TFEU, the EU adopts 
directives that set minimum requirements for working and employment 
conditions, and informing and consulting workers.  
There are EU employment directives in the following areas: protection from 
discrimination at work on grounds of sex; protection from discrimination on other 
protected grounds (race/ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, age and religion 
and belief); health and safety at work; protections during business changes 
(redundancy, mergers/acquisitions and outsourcing changes); freedom of 
movement for workers to obtain jobs or be seconded across the EU and to 
establish businesses in other parts of the EU, along with supportive measures, 
such as mutual recognition of qualifications and skills, provision of information 
and consultation with employees and/or their representatives in addition to the 
requirements relating to redundancies and transfers; rights for some atypical/non-
standard workers, such as part-timers, teleworkers, fixed term workers and 
agency temps; and “family friendly rights” such as maternity rights and parental 
leave.431 
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Besides having a minimum harmonisation approach, directives do not cover 
all areas of employment law. Thus, domestic regulation of cross-border 
employment remains still of major importance. Legal diversity within the EU is 
very noticeable. For example, Nordic countries such as Denmark and Sweden are 
characterised for regulating most of the important issues by collective bargaining 
at different levels. On the other hand, France, for instance, has a comprehensive 
and detailed regulation (although also high levels of collective bargaining).432 The 
legal diversity in the area of employment law among Member States is the main 
reason for the exclusion of some very important areas of labour law from the EU 
competences (e.g. unfair dismissal, right to strike, etc.) or the lack of regulation 
regarding some other issues because of the difficulty to reach agreements among 
the Member States. Because of the importance of the interests involved, Member 
States have a special interest in regulating themselves employment law matters.433 
However, it is also an area of utmost importance for the well-functioning of the 
EU internal market. 
The current phase of development has been defined as one of 
‘consolidation’.434 While EU employment law is focussed upon cross-border 
matters and the well-functioning of the internal market, the genuine employment 
protection is provided by the national law of every Member State.435 In this 
regard, important attempts from the Commission to make amendments on this 
area have been withdrawn due to the lack of agreement. For example, that is the 
case of the Proposal to amend the Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC436, as 
well as the Proposal for a Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective 
action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services.437  
Developments through EU law in some areas of labour law regarding 
employee protection are therefore very difficult to achieve, and, although there is 
still room for improvement of minimum standards, EU employment law is 
nowadays more focused on cross-border matters. Among some of the recent 
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legislative projects, we can highlight the adoption of the revision of the Posted 
Workers Directive.438  
EU employment law is a complex area because of the importance of the 
interests involved, both at national and EU level. The existence of different levels 
and sources of regulation makes difficult the determination of the applicable law 
in cross-border situations.  
 
3.2. Unification of EU contract law vs. EU PIL rules as 
the best regulatory technique for consumer and 
employment contracts  
A vast quantity of cross-border contracts in the EU have exclusively connections 
with two or more Member States. They are purely intra-EU contracts, happening 
within the internal market. Therefore, the issue of harmonisation of substantive 
law within the internal market receives special attention from the EU 
Commission and legal scholars. The incremental growth of the programme of 
legislative harmonisation in the area of contract law during the last decades brings 
the debate of which should be the best manner to address contract law in the 
internal market. On the one hand, some have defended the necessity of creation 
of a much more systematic structure within this area through the elaboration of a 
European Civil Code.439 They defend that unification of contract law will benefit 
the functioning of the internal market. On the other hand, the opposite view 
defends Europe’s legal diversity based on the argument of a deep existent cultural 
diversity, and thus reject any attempt that goes beyond minimum and fragmentary 
harmonisation, contending for fewer harmonisation initiatives at European 
level.440 In between these extremes we find many other options and initiatives. 
However, this section is not intended to describe all the initiatives and attempts 
of harmonising this area, but to highlight the benefits and disadvantages of the 
unification or maximum harmonisation of contract law versus the operation of 
PIL. Thus, only a brief overview of the main harmonisation attempts in this area 
and the current situation will be given before evaluating the necessity and 
adequacy of harmonisation in the EU.  
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3.2.1. A brief overview of the attempts of full harmonisation or unification of 
EU contract law 
Harmonisation of contract law has been on the agenda for years. Several calls of 
the European Parliament in favour of a European Civil Code incited an animated 
academic debate. During the nineties, working groups were established with the 
intention to develop common principles among the private laws of the Member 
States that could lead to further harmonisation of contract law (e.g. the Pavia 
group, the Study Group on a European Civil Code (Von Bar Group) and the 
Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group)). Also, the Lando 
Commission, which was already set up in 1980 with the aim to find common rules 
of private law among the EU, published the first part of the PECL (Principles of 
European Contract Law) in 1995.441 The PECL are non-binding rules on contract 
law. Due to their optional character, their functions are restricted, but still could 
be chosen as applicable (neutral) law by the parties to a contract, or serve as a 
model for legislators, or for the EU institutions, when drafting laws, or even as a 
model for a European Code of Contracts.442 The PECL does not include aspects 
of EU law. The Acquis group later filled that gap and published in 2008 the 
Principles of Existing EC Contract Law (ACQP).  
The European Commission has been especially active regarding 
harmonisation of contract law. In 2001 the Commission issued a Communication 
on European Contract law443, considering four options for subsequent action in 
the area of contract law: 1. No EU action; 2. Promotion of the development of 
principles of contract law that would lead to the greater convergence of national 
law; 3. Improvement of the quality of the existing legislation; 4. Adoption of a 
new comprehensive legislation with the form of a European code (either 
replacing national law or as an optional instrument). In February 2003, the follow 
up Action Plan on a more coherent European Contract Law revealed the outcome 
of the process of consultation. Preference was on the second and third option, 
disregarding the extremes. The Commission’s response was two-folded: first, the 
Commission aimed to review the legislative consumer acquis and remedy the 
deficiencies in the EU consumer directives; second, the Commission proposed 
the adoption of a Common Frame of Reference (CFR).  
Regarding the revision of the consumer acquis, the Commission went through 
a deep review of the functioning of the EU consumer directives, and identified as 
main problems the absence of common interpretation of relevant terms and the 
use of ‘minimum’ rules.444 The Commission aimed at applying a common 
approach and reduce national diversity by switching from a model of minimum 
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harmonisation to a maximum harmonisation one. Eight EU consumer directives 
were reviewed.445 However, the Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights in 
October 2008 considered only the replacement of four of those Directives 
(regarding doorstep selling, unfair terms, timeshare and distance sale). This 
project was proved to be overambitious, and the turning of those four Directives 
into a maximum harmonisation directive turned to be not politically realistic. The 
Consumer Rights Directive446, adopted in 2011, kept the maximum 
harmonisation model, but its scope was reduced to replace only two of the 
Directives (regarding doorstep selling and distance contracts) of the eight that 
were in the original review agenda.  
Regarding the Commission’s idea to adopt a Common Frame of Reference, 
the planned intention for the Common Frame of Reference was to identify the 
best solutions to be taken into account in national practice, the EU acquis and 
relevant international practice.  It would set out common fundamental principles 
of contract law, definitions and model rules, and thus it would be available to the 
Commission as a ‘toolbox’ when preparing proposals to improve the existing EU 
contract law or for the drafting of new instruments. A draft CFR was delivered to 
the Commission in 2007, and published in 2009; however, it was to be treated 
and referred to as an academic Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). The 
DCFR has to be distinguished from the CFR originally called for by the 
Commission in its Action Plan. The DCRF is a comprehensive body of detailed 
rules on European private law. The DCFR contains principles which underpin the 
model rules, definitions of terms used in the model rules; and model rules on a 
number of areas of private law. Some even consider it as a European Civil Code 
in all but in its name.447 However, most defend its nature as an academic project 
providing for insights in the area of EU Contract law. The DCFR has been subject 
of extensive criticism, principally due to its shape as a closed and comprehensive 
body of specific rules.448  
Nowadays, the DCFR is available to deepen knowledge of European private 
law and as source of inspiration and reference for European and national 
legislators, as well as the European Court of Justice and national courts when 
tasked with resolving a novel or difficult question in the fields of private law 
covered by the DCFR. As Kuipers states, ‘[t]he DCFR is another milestone on 
the road towards a larger convergence between the European legal systems. It is 
however unclear where that road will lead to.’449 
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The Commission also referred in some occasions to the possibility of adopting 
an ‘optional instrument’ of contract law at a EU level.450 This eventually resulted 
in the Proposal for a Regulation on Common European Sales Law (CESL).451 The 
CESL would be a second regime for each Member State, like an overall 29th 
regime for the EU. Its use was intended to be optional, depending on the will of 
business and consumers to choose it as applicable rather than other national law, 
and it would be limited to cross-border contracts regarding B2C contracts and 
B2B contracts where one of the parties was a small or medium-size enterprise. 
This EU ambition towards codification, even through an optional document, did 
not come through, and the issues covered by the CESL are currently governed by 
EU directives (Consumer Sales Directive (CSD), the Consumer Rights Directive, 
the Unfair Terms Directive, and the e-Commerce Directive). All four, with the 
exception of the Consumer Rights Directive, are minimum harmonisation 
instruments. 
The improvement of the EU directives regarding their drafting and internal 
coherence does not affect the conflict of laws system in intra-EU situations. 
Neither would have done it the adoption of an optional instrument, since 
differences between the legal systems of the Member States would continue to 
exist. In fact, in the preamble to the Rome I Regulation it is stated that in the event 
that the EU adopted rules of substantive contract law, including standard terms 
and conditions, such instrument could provide the possibility that parties could 
choose those rules as applicable to the contract. Such a 29th regime would 
therefore be like another law that the parties could choose to apply.452  
However, the gradual harmonisation in the EU contract law does diminish the 
role of Rome I, especially if the EU legislator decides to systematically pursue 
the maximum harmonisation approach like it has been done lately in the area of 
EU consumer law. Such a trend could lead to the substitution of national 
consumer policy by an EU acquis. The options of maximum harmonisation or a 
civil code would indeed significantly limit the role of the Rome I Regulation. If 
the contract law of the Member States was unified, no conflict rules for intra-EU 
cases would be needed.  
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Nevertheless, such a unification does not seem to be a realistic option. Besides 
the political reluctance of the Member States to the unification of contract law in 
the EU and to the maximum harmonisation approach in most of the areas, the 
desirability and feasibility of such options are also object of discussion.453 First, 
regarding the desirability of a EU unified contract law instrument, it has to be 
pointed out that there are areas of contract law, such as international sales law, 
where a EU codification would bring more difficulties by creating more layers to 
the existent regulatory regimes. For example, a EU codification could be 
contradictory to the UNIDROIT Principles.454 The field of international 
commercial contracts between professionals is benefited by a low intervention 
and from flexible legal solutions and such as soft law solutions or universal 
principles such as the UNIDROIT Principles.455 Second, concerning the 
feasibility, regarding the competence of the EU, there is not explicit legal basis 
in the TFEU that recognises the power of the EU to act in the area of contract 
law. A potential civil code or contract code should then be based on a general law 
making competence. Article 114 TFEU could provide a legal basis if the adoption 
of such a code would be necessary for the functioning of the internal market, since 
that provision allows the EU to adopt ‘measures for the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market.’ However, article 114 should not be interpreted in a too broad manner.456 
In fact, it is generally agreed that the EU does not have the competence to adopt 
such a comprehensive code.457 The possibility of sector specific codes is more 
likely, especially regarding consumer contracts, a field in which the EU has vast 
legislation.458  
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3.2.2. Advantages and disadvantages of unification of EU contract law: 
defending EU PIL as the best current option to regulate EU consumer 
and employment contracts 
If feasible, is unification or maximum harmonisation of contract law the best 
option for the better functioning of the internal market? Can there be a truly EU 
internal market without a comprehensive legal framework at a EU level? The 
discussion over unification or full-harmonisation of contract law or consumer law 
is intense and literature over it is extensive. Many authors put into question the 
arguments behind those initiatives. The criticisms towards the transaction cost 
argument and the ‘consumer confidence’ argument are numerous and fierce, and 
destroy the foundations on which EU bases the need of unification or maximum 
harmonisation.459 On the other side of the balance, other authors also fiercely 
defended the benefits of unification of contract law and proposed many manners 
to achieve such a purpose. In this regard, the work of Collins seems remarkable.460 
In short, he submitted that the EU could not evolve into an effective system 
without the creation of a cohesive community (or transnational legal society), for 
which the common private rules are necessary, since private relationships are the 
root of a social order. That community requires an economic and social 
constitution that will give shape to a particular economic and social system that 
would promote Europe-wide values of fairness and social justice. According to 
this author, the EU has failed to establish such an integrated transnational legal 
society which would have led to a common European identity. He claims that by 
harmonising the basic rules and institutions governing social interaction in civil 
society (i.e. private law), the EU could evolve to such an integrated community.461 
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The European Civil Code according to Collins would be founded on respect for 
social and economic rights. Instead of conceiving such a code as a complex body 
of detailed rules, the author considers that, to be legitimate and effective, a EU 
Civil Code would have to encompass principles-based regulation, a framework 
of normative standards for an integrated legal community or transnational legal 
society.462 This idea seems attractive, since it has a strong emphasis on the society 
and social rights, but even more burdensome and ‘utopic’ than the projects 
pursued by the EU institutions or other working groups. Indeed, it seems more 
realistic to focus on the possibility of a full harmonisation of EU consumer law, 
an area where the EU has already achieved many legislative advances.   
On the one hand, the benefits of the unification approach have to be 
recognised. The principal argument in this regard consists on the reduction of the 
transaction costs in cross-border trade, benefiting the internal market. The EU 
normally refers to the removing of barriers that hinder the correct and smooth 
functioning of the internal market to justify the drafting of common or 
harmonised rules in different legal areas, especially in contract law and consumer 
law. According to the 2010 Green Paper on options for European Contract 
Law463, the difference between the national laws can constitute barriers to the 
internal market. Those differences might entail additional transaction costs and 
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uniform laws: an integrated body of legal principles to govern all the different kinds of relations 
formed by citizens in a civil society.’  
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legal uncertainty for business. Therefore, full harmonisation would help to 
eliminate those barriers and benefit consumer confidence and allow to ‘take full 
advantage of the internal market’.464  Thus, it is generally claimed that diversity 
among the different Member States’ laws distorts competition in the market. 
According to that line of reasoning, full harmonisation or unification of the rules 
in contract law would constitute a reduction of the costs of pursuing business. 
The ‘costs of internationality’ would be avoided while operating within the 
internal market. This is, the compliance with foreign legal requirements, 
standards, mandatory rules, etc. might prevent businesses to engage into cross-
border transactions, since they can be very costly. The costs of seeking 
appropriate information and foreign legal systems might prevent businesses to 
engage in cross-border trade.465 Moreover, it is difficult to anticipate the different 
results in the different stages of the contract, the legal means and costs of solution, 
and in the case a dispute arises, the costs of specialised lawyers in cross-border 
cases are most likely not affordable to medium and small enterprises. Because of 
the costs of cross-border commerce, it would be large companies who could 
benefit from diversity among legal systems.466  
In addition, it is also considered that the consumer confidence is damaged by 
the uncertainties of the legal aspects of a cross-border transaction. The ‘consumer 
confidence’ argument considers that consumers are prevented to enter into cross-
border transactions because of the differences between national laws, since they 
would not be confident that they would receive adequate protection outside their 
own market. The consumer attitude to cross-border trade would constitute an 
important barrier to the well-functioning of the internal market.467 EU Consumer 
Directives refer to this argument in their Recitals as a justification for 
harmonising the specific area of consumer law they cover. For example, Recital 
5 of the Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC) reads “the creation of a common 
set of minimum rules of consumer law, valid no matter where goods are 
purchased within the Community, will strengthen consumer confidence and 
enable consumers to make the most of the internal market”. Recital 3 of The 
Directive on the Distance Marketing of Financial Services (2002/65/EC) refers 
to consumer confidence on Recitals 3 and 5, first stating that “(…) a high degree 
of consumer protection is required in order to enhance consumer confidence in 
distance selling” and then providing that “[b]ecause of their intangible nature, 
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financial services are particularly suited to distance selling and the establishment 
of a legal framework governing the distance marketing of financial services 
should increase consumer confidence in the use of new techniques for the 
distance marketing of financial services, such as electronic commerce.” In the 
Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EU), recital 4 refers to the 
existence of different national rules on unfair commercial practices, which create 
barriers for traders and consumers, and which “make consumers uncertain of their 
rights and undermine their confidence in the internal market”; also, recital 13 
states that “in order to support consumer confidence the general prohibition [in 
Art.5] should apply equally to unfair commercial practices which occur outside 
any contractual relationship between a trader and a consumer or following the 
conclusion of a contract and during its execution”. Finally, recital 6 of the 
Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU) provides that “[c]ertain disparities 
create significant internal market barriers affecting traders and consumers. Those 
disparities increase compliance costs to traders wishing to engage in the cross-
border sale of goods or provision of services. Disproportionate fragmentation also 
undermines consumer confidence in the internal market”. According to Recital 7, 
legal certainty would be considerably increased through the full harmonisation of 
consumer information and the right of withdrawal in distance and off-premises 
sales, which would boost cross-border sales.  
Therefore, it is generally believed that unification of contract law within the 
internal market would reduce transaction costs and increase the consumer 
confidence on the internal market. In addition, one of the reasons calling for a 
different approach consisted on the existence of the problems derived from the 
minimum harmonisation approach by the directives. It is argued that the 
minimum harmonisation technique has failed to provide a suitable legal 
framework, especially in the area of EU consumer law, and therefore a different 
alternative is needed.468 EU consumer directives only deal with some aspects of 
consumer law, and also have to be implemented into national law of the Member 
States. Minimum harmonisation directives allow national legislation giving effect 
to the directive to go further, and make possible for Member States to retain 
existing national law without major change if it was already matching (or 
exceeding) the minimum standards required by the directive. This approach is 
criticised because it has not been able to create a coherent or consistent body on 
consumer law, but rather different sets of rules on unfair contract terms, doorstep 
selling, and so on per Member State. Minimum harmonisation directives 
approximate national laws and reduce the differences between the different 
standards existent among the Member States. Legal diversity is not eliminated. 
The continuing diversity is mainly due to the incoherence within the existing 
directives (e.g. inconsistencies when transposing directives into national law due 
to the different language versions), the regulatory gaps existent in the directives 
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and filled by the Member States in different manners, or the reliance on minimum 
harmonisation clauses.469 Unification of consumer law or contract law would 
solve the problems related with the minimum harmonisation approach of 
directives.  
Nevertheless, it can also be argued that legal diversity would not completely 
disappear, neither would the transaction costs deriving from it. Even if law in the 
books became the same among the Member States, the law in practice would still 
be different. Courts, legal procedure, legal environment, etc. would still differ, 
and businesses would still have to adapt to the foreign market traditions. As a 
result, the costs of legal diversity for businesses would not drop dramatically 
within the internal market.470 
The aforementioned ‘consumer confidence’ argument is also highly 
disputed.471 It can be argued that the reluctance of consumers to shop abroad is 
explained by many other factors that have more relevance on their behaviour than 
the possibility of application of a foreign law (language for example, or 
accessibility in general) and that cannot be easily solved though legal regulation. 
It has been argued that this argument has been used in an excessive manner as a 
justification for harmonisation measures by the EU, and then as a justification for 
the need of unification of consumer law or contract law.472 A close understanding 
of the expectations of consumers and the consumer culture is necessary, and that 
varies among Member States.  In addition, unification would probably lead to less 
protection for the consumers of some Member States (especially Nordic 
countries). At the same time the consumers of some countries would gain 
protection, others would lose more, which, at least for the latter, would not 
increase consumer confidence in the internal market.473   
Regarding the argument of legal diversity, legal diversity is not necessarily 
bad from an economic perspective. In general, EU consumer directives claim that 
diversity among national contract law regimes distort competition within the 
internal market. However, this statement has not been satisfactorily proven.474 
Such an assumption would mean that all the differences between the private laws 
of the Member States would be an impediment for the functioning of the internal 
market and should be eliminated. Nevertheless, the example of the United States 
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shows that the achievement of an integrated market is not dependent to such a big 
extent on the unification of legislation.475 In fact, unification can be damaging as 
well. A EU uniform law could easily become static, since a single Member State 
would not be able to change it. Meanwhile, both local preferences and legal 
standards will probably change and evolve over time. Moreover, the consumer 
preferences or needs and the legal culture among Member States also differs, and 
unification would not be able to reflect that. This is, for instance, what is 
considered an unfair trade practice in one Member State might be considered a 
common one in another Member State.476 
In the area of contract law, if legal diversity is maintained, Member States will 
develop better solutions adapting to the wishes and needs of private parties. Since 
market participants can freely move around Member States, they would choose 
for the one offering the best solutions. This could lead to a race to the top: 
Member States would learn from each other, which would lead to better and more 
efficient rules. Eventually, the most efficient set of rules would dominate within 
the market, and thus the contract law in the EU would converge towards the most 
efficient solution.477 However, in the areas of contract law where mandatory rules 
play an important role, like in the cases involving weaker contracting parties, the 
situation is different. In those cases, national preferences and levels of protection 
tend to differ among the Member States. For example, in the case of consumer 
law, competition for the best legal system entails that consumers and traders can 
move around the Member States at no cost and are fully informed about the 
content of the legal systems in force in the Member States so they choose the 
most efficient and beneficial for them. Indeed, consumers are not in such 
situation. Most frequently consumers would be ignorant regarding the 
comparative advantages of other legal systems. Costs of relocation are high, there 
are cultural differences, different languages, etc. In the same way, the opposite 
scenario of a ‘race to the bottom’ in which Member States with better protective 
rules would lower their standards to compete with Member States that have lower 
social standards and thus are more attractive to companies does not seem likely. 
First, legislators would find too costly, and, second, a regime with stricter 
standards is considered more beneficial for businesses in the long term since the 
obligation to comply with higher standards might cause technological 
improvements, resulting in a competitive advantage. Although unification of 
consumer law would avoid such a risk, it could also prevent the parties from the 
economic advantages of legal diversity. EU PIL allows parties to a contract to 
choose the law applicable to their contract, and thus benefit from a more 
favourable legal system for their interests. In the case of contracts involving 
weaker parties, EU PIL rules ensure that the mandatory rules of the country of 
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the consumer or the employee are applicable, preventing them from a possible 
abuse of their counterparties.  
Since this study is focused on the protection of weaker parties, which are areas 
where mandatory rules are more present than dispositive rules, special attention 
is necessary. Full harmonisation is mainly called for in the area of consumer law, 
although there has also been some –less successful- calls regarding EU labour 
law.478 However, as it has been submitted, the introduction of a common 
regulation with the exact same protection in all Member States might be 
beneficial for some countries but prejudicial for others. Thus, the setting of EU 
minimum standards is still an option and can be in fact the good option. However, 
that would require the improvement on the implementation of the EU Directives 
by the Member States and the coordination of the rules and scope of EU 
Directives with the EU PIL rules. If the current implementation and coordination 
gaps are solved, unified EU PIL rules would be able to ensure that the minimum 
EU mandatory standards are respected when necessary in cross-border extra-EU 
situations, and at the same time ensure legal diversity between Member States. 
Therefore, the use of EU PIL rules would preserve legal diversity and, at the same 
time, ensure that the consumer enjoys an adequate protection, benefiting from 
legal diversity: the law applicable to the consumer contract is the law of the 
country of habitual residence, and parties can only choose another applicable law 
if it grants the same or higher standards of consumer protection than the law of 
habitual residence of the consumer (art. 6 Rome I). In intra-EU situations, when 
the existent conflict rules are according to the values and objectives of the EU, 
parties benefit from legal pluralism among the Member States. Thus, it can be 
said that the problem lays on legal predictability rather than on legal diversity. 
Taking into account all the aforementioned, I consider that harmonisation up 
to a certain extent of EU contract law, especially regarding EU consumer law, 
seems necessary and beneficial to the EU internal market. There are certain values 
regarding consumer and employee protection that need to be ensured at a EU 
level in order to avoid distortions, both affecting the economic and social 
structure of the EU. However, full harmonisation, at the current moment, might 
be a step too far, bringing in general more burdens than advantages. Still, in the 
area of EU consumer law, important and benefitial achievements have been 
made. It is true that unified EU PIL rules do not achieve the equivalent result as 
unified contract law rules in the internal market; however, they are not contrary 
techniques, but complementary.479 In my opinion, in order to achieve a correct 
protection of consumers and employees within the EU internal market, both 
partial harmonisation and EU PIL rules shall play an important role. If EU PIL 
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rules are sufficiently adapted to the objectives of the internal market and 
coordinated with EU substantive law, legal certainty and flexibility within the 
market would be achieved. EU PIL is presented as the best solution provided that 
conflict rules in contract law (Rome I Regulation) are effectively coordinated 
with the EU directives protecting weaker parties, and vice versa. In that manner, 
EU PIL can deal with cross-border contracts within the internal market without 
bringing disadvantages to the proper functioning of the internal market, and at 
the same time it brings more advantages than a situation of unification or full-
harmonisation. 
 
4. Mechanisms of protection of weaker parties in 
PIL 
The peculiarities that substantive consumer law and employment law present are 
also reflected in private international law. Once it has been determined that 
certain contracting parties are in need of some protection, the next question 
regards how can this protection be best achieved. 
The protection of weaker contracting parties is in our time an inherent part of 
most PIL systems. However, there are many different manners to deal with the 
necessities of weaker contracting parties in PIL terms. Nowadays, the majority of 
legal systems have implemented multilateral conflict rules in consumer and 
employment matters. Only few states still keep a unilateral approach, especially 
regarding employment contracts, due to the private and public interests at stake, 
and thus define the scope of application of their own employment regulations 
(e.g. art. 11 Russian Labour Code480 provides that the domestic labour laws are 
mandatory on all employers within the Russian territory, including employment 
relationships of foreigners).481 An unilateral approach in employment contracts 
was also accepted in some European countries before the enactment of the Rome 
Convention; for example, some English statutes expressly defined their territorial 
scope of application, and if a case felt within it the application of foreign law 
would be overridden; also, German courts used to determine the application of 
domestic labour law in a particular case.482 It is also remarkable that, even 
nowadays, the Spanish Workers’ Statute (‘Estatuto de los Trabajadores’)483 
contains a very controversial provision in art. 1(4) of a unilateral nature, which is 
in fact a scope rule determining the territorial scope of Spanish labour laws.484 
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However, in general, the multilateral PIL method gained terrain even in these 
areas of law, and thus the majority of PIL rules we find are of a multilateral 
character, that take into account the possible applicability of a foreign law. 
The existing general rules regarding party autonomy and law applicable in 
absence of choice are modified in the case of consumer and employment 
contracts. It has been submitted that weaker contracting parties need some 
mechanism of protection against the threats that party autonomy brings. In this 
regard, the options range from the extreme of prohibiting party autonomy 
altogether to a more flexible approach like providing for the more protective law. 
On the other hand, the law applicable in absence of choice should neither be 
determined by the general connecting factors, but adequate and protective 
connecting factors need to be designed. Thus, this section will describe the main 
options and mechanisms that exist to deal with and restrict the freedom choice of 
law in consumer and employment contracts, as well as the existing protective 
conflict rules to deal with the law applicable in absence of choice of law in 
consumer and employment contracts. 
 
4.1. Party autonomy and protection of consumers and 
employees: the options 
It has been submitted that party autonomy is a general principle in PIL regarding 
contractual obligations almost all around the world. However, when important 
interests are at stake, like in the cases of consumer and employment law, the 
weaker contracting party would see itself at a disadvantaged position if the 
stronger party was to freely choose the law applicable to the contract. As a result, 
most legal systems restrict the freedom of choice of law in these cases.  
In consumer contracts, the discussion regarding party autonomy was brought 
up as soon as the consumer protection movement was widespread in the legal 
systems around the world in the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, most legal systems 
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restrict party autonomy in consumer contracts in one way or another, and 
consumer protection in PIL became an integral part of the different national PIL 
regulations.485 
In employment law, the discussion regarding the treatment of the employment 
contract as a normal contract with the possibility of the parties choosing the law 
applicable was brought up early on. The main argument against party autonomy 
in employment contracts was evidently the inequality of bargaining power, with 
the risk that the employer could impose the application of a law with lower 
standards in employment protection that the law of the country of the place of 
work. Nevertheless, a growing number of European countries started to recognise 
party autonomy in these cases, although in a very limited manner.486 For example, 
in the Netherlands, party autonomy was  permitted but with a statutory exception 
in some cases of unfair discharge.487 In Spain, while also allowing party 
autonomy in general, there was a statutory provision that required the application 
of Spanish law when there were some specific strong connections to 
Spain.488With the Rome Convention, the possibility of choosing the law 
applicable in employment contracts, with limitations, was generalized among the 
European states. 
Despite the differences of rationale between consumer protection and 
employee protection in substantive law, the threats of party autonomy in PIL are 
similar (i.e. in general terms, the danger that the strong party chooses as 
applicable to the contract a law with low standards of consumer or employee 
protection). Thus, the manners of treating party autonomy in PIL in consumer 
and employment contracts are the same in this regard.  
There are several ways to restrict party autonomy which bring different 
advantages and consequences. Essentially, party autonomy can be completely 
excluded, limited to specific legal systems or limited as to its effects: 
 
a. Exclusion of party autonomy 
The complete exclusion of party autonomy is an exceptional and straightforward 
measure. This drastic solution is found, for example, in Switzerland regarding 
consumer contracts: according to art. 120(2) of the Swiss Act on Private 
International Law, choice of law is excluded in consumer contracts. Also, the 
exclusion was found in the Proposal for the Rome I Regulation (art. 5 Proposal 
Rome I). Regarding employment contracts, this measure can also be found in 
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China, where art. 43 of the Chinese Private International Law Act also does not 
admit party autonomy in labour contracts.  
By eliminating the possibility to choose the law applicable to the contract, 
consumers and employees do not have to fear that their counterparties will choose 
the law with the lowest protection standard. Moreover, legal certainty is definitely 
enhanced, since it is clear that parties are not allowed to choose the law 
applicable. Therefore, consumers and employees can easily predict the rights and 
obligations derived from the contract, and receive the protection of a law they are 
familiar with. In addition, the contracting parties and the courts do not have to 
engage in a complex process as compared to other models that limit party 
autonomy, and as a result this solution provides for legal certainly and reduces 
transaction and litigation costs.489   
However, this model would set aside all the advantages party autonomy 
brings, and has been harshly criticised.490 While it seems logical to reduce the 
professional’s or employer’s choice of law in order to avoid a potential abuse, the 
exclusion of party autonomy also brings consequences on the consumer or 
employee. Firstly, consumers and employees see themselves deprived from the 
eventual benefits of choosing the law: what if the chosen law is more beneficial 
for them? The main criticism of this model rests on the difficulty to rightly defend 
the interests of the weaker party, since it might exclude the application of a law 
more favourable than the law applicable in absence of choice.491 Moreover, the 
fact that these contracts involve parties with unequal bargaining power does not 
necessarily mean that the choice will be done unilaterally and in detriment of the 
weaker party; even if it is, it is more probable that the choice would refer to the 
application of a law familiar to the professional or the employer (e.g. law of the 
domicile of the business or law where the employer is established), which can be 
either more beneficial or detrimental for the weaker party than the law otherwise 
applicable in absence of choice.492 Also, this approach might impair the cross-
border commercial activities, making businesses to concentrate in their own 
national market. For example, in the case of consumer contracts, professionals 
might have to adjust the contract to a foreign law, which would be reflected in 
higher costs for the goods or services. Moreover, professionals might even refuse 
to provide their services or sell their goods in some countries due to the applicable 
law.493 Furthermore, the exclusion of party autonomy also excludes the possible 
benefits deriving from the competition among legal systems, which can lead to a 
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more protective national legal system where non-national professionals are at a 
disadvantage, which would result in an increase of prices and thus a disadvantage 
for the local consumers. Party autonomy is also an incentive to national legal 
orders to ensure their rules are attractive for the parties and thus prevent them to 
avoid the applicability of their rules by choosing a more favourable law.494 
Therefore, even if this option might enhance legal certainty, the complete 
exclusion of party autonomy seems to bring more disadvantages than benefits to 
the parties.  
 
b. Limitation to specific legal systems 
A second option, less drastic than completely excluding party autonomy, consists 
on limiting the freedom of choice of law to certain legal systems. This model can 
consist on a broad or a narrow approach: it can either limit the choice to any law 
with sufficient connection to the contract or to a number of specific laws. An 
example of a broad approach can be found on the US Uniform Commercial Code, 
where regarding consumer contracts, a choice of law is not effective unless the 
transaction holds a reasonable relation to the country designated.495 We also find 
an example of this model in a narrow approach, regarding employment contracts, 
in the Swiss Act on Private International Law, in which art. 121(3) limits the 
choice of the parties to the law of the country of habitual residence of the 
employee or to the law of the country in which the employer has the place of 
business, domicile or habitual residence.496  
Although this model provides for more flexibility for the parties, while 
avoiding the choice of a law that is not sufficiently connected with the contract, I 
consider it also brings more downsides than advantages.497 First of all, this model 
will only ensure a minimum protection to weaker parties if the laws provided 
ensure it; it can happen that a law with some connections to the contract provides 
for little or no consumer or employee protection at all. In this regard, if a listed 
law or a law sufficiently connected provides for a low protection, limiting party 
autonomy becomes useless, since the objective was to avoid that the stronger 
party would take advantage of its counterparty by choosing a more detrimental 
law. Thus, this option would only be effective if the choice of law is limited to 
laws of countries which are members of a federation or part of a union that enjoys 
the same or similar legal framework, such as the US or the EU; in these cases, the 
EU Member States share the same minimum standards of protection, and 
therefore it would not be so relevant if the law applicable is the one of one 
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Member State or another.498 However, this model would just work in an intra-EU 
context, and not towards third states. The EU Green Paper on the conversion of 
the Rome Convention into the Rome I Regulation499, when considering the 
existing possibilities to update the rule on the law applicable to consumer 
contracts, referred to this model. In one of the options, a limited choice of law 
was suggested, allowing only the choice of the law of the country where the 
business is established. However, for the choice to be valid, it would have to be 
required that the business proved that the consumer had made an informed choice 
and that the consumer had the information on all rights and obligations conferred 
on him by the law of the business’s habitual residence, such as the right of 
withdrawal, the duration, terms of the guarantee, etc. If these conditions were not 
met, the court would have to apply the law of the consumer’s habitual residence 
or the mandatory provisions of that law. Also, this option would only be 
applicable to businesses domiciled in Member States, while those with domicile 
in a third country would be subject to the mandatory provisions of the country of 
habitual residence of the consumer when they choose another applicable law.500  
This solution seems problematic. Primarily, regarding the requirement to 
provide information of all the rights and obligations conferred to the consumers 
by the chosen law, it seems difficult to determine which information to provide, 
since consumer law is rather complex and might involve several laws and issues. 
More importantly, even if businesses were to provide all the relevant information, 
it is unlikely that consumers would actually read it and, if so, understand it. It 
does not seem feasible to ask consumers to compare their own law with the 
chosen law.501  
Finally, regarding both consumer and employment contracts, another 
disadvantage consists on the fact that the strong party of the contract might be 
able to influence the choice of law by influencing the connecting factors; for 
example, in cases referring to the law of the place of the habitual residence or 
place of business of the employer, this place can be chosen by the employer due 
to its low employee protection. In addition, in the same manner than the previous 
model excluding completely party autonomy, it deprives the weaker parties from 
enjoying a more beneficial law to their situation. 
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c. Limitation of the effects of party autonomy 
A third option consists on curtailing the effects of party autonomy, without 
neither excluding it or limiting it to certain laws. The parties can choose the law 
applicable to their consumer or employment contract, but this choice cannot 
deprive the consumer or employee of the protection provided by the law 
applicable in absence of choice. This is the model used in the European Union. 
Article 6 Rome I regarding consumer contracts and article 8 Rome I regarding 
individual employment contracts allow the parties to choose the law applicable 
to their contract as long as it does not deprive the consumer or employee of the 
protection afforded to him by the mandatory provisions of the law which, in the 
absence of choice, would have been applicable. Regarding consumer contracts, 
this model is also followed, for example, by Japan, Korea, Turkey and the US.502 
Also, regarding employment contracts, this solution is found in the US.503 
However, the US model for consumer and employee protection differs from the 
preferential law model of the EU, since it is determined fundamental public-
policy doctrine. Employee and (most of) consumer protection rules are 
considered an expression of fundamental policy, and according to Section 
187(2)(b) “application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a 
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the 
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which (…) would be 
the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the 
parties”. This is, consumers and employees are protected against a choice of law 
that violates a fundamental public policy of the law applicable in absence of 
choice.504 In the same manner as in the EU, courts engage in a comparison 
between the law chosen by the parties and the law applicable in absence of choice; 
however, while in the EU when the law chosen is less favourable than the 
mandatory rules of the law objectively applicably a mix of both laws applies (i.e. 
the law chosen plus the better mandatory protection of the law applicable in 
absence of choice), in the US the law chosen would be completely set aside and 
the law in absence of choice would govern completely the contract. 
This model enhances predictability of results and legal certainty, allowing the 
parties to choose the law applicable to their contract. At the same time, consumers 
and employees do not lose the protection afforded to them by the law objectively 
applicable to their contracts. The preferential law model allows parties to choose 
the law applicable to their consumer or employment contract, and at the same 
time ensures that they are not deprived from the protection afforded to them by 
the law applicable in absence of choice. In case the law chosen provides lower 
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protection than the mandatory provisions of the law in absence of choice, these 
mandatory provisions will be applicable. It is a compromise between freedom of 
contract and weaker party protection. Thus, it respects the parties’ preferences by 
not excluding party autonomy but rather allowing the choice of law that would 
benefit the weaker contracting party. In contrast to the option of completely 
excluding party autonomy, on which consumers and employees see themselves 
deprived from the eventual benefits of choosing the law, according to this model 
only those consumers and employees who agree to a lower standard of protection 
see themselves deprived from the freedom of choice of law. In addition, the other 
party to the contract is also benefited since this approach allows the 
standardization of the legal relationships with its consumers or employees.505 
However, this approach also has some downsides and has been initially 
criticised due to the depeçage resulting from it, as well as regarding the 
information costs resulting from the obligatory analysis of a foreign legal 
system.506 Criticisms around the fractioning of the law applicable to the contract 
or depeçage have been overcame nowadays, at least in the EU context, where the 
Rome I Regulation even refers to the possibility of depeçage in art. 3 Rome I 
regarding party autonomy.507  
Still, this approach is characterised by the difficulty of application, specially 
complicated in practice.508 The preferential law approach requires parties and 
courts to compare the law chosen and the mandatory rules of the law applicable 
in absence of choice; in some versions, it can even require courts to combine both 
laws. In this regard, two main difficulties arise: the determination of mandatory 
rules and the issue of the comparison. “Mandatory rules” are defined as rules that 
cannot be derogated from by agreement. They are provisions of a legal order 
whose mandatoriness is only internal and not international, especially those 
aimed to protect the weaker party; they are part of the domestic legal system.509 
However, it is still a vague concept, since it varies from country to country and, 
as a result, it might create difficulties regarding the predictability of their 
                                                     
505 Guillermo Palao Moreno, ‘Article 8: Individual Employment Contracts’ in Ulrich Magnus and 
Peter Mankowski (eds), Rome I Regulation - Commentary (sellier european law publishers 2017) 
583. 
506 Franz Gamillscheg, ‘Rules of Public Order in Private International Labour Law’ (1983) 181 
Recueil des Cours 285, 306–320; Guillermo Palao Moreno, ‘Las Normas Del Derecho Internacional 
Privado de Origen Comunitario En Materia de Contrato Individual de Trabajo, Ante Los Retos de 
La Integración Europea Y La Globalización’ (2005) 5 Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional 
Privado 309, 328. 
507 Art. 3(1) Rome I provides that “(…) parties can select the law applicable to the whole or to part 
only of the contract.” Miguel Gardeñes Santiago, ‘La Regulación Conflictual Del Contrato de 
Trabajo En El Reglamento Roma I: Una Oportunidad Perdida’ (2008) 8 Anuario Español de 
Derecho Internacional Privado 387, 404,405. 
508 ibid 405–407. 
509 Concerning the definition of mandatory rules, see Chapter III in 3.1.1.a. 
 134 
application in a specific situation.510 On the other hand, comparison between two 
different laws also becomes burdensome. Since the mandatory rules of the law in 
absence of law only become applicable when they are more beneficial to the 
weaker party, the court must compare in order to decide which law is preferential 
to the consumer, since that process cannot be made in abstract. This comparison 
is not always easy, and it entails several dangers. For example, in the case of a 
consumer contract, the law of the country of habitual residence of the consumer 
recognises to consumers the right to withdraw from a contract within 14 working 
days since the receipt, while it requires professionals to reimburse the money 
within 90 days; at the same time, the law chosen by the parties only gives 7 days 
to withdraw from the contract, but it requires professionals to reimburse the 
money within 30 days.511 Or, in the case of an employment contract, one law 
provides for the right to payment upon dismissal but not the right to claim 
reinstatement, while the other law provides for the latter right but not right to 
monetary compensation.512 The comparison should not result in the practice of 
cherry picking, by which a combination of preferential rules from both laws are 
combined with the result of a protection that none of the laws aims to provide; it 
should not result neither in a practice under which the consumer always wins.513 
It is generally agreed that the comparison should be based on the implications for 
the individual case and attending to the overall level of protection of each legal 
order for the claim at issue; nevertheless, it is indeed a troublesome process.514  
In conclusion, it is true that the application of the preferential law approach 
results complicated in practice; nevertheless, an overview of the different 
possible models to protect the weaker parties against party autonomy show that 
it is not possible to ensure consumer and employee protection, grant party 
autonomy and avoid complex rules simultaneously.515    
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4.2. The existing connecting factors in absence of 
choice of law 
The law applicable in absence of choice must also be considered specifically 
for these cases, since the general conflict rules are not designed for contracts 
containing a weaker party. Generally, this law is the most relevant for the party 
protected, the law that this party would reasonably expect to be applicable.  
 
4.2.1. Law applicable in absence of choice to employment contracts 
There have been various options developed regarding the determination of the 
law applicable to employment contracts in absence of choice. The diversity of 
conflict rules in this area is due to the different approaches in the law applicable 
to contracts regarding the determination of the law applicable in absence of 
choice and the different situations to which these rules have to adapt. Some 
solutions are based on flexible connecting factors, while others in hard rules; 
some focus on the interests of the parties, while others give more importance to 
public interests.516 Some authors have even suggested that courts should take into 
account all legal orders related with the employment contract and decide among 
them for the most favourable law to the employee.517 However, it is the law of 
the place where the work is performed which is generally considered to be the 
most appropriate for the majority of "typical" employment relationships.  
In a typical employment relationship, in which the employee works and lives 
for the entire period of employment in one place, which is also where the 
employer is established, the application of the law of the habitual work place is 
the most common in most jurisdictions. In the EU, article 8 Rome I includes the 
country in which or from which the employee carries out his work as its main 
connecting factor in absence of choice of law. In the same manner, other 
jurisdictions also refer to the law of the habitual place of work (e.g. art. 21(3) 
Japanese Private International Law Act, art. 27(2) Turkish Private International 
Law Act, art.121(1) Swiss Private International Law Act, s196 Restatement 
Second of Conflict of Laws, art. 41 Chinese Private International Law Act, 
etc.).518 Since the employee works and resides in the same place, where the 
employer is also established, there is generally no need to consider another law. 
The employee is entitled to the rights that the law which is most familiar provides, 
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while the employer is ensured that all employment contracts with the employees 
working in the same place are subject to the same law. Thus, both parties benefit 
from it. Regarding public interests, the protective national legislation of a country 
is normally directed to the employees habitually working in that country and to 
their employers. Moreover, the courts of that place would normally have 
jurisdiction, and they will be able to apply their own law.519  
Determining the law of the habitual place of work as applicable suggests that 
the law applicable to the employment contract does not change in the cases where 
the employee is temporary posted abroad. Nowadays, it is common that 
employers expect their employees to be mobile, either to acquire knowledge, 
experience, or contribute with their work on establishments abroad on a 
temporary basis. Since the habitual place of work does not change, the law 
applicable to the contract usually remains the same. However, it seems logical 
that the country to which the employee is posted might also have some interest in 
the application of some terms of its labour law, such as mandatory provisions 
regarding health and safety, minimum wage, non-discrimination, etc., with the 
intention to protect local employers and employees from competition from 
abroad. 520    
On the other hand, not all transnational employment relationships are 
traditional employment relationships, and thus the adequacy of the application of 
the law of the country of habitual place of work is sometimes doubtful. In some 
cases, the place where the employer is established is used as a connecting factor 
to determine the law applicable to the employment relationship. This connecting 
factor is used in addition to the habitual place of work in many jurisdictions (e.g. 
art. 8(2) Rome I Regulation, art. 43 Chinese Private International Law Act, art. 
12(2) Japanese private international law act, art. 121(2) Swiss Private 
International Law Act, art. 27(3) Turkish Private Internatioanl Law Act). It seems 
that the place where the employer is established is a connecting factor less 
suitable to protect the interests of the employees. First, it might lead to fortuitous 
results; for example, in the case of large multinational companies, with numerous 
offices and agencies in different countries, the place where the employee was 
hired might be the result of a coincidence. Secondly, the place of establishment 
of the employer might be easily manipulated, and in that manner the employer 
could be located in a country with a low standard of protection of employees on 
purpose. However, there might sometimes be good reasons to apply the law of 
the country where the employer is established due to the nature of the 
employment relationship. In the case of transnational companies, specialist 
employees, or management or advisory personnel, are often transferred from one 
of the countries where the employer does business to another. If the employment 
contract is governed by the law of the principal place of business, it avoids having 
to consider a different law every time an employee is transferred, which is 
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beneficial for the employer and can be reasonably expected by the employee.521 
Also, it has to be noticed that this connecting factor is normally used when it is 
not possible to establish the habitual place of work of the employee, i.e. it works 
as a subsidiary of the connecting factor of the habitual place of work.  
Employment relationships without a habitual place of work might be 
problematic from the private international law point of view. These are cases 
where the employee carries out his work in several countries, or when the territory 
where the work is carried out does not belong to any country.522 Typical examples 
of the first scenario are international transport workers (e.g. seamen, aircrew 
members or lorry drivers), on which regular assignments abroad are performed 
and there are at least two countries where the work is habitually performed.523 
Also, some commercial representatives, which act in different countries and the 
centre of their activity has not been established, belong to this category. 
Regarding the second scenario, which is not found very often, an example could 
be temporary employment at offshore installations, such as an oil platform.524 The 
law of the place of establishment of the employer is the common conflict rule in 
these cases, although there are other widespread solutions, such as the laws of the 
countries of the ship’s flag, law of the country where the aircraft is registered, or 
the law of the place from which the work is performed.525 
All the mentioned connecting factors look for the most closely connected law 
to apply to the employment relationship. However, due to the diversity of factual 
circumstances, it might be the case that the employment relationship is more 
closely connected to a different country than the one indicated in the applicable 
conflict rule. Conflict rules regarding employment contracts must be flexible 
enough to take into account the important interests involved. In this regard, many 
jurisdictions include an ‘escape clause’ which allows courts to disregard the law 
designated by the other connecting factors and apply instead the law that is most 
closely connected to that specific case. This escape clause can be found in the EU 
in art. 8(4) Rome I, art. 67(2) Tunisian Private International Law Act or art. 27(4) 
Turkish Private International Law Act.526  
The use of this clause is justified when all the elements of the employment 
relationship are located in one country except the habitual place of work, or by 
the common nationality of the parties or the common place of habitual residence. 
A clear example would be when a company based in one country hires an 
employee domiciled in the same country to work indefinitely in a foreign country 
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where the standards of employment protection are lower than it their home 
country; in this case, courts would rather apply the law most closely connected, 
which would be the law of the home state, rather than the law of habitual place 
of work, which offers lower standards of protection.527 
 
4.2.2. Law applicable in absence of choice to consumer contracts 
Regarding the law applicable in absence of choice to consumer contracts, it is 
generally agreed in most legal systems that the appropriate connecting factor is 
the habitual residence of the consumer. Thus, in most jurisdictions around the 
world the law applicable to the consumer contract is the law of the habitual 
residence of the consumer. For example, this conflict rule is found in the EU in 
art. 6(1) Rome I, in art. 120(1) Swiss Private International Law Act, Article 11(2) 
of the Japanese Private 
International Law Act, Article 1212(2) of the Russian Civil Code, Article 
26(2) of the Turkish Private International Law Act, etc. Also, the law of the 
country of habitual residence of the consumer is the law applicable to consumer 
contracts under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Despite there is 
no specific rule providing that, contracts in general are subject to the law of the 
party who receives the goods and services (Sections 189 to 197), and since the 
consumer is normally that party, the result would lead to the applicability to the 
law of his habitual residence, without the need for a specific provisions dealing 
with consumer contracts.528 
Since, in general terms, the consumer contract will be for the supply of goods 
or services for personal, household, or family use, it seems natural that the 
connecting factor for the law applicable is the place where the consumer lives and 
would most likely receive and use the services or goods.529 From the point of view 
of the consumers, they are more familiar from the law of their habitual residence, 
and it can be guessed that they have a better access to information about that law. 
The application of the law of habitual residence of the consumer corresponds to 
the reasonable expectations from the consumer, while the professional can also 
predict that, when he targets the market of a different country, the consumer law 
of that country would apply. 
In addition, the application of the law of the consumer’s habitual residence 
prevents a possible abuse from the professional. Even if there is no choice of law, 
the professional could influence the applicable law if, for example, a non-
protective conflict rule was applicable. If the law of the place of habitual 
residence of the seller or the provider of the services (i.e. the professional in this 
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case) was applicable, the professional could determine this law by moving the 
seat of the company, for instance.530 
Moreover, since most countries also assign the jurisdiction of the court of the 
consumer’s habitual residence in the case of consumer contracts, the application 
of the law of that country avoids a split of jurisdiction and applicable law. 
Therefore, the court does not need to engage in the burdensome task of applying 
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CHAPTER III - THE ROME I REGULATION 
AND ITS MECHANISMS OF PROTECTION 
OF CONSUMERS AND EMPLOYEES 
 
Party autonomy is the cornerstone of the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations.532 Freedom of choice of law is considered as an 
extension of freedom of contract and is now well rooted in the area of contract 
law in EU private international law (EU PIL).533  In the Rome I Regulation, as a 
general rule, the objective connecting factors will only apply when the parties 
have not made a choice of law. Article 3(1) Rome I allows the parties to the 
contract to choose the law of any state as the law governing their contract. In a 
cross-border contract, a Dutch seller and a Spanish buyer are free to choose 
German law to govern their contract, even when the situation has no connections 
to Germany. Moreover, the depeçage, or choice of a law to govern only a part of 
the contract, is also permitted, although it is highly debated whether the contract 
should be divisible into different parts in those cases.534 Parties also have the 
freedom to change the law applicable to their contract at any moment. This is, 
parties can agree on a different law (or choose a governing law if they did not do 
it in their contract), for example, when the dispute has already arisen. In addition, 
the choice of law can be express or implicit. This means that the choice can be 
expressly stipulated by the parties but it can also be implied by the terms of the 
contract and all the circumstances of the case. In order to consider that there is an 
implicit choice of law, a genuine intention of the parties in that regard must be 
ascertained with a certain degree of certainty, taking into account all the 
circumstances of the case.535 Party autonomy, at least in the area of contracts, is 
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widely recognised and accepted in EU PIL. The discussion is focused on its 
extension and its limits. Thus, it is also acknowledged that the freedom of choice 
of law requires regulation, especially when it works to the detriment of one of the 
parties to the contract, like a consumer or an employee.  
Protection of weaker parties is one of the principles underlying the current EU 
PIL and widely present in the Rome I Regulation. The Rome I Regulation 
provides for several mechanisms for the protection of weaker contracting parties 
which constitute a limit on party autonomy. Also, special connecting factors are 
established to determine the law applicable in absence of choice for those 
contracts which are considered to be in imbalance. The weaker contracting parties 
that enjoy special protection in the Rome I Regulation are consumers involved in 
a consumer contract falling under the conditions required by article 6 Rome I and 
employees part of an individual employment contract according to article 8 Rome 
I.  
On the one hand, when there is a choice of law, the danger of party autonomy 
is similar in the case of consumer and employment contracts, consisting on the 
possible threat that the strong party chooses as applicable to the contract a law 
with low standards of consumer or employee protection. Thus, both articles limit 
party autonomy in the same manner, providing for the application of the 
provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement of the law objectively 
applicable to the contract. On the other hand, in absence of choice of law, both 
articles provide for special connecting factors. Article 6 Rome I, in the case of 
consumer contracts, provides for the application of the law of the country of 
habitual residence of the consumer. The application of the law of habitual 
residence of the consumer corresponds to the reasonable expectations of the 
consumer, and, at the same time, the professional can also predict that, when he 
targets the market of a different country, the consumer law of that country would 
apply. In addition, the application of the law of the consumer’s habitual residence 
prevents a possible abuse from the professional: if the general connecting factors 
of article 4 Rome I would apply to the consumer contract, they will most probably 
lead to the application of the law of the country of the seller or services provider 
(the professional in this case), which means that the professional could determine 
this law by moving the seat of the company, for instance.536 In the case of 
employment contracts, article 8 Rome I primarily refers to the law of the country 
in which the employee habitually carries out his work. The place of habitual work 
is considered as most closely connected to the employment contract, and, in 
general, both employee and employer are familiar with it. Moreover, the place 
where the employee habitually carries out his work will often coincide with his 
habitual residence. The country where the employee habitually carries out his 
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work has the most interest in applying his mandatory rules ensuring employment 
rights and conditions.537 
However, articles 6 and 8 Rome I are not the only mechanisms that the Rome 
I Regulation has in order to ensure the application of mandatory law protecting 
weaker contracting parties. Articles 3(3) and 3(4) Rome I limit party autonomy 
with the aim to avoid parties to artificially relate the contract to any country to 
which it lacks any connection, with the only intention to avoid the application of 
the mandatory national or European provisions. Pursuant to article 3(3) Rome I, 
when a situation is only connected to one single Member State, the choice of a 
foreign law by the parties should not affect the application of the domestically 
mandatory provisions of the national law. In the same manner, pursuant to article 
3(4) Rome I, if the situation is only connected with one or several Member States, 
the choice of a non-Member State law by the parties will not affect the application 
of mandatory EU Law. This provision is also a potential vehicle regarding the 
safeguarding of the interests of contractual parties, as they will be prevented from 
avoiding the applicability of mandatory provisions originated in EU directives in 
intra-EU situations. 
In addition, article 9 Rome I ensures the application of the so-called overriding 
mandatory provisions, which must be of internationally mandatory application 
regardless the law applicable to the contract. Overriding mandatory provisions 
are defined in article 9(1) as “provisions the respect for which is regarded as 
crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, 
social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any 
situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable 
to the contract under this Regulation”. However, whether this provision can be 
used as a mechanism of protection of consumers, employees and other weaker 
parties is highly discussed. 
Thus, this chapter will focus on those specific mechanisms that the Rome I 
Regulation provides for the protection of weaker parties, in special of consumers 
and employees: 
- First, article 6 Rome I regarding consumer contracts will be object of 
analysis. Not all consumer contracts fall under the conditions required by article 
6 Rome I and, as a consequence, those contracts outside its scope of application 
will be subject to the general rules of the Rome I Regulation and will not enjoy 
the special protection ensured by article 6 Rome I. Both the scope of application 
and connecting factors of article 6 Rome I regarding consumer contracts will be 
analysed.  
- Second, article 8 Rome I concerning the law applicable to individual 
employment contracts will be examined.  
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- In addition, article 9 Rome I regarding overriding mandatory rules will be 
object of analysis. Specifically, the role of overriding mandatory rules regarding 
the protection of weaker parties will be debated.  
- Finally, article 3(4) Rome I will also be described as a mechanism for the 
protection of weaker parties within the EU. 
 
1. The law applicable to consumer contracts: 
Article 6 Rome I 
Consumers have a weaker economic and legal position vis-à-vis professionals, 
and the protection designed to balance out this inequality needs to be reflected in 
PIL. The principle of consumer protection is reflected in the area of EU PIL 
regarding applicable law to cross-border consumer contracts in article 6 Rome I. 
National legislators, and the EU legislator, enact mandatory consumer contract 
provisions that restrict freedom of contract and create substantive consumer 
rights; these rights need to be protected in cross-border situations. 
Already the Rome Convention included a special conflict rule protecting 
consumers (art. 5 Rome Convention). Due to its narrow scope of application and 
other inconsistencies, article 6 Rome I introduced changes. Article 5 Rome 
Convention covered only ‘certain consumer contracts’, namely those ‘the object 
of which is the supply of goods or services’ and those ‘for the provision of credit 
for that object’. PIL interprets the supply of goods and services in a narrow 
contractual understanding of the concept (not extended to almost every economic 
activity) and, as a result, the scope covered by article 5 Rome Convention was 
inconsistent with the scope that the EU Directives on consumer protection 
intended to cover.538 Moreover, the challenges of the growth of electronic 
commerce also called for a new rule.  
When modernizing the Rome Convention, EU PIL was aligned regarding 
consumer contracts, and article 6 Rome I was drafted in coordination with arts. 
15-17 Brussels I Regulation (now arts. 17-19 Brussels I bis Regulation). Recital 
7 Rome I makes express reference to the synchronisation between both 
Regulations: “the substantive scope and the provisions of this Regulation should 
be consistent with Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (Brussels I) and Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the 
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European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (Rome II)”.539 
 
1.1. Conditions of application of article 6 Rome I 
Article 6 Rome I applies to consumer contracts entered into on or after 18 
December 2009. As to the personal scope, a consumer under article 6 Rome I 
needs to be a natural person who is acting for a purpose outside the scope of his 
trade or profession. At the same time, the professional needs to be a person 
(natural or legal) acting in the exercise of its trade or profession. The notion of 
consumer and professional need to be interpreted autonomously and 
independently according to the object and purpose of the Regulation.540  
The complexity of article 6 Rome I lies on the specific requirements necessary 
for its applicability. Since not all ‘consumers’ or ‘customers’ are in need of 
protective PIL rules, article 6 Rome I limits its scope of application. Under the 
Rome Convention, the applicability of the rule was subject to the difference 
between passive consumer and active consumer. The passive consumer, who is 
approached by a professional to enter into a contract, might not be aware of the 
international character of the situation (e.g. he does not know whether the 
professional is located in the consumer’s country or not). Conversely, the active 
consumer, who enters into a contract by its own initiative with a business in a 
foreign country, is aware of the internationality of the contract. Therefore, the 
reasonable expectation of the passive consumer, as well as for the business who 
intentionally directs his activities to that country, is the law of the consumer’s 
home-country to be applicable, while the active consumer who approaches a 
business in a foreign country can reasonably expect that his own law will not be 
applicable.541 Both the Rome I Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation changed 
this approach. Article 6 Rome I intends to prevent contracting around mandatory 
consumer regulations as a result of the operation of the conflict rules in the cases 
where the contract has a close connection to the home-country of the consumer. 
To determine the applicability of article 6 Rome I, we can distinguish between 
material and territorial requirements: 
(a) Material requirements 
Article 6 Rome I applies to “a contract concluded by a natural person for a 
purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession (‘the 
consumer’) with another person acting in the exercise of his trade or profession 
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(‘the professional’) […]”, as long as the contract falls within the scope of such 
activities. The material requirements necessary in a contract to be considered a 
consumer contract under article 6 Rome I are fulfilled when:  
-the professional party pursues commercial or professional activities; 
-the consumer does not act within its commercial or professional activities; 
-the contract falls within the scope of such activities; 
-the contract does not fall within the material exclusions of article 6(4) Rome 
I. 
Thus, article 6 Rome I applies to all types of contracts concluded between a 
professional and a consumer, except those specifically excluded.542 Article 6 
Rome I applies without prejudice of arts. 5 and 7 Rome I (contracts of carriage 
and insurance contracts, respectively), which are dealt with in specific provisions 
due to the particular nature of those types of contract.543  
The two first points have been previously subject of analysis.544 Regarding the 
third point, it is required that the contract falls within the scope of ‘such 
activities’. In this regard, recital 25 states “[…] provided that the consumer 
contract has been concluded as a result of the professional pursuing his 
commercial or professional activities in that particular country […]”545, which 
requires a nexus between the activities and the conclusion of the contract. This 
requirement should not be interpreted strictly, since in cases of advertisement in 
media, for example, it would be very difficult to prove the link between the 
directed activity and the conclusion of the contract. Moreover, the consumer does 
not need to establish the existence of a causal link, and it is also not necessary 
that the professional advertised the specific product or service acquired by the 
consumer, but only a general relation to the business is sufficient.546  
Article 6(4) Rome I provides a list of excluded contracts.547 The exception in 
point (a) regards a contract for the supply of services to be supplied entirely 
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outside the consumer’s country of habitual residence. Although included in the 
definition of consumer contracts within the Brussels I bis Regulation, it is 
excluded from article 6 Rome I on the grounds that, in such cases, the consumer 
cannot reasonably expect the protection of his own law.548 A clear example is a 
contract for the provision of hotel accommodation, or a language course. In those 
cases, it is understood that the consumer ‘cannot reasonably expect the law of his 
state of origin to be applied…The contract is more closely connected with the 
State in which the other contracting party is resident, even if the latter has 
performed one of the acts described in paragraph 2 (advertising, for example) in 
the State in which the consumer is resident’.549 This rationale is questionable in 
some aspects. Specially, it is inefficient the fact that is not parallel with article 17 
Brussels I bis Regulation and thus might lead to a situation where the court of the 
country of the consumer has to apply a foreign law. For this provision, it is 
essential to distinguish contracts for the provision of services from contracts for 
the sales of goods, including the issues regarding mixed contracts or a third 
category of contracts. In this regard, it has to be noticed that the concept of 
contract ‘for the supply of services’ in EU PIL is not as broad as in other areas: 
the ECJ in Falco Privatstiftung550 held that the notion of service required some 
activity or active conduct from the service provider, and thus is not synonymous 
to the concept of services within the meaning of article 49 of the EC Treaty.551 
Moreover, to be excluded by article 6(4)(a), the service has to be provided 
exclusively in a country different than the country of the consumer. A service is 
rendered where the provider performs the activities and, when applicable, where 
the consumer receives the results. In cross-border services, these places could be 
different countries (e.g. an internet service provider situated in one country, while 
the consumer downloading the content of the website is in another country).552 
The place of performance is considered to be the place where the service is 
completed and passed to the customer. However, in the case of the exception of 
article 6(4)(a), it is clear that the service is just excluded when the consumer has 
to travel abroad in order to receive the service, and in such a case the service will 
be performed and the results received outside the country of the consumer. 
Article 6(4)(b) Rome I excludes a contract of carriage other than a contract 
involving a package travel as defined by Directive 90/314/ECC on package 
                                                     
(d) rights and obligations which constitute a financial instrument and rights and obligations 
constituting the terms and conditions governing the issuance or offer to the public and public take-
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travel, package holidays and package tours (now repealed by Directive (EU) 
2015/2302).553 All kinds of carriage, regardless whether by air, sea, rail or land, 
are excluded, and irrespective of whether the contract for the carriage is for the 
carriage of goods or persons and of whether the carriage is free or not.554 The 
drafting of this norm has been criticised.555 Article 2(1) Package Travel Directive 
defines a package as a combination of accommodation, transport and/or other 
tourist services. Thus, a package could be a combination of accommodation (e.g. 
hotel) and a tourist service (e.g. sailing), without transport, and in this case it 
could fall at the same time under the previous exception of article 6(4)(a) (i.e. 
services that are provided exclusively in a country other than the country of the 
consumer). Following an interpretation parallel to the Brussels I Regulation, it is 
understood that the exception of article 6(4)(b) is a lex specialis regarding the 
other exceptions of article 6(4) Rome I.556  
Article 6(4)(c) excludes from the scope of consumer protection contracts 
relating to rights in rem in immovable property (e.g. contracts for the sale or 
donation of real estate, mortgage contracts, etc.) or tenancies of immovable 
property, other than timeshare contracts. The ratio of this exclusion is that such 
contracts are normally subject to the law of the place where the real state is 
situated, to which they are most closely related.557 The importance of the 
connection between immovable property and the territory where the immovable 
property is located is shown in article 4(1)(c) Rome I and article 24(1) Brussels I 
bis, which, respectively, use as connecting factor the place where the property is 
located to determine the law applicable, and points to the court of the place where 
the property is situated as the exclusive jurisdiction for contracts relating to rights 
in rem in immovable property or over six month tenancies of immovable 
property. Article 4(1)(d) and article 24(1) provide as an exception that a tenancy 
of up to six months for private use (e.g. holiday house) is most closely connected 
to the country of common habitual residence of tenant and landlord. The main 
issue regarding article 6(4)(c) is that parties are then allowed to freely choose the 
law applicable to contracts relating to rights in rem in immovable property or 
tenancies of immovable property according to article 3(1) Rome I, deviating from 
the conflict rules of article 4(1)(c) and (d). As a result, since article 6 Rome I 
cannot ensure the applicability of the mandatory rules of the place where the 
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property is located regarding the protection of private tenants, it is uncertain 
whether these norms could apply as overriding mandatory rules according to 
article 9 Rome I.558 
Timeshare contracts within the meaning of Directive 94/7/EC, now repealed 
by Directive 2008/122/EC559, are not subject to this exception. The definition of 
a timeshare contract under the new Directive is simplified, and it is defined as “a 
contract […] under which a consumer […] acquires the right to use one or more 
overnight accommodation […]”.560 This exception creates the uncertainty of 
whether all timeshare contracts fall under the scope of article 6 Rome I or whether 
those that could fall under other exceptions at the same time (i.e. timeshare 
contracts that are essentially contracts for the provision of services excluded by 
article 6(4)(a)) would be excluded. This is, the broad definition of timeshare 
contracts includes contracts for the provision of services, that could be supplied 
exclusively in a country other than the consumer’s country of habitual residence 
and thus also fall under the exception of article 6(4)(a).561 It can be considered 
that the legislative intent and objective purpose of the rule is to include any 
timeshare contract covered by the Directive in the scope of article 6 Rome I, being 
article 6(4)(c) a lex specialis over article 6(4)(a) regarding all contracts covered 
by the Timeshare Directive, even if they do not relate to a right in rem in or a 
tenancy of immovable property.562 
The next exception refers to financial instruments, public issuances or offers 
and public takeover bids, and the subscription and redemption of units in 
collective investment undertakings. Article 6(4)(d) excludes “rights and 
obligations which constitute a financial instrument and rights and obligations 
constituting the terms and conditions governing the issuance or offer to the public 
and public take-over bids of transferable securities, and the subscription and 
redemption of units in collective investment undertakings in so far as these 
activities do not constitute provision of a financial service”. This exclusion, as 
well as the previous and the following one, were not included in the Rome 
Convention. In this case, that is due to the fact that, while article 5(1) Rome 
Convention was not applicable to the sale of securities, article 6(1) Rome I 
extended the scope to all contracts. 
It has first to be clarified that this exclusion only affects financial instruments 
(i.e. the rights and obligations that derive from a financial instrument) but not 
contracts that have as an object a financial instrument. Article 6(4)(d) is complex 
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and has to be read together with recitals 26, 28, 29 and 30 Rome I. Recital 30 
states that financial instruments are those referred in the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID)563, which provides for a list including transferable 
securities, money-market instruments, units in collective investment 
undertakings (UCITS), options, futures, swaps, and any other derivative 
contracts, credit default swaps (CDS) or financial contracts for differences.564 The 
ratio of this exception is to prevent any negative effects that could arise from the 
application of two different laws as a result of the operation of article 6 Rome I. 
It is of importance that some aspects of transactions of financial instruments are 
governed by a single law, and thus must be excluded from article 6 Rome I (which 
can lead to the application of two different laws to the consumer contract).565 This 
is, financial instruments are rights and obligations that are normally fungible and 
standardized products, which, as a consequence, should be governed by a single 
law, not always being possible if they fall under art. 6 Rome I. Also, if the law 
applicable to the financial instrument was dependent on the country of habitual 
residence of the holder who felt the definition of consumer, financial markets 
would not work properly.566 However, despite these risks on which this exception 
is justified, its practical relevance or even its necessity are questioned. Firstly, on 
the basis of the existence of the general exceptions of article 1 Rome I in 
paragraphs 2(d), (f) and (h), already excluding obligations under negotiable 
instruments, questions governed by the law of companies and constitution of 
trusts and the relationship between settlors, trustees and beneficiaries. Secondly, 
a consumer in practice is very rarely involved in a direct manner in the referred 
international transactions, but rather invests through his domestic bank.567 
The last exclusion of article 6(4) Rome I regards contracts concluded within a 
multilateral system bringing together or facilitating the bringing together of 
multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial instruments. 
Normally, consumers are not admitted to directly participate in those systems, 
and contracts mentioned in article 6(4)(e) usually comprise persons acting for 
professional or commercial purposes in their own names.568 
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(b) Territorial requirements 
For article 6 Rome I to be applicable, besides the material requirements 
previously mentioned, some territorial requirements need to be met. Article 6 
Rome I is applicable when: (a) the professional pursues his activities in the 
Member State of the consumer’s habitual residence or (b) by any means, directs 
such activities to that Member State (art. 6(1) Rome I). This is, the so-called 
targeted activity test, which was first provided by article 15(1)(c) Brussels I 
Regulation in order to adapt the private international law rules to a more 
technological neutral approach, is introduced in the Rome I Regulation. 
The interpretation of point (a) does not bring specific difficulties. A physical 
presence of the professional in the country of the consumer is required. This point 
refers to situations where the professional has its place of central administration 
or principal place of business according to article 19(1) Rome I outside the 
country of the consumer, but the contract was concluded, according to article 
19(2) Rome I, through the operations of a branch, agency or any other 
establishment (or they are in charge of the performance of the contract) located 
in the country of the consumer. Article 6(1)(a) Rome I is applicable not only when 
the establishment of the professional in the country of the consumer is permanent, 
but also where the professional, or his agents, employees, or representatives, are 
temporarily in the consumer’s country (e.g. a stand at a trade fair), and solicit a 
consumer contract there.569 Also, it is sometimes defended that a situation falls 
under article 6(1)(a) Rome I when the professional provides on a regular basis 
services in the country of the consumer or when the professional arranges the 
journey of the consumer to a foreign country in order to induce the conclusion of 
a consumer contract.570 It is not sufficient for the application of this article, 
however, the fact that the professional enters in the country of the consumer after 
the conclusion of the contract for the performance of the contract if the contract 
itself was not solicited in the country of the consumer.571 
The interpretation of point (b), which requires the professional to direct his 
activities to the country of the consumer, is more complex. Article 6(1)(b) Rome 
I is applicable where the professional (or his employees, or staff in general, and 
affiliates) was not physically present in the country of the consumer to induce the 
conclusion of the contract, but by any means directed his commercial or 
professional activities to that country in order to conclude contracts with 
consumers from that country. The concept of ‘directed activity’ or ‘targeted 
activity’ was introduced by the Brussels I Regulation with the aim to adapt the 
rules to the growth of communication technologies and distance selling, in special 
regarding electronic commerce.572 In reference to consumer contracts, recital 24 
                                                     
569 Calliess, ‘Article 6. Consumer Contracts’ (n 268) 175. 
570 Ragno (n 553) 228. 
571 Calliess, ‘Article 6. Consumer Contracts’ (n 268) 176. 
572 Ragno (n 553) 228. 
 152 
Rome I states that “[…] the conflict-of-law rule should make it possible to cut the 
cost of settling disputes concerning what are commonly relatively small claims 
and to take account of the development of distance-selling techniques. 
Consistency with Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 [now Regulation No 1215/2012 –
Brussels I bis-] requires both that there be a reference to the concept of directed 
activity as a condition for applying the consumer protection rule and that the 
concept be interpreted harmoniously in Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 and this 
Regulation […]”. However, because of its intended broad approach, it has to be 
said that the concept of ‘directed activity’ sometimes results rather vague and thus 
needs to be interpreted.  
Article 6(1)(b) Rome I encompasses many situations in which the professional 
makes himself known to the consumers of another country through, for example, 
telephone calls, television broadcasts, paper advertising, etc. Nowadays, one of 
the main manners and the most controversial one is through internet websites. 
Commercial websites can be viewed generally in almost every country, and that 
creates different risks. First, this can result in companies obtaining business of 
consumers from countries which they have not targeted and thus facing the risk 
of a foreign court or foreign law applicable, and, second, a consumer might be 
subject as well to those risks without even leaving his house. Although these risks 
are not exclusive to electronic commerce, they are more common due to the big 
and increasing amount of internet transactions worldwide.   
The ECJ has clarified the meaning of ‘directed activities’ in numerous 
cases.573 The following case law can be highlighted: 
The joined cases Pammer and Alpenhof574 concerned the interpretation of the 
concept of ‘directed activities’ in the context of article 15(1)(c) and (3) of the 
Brussels I Regulation (now article17(1)(c) and (3) Brussels I bis Regulation). In 
the first case, Mr. Pammer, with habitual residence in Austria, booked a voyage 
by freighter from Italy to the Far East via the internet through a company with 
seat in Germany. In his view, the description of the website did not correspond to 
the conditions of the vessel, and Mr. Pammer decided to claim payment of the 
balance and interest before an Austrian court. The Austrian court referred a 
preliminary ruling to the ECJ asking (1) whether the ‘voyage by freighter’ 
constituted a package travel and (2) whether the fact that an intermediary’s 
website can be accessible on the internet is sufficient to consider that activities 
are being ‘directed’ to the Member State of the habitual residence of the 
consumer. The ECJ answer the first question in positive: a contract of transport 
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including, for an inclusive price, combination of travel and accommodation felt 
into the concept of package travel. Given the similarity of the second question 
with the question brought in the Alpenhof case, the ECJ gave answer to them 
jointly. In the second case, the dispute arises between Hotel Alpenhof, a company 
located in Austria operating the hotel with the same name, and Mr. Heller, with 
habitual residence in Germany. Mr. Heller saw the hotel’s website and booked a 
number of rooms through email. After saying that he had found fault with the 
hotel’s services, Mr. Heller left without paying, and Hotel Alpenhof brought an 
action against him before an Austrian court. The preliminary question brought to 
the ECJ consisted on whether the fact that a website could be consulted on the 
internet was sufficient to find that an activity is being ‘directed’ within the 
meaning of article 15(1)(c) Brussels I Regulation. Thus, it needed to be 
ascertained on the basis of which criteria a trader using a website can be 
considered as directing his activities to the Member State of the consumer and 
whether the fact that such a website is accessible in the Member State of the 
consumer is sufficient to consider that. The ECJ, since the Brussels I Regulation 
did not define the concept of activity directed to the Member State of the 
consumer’s country, stated that this concept must be interpreted independently, 
by reference to the system and objectives of the Regulation.575 Although this 
provision has the intention to protect consumers, this protection is not absolute, 
and consequently the ECJ considered that the trader must have manifested its 
intention to establish commercial relations with consumers from one or more 
Member States (including the Member State of the consumer).576 It follows that 
it is necessary to determine whether, before the contract was concluded, there was 
evidence showing that the professional had the intention to do business in the 
Member State of the consumer. The ECJ held that it must be apparent from the 
website and the overall activity of the professional that, before the conclusion of 
any contract with the consumer, the trader envisaged doing business with 
consumers domiciled in one or more Member States, including that of the 
domicile of the Member State in question. In order to consider that the website is 
inviting the consumer to contract, national courts can take into account a non-
exhaustive list of evidence: “The following matters, the list of which is not 
exhaustive, are capable of constituting evidence from which it may be concluded 
that the trader’s activity is directed to the Member State of the consumer’s 
domicile, namely the international nature of the activity, mention of itineraries 
from other Member States for going to the place where the trader is established, 
use of a language or a currency other than the language or currency generally 
used in the Member State in which the trader is established with the possibility 
of making and confirming the reservation in that other language, mention of 
telephone numbers with an international code, outlay of expenditure on an 
internet referencing service in order to facilitate access to the trader’s site or that 
of its intermediary by consumers domiciled in other Member States, use of a top-
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level domain name other than that of the Member State in which the trader is 
established, and mention of an international clientele composed of customers 
domiciled in various Member States. It is for the national courts to ascertain 
whether such evidence exists.”577 
Although recital 24 Rome I expresses that the language or currency used by a 
website does not constitute a relevant factor in order to consider that a website is 
directing its activities to a determinate Member State, the ECJ did not follow that 
guideline and made clear that foreign language and currency do constitute factors 
to take into account when considering whether a website is inviting a consumer 
to contract.578 
Finally, it has to be highlighted that the mere accessibility of the trader’s 
website in the Member State of the customer is not sufficient. 
The ECJ in the Emrek case579 clarified whether or not there is need of a causal 
link between the commercial or professional activity directed to the Member 
State of the consumer’s habitual residence via a website and the conclusion of the 
contract. In this case, Mr. Emrek, with habitual residence in Germany, and who 
was looking for a second-hand motor vehicle, learned from acquaintances of Mr 
Sabranovic’s second-hand motor vehicles business located in a French town close 
to the German border. Mr. Sabranovic’s business had a website containing details 
of his business, including French telephone numbers and a German mobile 
telephone number, with the respective international codes. Mr. Emrek went to the 
premises of the undertaking in France to conclude a written contract for the sale 
of a second-hand motor vehicle. Subsequently, Mr. Emrek claimed Mr. 
Sabranovic under the warranty before German courts. The preliminary questions 
referred to the ECJ were: (1) whether in cases in which the trader’s website is 
directed to the Member State of the consumer is it required that the consumer was 
induced to enter into the contract by the website and thus the website has a causal 
link with the conclusion of the contract and (2) in the case that causal link is 
required, whether is it necessary that the contract was concluded at a distance. 
Regarding the first question, the ECJ explains that the essential condition for 
article 15(1)(c) Brussels I Regulation is that of the professional activity directed 
to the member State of the consumer, and that condition is satisfied in this case. 
The addition of an unwritten condition requiring a causal link between the 
existence of the website and the contracting would be contrary to the objective of 
protecting the consumer, and would give rise to problems of proof.580 Therefore, 
the ECJ concludes that there is no need for a causal link between the means 
employed to attract the consumer and the conclusion of the contract. This is, even 
if the consumer knew about the business about a friend and not through the 
website, it does not affect the applicability of the provision. Regarding the second 
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question, the ECJ already gave answer to it one year before in the Mühlleitner 
case.581 
The Mühlleitner case concerns the possible limitation of the concept of 
‘directed activities’ to distance contracts, also in the context of article 15(1)(c). 
In this case, Ms. Mühlleitner, with habitual residence in Austria, when searching 
the Internet for a car, was directed to an offer of Autohaus Yusufi, a partnership 
established in Germany. Ms. Mühlleitner contacted the business through the 
telephone number stated of the website, which contained an international dialling 
code, in order to obtain more information. However, she went to Germany to sign 
the contract of sale and receive the vehicle. Subsequently, because she considered 
that the vehicle was defective, she brought proceedings in an Austrian court for 
rescission of contract. The preliminary question brought to the ECJ regarding this 
case was whether the application of article 15(1)(c) Brussels I Regulation (the 
concept of ‘directed activity’) required that the contract between the consumer 
and the undertaking was concluded at a distance. There is no express mention to 
such a requirement in the regulation, and the ECJ considers that the addition of 
such a non-written condition would run counter to the objective of protecting the 
consumers of the provision in its ‘new, less restrictive formulation’.582 According 
to the ECJ reasoning, the essential condition for the application of the provision 
in question is that relating to a commercial or professional activity directed to the 
state of consumer’s domicile, and both the establishment of a contact at a distance 
and the reservation of goods or services at a distances, like in this case, or the 
conclusion of the contract at a distance in other cases, are indications that the 
contract is connected to the activity.583 Thus, the ECJ concludes that is not 
necessary that the contract between the consumer and the trader is concluded at 
a distance. 
In relation to e-commerce and the concept of directed activities, the new Geo-
blocking Regulation584 that entered into force on 22nd March 2018 in the EU as a 
part of the Digital Single Market strategy includes certain obligations that might 
have an effect on the concept of directed activities of article 6 Rome I. The Geo-
blocking Regulation deals with the obstacles that traders create when blocking or 
limiting the access to online interfaces (websites, apps…), goods or services, or 
when discriminating for reasons related to payment. Certain geo-blocking 
obstacles are sometimes used by traders to avoid engaging in commercial 
relations with customers from other Member States in order to prevent them from 
divergent legal environments, the legal uncertainty involved, the risks regarding 
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the applicable consumer protection laws, the environmental or labelling laws, 
taxation and fiscal issues, delivery costs or language requirements. However, in 
other cases, traders artificially create internal barriers within the internal market 
that hamper the free movement of goods and services, resulting in a restriction of 
the rights of the customers and preventing them from benefitting from a wider 
choice and optimal conditions. It is considered that these type of unjustified geo-
blocking practices, together with factors such as legal uncertainty, language or 
consumer protection and confidence, contribute to the low level of cross-border 
contracts within the EU.585 The Geo-blocking Regulation clarifies which of those 
obstacles or different treatments cannot be justified within the internal market, 
and bans these unjustified geo-blocking practices in the EU.  
Geo-blocking elements helped to ascertain whether the activities of the trader 
were directed to some specific countries and not to others, which helped 
consumers located in these other countries to not contract with that trader, and 
avoided risks for the professional since it was more clear to which countries he 
directed his activities (risks of litigating in the country of habitual residence of 
the ‘consumer’ and having the law of that country as applicable). Since many 
geo-blocking elements are now banned by the Geo-blocking Regulation, article 
1(6) of the Geo-blocking Regulation clarifies that where a trader, complying with 
the provisions of the Regulation, does not block or limit the access to an online 
interface or redirect the customer to a different version of it, does not apply 
different conditions of access to goods and services or does not reject specific 
commercial transactions or apply different payment conditions to those 
transactions, it should not be considered, on the basis of those grounds alone, that 
the trader is directing his activities to the Member State of habitual residence of 
the consumer.586 This is, the trader’s compliance with the different requirements 
of the Geo-blocking Regulation should not constitute grounds to consider that a 
trader is directing activities to the consumer’s Member State. Thus, article 1(6) 
Geo-blocking Regulation protects the position of the trader against the 
consequences of directing activities to the Member State of the habitual residence 
of the consumer. 
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However, the idea that the Geo-blocking Regulation establishes what is 
relevant regarding the interpretation of articles 17(1)(c) Brussels I bis and 6(1)(b) 
Rome I can be debated. When a trader concludes contracts on a regular basis with 
customers located in a specific country through a website with an international 
setting (e.g., in English language and price in euros), the regularity of conclusion 
of contracts with clients from a specific country can be a factor indicating that the 
trader is directing his activities to that country. The concept of ‘directed activities’ 
has been interpreted in a broad manner by the ECJ, and the list of factors that 
indicate whether a website is directing activities to the Member State of the 
consumer is numerous and non-exhaustive. Thus, in practice, and despite the 
clear wording of article 1(6) of the Geo-blocking Regulation, it might not be that 
easy to differentiate between relevant factors indicating that the trader is directing 
his activities to the Member State of the consumer and factors that are just a 
consequence of the requirements of the Geo-blocking Regulation. It has to be 
considered that many traders will have to adapt their websites in order to comply 
with the requirements of the Geo-blocking Regulation. So far, in that situation, if 
they were not directing activities to other Member States until that moment, 
article 1(6) Geo-blocking Regulation ensures that adaptation to the requirements 
of the Regulation does not change the previous situation, and therefore traders do 
not have to comply with consumer protection rules of other Member States. A 
different scenario would be when a trader, as a result of the requirements of the 
Geo-blocking Regulation, grants access to his products from all Member States, 
and in addition decides to consequently expand his business to other Member 
States, adapting his website and business to such an expansion; then the 
professional has the clear intention of directing activities to other Member States. 
However, a trader, when adapting the business’ website to the requirement of 
equal access to goods and services of the Geo-blocking Regulation, might decide 
to add in the website an English language option and show the prices in euros 
(when this is not his country’s language or currency) just to facilitate such an 
access, but without any intention to actually target consumers of another Member 
State. Will granting access and, as a result, offering the website in a foreign 
language (e.g. English, a widely spoken language among the Member States) 
mean that the trader is targeting other specific markets? Will traders have to 
comply with consumer protection law of other Member States?  
In practice, article 1(6) of the Geo-blocking Regulation can be interpreted in 
a manner that favours the trader, restricting the interpretation of the concept of 
directed activities. At the same time, it can also be argued that if a trader, as a 
result of the obligations of the Geo-blocking Regulation, is legally ‘bound’ to 
serve consumers in a certain country, the analysis of the criteria that determine 
the trader’s intention to direct commercial or professional activities to such 
country might become blurred, despite the clarification of article 1(6) of the Ge-
blocking Regulation. In order to ensure legal certainty, courts should be in the 
future more cautious in the analysis of the criteria that determine the trader’s 
intention to direct his activities and take into account all the circumstances of the 
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case, especially the existence of the requirements of the Geo-blocking 
Regulation. This is, legal certainty for traders and consumers might require a 
more careful examination of the Pammer and Alpenhof criteria when assessing 
whether the website of a professional is directing commercial activities to 
consumers of another Member State, taking into account all the circumstances of 
the case and, specifically, the existence of the requirements of the Geo-blocking 
Regulation. 
 
1.2. The law applicable to consumer contracts under 
article 6 Rome I 
When the previous requirements are not met, it means that the contract is not 
considered a consumer contract under the definition of article 6 Rome I, and thus 
the general rules of the Rome I Regulation will be applicable to that contract. 
Where all the previous requirements are met, which means that the consumer 
contract has a close connection to the country where the consumer has his habitual 
residence, article 6(1) Rome I provides that the contract shall be governed by the 
law of the country of habitual residence of the consumer. The place of habitual 
residence is to be interpreted according to article 19 Rome I, which in paragraph 
3 states that the relevant point in time to determine the habitual residence shall be 
the time of the conclusion of the contract.  
However, article 6 Rome I also recognises the exercise of party autonomy. 
This conflict rule does not differ as much as expected from article 5 Rome 
Convention. Article 5(2) Rome Convention provided that “a choice of law made 
by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection 
afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has 
his habitual residence”. Radical changes were suggested in the debate regarding 
the conversion from the Rome Convention to the Rome I Regulation due to the 
criticisms received by the so-called preferential-law approach.587 The main 
criticism consisted on the complexity of such an approach: first, it is difficult to 
determine which mandatory rules bring a higher level of protection, and it has to 
be determined in a case-by-case basis; second, the exact division between non-
mandatory rules, mandatory rules and overriding mandatory rules is complicated; 
thirdly, the mix of provisions of two different legal systems might lead to a 
“cherry-picking” problem (i.e. choosing the most favourable rules from both legal 
systems and mixing them). Also, taking into account that most consumer 
contracts involve small claims, these complexities were criticised as extremely 
burdensome in comparison with the claims involved.588 As a consequence, the 
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Commission Proposal did not recognise at all the possibility of choice of law of 
the parties, but only stipulated the law of the country of habitual residence of the 
consumer as applicable. Although indeed simple, this approach completely 
excluding party autonomy was criticised: the choice of law would probably be a 
law with which the professional is familiar with, such as the law of his place of 
establishment, which can be either more beneficial or detrimental for the weaker 
party than the law otherwise applicable in absence of choice; also, excluding party 
autonomy may impair the cross-border commercial activities, since the 
professional might want to focus on the national market.589 A compromise 
between weaker party protection and party autonomy is desirable, respecting the 
parties’ preferences and keeping a minimum level of consumer protection, 
benefiting both parties. Following the preferential law approach, in contrast to 
the option of completely excluding party autonomy, only those consumers 
agreeing to a choice of a law with a lower standard of protection see themselves 
deprived from the freedom of choice of law. At the same time, the professional 
is also benefited since this approach allows the standardization of the legal 
relationships with its consumers.590 
Thus, the final version of the Rome I Regulation determines that consumer 
contracts falling under article 6 Rome I are governed by the law of the country of 
habitual residence of the consumer, except when there is a choice of law by the 
parties, in which case the chosen law is applicable as long as it does not deprive 
the consumers from the protection provided by the mandatory rules of the law 
otherwise applicable. Article 6(2) Rome I provides that: “Notwithstanding 
paragraph 1, the parties may choose the law applicable to a contract which fulfils 
the requirements of paragraph 1, in accordance with Article 3. Such a choice 
may not, however, have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection 
afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement by 
virtue of the law which, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable on 
the basis of paragraph 1”. By taking this approach, the legislator adopted a 
hybrid system that reconciles the principle of party autonomy with the need of 
consumer protection. The rationale behind the preferential-law approach consists 
on the idea that the mandatory rules of the country of the consumer already 
provide for a minimum protection to the consumer, and there is no reason to 
hinder the parties to agree on a higher level of protection. 
The choice of law has to be made in accordance with article 3 Rome I, this is, 
it has to be established that a choice of law agreement was formed under article 
3(1) and 3(5) Rome I. In a consumer contract, the choice of law will generally 
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consist on an express choice of law clause contained in the contract, usually in 
the general terms and conditions of the professional. Moreover, it will generally 
refer to the law of the country of habitual residence of the professional. It has to 
be noticed that a standard form choice of law clause will not generally come as a 
surprise or be considered not transparent due to the international character of a 
cross-border consumer contract. However, in this regard, the ECJ in Verein für 
Konsumenteninformation v Amazon EU Sàrl591 has made a decision regarding 
general terms and conditions of a contract containing a choice of law for the law 
of the Member State in which the company is established.  This case concerned 
Amazon EU, a company established in Luxembourg, which, among other 
activities, via a website with a domain name with the extension .de (amazon.de), 
addressed consumers residing in Austria, concluding electronic sales contracts. 
Until 2012, the general terms and conditions of the contracts contained a clause 
providing a choice of law for Luxembourg law. The ECJ concluded that: 
“Article 3(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that a term in the general 
terms and conditions of a seller or supplier which has not been individually 
negotiated, under which the contract concluded with a consumer in the course of 
electronic commerce is to be governed by the law of the Member State in which 
the seller or supplier is established, is unfair in so far as it leads the consumer into 
error by giving him the impression that only the law of that Member State applies 
to the contract, without informing him that under Article 6(2) of Regulation 
No 593/2008 he also enjoys the protection of the mandatory provisions of the law 
that would be applicable in the absence of that term, this being for the national 
court to ascertain in the light of all the relevant circumstances”. 
One of the main complexities of the preferential-law approach is the 
comparison between the chosen law and the law of otherwise applicable to the 
consumer contract (i.e. the law of the country of habitual residence of the 
consumer). It is considered that the mandatory norms of the country of the 
consumer are not to be applied jointly and cumulative, but alternatively to the 
applicable rules of the chosen law, and thus a comparison of the results of both 
needs to be made in order to determine which ones are more beneficial to the 
consumer.592 It is generally considered that the comparison needs to be made on 
the basis of the concrete claim at issue, attending to the general results in the 
individual case, since it would be impossible to the judge to decide in abstract 
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which law is better. “Cherry-picking” is not allowed and thus the consumer 
cannot pick preferential norms from both legal systems involved a combine them 
to a result that none of those laws intends to provide. Therefore, the comparison 
has to refer to the mandatory consumer provisions of both legal systems involved, 
and get an overall view of the level of protection that each legal system provides 
to the consumer in the specific case, in order to apply either the mandatory 
protection of the chosen law or the law of habitual residence of the consumer.593 
This process needs to be kept impartial in order to avoid a kind of ‘Robin-
Hood principle’, under which the consumer as the weaker party would always 
win.594 A balance between consumer protection and impartiality in the legal 
process is difficult to maintain, and thus when applying article 6 Rome I its 
purpose needs to be kept in mind: the legitimate expectations of consumers need 
to be protected against a possible abuse of the professionals which would deprive 
them from the protection afforded to them by their country. However, it is not 
intended to create an overprotective system in which the consumer would always 
get the best solution ever, ignoring legal certainty and the legal expectations of 
both parties. 
 
2. The law applicable to individual employment 
contracts: Article 8 Rome I 
The protection of employees as weaker parties in individual employment 
contracts is reflected in the EU PIL regarding the law applicable to the contract 
in article 8 Rome I Regulation. Article 8 Rome I has article 6 Rome Convention 
as precedent and is drafted in a very similar manner, although with several 
improvements. Both provisions share the objectives of protection of the worker 
as the weaker party of the contract and the determination of the most closely 
connected law to the employment relationship.595 
Regarding its scope of application, article 8 Rome I only applies to individual 
employment contracts, and therefore it does not cover collective labour law 
issues, such as collective bargaining agreements. Under the Rome I Regulation, 
the term individual employment contract needs to be interpreted autonomously, 
taking into account the intention of the Regulation and relevant EU law. An 
individual employment contract is a contract between an employee and an 
employer, according to which the employee must perform the service promised 
and the employer gives in exchange the agreed remuneration. The EU has 
developed an autonomous definition of the term ‘employee’ from a EU 
perspective in reference to the freedom of movement of workers in article 45 
TFEU: an employee is a person who performs services for and under the direction 
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of another person for a certain period of time in return for remuneration. This 
definition can be taken into account for the interpretation of the term ‘employee’ 
under article 8 Rome I, although with certain reservations.596 In general, 
according to the definitions of the different Member States and the definition in 
article 45 TFEU, it can be stated that the criteria of the employer having the right 
to issue directives and the employee as a person who fulfils work for the employer 
due to a contractual obligation are of major importance for the definition of 
individual employment contract. 
Individual employment contracts concluded after 17 December 2009 are 
governed by the law determined by the conflict rules of article 8 Rome I. This 
provision allows a limited choice of law by the parties and provides for different 
connecting factors in order to determine the objectively applicable law. 
 
2.1. Choice of the law applicable to the individual 
employment contract 
According to article 8(1) Rome I: “An individual employment contract shall be 
governed by the law chosen by the parties in accordance with Article 3. Such a 
choice of law may not, however, have the result of depriving the employee of the 
protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement under the law that, in the absence of choice, would have been 
applicable pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article.” 
Therefore, choice-of-law agreements only operate in favour of the employees. 
However, employers insert such choice of law agreements in their employment 
contracts anyway on the basis of several grounds. For example, employers might 
be unaware of the operation of article 8(1) Rome I, or the cross-border contract 
might have been initially a domestic contract with a choice of law of domestic 
law that was left unchanged when becoming an international contract. Also, in 
the case of permanent posting of workers to another country, there might be a 
choice of the law of the country of origin. Moreover, employers might also decide 
to include a choice of law clause with the intention of discouraging employees to 
pursue a claim, expecting that when a dispute arises and the employee reads such 
a clause in the contract, he will be discouraged from pursuing the claim and ignore 
that he would still enjoy the protection granted by the objectively applicable 
law.597 
Like in the case of consumer contracts, a limited choice of law is allowed in 
individual employment contracts. The mandatory provisions of the law 
objectively applicable are the minimum protection to which the employee is 
entitled in the case of a dispute regarding a cross-border individual employment 
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contract. When parties have chosen the law applicable to their employment 
contract, the judge must first determine which law would be objectively 
applicable according to the following paragraphs of article 8 Rome I, and 
subsequently compare that law to the chosen law to conclude whether the chosen 
law offers the same or better protection to the employee than the mandatory 
provisions of the objectively applicable law. Thus, it is necessary to identify the 
relevant mandatory provisions and then compare which ones offer a better 
protection to the employee. 
Which are the relevant mandatory rules? First of all, ‘provisions that cannot 
be derogated from by agreement’ are to be distinguished from the narrower 
category of ‘overriding mandatory provisions’ (Recital 37 Rome I). Article 8(1) 
Rome I only refers to the provisions of the law objectively applicable that parties 
cannot exclude by agreement. Secondly, article 8(1) Rome I does not refer to all 
mandatory provisions of that law, but only those concerning the protection of 
employees. The article specifically refers to the provisions protecting the 
employee (“…choice of law may not… have the result of depriving the employee 
of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement…”).598 Labour legislation in most of the EU countries constitutes one 
of the most important sources of mandatory provisions. Protective statutory 
provisions such as provisions against wrongful dismissal, working hours and 
vacations, protection of employees in a business transfer, etc. fall within that 
category.599  Collective agreements also contain mandatory provisions which 
sometimes are relevant for the purposes of article 8(1) Rome I, especially when 
the state extends the application of a collective agreement to additional employers 
and employees, giving it a status similar to legislation.600  
On the other hand, it is not that easy to compare and determine whether the 
chosen law is depriving the employee from the protection afforded to him by the 
law otherwise applicable. As it has been previously discussed regarding 
consumer contracts, one of the main problems of the preferential-law approach is 
the comparison between the legal systems involved. First, article 8(1) Rome I 
does not exclude the accumulation of benefits under both laws at stake. This is, 
if the law chosen provides compensation as a remedy for wrongful dismissal, and 
the law objectively applicable provides instead for reinstatement, the employee 
would enjoy a ‘double protection’. However, this approach is rejected.601 The 
‘cherry-picking’ technique, which would lead to the maximum advantages to the 
employee, consisting on choosing the best single provisions of each legal system, 
must therefore be rejected. It is considered to be unjust since no legal system 
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provides for such a protection, and legal certainty would be impaired.602 Second, 
the comparison of the legal systems in general is also rejected, since it does not 
seem possible to compare the overall quality of a legal system. It would be 
considered as arbitrary and even disrespectful for the countries to judge the 
general quality of a legal system.603 Thus, the most logical approach seems to be 
the comparison of the specific provisions of each legal system applicable to the 
claim at issue, taking into account the specific facts of the case.604 This is, if the 
notice of dismissal period is the issue of the claim, the law prescribing the longer 
period is the most favourable one for the employee (e.g. country A providing that 
employee is entitled to a notice of dismissal of five months is more favourable 
than law of country B providing for a notice of three months in that specific 
claim). However, provisions from one country are not always exact equivalent to 
the provisions of other country (e.g. law of country A provides for a shorter period 
of notice and right to compensation but law of country B does not afford 
compensation for dismissal). In such cases, the judge must examine whether the 
employee in that case would benefit more from one solution or the other, even 
taking into account the employee’s situation and opinion.605 
The uncertainties around the manner of comparison has been one of the main 
criticisms of this technique, together with the fact that it implies a two-step 
process (i.e. determination of the objectively applicable law and comparison with 
the chosen law) which increases information costs.606 However, it also brings 
many advantages: firstly, the acceptance of choice of law as a connecting factor 
in individual employment contracts enhances predictability of results and legal 
certainty; secondly, the limitation provided by the preferential law approach 
ensures that the employee receives the minimum protection; in addition, the 
employer is also benefited since this approach allows the standardization of the 
legal relationships with its employees.607 
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2.2. The law applicable in absence of choice: objective 
connecting factors 
When the parties have not chosen the law applicable to their contract, the law 
applicable to the individual employment contract will be determined by the 
conflict rules contained in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of article 8 Rome I. These 
provisions determine an objective connection to the employment relationship, 
and they fulfil a double function: first, the determination of the law applicable 
when parties have not chosen the applicable law; and second, they determine the 
legal system whose minimum protection provided by its mandatory provisions is 
applicable to the employment relationship even when the parties have chosen the 
applicable law.  
The connecting factors provided by article 8(2) and 8(3) Rome I are to be 
applied alternatively, meaning that when the connecting factor of article 8(2) 
Rome I (i.e. habitual place of work) can be ascertained, the application of article 
8(3) Rome I (which refers to the place of business through which the employee 
was engaged) is not required. Thus, article 8(3) Rome I works as a secondary 
connecting factor.608 In addition, article 8(4) Rome I constitutes an exceptional 
provision which indicates that where the general circumstances indicate that the 
contract is most closely connected to another country, the law of that country 
shall be applicable.   
 
2.2.1. Article 8(2) Rome I: place where the employee habitually carries out 
his work 
Article 8(2) Rome I provides that: “To the extent that the law applicable to the 
individual employment contract has not been chosen by the parties, the contract 
shall be governed by the law of the country in which or, failing that, from which 
the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract. The 
country where the work is habitually carried out shall not be deemed to have 
changed if he is temporarily employed in another country.”  
The lex loci laboris is the principal connecting factor to determine the law 
applicable to the individual contract of employment in absence of choice of law. 
The same connecting factor was used by the Rome Convention as well as in the 
different Member States. The law of the place where the employee habitually 
carries out his work is considered to be the most closely connected to the contract, 
and its applicability is predictable by the parties. This law will be familiar to the 
employee, since the place where the worker habitually works is usually his 
habitual residence as well, and it also favours the interests of the employer, since 
all the workers of the establishment, independently of the nationality of the 
worker, will be governed by the same law (i.e. the law of their habitual place of 
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work).609 This connecting factor is generally supported, especially from the 
perspective of the internal market, because it treats all the employees working in 
a same country in an equal manner, regardless their nationality.  
It has to be noticed that the rule refers to the country ‘in’ or ‘from which’ the 
employees habitually carry out their work. The corresponding provision in the 
Rome Convention (art. 6 Rome Convention) only referred to the place in which 
employees habitually carry out their work, and the ECJ clarified that this 
expression was to be interpreted as the place “where or from which the employee 
principally discharges his obligations towards his employer” or where he “has 
established the effective centre of his working activities and where, or from 
which, he in fact performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his 
employer.”610 Thus, the ECJ allowed for a broader interpretation of the 
connecting factor contained in article 6 Rome Convention, now reflected in 
article 8 Rome I. In the majority of the cases, employees will carry out their work 
in a specific single country. However, there are also cases of ‘mobile’ labour 
relationships, in which in most of the cases there is a fixed base from which the 
employees work. Those cases are covered by article 6(2) Rome I.  
The identification of the habitual place of work is easy in the majority of the 
cases where the work is performed by the employee in one single place, like in 
the case of local employees or employees transferred to another country. Cases 
involving migrant workers, frontier workers or workers that are employed by a 
foreign employer do not normally bring special difficulties, since the work is 
typically performed in one country and thus the habitual place of work is easy to 
determine. However, there are circumstances under which the determination of 
such a place becomes more complicated, especially when the worker carries out 
activities in more than one place. Cases involving transnational occupations, such 
as transport workers, and cases regarding posting of workers abroad, deserve a 
closer look.  
a. ‘Transnational occupations’ 
There are some occupations which are transnational by nature, such as 
commercial representatives or international transport workers. In these cases, 
where the employee performs his work in different countries, difficulties might 
arise regarding the determination or existence of the habitual place of work. The 
ECJ has clarified the meaning of the place where or from which the work is 
habitually carried out in several cases. 
The question was first brought in the Mulox case611 regarding the 
interpretation of article 5(1) Brussels Convention 1968. This case concerned a 
dispute between Mulox, an English company, and Mr. Geels, a Dutch national 
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with French domicile. Mr. Geels, employed as a commercial representative, used 
his French home as an office and base of operations. In the first fourteen months 
on his employment, he sold products in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Scandinavia, but not in France. Following his dismissal, he started proceedings 
in France. The employer argued that French courts did not have jurisdiction since 
it was not the habitual place of work. In response to a preliminary ruling, the ECJ 
held that where the work was performed in more than one country, the 
multiplication of courts having jurisdiction should be avoided.612 Jurisdiction 
should not be conferred on the courts of each Member State in which the work 
was performed. Jurisdiction over the whole dispute should be concentrated at the 
place “where or from which the employee principally discharges his obligations 
towards the employer. The most important factor determining this place is that 
“the work entrusted to the employee was carried out from an office…from which 
he performed his work and to which he returned after each business trip”.613 Thus, 
the ECJ concluded that “the case of a contract of employment in pursuance of 
which the employee performs his work in more than one Contracting State, the 
place of performance of the obligation characterizing the contract, within the 
meaning of that provision, is the place where or from which the employee 
principally discharges his obligations towards his employer”.  
The Rutten case614 involved a similar situation. Mr. Rutten, a commercial 
representative with domicile in the Netherlands, started proceedings in the 
Netherlands against Cross Medical, his English employer. In this case, Mr. Rutten 
performed 2/3 of his work in the Netherlands, and the rest divided among the UK 
and other countries. The work was carried out from an office Mr. Rutten had 
established in his home in the Netherlands. The ECJ, referring to the Mulox case, 
held that habitual place of work was “the place where the employee has 
established the effective centre of his working activities and where, or from 
which, he in fact performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his 
employer”.615  
From these two cases it can be understood that relevant factors to identify the 
habitual place of work are the location of the employee’s effective centre of 
working activities or ‘office’ and the distribution of the working time among 
various countries. 
The Weber case616 concerned an employee who, differing from the previous 
cases, did not have an office that could constitute the effective centre of his 
working activities. Mr. Weber was a German national, also domiciled in 
Germany, employed as a cook by Universal Ogden Services (Scottish company) 
on board of various vessels and sea installations. It was established that he was 
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first, and most of the time, in the Netherlands, and later on in Denmark. The ECJ 
held that:  
“[…] Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning 
that where an employee performs the obligations arising under his contract of 
employment in several Contracting States the place where he habitually works, 
within the meaning of that provision, is the place where, or from which, taking 
account of all the circumstances of the case, he in fact performs the essential part 
of his duties vis-à-vis his employer.  
In the case of a contract of employment under which an employee performs 
for his employer the same activities in more than one Contracting State, it is 
necessary, in principle, to take account of the whole of the duration of the 
employment relationship in order to identify the place where the employee 
habitually works, within the meaning of Article 5(1). 
Failing other criteria, that will be the place where the employee has worked 
the longest. 
It will only be otherwise if, in light of the facts of the case, the subject-matter 
of the dispute is more closely connected with a different place of work, which 
would, in that case, be the relevant place for the purposes of applying Article 5(1) 
of the Brussels Convention […]”.617 
This is, it is not possible to grant jurisdiction to all courts of the countries 
where the employee has carried out his work; in the same manner, it is not 
possible to determine as applicable the laws of several countries. In order to 
establish the habitual place of work when there are several Member States 
involved, it is necessary to determine where the employee performs the essential 
part of his duties. The existence of an effective centre of working activities (i.e. 
an office from where the employee performs most of his duties) constitutes a 
presumption. However, when the employee performs for his employer the same 
activities in more than one Member State, it is required to take into account the 
duration of the employment relationship and ascertain in which place the 
employee has worked the longest. However, these presumptions can be 
overturned if, in the light of the facts of the case, the subject-matter of the dispute 
is more closely connected with a different place of work.618 
Transport workers were traditionally understood as falling under what now 
would be article 8(3) Rome I, which reads that “[w]here the law applicable cannot 
be determined pursuant to paragraph 2, the contract shall be governed by the law 
of the country where the place of business through which the employee was 
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engaged is situated”. Nevertheless, the ECJ interprets the habitual place of work 
of paragraph 2 in such a wide manner that most of the cases of international 
transport can fall under article 8(2) and do not need to invoke article 8(3) Rome 
I. In the cases Koelzsch619 and Voogsgeerd620, involving a lorry driver and a 
seaman, the ECJ made a wide interpretation of ‘habitual place of work’.  
In the first case, Mr. Koelzsch, domiciled in Germany, signed an employment 
contract in Luxembourg in 1998 to work as an international heavy goods vehicle 
driver with Gasa (a subsidiary of Gasa Odense Blomsteramba, a company 
established under Danish law). The business consisted on the transport of flowers 
and other plants from Denmark to other European countries, mainly Germany, by 
means of lorries located in Germany. However, the company did not have seat or 
offices in Germany, the lorries were registered in Luxembourg and the drivers 
covered by Luxembourg social security. Following his dismissal, Mr. Koelzsch 
started proceedings against his employer before German courts, who declined 
jurisdiction, and subsequently before the Luxembourg court. He argued that, 
notwithstanding the choice of Luxembourg law as the lex contractus, the 
mandatory rules of German law which protect members of works councils were 
applicable to the dispute, within the terms of Article 6(1) of the Rome 
Convention, on the ground that the contract would have been governed by 
German law in the absence of choice by the parties. The preliminary question 
brought to the ECJ consisted on whether, in a situation where the employee works 
in more than one country, but returns systematically to one of them, that country 
must be regarded as that in which the employee habitually carries out his work. 
The ECJ, in accordance with the case law and the new drafting in article 8(2) 
Rome I, stated that an extensive interpretation of the place of habitual work 
should be given, taking into account all the factors which characterise the activity 
of the employee. The ECJ provided that “[…]in a situation in which an employee 
carries out his activities in more than one Contracting State, the country in which 
the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract, 
within the meaning of that provision, is that in which or from which, in the light 
of all the factors which characterise that activity, the employee performs the 
greater part of his obligations towards his employer.” In the case of transport 
workers, in particular, the relevant factors that need to be taken into account to 
determine the habitual place of work are the place from which the employee 
carries out his transport tasks and receives instructions, where his work tools are 
situated, as well as the place where the transport is principally carried out, where 
the goods are unloaded, and the place to which the employee returns after 
working.621  
In the Voogsgeerd case, which involved a seaman, the ECJ also defended an 
extensive interpretation of the term ‘habitual place of work’. In this case, Mr. 
                                                     
619 Case C-29/10 Heiko Koelzsch v État du Grand Duchy of Luxemburg [2011] ECR I-01595. 
620 Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA [2011] ECR I-13275. 
621 Koelzsch, paras 39 et seq. 
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Voorgsgeerd, the seaman, had concluded an employment contract with Navimer, 
a Luxembourg company, at the headquarters of the company’s subsidiary 
(Naviglobe) in Belgium. The contract contained a choice of law clause to the law 
of Luxembourg. While Mr. Voogsgeerd worked on board of ships from Navimer 
and received the salary from that Luxembourg company, he received instructions 
from and reported to the subsidiary in Belgium, where he also commenced and 
terminated all of his voyages. Mr. Voogsgeerd started proceedings in Belgium 
against his employer and claiming Belgium law as the law objectively applicable 
to the contract, while Navimer disagreed arguing that Luxembourg law was the 
only law applicable to the contract as the chosen law and as a result of article 
8(3), since Mr. Voogsgeerd did not have a habitual place of work and the 
engaging place of business was located in Luxembourg. The issue was referred 
to the ECJ, which confirmed the extensive interpretation given to the rule of the 
habitual place of work. The ECJ held that “the national court seised of the case 
must first establish whether the employee, in the performance of his contract, 
habitually carries out his work in any one country, which is that in which or from 
which, in the light of all the aspects characterising that activity, the employee 
performs the main part of his duties to his employer”. 
In addition, the Voogsgeerd case is also of relevance regarding which should 
be the law applicable to an employment contract of a seaman or to an employment 
contract of an aircrew member. Regarding the employment contract of the 
seaman, some defended the application of the law of the flag, since seamen work 
on ships, which fall under the jurisdiction of the country of the flag. However, it 
was argued that it does not seem appropriate since there is no guarantee that the 
country of the flag of the ship will have a close connection with the employment 
contract, and thus that country might not be legitimately interested in regulating 
the employment relationship. Also, such a connecting factor would be unilaterally 
influenced by the employer. Now the debate has been solved in favour of the law 
of the country where the employee seaman has his permanent base, where, in the 
light of all the aspects characterising that activity, the employee performs the 
main part of his duties to his employer (art. 8(2): habitual place of work). When 
determining such a place is not possible, resort can be made to the connecting 
factor of article 8(3) Rome I. Regarding aircrew members, some supported the 
application of the law of the aircraft’s registration, while others referred to the 
law of the engagement place of business (art 8(3)). However, when drafting the 
Rome I Regulation, the European Commission explained that the wording 
‘country in which or, failing that, from which’ of article 8(2) also covered aircrew 
members personnel working on board of an aircraft, if there is a fixed base from 
which work is organised and where the personnel perform other obligations in 
relation to the employer (registration, safety checks).622 The interpretation in the 
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Voogsgeerd case matches the Commission’s interpretation of article 8(2) Rome 
I. 
More recently, in the Nogueira case623, the ECJ reaffirmed its possition. The 
case involved employees employed or assigned to as aircrew members by an 
airline. The preliminary question posed to the ECJ consisted on whether in such 
cases , the concept of ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’, 
within the meaning of art. 19(2)(a) Brussels I Reguation,  could be equated to the 
term of ‘home base’  within the meaning of Annex III to Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3922/91 of 16 December 1991 on the harmonisation of technical 
requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation, as 
amended by Regulation (EC) No 1899/2006 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 December 2006. The ECJ made reference to the above 
mentioned judgments regarding the interpretation of the concept of ‘habitual 
place of work’, stating that it must be interpreted broadly and autonomously, and 
as referring to the place where or from which the employee perfoms the essential 
part of his duties towards the employer. 624 Several indicia to take into account in 
this regard were metioned in the judgments Koelzsch (para 49) and Voogsgeerd 
(paras 38 to 41), in particular the the place from which the employee carries out 
his transport-related tasks, the place where he returns after his tasks, receives 
instructions concerning his tasks and organises his work, and the place where his 
work tools are to be found.625 These circumstances are also to be taken into 
account in the present case, and, as a result, the concept of ‘place where, or from 
which, the employee habitually performs his work’ cannot be equated with any 
concept referred to in another act of EU law.626 Still, the concept of ‘home base’ 
is an important indicium in order to determine the place where the employee 
habitually carries out his work.   
Finally, in reference to offshore workers, we have to distinguish between two 
situations: when offshore workers work within a country’s territorial waters and 
when they do work on the high seas or above a country’s continental shelf. In the 
first situation, the ECJ held in the above-mentioned Weber case that the work that 
an employee carries out on a fixed or floating installation located on or above the 
part of the continental shelf adjacent to a Member State, when prospecting or 
exploiting its natural resources, is to be regarded as work performed in the 
territory of that Member State.627 However, when that is not the case, and the 
work is performed on installations on high seas, it is generally agreed that the 
                                                     
623 Joined Cases C‑168/16 and C‑169/16 Sandra Nogueira and Others v Crewlink Ireland Ltd and 
Miguel José Moreno Osacar v Ryanair Designated Activity Company [2017] 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:688. 
624 Nogueira and others, paras 56-59, 74. 
625 Nogueira and others, para 63. 
626 Nogueira and others, paras 64, 65. 
627 Weber, para 36. 
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habitual place of work is not possible to be determined and thus the law applicable 
to the employment contract shall be determined by article 8(3) Rome I.628 
 
b. Temporary employment in another country 
Employees are often posted abroad by their employers, either on a temporary 
basis or for the completion of a specific task, or on a permanent basis. They can 
either be posted to an employer’s foreign place of business, branch, subsidiary, 
etc., or to a foreign company with which their employer has a cooperation 
agreement or other similar agreement in that regard. At the same time, the posting 
might be the result of a clause already existent in the employment contract (a 
‘mobility clause’), or it can be the result of a new contract containing the details 
of the posting abroad. Posting of workers takes place specially within the EU 
internal market, where freedom of establishment and freedom of movement are 
guaranteed. 
According to article 8(2) Rome I, the habitual place of work does not change 
when the employee is temporarily employed in another country. There are several 
reasons underlying this provision stating that the habitual place of work does not 
change when the employee is temporarily employed in another country, and thus 
neither does the law applicable to the employment contract: avoiding a possible 
depeçage of the law applicable to the contract in those circumstances, promoting 
the application of the most closely connected and predictable law, and allowing 
a continuity in the law applicable to the employment relationship when the 
employee returns to the country of origin.   
It is very important to differentiate between the situation where the employee 
has been transferred to another country (and thus changing his habitual place of 
work) and the situation where the employee has been temporarily posted to 
another contract (with no change of habitual place of work).  In the latter case, 
the Posted Workers Directive629 plays an important role. In order to distinguish 
between the two mentioned situations, the determination of the duration of the 
employment seems crucial. Article 8(2) Rome I does not make any reference to 
the extension of the period that ‘temporary’ refers to. In this regard, recital 36 
Rome I provides: “As regards individual employment contracts, work carried out 
in another country should be regarded as temporary if the employee is expected 
to resume working in the country of origin after carrying out his tasks abroad. 
The conclusion of a new contract of employment with the original employer or 
an employer belonging to the same group of companies as the original employer 
should not preclude the employee from being regarded as carrying out his work 
in another country temporarily.” Thus, special importance is given to the 
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intentions of employer and employee to resume working in the country of origin 
after the posting abroad. This is, if parties intend the posting to be temporary then 
there is no change of habitual place of work. The terms of the contract and the 
circumstances of the case can show those intentions.630 However, besides the 
intention of the parties, the duration of the posting abroad can also be taken into 
account. This is, if the worker is posted abroad for a very significant amount of 
time, it could be regarded that that country is the habitual place of work even if 
there was an intention to eventually return to the country of origin. However, only 
a very long posting, together with the circumstances of the case, could lead to 
such an exception.631 
The situation where employment starts or ends with a posting abroad might 
bring doubts. Recital 36 states that the employee must have had worked in the 
country of origin before the posting, and must resume his work there after the 
posting abroad. However, when the employment begins with a temporary posting 
abroad, the first requirement would not be met, and when the employment is 
expected to end with a temporary posting, the second requirement is not met. 
However, rather than a literal interpretation, it is generally considered that article 
8(2) Rome I should be interpreted in a broad manner and still apply the law of the 
country of origin in the cases where employment starts or ends with a posting 
abroad.632  
In a permanent posting, regarding a dispute brought after the habitual place of 
work changed concerning a previously performed work, it is generally agreed that 
the law applicable is the law of the country where the employee habitually worked 
when the fact giving rise to the dispute occurred.633 This solution seems more 
logical and favours legal certainty, since the parties complying with the law 
applicable in that moment should not be affected adversely by the change of 
habitual place of work and subsequent change of applicable law. 
In addition, there are some employees that, because of the speciality of their 
tasks, are often posted from country to country. For example, managerial, 
advisory and specialist staff are usually moved to the countries where the 
employer is doing business, or construction workers are often posted from 
country to country in order to complete different construction projects. In these 
cases, the determination of the habitual place of work (or country of origin) will 
be determined following the criteria described above regarding ‘transnational 
                                                     
630 Employers are obliged to provide information regarding the posting to posted employees (art. 4 
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631 In the Schlecker case (Case C-64/12 Anton Schlecker v Melitta Josefa Boedeker [2013] 
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occupations’. Thus, according to the criteria of the ECJ, it is necessary to 
determine where the employee performs the essential part of his duties, or where 
he spends most of his or her working time, unless the circumstances of the case 
show otherwise.634  
Finally, notwithstanding article 8 Rome I, a special legal regime regarding 
temporary posted workers is provided by the Posted Workers Directive. 
According to article 3 of the Directive, when a labour relationship falls under its 
scope, Member States must ensure that, whatever the law applicable to the 
employment relationship is, undertakings have to guarantee workers posted to 
their territory some specific terms and conditions of employment laid down in the 
Member State where the work is carried out. Article 3 refers to the terms and 
conditions laid down by law, regulation or administrative provision, or by 
collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally 
applicable, regarding: maximum work periods and minimum rest periods; 
minimum paid annual holidays; the minimum rates of pay; the conditions of 
hiring-out of workers; health, safety and hygiene at work; protective measures 
with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of pregnant women or 
women who have recently given birth, of children and of young people; equality 
of treatment between men and women and other provisions on non-
discrimination). Therefore, even when article 8(2) establishes the law of the 
country of origin as applicable, some mandatory rules regarding those specific 
terms and conditions of the law of the Member State of posting listed in article 3 
Posted Workers Directive must apply to the working relationship.635 
 
2.2.2. Article 8(3) Rome I: engaging place of business 
Article 8(3) Rome I provides that: “Where the law applicable cannot be 
determined pursuant to paragraph 2, the contract shall be governed by the law 
of the country where the place of business through which the employee was 
engaged is situated”. This is, when the employee does not carry out his or her 
work in any one country, the contract is governed by the law of the country where 
the place of business through which the employee was engaged is situated.  
The ECJ, in the Voogsgeerd case, clarified the concepts of ‘engaged’ and 
‘place of business’. Regarding the term ‘engaged’, debate existed regarding 
whether it could relate to the conclusion of the employment contract (or 
recruitment of employees), or to the ‘organisational integration, internal 
structuring and internal directives’.636 The ECJ in Voogsgeerd held that the term 
referred to “the conclusion of the contract or, in the case of a de facto employment 
relationship, to the creation of the employment relationship and not to the way in 
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which the employee’s actual employment is carried out”.637 Thus, the term 
engagement shall be determined by looking at the conclusion of the contract, and 
not with reference to the place at which the employee is effectively 
organizationally integrated. Regarding the term ‘place of business’, there were 
also different interpretations in reference to its meaning. The ECJ expressed that 
the term ‘place of business’ covered every stable structure of an undertaking, 
including a subsidiary, office or branch, even when it did not have legal 
personality, with the condition that it had a sufficient degree of permanence and 
was an integral part of the structure that engaged the employee.638 A mere agent 
or representative, or a place only used for recruitment purposes are not sufficient. 
Thus, the place of business in the context of article 8(3) Rome I refers not only 
to the employer’s domicile but also to any establishment, whether or not it 
possesses legal personality, with a sufficient degree of permanence and set up in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the country in which it has been 
established, from which the employer conducts business and from which he 
appoints employees.639  
It is necessary to clarify that the relevant point in time in order to define the 
place of business through which the employee was engaged must be when the 
first engagement takes place, and not the present moment. If one were to take into 
account the place of business at the present moment, the applicable law could be 
unilaterally changed by the employer by deciding on changing the competent 
place of business through which the employee is engaged.640 Therefore, article 
8(3) refers to the time of the first engagement when determining the place of 
business through which the employee was engaged. 
As it has been explained regarding article 8(2) Rome I, the ECJ has made a 
very extensive interpretation of the term ‘habitual place of work’, which 
consequently reduces the role of the rule of article 8(3) Rome I to exceptional 
cases. Only when the court dealing with the case is not in a position of 
determining the country in which the work is habitually carried out, it can resort 
to the rule of the engaging place of business. Even when the work is performed 
in more than one country or it requires regular assignments abroad, like in the 
case of transport workers or sale representatives, it is possible in most of the cases 
to determine the habitual place of work by attending to the place of effective 
centre of the activity, the amount of time the employee expends in the countries 
and other relevant factors. Also, in the case of transport workers, the place of 
habitual work is determined by the place where, in the light of all the factors 
which characterise that activity, the employee performs the greater part of his 
obligations towards his employer. Thus, the role of the rule of article 8(3) Rome 
I is reduced to the cases in which the employee carries out his work in more than 
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639 Grusic (n 200) 170; Franzen and Gröner (n 300) 230,231. 
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one country and it is not possible by any means to determine the place of habitual 
work (no centre of activity can be established and the amount of time is not 
relevant, or the means of travel cannot be attributed to any country in the case of 
transport workers), and to the cases where the place where the employee habitual 
carries out his work does not belong to any country (stateless territory), such as 
permanent employment in an oil platform in the ocean.  
The use of the engaging place of business as a connecting factor brings several 
criticisms. First, there is no guarantee that this connecting factor will lead to a 
law that is actually closely connected to the employment contract, contrary to the 
law of habitual place of work, and, as a consequence, the country might not be 
legitimately interested in regulating the employment relationship. Second, the 
employer would ultimately be the one deciding the law applicable to the 
employment contract, since engagement is within the employer’s control. In the 
context of the EU internal market, where employers enjoy freedom of 
establishment and freedom of provision of services, they could easily be able to 
manipulate the law applicable to the employment contract by engaging the 
employee from an establishment in the country they wish its rules to apply. As a 
result, the necessity of the rule of the engaging place of business is questioned. If 
article 8(3) Rome I was abolished, article 8(4) would step in in the cases where 
the habitual place of work cannot be determined. This is, the law most closely 
connected to the employment contract taking into account all the circumstances 
of the case would be applicable. It is argued that the abolition of article 8(3) Rome 
I would bring legal certainty and foreseeability, since interpretation of the terms 
‘engaged’ and ‘place of business’ can give rise to a dispute between the parties 
and lead to appeal to a higher court to obtain the favourable interpretation.641 
Moreover, the protection of employees would be enhanced, since the employer 
would not be able to directly manipulate the law objectively applicable to the 
employment contract. Finally, the law most closely connected to the employment 
contract would be applicable, which ensures that the designated country will be 
legitimately interested in regulating that employment relationship. Still, in my 
opinion, due to the secondary and reduced role of article 8(3) and the possibility 
to correct its eventual inappropriate outcome with the escape clause of article 
8(4), its downsides are not very apparent and thus the existence of this rule can 
only benefit legal certainty. 
 
2.2.3. Article 8(4) Rome I: escape clause 
According to article 8(4) Rome I: “Where it appears from the circumstances as a 
whole that the contract is more closely connected with a country other than that 
indicated in paragraphs 2 or 3, the law of that other country shall apply”. 
Regardless the law objectively applicable to the contract, if from all the 
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circumstances there is a more closely connected law to the employment contract, 
this law shall apply. Article 8(4) Rome I contains a so-called escape clause which 
offers the possibility of correcting on a case-by-case basis the outcome of the 
application of the connecting factors of ‘habitual place of work’ and ‘engaging 
place of business’, when the circumstances suggest that the contract is most 
closely connected to another country. The basis of this provision lays on the 
difficulty to predict all the exact circumstances that can arise in practice and the 
need for an appropriate solution in such cases.642   
Art. 8(4) Rome I is an exception to the previous paragraphs. However, the 
wording of the escape clause of article 8(4) Rome I differs from the escape clause 
contained in article 4(3) Rome I, the latter referring to a law manifestly more 
closely connected and applicable only in truly exceptional circumstances. Thus, 
it was questioned whether the rule of article 8(4) Rome I should be interpreted as 
less exceptional and therefore making it easier to depart from the rules of article 
8(2) and 8(3) Rome I. In the Schlecker case643, the ECJ agreed with the opinion 
of the Advocate General Wahl, which, when interpreting the escape clause of 
article 6(2) Rome Convention, considered that there is no hierarchical 
relationship between the rules of ‘habitual place of work’ or ‘engaging place of 
business’ on the one hand and the escape clause on the other hand. Therefore, the 
court has discretion in determining the law most closely connected to the relevant 
employment relationship. The AG explained that even if the employment contract 
has been performed in a lasting, continuous and uninterrupted manner in a single 
country, when that contract is located in a country that is obviously not the 
habitual place of work, the court can bring the escape clause into operation.644 
The ECJ explained that ‘even where an employee carries out the work in 
performance of the contract habitually, for a lengthy period and without 
interruption in the same country, the national court may...disregard the law 
applicable in the country where the work is habitually carried out’.645 Therefore, 
article 8(4) Rome I is drafted in a less strict way that the escape clause of article 
4(3) Rome I, giving the judge a wider margin for interpretation.646   
There are several relevant circumstances to take into account in order to 
consider the application of article 8(4) Rome I. According to the ECJ, particular 
significant factors to consider are the payment of taxes in a certain country and 
the affiliation to social security, pension, sickness insurance and invalidity 
schemes, as well as other circumstances of the case such as parameters relating 
                                                     
642 Gardeñes Santiago, ‘La Regulación Conflictual Del Contrato de Trabajo En El Reglamento 
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to salary determination and other working conditions.647 Other factors to take into 
account, although in a lesser degree, can be common nationality of the parties, 
habitual residence of the employee, place of establishment of the employer, place 
of conclusion of the contract, language, place and currency of the payment of 
salary, or the previous relationship between the parties.648 For example, in many 
cases, the law applicable to employment contracts of workers of embassies and 
consulates could be determined according to art. 8(4) Rome I, leading to the 
application of the law of their country of ‘origin’ rather than the law of habitual 
place of work. It is common that the worker in a foreign embassy is still affiliated 
to the social security and pension schemes of the country of his employer, as well 
as enjoying a common nationality and language, factors that also point to the 
place of establishment of the employer, place of conclusion of the contract. All 
these factors conduct to a different country than the country of habitual place of 
work.649 
Also, Recital 20 Rome I states that it should be taken into account whether the 
contract has a very close relationship with another contract (e.g. cases of 
triangular employment relationships within agency employment or within a 
corporate group). The majority of factors must altogether point out to one legal 
system different than the one designated by the objective connecting factors. 
However, the escape clause cannot be used, in its current drafting, to ensure the 
application of the law with the best employee protection among the laws 
connected with the employment contract. That is not the intention of this 
provision and such a use could result in legal uncertainty and unpredictability.650 
The application of the escape clause should be limited to those situations where 
another legal system is clearly more closely connected to the employment 
contract.651 
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the circumstances of the case, the law most closely connected to the employment contract, not the 
most beneficial law for the worker.  




3. Overriding mandatory provisions: Article 9 
Rome I 
The Rome I Regulation defines overriding mandatory provisions (also known as 
lois de police) in article 9(1) Rome I as “provisions the respect for which is 
regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its 
political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are 
applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law 
otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation.” 
The conflict rules contained in the Rome I Regulation generally focus on the 
parties’ interests (article 3 Rome I recognises party autonomy, articles 6 and 8 
protect the consumer and employee respectively, etc.), while state interests do not 
play a central role in the Regulation. However, article 9 Rome I deals with those 
provisions that are so important for the country that has enacted them that must 
be observed even in international situations, irrespective of the law applicable to 
the contract under the normally applicable conflict rules of the Regulation. Article 
9 Rome I deals with those rules whose observance is regarded as essential by a 
country for the safeguard of its public interests, such as its political, social or 
economic organization. Thus, this provision aims at ensuring, on the one hand, 
the safeguard of crucial state interests and, on the other hand, the uniformity of 
conflict rules among Member States and the admission of party autonomy.652 
It has to be kept in mind that the operation of article 9 Rome I differs from the 
rest of conflict rules. Overriding mandatory rules are applicable according to their 
object and purpose. They do not rest in the same theoretical premises as the 
multilateral conflict of laws rules, which are the base of the modern Western-
Europe PIL and have their origin in the German jurist Friedrich Karl von Savigny. 
In the 19th century, Savigny proposed a new approach to determine which law 
should be applicable to an international legal relationship. Instead of applying the 
Statutists theories of unilateral rules which determined the law applicable from a 
domestic approach, primarily determining the scope of domestic law, Savigny 
maintained an approach from the abstract legal relationship, being the 
international legal relationship the starting point to determine the applicable law 
through multilateral conflict of laws rules. He rejected the domestic approach and 
established categories of legal relationships, designing conflict of laws rules 
which linked these categories to a particular legal system through objective 
connecting factors.653 However, it seems he allowed an exception from this 
multilateral conflict of laws rules by the application of ‘strictly mandatory rules’ 
of the lex fori. These rules were supposed to function as a correcting mechanism 
                                                     
652 Andrea Bonomi, ‘Article 9: Overriding Mandatory Provisions’ in Ulrich Magnus and Peter 
Mankowski (eds), Rome I Regulation - Commentary (sellier european law publishers 2017) 604. 
653 Savigny, System Des Heutigen Römischen Rechts (n 107). In this regard, Chapter I.4.1. 
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and Savigny considered that they would eventually be unnecessary within the 
multilateral conflict of rules theory. Nevertheless, overriding mandatory rules 
prove to be essential in the contemporary European conflict of laws. The 
application of overriding mandatory rules is based on their object and purpose 
instead of on the most appropriate law approach. In other words, both the 
fundamental nature of this type of rule, essential for the interest of the state, and 
the need of preventing parties to abuse of their party autonomy, are the basis for 
its application.654 Overriding mandatory rules are an expression of the unilateral 
approach to the conflict of laws. Based on their content and purpose, they 
unilaterally determine their own applicability. These rules coexist in the Rome I 
Regulation with the traditional multilateral conflict rules, and only prevail over 
them in exceptional cases.655 
Overriding mandatory rules are provisions with mandatory character which 
function is to regulate international legal relationships independently from the 
law applicable, provided the situation follows within their scope of application, 
and with the objective of protecting a public interest related with the political, 
social or economic organisation of a Member State.656 Therefore, their application 
is not limited to the legal system of the state where they originate, but their 
application outside their own legal system becomes necessary due to the high 
interest they seek to protect. For this reason, they prevail over the law applicable 
determined by the objective connecting factors or party autonomy, and as a result 
their application will be dependent solely on whether the situation follows within 
their scope of application.657 
The definition given by article 9 Rome I does not solve all uncertainties 
regarding these special rules. Referring to their application, two important 
problems arise: firstly, their identification; and, secondly, their application. The 
analysis of these uncertainties becomes essential in order to ascertain whether 
article 9 Rome I can be used as a mechanism of protection of weaker contracting 
parties: can the protection of consumers as employees be considered as “crucial 
                                                     
654 Moritz Renner, ‘Article 9. Overriding Mandatory Provisions’ in Gralf-Peter Calliess (ed), Rome 
Regulations. Commentary (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2015) 242.243. 
655 Marques dos Santos explains in detail how the doctrine of overriding mandatory rules (‘normas 
de aplicaçao imediata’) started to be introduced in the doctrine, case law, legislation of PIL in 
Europe in the second half of the twentieth century, displacing the supremacy of Savigny’s 
multilateral method to an acceptance of a pluralism of methods is PIL: Marques dos Santos (n 167). 
656 Belohlávek (n 335) 1479–1480; Javier Carrascosa González, Ley Aplicable a Los Contratos 
Internacionales: El Reglamento Roma I (Colex 2009) 119; Miguel Gardeñes Santiago, La 
Aplicación de La Regla de Reconocimiento Mutuo Y Su Incidencia En El Comercio de Mercancías 
Y Servicios En El Ámbito Comunitario E Internacional (Eurolex 1999) 105–110. 
657 In this sense, Preamble 37 Rome I states that: “Considerations of public interest justify giving 
the courts of the Member States the possibility, in exceptional circumstances, of applying 
exceptions based on public policy and overriding mandatory provisions. The concept of overriding 
mandatory provisions should be distinguished from the expression ‘provisions which cannot be 
derogated from by agreement’ and should be construed more restrictively.” Kuipers (n 11) 67; van 
Bochove (n 352) 148. 
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by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or 
economic organisation”? And if so, can the rules deriving from the EU consumer 
and employment directives be considered as having overriding mandatory 
character? In this context, this section will first focus on the identification of 
overriding mandatory rules, including their definition and whether provisions 
protecting consumers and employees can fall within that definition, and the 
possible legal sources of overriding mandatory rules, including EU directives. 
Secondly, the applicability of overriding mandatory rules of the forum and third 
countries will be described (arts. 9(2) and 9(3) Rome I). Finally, the relationship 
between article 9 Rome I and articles 6 and 8 Rome I regarding consumer and 
employee protection will be analysed. 
 
3.1. Identification of overriding mandatory provisions 
3.1.1. Definition 
Article 9 Rome I includes a definition of overriding mandatory provisions in its 
paragraph 1: “provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country 
for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic 
organisation, to such extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within 
their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract”. The 
origin of this definition is to be found in the joined cases of Arblade (C-369/96) 
and Leloup (C-376/96) of the ECJ on 23 November 1999.658 At the same time, 
this definition originates from the legal doctrine, especially from Phocion 
Francescakis and his writings during the 1960s regarding “lois d’application 
immediate”.659 
According to the definition of article 9(1) Rome I, three conditions have to be 
satisfied for a rule to qualify as overriding mandatory: (a) the provision must have 
mandatory character, (b) its observance should be crucial for the safeguard of the 
public interests of a country, and (c) the rule should be applicable irrespective of 
the law that otherwise governs the contract. 
                                                     
658Joined cases C-369/96 Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils SARL and C-376/96 Bernard 
Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL [1999] ECRI-8453, where para 30 states: “(…) that term 
must be understood as applying to national provisions compliance with which has been deemed to 
be so crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic order in the Member State 
concerned as to require compliance therewith by all persons present on the national territory of 
that Member State and all legal relationships within that State.”. 
659 For example, Phocion Francescakis, ‘Lois D’application Immediate et Règles de Conflit’ [1967] 
Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 691; Phocion Francescakis, ‘Quelques 
Precisions Sur Les “lois D’application Immediate” et Leurs Rapports Avec Les Règles Sur Les 
Conflits de Lois’ [1966] Revue critique de droit international privé 1. An extensive study regarding 
the origin and comparative analysis of the definition of overriding mandatory rules is contained in: 
António Marques dos Santos, As Normas de Aplicaçao Imediata No Direito Internacional Privado, 
vol 2 (Livraria Almedina 1991) 693–943. 
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a. Mandatory character. Difference between overriding mandatory 
provisions and provisions that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement (domestic mandatory provisions) 
As it results evident from the definition, only mandatory provisions can be 
characterized as overriding mandatory provisions. However, not all provisions 
with mandatory character can be characterized as overriding mandatory rules. 
The introduction of the definition in the Rome I has been very useful to 
distinguish overriding mandatory provisions from provisions that cannot be 
derogated from by agreement. As expressed in recital 37, “the concept of 
‘overriding mandatory provisions’ should be distinguished from the expression 
‘provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement’ and should be construed 
more restrictively”.  
The introduction of the terminology ‘overriding mandatory rules’ in the Rome 
I Regulation has been chosen in order to avoid the confusion of both terms, since 
in the Rome Convention both types of rules were referred to as ‘mandatory 
rules’.660 The Rome Convention maintained certain ambiguity between both 
concepts. In fact, the expression ‘mandatory rules’ was used with different 
meanings in several articles of the Convention: while in articles 3(3) Rome 
Convention (internal contracts with no cross-border elements), 5(2) Rome 
Convention (consumer contracts) and 6(1) Rome Convention (employment 
contracts), the term was used as a limitation to the party autonomy of the parties 
and referred to rules that cannot be departed from by agreement, the same term 
appeared in article 7 Rome Convention which covered mandatory rules with 
overriding mandatory character that have to be applied irrespective of the law 
applicable to the contract. The formulation led to confusion, and it was especially 
noticeable in some linguistic versions of the Rome Convention which used 
literally the same legal term for both types of rules (e.g. in English “mandatory 
rules”, in German “zwingende Vorschriften” or in Spanish “disposiciones 
imperativas”).  
Where overriding mandatory provisions are aimed at protecting public 
interests of the Member State in question, and therefore require an international 
application, provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement are the 
provisions of a legal order whose mandatoriness is only domestic and not 
international, aimed at protecting private interests, specifically those intended to 
protect the weaker party or protect third parties from suffering any harm. 661 
Provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement are part of the domestic 
legal system. They are the opposite of default rules, which are applicable when 
parties have not reached an agreement about a specific legal matter. Normally, 
provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement, or domestic mandatory 
                                                     
660 Both article 3(3) Rome Convention and Article 7 Rome Convention (predecessor of article 9 
Rome I) used the terminology ‘mandatory rules’ when referring to two different concepts. 
661 Guardans Cambó (n 369) 314–316. 
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rules, are national rules that have mandatory character and thus cannot be 
derogated by the parties when choosing another state law. They must be complied 
with in purely domestic situations and, in international situations, when they 
belong to the law applicable to the contract.662 The Rome I Regulation, in its 
article 3(3) Rome I, limits party autonomy by stating that “where all other 
elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in a country 
other than the country whose law has been chosen, the choice of the parties shall 
not prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that other country which 
cannot be derogated from by agreement”. In addition, the Rome I Regulation also 
recognises the existence of ‘internal’ mandatory rules at a EU level. Article 3(4) 
Rome I provides that “where all other elements relevant to the situation at the 
time of the choice are located in one or more Member States, the parties' choice 
of applicable law other than that of a Member State shall not prejudice the 
application of provisions of Community law, where appropriate as implemented 
in the Member State of the forum, which cannot be derogated from by 
agreement”. In this context, when referring to ‘provisions of Community law that 
cannot be derogated from by agreement’-or EU mandatory law-, the EU is seen 
as a state, and these type of provisions are mandatory internally, within the EU 
legal system. Their meaning can be understood better if we relate them with the 
Rome I provisions regarding consumer contracts (art. 6 Rome I) and employment 
contracts (art. 8 Rome I), which also limit party autonomy by ensuring the 
application of the provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement of the 
law objectively applicable.  These articles refer to that provisions as the limit to 
respect when there is a choice of law, in the sense that the choice of law cannot 
diminish the protection the consumer or employee receives from the domestic 
mandatory provisions of the law which would have been applicable in the absence 
of choice.663 The protective character of the weaker contracting party, as well as 
the internal mandatoriness, proves apparent.664 
The mandatory character of internal EU mandatory provisions should be 
mainly determined by the legislator’s intention. That is, the national or European 
legislator can refer expressly to this character or, in absence of that statement, it 
has to be established by the adequate legal technics and with reference to the 
intention of the specific provision. More precisely, the mandatory character will 
be determined by the intention of the provision to serve private interests or protect 
the weaker contracting party.665 Again, this character is mandatory at an internal 
or European level and not at an international one. That is the reason why the 
                                                     
662 Miguel Gardeñes Santiago, ‘Derecho Imperativo Y Contrato Internacional de Trabajo’ (2017) 
132 Revista de Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social 163, 167. 
663 Garcimartín Alférez, ‘The Rome I Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing?’ (n 345) 65. 
664 ibid. 
665 Renner (n 649) 246,247; Rühl, ‘Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts: 
Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency’ (n 330) 153. 
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Rome I Regulation on articles 3(3) and 3(4) only provides for the application of 
these rules to objectively internal and intra-EU situations, respectively. 
In order to be applicable in all situations irrespective of the law applicable to 
the contract, a rule must have overriding mandatory character, i.e. crucial for the 
safeguarding of public interests. There is an unbreakable connection between the 
objective crucial for the safeguarding of public interests of the country to which 
the rule belongs and the scope of application of the rule. This is, overriding 
mandatory rules are characterized by their willingness to apply regardless the law 
applicable to the contract.666 
 National courts of the Member States should therefore restrain the temptation 
to attribute the character of overriding mandatory provisions to all mandatory 
rules and thus derogate from the conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation. Member 
State courts will be required to provide an appropriate justification when they 
decide to qualify a rule as overriding mandatory, specifying that it pursues an 
objective essential for the country and that its application is necessary to achieve 
that result.667  
 
b. Crucial for the safeguarding of public interests. Can rules protecting 
the weaker party fall within this category? 
It is clear from the definition of article 9(1) Rome I that overriding mandatory 
rules involve crucial public interests for a country, such as its political, social or 
economic organisation. However, how is it determined whether a provision is 
essential for the political, social or economic organization of a state? It is quite 
unlikely that these elements result from the wording of the rule itself. The court 
will have to assess the general structure of the provision and the circumstances 
under which it was adopted.668  
Typical examples are anti-trust legislation and rules against unreasonable 
restraint of trade, commercial embargoes, rules on the import and export of goods 
and services provisions on the access and exercise of specific trades or 
professions, restricting credit in the interest of currency stability, etc.669 These are 
provisions not concerned with the protection of private interests of a contractual 
party, but they directly aim to safeguard the public interests of a state. 
                                                     
666 Gardeñes Santiago, ‘Derecho Imperativo Y Contrato Internacional de Trabajo’ (n 657) 167. 
667 Andrea Bonomi, ‘Overriding Mandatory Provisions in the Rome I Regulation on the Law 
Applicable to Contracts’ in Petar Sarcevic, Andrea Bonomi and Paul Volken (eds), Yearbook of 
Private International Law, vol 10 (sellier european law publishers and Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law 2008) 289. 
668 Case C-184/12 United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v. Navigation Maritime 
Bulgare [2013] EU:C:2013:663, para. 50. Bonomi, ‘Article 9: Overriding Mandatory Provisions’ 
(n 647) 621. 
669 ibid. 
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However, controversy arises as to whether that definition should be 
interpreted restrictively, and therefore exclude those rules aiming at the 
protection of the considered contractual weaker parties, or otherwise a broader 
view of the definition of overriding mandatory rules should be contemplated and 
therefore cover rules which as such protect the interests of private individuals 
although indirectly affect interests of a public nature. The distinction of whether 
a rule is primarily aimed at the protection of a weaker party or also serves a public 
interest is difficult. In fact, every provision aimed at the protection of the weaker 
party could be understood as also aiming to protect a higher interest.670  Article 
9(1) Rome I offers no definition of public interests, but it merely explains that 
they include the political, social or economic organisation of the state. 
With regard to the inclusion on the definition of article 9 Rome I of certain 
provisions protecting the weaker contracting parties, neither doctrine nor 
jurisprudence among Member States share a common approach in this respect.671 
For example, on the one hand, the doctrine and jurisprudence of Germany 
interpret in a very restrictive manner the concept of overriding mandatory 
provisions. German doctrine distinguishes between two types of mandatory rules: 
Eingriffsnormen, or ordo-political rules (which pursue objectives of public 
interest, such as protection of competition), and Parteischutzvorschriften (which 
pursue the equilibrium between the parties of a contract, such as consumers’ and 
employees’ protection provisions). Only the former type of rules falls under the 
category of overriding mandatory rules.672 This point of view of the German 
doctrine has influenced German courts. For example, the Federal Labour Court 
(Bundesarbeitsgericht) refused to apply some German rules protecting 
employees against abusive dismissal based on this restrictive interpretation of 
article 7 Rome Convention (more exactly, of article 34(2) EGBGB implementing 
article 7 Rome Convention).673 Also, in a more clear example, the 
Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court) in a decision on 13 
December 2005, clearly stated that the provisions concerning the protection of 
contractual weaker party do not fall under the category of overriding mandatory 
provisions of article 34(2) EGBGB, even if they also promote, indirectly, public 
interests.674 Thus, a provision can serve either the individual interests of a weaker 
party or public interests, being these objectives mutually exclusive. Those 
supporting this view highlight that the reference to public interests of article 9 
should not be ignored and leads to a restrictive interpretation of the provision, 
                                                     
670 Kuipers (n 11) 93,94. 
671 Bonomi, ‘Overriding Mandatory Provisions in the Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to 
Contracts’ (n 662) 292. 
672 Bonomi, ‘Article 9: Overriding Mandatory Provisions’ (n 118) 622, referring to Mankowski, 
RIW- Kommentar (1996), 8 et seq, and Martiny, in: Münchener Kommentar, para. 13. 
673 Bundesarbeitbericht, 29 October 1992, in: IPRax 1994, p. 123.  
674 Bundesgerichtshof, 13 December 2005- XI ZR 82/05, in: IPRax 2006, p. 272. See Bonomi, 
‘Overriding Mandatory Provisions in the Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contracts’ 
(n 662); Garcimartín Alférez, ‘The Rome I Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing?’ (n 345) 77.   
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which would only be referring to ordo-political rules and excluding those rules 
aimed at the protection of weaker parties; art. 9 Rome I is not a provision destined 
to the protection of consumers, employees, commercial agents or other weaker 
parties.675  
On the other hand, others consider that the protective provisions of specific 
individual groups can also have an essential relevance for the political, social and 
economic organisation of a country, and therefore may fall under the category of 
overriding mandatory rules. French doctrine distinguishes between lois de police 
de direction (as comparable to the Eingriffsnormen) and lois de police de 
protection (equivalent to the Parteischutzvorschriften), but the vast majority 
agree that both can be classified as overriding mandatory rules.676 This approach 
can be seen in the case Agintis677, where the Cour de Cassation (French Supreme 
Court) held that the French law provisions at stake, under which a subcontractor 
can seek direct redress against the master of the works in case of the default of 
the main contractor, were lois de police, in both the sense of article 3(1) French 
Civil Code, and articles 3 and 7 Rome Convention. According to the Advocate 
General, those provisions were aimed at serving both the interests of the French 
State in ensuring French competition (ensuring equal competition for all 
subcontractors operating in the French market) and the protection of 
subcontractor as the weaker party.678  
In the Netherlands, rules protecting socially or economically weaker parties 
can be generally considered, according to the doctrine, overriding mandatory 
rules as long as they are partially intended to protect common higher interests, 
although there is no full agreement.679 In practice, in the Sorensen/Aramco 
decision680 of the Dutch Hoge Raad, the application of a Dutch employment law 
provision was imposed in an employment contract governed by the law of Texas 
on the grounds that the provision aimed both at protecting the employees against 
a socially unjustified termination of contract, and at protecting the Dutch labour 
                                                     
675 Garcimartín Alférez, ‘The Rome I Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing?’ (n 345) 77; Christian 
von Bar and Peter Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht Band 1: Allgemeine Lehren (2nd edn, 
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55) 89. 
677 Cour de Cassation, 30 November 2007, 06-14006. 
678 McParland (n 277) 691,692; Kuipers (n 11) 131. 
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market.681 The Hoge Raad explained that the socio-economic relations in the 
Netherlands were involved in such an extent that the interests protected by the 
provision were higher than the interest in fully applying the law objectively 
applicable to the employment contract. The involvement of the Dutch labour 
market justified the consideration of the Dutch provision as an overriding 
mandatory rule, rather than the protection of the individual employee.682 This 
approach has been confirmed more recently in the Nuon Personeelsbeheer 
decision683, regarding the same provision of Dutch law.684 Thus, the applicability 
of this provision regarding unfair dismissal depends on the extent to which the 
interests of the Dutch labor market are involved in the employment contract. The 
Hoge Raad added that the importance of the Dutch labor market must largely be 
equated with the interests of the individual employee against unjustified 
dismissal. On the other hand, in Belgium, the idea that provisions aimed primarily 
at protecting individual interests of weaker parties can qualify as overriding 
mandatory provisions in the sense that the abuse of weaker parties could be 
regarded a threat to the civil society, although they do not serve a specifically 
state interest, is particularly strong.685 
Finally, the Giulano-Lagarde report identified consumer protection rules as a 
category falling within the scope of article 7(2) Rome Convention (the 
predecessor of article 9 Rome I).686 
 
The ECJ position 
The ECJ left the door open to an extensive interpretation concerning the inclusion 
of weaker party protection rules within the definition of overriding mandatory 
rules in the Ingmar judgment687 regarding the consideration of the provisions 
protecting the commercial agent as overriding mandatory rules. In Ingmar v 
Eaton, the ECJ, although it did not address explicitly whether the provisions at 
                                                     
681 In this case, the Dutch provision in question was article 6 Buitengewoon Besluit 
Ardbeidsverhoudingen (BBA) which required employers to have prior consent from an 
employment office before proceeding to the termination of an employment relationship.  
682 Kirsten C Henckel, Cross-Border Transfers of Undertakings (Ulrik Huber Institute for Private 
International Law 2016) 286; Verhagen (n 320) 144. 
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[2013]).  
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stake were to be regarded as overriding mandatory rules in the sense of the Rome 
I Regulation, gave some guidelines for its determination as such. 
Ingmar, commercial agent with domicile in the United Kingdom, claimed 
Eaton, its principal established in California, the payment of a commission and 
the compensation of the damage caused because of the termination of their 
agency contractual relationship. Ingmar was performing its services exclusively 
in UK and Ireland. The parties had chosen Californian law to govern their 
contract. Nevertheless, Ingmar’s claims were based on the Commercial Agents 
Regulation of 8 December 1993, the transposition in English law of the 
Commercial Agents Directive.688 The Court of Appeal of England and Wales 
(Civil Division) requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ regarding whether 
articles 17 and 18 of the Commercial Agents Directive, on which the claims of 
the agent were based on, would be applicable when the commercial agent 
performs its activities within a Member State, regardless the establishment of the 
principal on a third state and the choice of a third state law to govern their 
contract. Articles 17 and 18 of the Commercial Agents Directive define the 
circumstances under which a commercial agent, upon termination of the contract, 
is entitled to claim compensation for the damages suffered because of the 
termination of the contractual relationship with the principal. At the same time, 
article 19 of the Directive states that “parties may not derogate from articles 17 
and 18 to the detriment of the agent before the agency contract expires”. The ECJ 
concluded that the purpose these provisions serve requires their application where 
the situation is closely connected with the EU, irrespective of the law chosen by 
the parties to govern their contract.689 
It has to be noticed that the Commercial Agents Directive protects private 
interests of a special category of individuals (the commercial agents). 
Nevertheless, it aims to harmonise the conditions of competence within the 
internal market and therefore contribute to the proper functioning of the internal 
market. The ECJ did not base its decision in relation to the objective of the 
Directive to protect a weaker party, but refers to its wide objectives of economic 
policy. That is, the ECJ explains that the aim of articles 17 to 19 of the Directive 
is to protect the freedom of establishment and to circumvent distorted competition 
within the internal market, promoting at the same time the certainty of the 
commercial transactions.690 Companies, both European or international, which 
hire agents in order to commercialize their products within the EU must be aware 
and respect that they are trading in an internal market environment and, as a 
result, cannot benefit from a legal diversity that may distort the competence of 
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Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents (OJ 1986 L 382/17).  
689 Ingmar, para. 25. 
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the internal market.691 Furthermore, although the Ingmar decision only refers to 
articles 17 to 19 of the Commercial Agents Directive, a wider meaning could be 
inferred from its reasoning. The ECJ based its decision by referring to the 
freedom of establishment and undistorted competition within the internal market 
as the aim of these provisions, and, since from the recitals of the Directive it is 
implied that these objectives are present in more provisions, those other 
provisions of the Directive could be regarded also as applicable irrespective of 
the law by which the parties intended the contract to be governed.692 
Consequently, following this line of reasoning, many authors agree that a 
provision which only aims to protect a weaker party would not be considered as 
an overriding mandatory rule, but it definitely could be as long as it also aims to 
promote a higher political, social or economic interest which justifies the priority 
of this provision in an international scenario.693 Although the definition of 
overriding mandatory provisions in article 9 Rome I does not provide sufficient 
clarity, there is no suggestion which shows that the EU legislator intended to 
overturn Ingmar. Therefore, it has been widely considered that the ECJ 
contemplates that article 9 Rome I also covers those provisions which protect the 
interests of weaker parties provided their application proofs crucial for the 
safeguarding of a public interest essential for the Member State in question. 
However, it is questionable whether the overriding effect given in Ingmar to 
the provisions of the Commercial Agents Directive could also be extended to 
consumers and employees, which already enjoy a limited choice of law under the 
Rome I Regulation.  Moreover, the Ingmar case is widely considered as giving 
rise to more questions than answers. The ECJ held that the provisions in question 
(originated in the Commercial Agents Directive and aimed at the protection of 
the rights of the agent) were aimed at ensuring the freedom of establishment and 
undistorted competition of the internal market, and therefore were to be 
considered essential for the EU. The safeguard of the internal market in this case 
seemed subsidiary to the protection of the agent in this case, and thus it is 
generally understood that the position taken is that provisions primarily 
protecting weaker parties can be considered overriding mandatory provisions as 
long as they aim at protecting an essential state (or EU) interest, even in a 
subsidiary manner. However, it has to be kept in mind that the ECJ did not refer 
                                                     
691 Albert Font i Segura, ‘Reparación Indemnizatoria Tras La Extinción Del Contrato Internacional 
de Agencia Comercial: Imperatividad Poliédrica O El Mito de Zagreo (STJCE de 9 de Noviembre 
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692 Verhagen (n 320) 138. 
693 For example, among others, Kuipers (n 11) 200; Hilda Aguilar Grieder, ‘La Voluntad de 
Conciliación Con Las Directivas Comunitarias Protectoras En La Propuesta Del Reglamento Roma 
I’ in JL Calvo Caravaca and E Castellanos Ruiz, La Unión Europea ante el Derecho de la 
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to the Rome Convention in this case, or to the concept of overriding mandatory 
rules, but rather made an autonomous interpretation determining the scope of the 
Directive on the basis of its nature and purpose (although it is true that Rome 
Convention was not temporarily applicable in this case and the ECJ also did not 
have by that time the competence to interpret the Rome Convention).694 
Therefore, there are still authors which do not consider that the ECJ has taken this 
position, and authors that, even though they consider the ECJ has taken this 
position, they criticise it on basis of several grounds: 
Firstly, within the Rome I Regulation (and also before in the Rome 
Convention) special protective conflict rules are already provided in order to 
protect higher interests at stake originated from the weaker position of some 
contracting parties (i.e. arts. 6 and 8 Rome I for employment and consumer 
contracts). It is true that overriding mandatory rules of article 9 Rome I may be 
still a recourse to protect those special individual interests in areas of contract law 
not covered by special conflict rules, such as the interests of commercial agents. 
But whereas the need of protection of consumers and employees is clear, the 
consideration of commercial agents as weaker parties is disputed, as, depending 
on the situation, they will not be necessarily in a weaker bargaining position, and 
therefore such a protection is not required.695 
Secondly, it seems reasonable that party autonomy may be limited in some 
cases in order to protect important EU interests, such as the freedom of 
establishment and undistorted competition within the internal market, as the ECJ 
explained in its judgment. Nevertheless, it is also true that the imposition of the 
provisions of the Commercial Agents Directive in this case does not seem really 
essential for the proper functioning of the internal market, but rather corresponds 
more with the protection of the rights of the agent against the foreign choice of 
law. It is criticised that the ECJ assumed too straightforwardly that the provisions 
of the Directive aimed the protection of such high interests, in a manner that even 
when the principal was established outside the EU, required application and party 
autonomy should be passed by.696 The impact these rules have on fair competition 
and freedom of establishment is considered too indirect as to contravene the law 
chosen by the parties.697 Indeed, the  ECJ seemed more worried about a uniform 
application and interpretation of the EU instruments. 
It has to be mentioned that in France, few days after the Ingmar decision, it 
has been declared that the provisions protecting the commercial agents do not 
                                                     
694 Kuipers (n 11) 199. 
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have overriding mandatory character, but are just internally mandatory.698 The 
ECJ seems to fail to make a distinction between domestic mandatory rules (or, in 
the terminology of the Rome I Regulation, ‘provisions that cannot be derogated 
from by agreement’) and overriding mandatory rules. If the criterion for the 
international mandatoriness of a provision is that it aims somehow to help the 
proper functioning of the internal market, almost every directive would be 
classified as internationally mandatory. As a result, party autonomy, the 
cornerstone of the Rome I Regulation, would be seriously undermined. It seems 
that whereas party autonomy is supported by the Court when it allows individuals 
to take advantages of the internal market, and therefore a strict test is imposed 
upon national overriding mandatory provisions that could affect that right, on the 
other hand the Court is less reluctant to limit that party autonomy in order to 
guarantee the application of EU law.699 The concept of overriding mandatory 
provisions seems to be interpreted more widely than traditionally some Member 
States did in order to ensure the application of EU secondary law, which blurs the 
distinction between the provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement 
and overriding mandatory rules and leaves to the exclusion of party autonomy. 
Moreover, in my opinion, it also has to be added that the ECJ in this case provided 
for the application of the Commercial Agents Directive provisions “irrespective 
of the law chosen by the parties”. Thus, it does not provide for its applicability 
“irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract”, which means that 
if the third country law was applicable as a result of the general conflict rules in 
absence of choice of law, the provisions of the directive would not require 
applicability. Although in the Rome Convention overriding mandatory rules were 
not defined, in the Rome I Regulation they are defined as applicable “irrespective 
of the law otherwise applicable to the contract”. Thus, it seems indeed like there 
is some confusion between provisions that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement and overriding mandatory rules.  
To sum up, it is generally presumed that article 9 Rome I, according to the 
interpretation of the ECJ, will also include those provisions that, although they 
protect a structural weaker party, they mainly serve to protect higher interests 
which are so essential that its priority over the law chosen by the parties is 
justified, including significant EU interests. However, it is up to each Member 
State to determine which national rules are considered essential for their interests 
and thus overriding mandatory. Member States have to restrain themselves and 
be cautious when they define their protective rules as overriding mandatory. 
Indeed, article 9 Rome I requires that they must be classified as as crucial by a 
                                                     
698 Nine days after the Ingmar judgment, the French Cour de Cassation on 28 November 2000 (no. 
98-11.335) held that the Commercial Agents Directive does not provide overriding mandatory 
character to the French implementing legislation. This also seemed to be the position taken by the 
Netherlands previous to the Ingmar judgment, where the District Court Arnhem (The Netherlands), 
on 11 July 1991, held that the Dutch commercial agency provisions implementing that Directive 
sis not have overriding mandatory character. 
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country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or 
economic organization, and the Member State would have to justify it. 
The same conclusion can be inferred from the Unamar judgment.700 In this 
case, a preliminary ruling was referred to the ECJ asking whether the mandatory 
rules of the lex fori (in this case, the Belgium agency rules), that offer wider 
protection than the minimum laid down by the Commercial Agents Directive, 
could be applied even when the law chosen by the parties is the law of another 
Member State in which the minimum protection provided by the Directive has 
also been implemented (in the case, Bulgarian law). The ECJ concluded that 
despite the Commercial Agents Directive was correctly transposed in Bulgarian 
law, the Belgium Court had discretion to qualify its own national provisions as 
overriding mandatory rules in the sense of article 7 Rome Convention (now 
article 9 Rome I), and therefore apply them irrespective the otherwise applicable 
law.701 
Therefore, it seems that, although article 9 Rome I refers to public interests, it 
does not lead a priori to the exclusion of all protective rules. Another argument 
that supports this approach can be inferred from the Arblade case702 and the 
Mazzoleni case703, in which the ECJ used the notion ‘overriding mandatory rules’ 
in reference to national rules on employee’s protection. This view seems to be 
supported by the European legislator, which also provides overriding mandatory 
character to provisions protecting the weaker party in certain EU Directives. In 
the Posting of Workers Directive, for example, certain protective norms of the 
state to which an employee is posted are given the nature of overriding mandatory 
rules. Therefore, apparently, the tendency of the EU is to accept that rules aimed 
at the protection of weaker parties can also qualify as overriding mandatory 
rules.704 Nevertheless, this does not mean that all protective rules can have such 
a character, but only when it is regarded as crucial for the safeguarding of the 
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country’s interests. The rule must have a dual purpose: the protection of weaker 
parties plus the promotion of public interests. This extensive approach for the 
meaning of article 9 Rome I leaves enough autonomy to the legislators and courts 
of the Member States to determine their own crucial interests.  
 
c. Applicable irrespective of the law that otherwise governs the 
contract 
Overriding mandatory rules, because of their particular purpose and content, 
demand to be applied in all circumstances falling within their scope, irrespective 
of the law that otherwise governs the contract. The overriding reach of a provision 
can be indicated by an express delimitation of its scope or it can result from its 
wording. However, in general, overriding mandatory provisions do not 
specifically refer to their overriding reach, or determine their own scope. Courts 
would have to, in those cases, determine the provision’s scope by attending to the 
content and objectives of the rule.705 
 
3.1.2. Sources of overriding mandatory rules 
Overriding mandatory rules are normally originated on the national law of a 
country.  Sometimes, also public international law can be qualified as overriding 
mandatory, such as measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council 
like trade embargoes or other personal or economic sanctions; these rules are 
applicable in the law of the Member States when they are in force, normally as a 
result of transposition by EU Regulations, and can prevail over the law otherwise 
applicable when they meet the definition of art. 9 Rome I.706 
EU law can also be qualified as overriding mandatory. In the cases of EU law 
rules, the application of article 9 Rome I supposes the objective to safeguard 
public interests of the EU.707 EU Treaties or EU Regulations already enjoy direct 
applicability, and its application within the EU does not depend on their 
classification as overriding mandatory rules but in any case they have priority 
over the national law of the Member States. The principles of primacy and 
territoriality solve the conflicts between national law and EU law. According to 
the principle of territoriality, all EU legislation is applicable within the EU 
territory, in the same manner national law applies within national territory. By 
reason of the principle of primacy, EU law takes precedence over national law 
when both conflict. This is the case when the law applicable to the contract is the 
law of a Member State; however, when the law of a non-Member State governs 
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the contract, EU law rules are not directly applicable and need a basis for their 
application under the Rome I Regulation. When a non-Member State law is 
applicable to the contract, EU rules can only prevail over the law applicable to 
the contract if they are considered overriding mandatory rules under article 9 
Rome I.708 
The situation regarding rules originated in EU directives is different. 
Overriding mandatory provisions can have their origin in EU directives. 
However, directives have to be implemented into national law. Directives do not 
enjoy horizontal effect, and therefore private parties cannot rely directly on the 
provisions of the directive against other individuals when they are not properly 
transposed. Thus, they have to be transposed into national law, becoming part of 
national law and having the same hierarchy as any other national provision. This 
means that, in order to be considered as overriding mandatory rules, the 
provisions of EU directives, in the same manner as any other provision of 
domestic law, must fall under the definition of article 9(1) Rome I. In order to 
determine whether the provisions of a directive are aimed at protecting public 
interests a restrictive interpretation is defended in this study since, to some extent, 
all EU legislation is aimed at the proper functioning of the internal market.709 
Some directives ask Member States to establish overriding mandatory 
provisions. For example, article 3 of the Posted Workers Directive (96/71/EC) 
states that Member States shall ensure that employees posted to their territory 
enjoy certain terms and conditions of employment, whatever the law applicable 
to the employment relationship is.710 According to some authors, the clauses 
included in some EU consumer directives (which provide for the application of 
the protection provided in the directive when parties chose the law of a third state 
but the situation is closely connected to the EU) also have the effect of conferring 
overriding mandatory character to the relevant substantive rules.711 However, this 
affirmation is very arguable, and it will later be discussed that such rules should 
not generally be interpreted as asking Member States to establish overriding 
mandatory provisions.712 According to the definition of overriding mandatory 
rules, three elements are needed for a rule to be considered overriding mandatory: 
to have mandatory character, to be crucial for the safeguarding of public interests, 
and to be applicable irrespective of the law that otherwise governs the contract. 
It has been submitted that not all rules with mandatory character can have 
overriding mandatory character. In order to be overriding mandatory, the rule 
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must be essential for protecting specific public interests. Provisions protecting a 
weaker party can still have the possibility to be overriding mandatory if at the 
same time pursue the protection of a crucial public interest. I consider that 
provisions deriving from EU directives protecting weaker contracting parties do 
not have, as a general rule, overriding mandatory character. In my opinion, they 
usually have the character of provisions that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement in the sense of articles 3(3), 3(4), 6 or 8 Rome I. However, if 
exceptionally a specific (implemented) directive provision mainly serves public 
interests its qualification as overriding mandatory provision in the sense of article 
9 is not excluded.713  
 
3.2. Application of overriding mandatory provisions 
Article 9 Rome I governs overriding mandatory rules in the area of contracts. 
This means that it provides for the possible applicability of overriding mandatory 
provisions which have an effect on the formation, validity or interpretation of a 
contract, or on the rights or duties of the parties to the contract. Moreover, in 
accordance to the universal scope of application of the Rome I Regulation, the 
overriding mandatory provisions referred to by article 9 are applicable whether 
or not are part of the law of a Member State.  
After having determined what an overriding mandatory rule is according to 
article 9(1) Rome I, articles 9(2) and 9(3) describe the legal effect of overriding 
mandatory rules. Article 9(2) covers the overriding mandatory provisions of the 
forum and article 9(3) gives effect to the ones of the law of the country where the 
contractual obligations have to be or have been performed. 
Article 9(2) Rome I explicitly makes reference to the law of the forum. It 
provides that “nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the 
overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum”. The provisions of the 
law of the forum within the category of overriding mandatory rules prevail over 
the lex contractus. Once a provision is classified as an overriding mandatory rule 
the question is whether it would be applicable to the specific case at hand.  
Article 9(2) Rome I presents not a mayor problem: the application of 
overriding mandatory rules of the law of the forum is perceived as self-evident. 
Still, some circumstances need some clarification. In the situation where the law 
applicable to the contract is the law of the forum and the overriding mandatory 
provision also belongs to that law, is it automatically applicable? This is, are they 
applicable as part of the applicable law regardless whether the situation falls 
within its scope? This question seems to be solved differently among the Member 
States. While in Germany and the Netherlands overriding mandatory rules have 
to justify their own application regardless the law applicable to the contract is 
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already the law of the forum, in France there is no reluctance towards the 
application of overriding mandatory provisions as part of the law applicable to 
the contract in those cases.714  
The application of foreign overriding mandatory provisions is more 
controversial. Article 9(3) states that “effect may be given to the overriding 
mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the obligations arising out 
of the contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those overriding 
mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. In 
considering whether to give effect to those provisions, regard shall be had to their 
nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-
application”. The possibility of applying foreign overriding mandatory rules is 
narrower than under article 7 Rome Convention, which referred to a close 
connection with the country rather than to the country where the obligations 
arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed. The final solution 
adopted in article 9(3) is the result of the compromise of the Member States 
regarding this concept.715 During the conversion of the Rome Convention into the 
Rome I Regulation, the application of foreign overriding mandatory rules was 
object of large debate. The possibility of applying foreign overriding mandatory 
rules was already accepted by the Dutch Hoge Raad in the Alnati case (1966), 
where it was held that a foreign state might have such an interest in the application 
of its mandatory law outside its territory that these provisions would have to be 
respected by Dutch courts in such cases, even though the parties had chosen the 
application of Dutch law.716 This is the rationale incorporated already in the Rome 
Convention. However, there were many grounds of criticism to this approach: it 
required analysing foreign policies, splitting up the applicable law, and it 
restricted party autonomy and brought legal uncertainty to the conflict of laws 
process.717 The first two arguments could also be used against the application of 
overriding mandatory rules of the forum. The principal criticism consisted on the 
idea that it would create a large amount of legal uncertainty. Still, article 7 Rome 
Convention did not refer to every potential legal system but it limited the 
application of foreign overriding mandatory rules when the situation had a 
sufficient close connection with the legal system where the overriding mandatory 
rules belonged. Besides this criticism, article 7 Rome Convention was defended 
on the grounds that it was the manner to respect and give effect to public interests 
of foreign states, and respect each other’s sociological and economic interests. 
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Some Member States made a reservation on this clause, which was allowed in the 
light of all the controversy, and even the states which did not make a reservation 
were not very keen on its application.718 Thus, during the conversion of the Rome 
Convention into the Rome I Regulation there was a long debate over the drafting 
of this clause. There were several ideas. It was first proposed by the Commission 
to redraft the wording of article 7 Rome Convention, which became one of the 
key objections against Rome I. The European Parliament suggested to delete the 
article altogether on the basis that its “discretionary nature, the uncertainty of the 
criteria which it employs and its potential breadth could detract from legal 
certainty and encourage speculative attempts to evade contractual obligations, 
thereby increasing uncertainty and risk for economic operators and entailing 
higher costs”.719 The final version was a compromise, allowing the application of 
foreign overriding mandatory rules but narrowing the reach compared to article 
7 Rome Convention: effect may be given to the overriding mandatory rules of the 
lex loci solutionis.720  
Article 9(3) Rome I refers to the place of performance as particular close 
connection, and only applies to cases of unlawfulness of performance that 
contravenes an overriding mandatory rule. While this solution has not been very 
welcomed by some scholars which consider it a step backwards, others consider 
the modification as necessary and even rest relevance to the differences in 
practice between both provisions.721  
The wording “effect may be given” provides the court with a wide discretion 
to apply such a rule or not.722 When considering in giving effect to it, the court 
shall look at the nature and purpose of the provision and the consequences of its 
(non)-application. It seems that the court has the freedom to strictly apply foreign 
law or to only take it into account in a substantive level. While the application of 
the rule would mean the application of the legal consequences of such rule to the 
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specific case covered by it, the ‘giving effect to the rule’ means taking the rule 
into account but does not necessarily mean the application of such legal 
consequences, or can even consist on the application of just some of them.723 In 
addition, the court could take into account the foreign rule as a legal rule, or could 
take it into account as a fact, integrating it within the law applicable to the 
contract.724 The ECJ has recently addressed the scope and effect of article 9(3) 
Rome I in the Nikiforidis case.725 The case concerned an employment contract 
governed by German law, in which the employee was a teacher at a Greek school 
in Germany, employed by Greece. The question was whether Greek legislation 
involving a reduction on the payment of public employees, implemented as a 
result of the economic crisis, would apply to the contract of Mr. Nikiforidis. 
According to the ECJ, art. 9(3) Rome I should not be given a wide interpretation, 
allowing only the application as legal rules of the overriding mandatory 
provisions of the state where the obligations arising out of the contract had to be 
or had been performed (which, in the present case, was Germany and not Greece). 
However, the ECJ also concluded that it is allowed, provided the law applicable 
to the contract allows so, for a court to take into account other overriding 
mandatory provisions as matters of fact. 
The ECJ also clarified that article 4(3) TEU providing for the principle of 
sincere cooperation does not change the conclusion reached. This is, since the 
principle does not allow a Member State to circumvent the obligations that are 
imposed upon it by EU law, it is accordingly not capable of allowing a court to 
disregard the fact that the list of overriding mandatory provisions to which effect 
may be given as legal rules according to art. 9(3) Rome I is exhaustive and just 
includes those of the law of the country where the obligations arising out of the 
contract had to be or had been performed.726  
 
3.3. The relationship between overriding mandatory 
provisions and the protective conflict rules of the Rome I 
Regulation 
As it has been described, overriding mandatory provisions are an exception to the 
normal operation of the conflict of laws mechanism, and have been narrowly 
defined by article 9(1) Rome I.  
Although they conventionally aim to protect the state interests, they can also 
sometimes play a role in the protection of weaker parties. It has been previously 
submitted that provisions protecting weaker parties can be considered overriding 
mandatory rules as long as they also pursue the protection of essential public 
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interests, fulfilling the definition of article 9(1) Rome I. The Rome I Regulation 
already provides for protective conflict rules regarding weaker parties (i.e. article 
6 Rome I relative to consumer contracts and article 8 Rome I relative to individual 
employment contracts). The main question would be whether the Rome I 
Regulation provides for two cumulative mechanisms of protection of weaker 
contracting parties.  
Since it seems generally accepted that article 9 Rome I can be used as 
mechanism to protect the weaker contracting party (in exceptional circumstances, 
when public interests are at stake)727, it is necessary to analyse its relationship 
with the protective conflict rules contained in the Rome I Regulation regarding 
consumer contracts (art. 6 Rome I) and individual employment contracts (art. 8 
Rome I). 
 
3.3.1. The relationship between article 9 Rome I and article 6 Rome I: Consumer 
contracts and overriding mandatory provisions 
Article 6 Rome I provides that a consumer contract shall be governed by the law 
of the place where the consumer has his habitual residence “provided that the 
professional: (a) pursues his commercial or professional activities in the country 
where the consumer has his habitual residence, or (b) by any means, directs such 
activities to that country or to several countries including that country, and the 
contract falls within the scope of such activities.” Parties can choose the law 
applicable to the contract if the law chosen provides for the same or more 
protection to the consumer than the law applicable in absence of choice (law of 
habitual residence of the consumer). In a situation where the consumer expects 
his own law to apply, he is protected against the imposition of another law. In this 
regard, article 6 Rome I does not intend to raise the substantive level of consumer 
protection, but just to protect the consumer against the negative consequences of 
a choice of law. Article 6 Rome I ensures the application of the mandatory rules 
of the country of habitual residence of the consumer, and only allows the 
application of other law chosen by the parties if the mandatory rules protecting 
the consumer offer him the same or a better protection. Article 6 Rome I refers to 
“rules that cannot be derogated from by agreement”, which are a wider set of 
rules than overriding mandatory rules. However, their mandatory character is of 
a national character and not international, and thus limited to the legal system 
where they come from. Provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement, 
thus, cannot be derogated by the parties when choosing another state law. They 
are applicable in purely domestic situations and in international situations when 
they belong to the law applicable to the contract, and therefore cannot be departed 
from by choosing a different law as applicable to the contract. On the other hand, 
overriding mandatory provisions are a more limited category within the group of 
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mandatory rules. They are applicable in international situations and not limited 
to the legal system where they come from, and thus they can be applied regardless 
the law applicable to the contract (regardless it is the result of a choice of law or 
on the basis of the objective connecting factors). Mandatory rules protecting the 
consumer belonging to the law of the country of habitual residence of the 
consumer are already ensured by article 6 Rome I, regardless they have the 
character of internally mandatory or overriding mandatory.  
We can distinguish two different types of situations regarding the relationship 
between article 6 Rome I and article 9 Rome I: 
The first situation is when the consumer contract falls within the scope of 
article 6 Rome I, and therefore the application of the mandatory rules of the 
country of habitual residence of the consumer is ensured by that article, but at the 
same time the forum (which can be a different country) is interested in the 
application of the forum’s consumer protection rules as overriding mandatory 
provisions. According to articles 17-19 Brussels I bis Regulation, jurisdiction 
over the dispute regarding a consumer contract is conferred to either the courts of 
the country of habitual residence of the consumer or to the courts of the country 
of habitual residence of the professional (only in case the consumer decides to 
sue the professional there). Choice of court is limited to certain scenarios (i.e. 
parties agreed on it after the dispute has arisen; the choice of court agreement 
allows the consumer to bring proceedings in a court different than the court of the 
consumer or professional habitual residence; or consumer and professional have 
habitual residence in the same Member State at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract and they choose the courts of that Member State, provided that such a 
choice is not contrary to the law of that Member State). Therefore, there is the 
possibility that the forum court is not the court of the place of habitual residence 
of the consumer, and thus this court would have an interest in the application of 
the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum. However, it seems very rare 
that a country where the consumer does not even have his or her habitual 
residence would have an interest in applying its consumer protection provisions, 
and specially that the application of these provisions would be regarded as crucial 
for the safeguarding of the public interests of that country. Also, in these cases, 
the application of overriding mandatory rules is hard to justify, since the 
mandatory protection offered by the country of habitual residence of the 
consumer is already given effect by article 6 Rome I, and there is no reason why 
a higher protection should be ensured by an overriding mandatory rule when the 
weaker position of the consumer has already been compensated by the operation 
of article 6 Rome I. Thus, overriding mandatory rules should not be applicable 
when the weaker party already enjoys the protection of a protective connecting 
factor. Article 9 Rome I should not play a role in this situation, since article 6 
Rome I already contains a protective conflict rule benefiting the consumer. 
A second situation is when the consumer contract at hand falls outside the 
scope of the protective conflict rule of article 6 Rome I. This is, it falls rationae 
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materiae under article 6 Rome I but not under the circumstances required by that 
provision to be applicable. As it is known, not all consumer contracts fall within 
the scope of article 6 Rome I: the consumer that approaches the professional on 
his or her own initiative is excluded (it is required that the professional pursues 
or directs his or her commercial activities to the country of habitual residence for 
the consumer). Also, several consumer contracts are excluded on article 6(4) 
Rome I. In these cases, the general rules of the Rome I Regulation would be 
applicable. It makes sense that when the consumer approaches the professional 
in the country of habitual residence of the professional, voluntarily leaving his 
jurisdiction and without any targeting activity from part of the professional, 
applying the law of the place of habitual residence of the consumer is not deemed 
as necessary anymore. This is, article 6 Rome I aims to undo the bias towards the 
stronger party of the contract (the professional) which is created by the objective 
conflict rules of the Rome I. The test of the characteristic performance of article 
4 Rome I, in the case of consumer contracts, favours the stronger party, since the 
law of the habitual place of residence of the professional would become 
applicable, going against the expectations of the consumer that was targeted in 
his own home country. When it is the consumer approaching the professional in 
the professional’s place without having been targeted by the professional, that 
presumption of bias towards the professional is vanished.728 That is why the 
application of the law of the place of habitual residence of the consumer is not 
required anymore. Ensuring the application of the mandatory rules protecting the 
consumer belonging to his country of habitual residence is not necessary in those 
situations. For example, when article 6 Rome I does not apply to a consumer 
contract because the professional did not target his activities to the Member State 
of habitual residence of the consumer, being the general rules of Rome I 
applicable, it does not seem possible that the Member State of habitual residence 
of the consumer would have interest in the application of its protective rules as 
essential for the public interests of the state. However, following this broad 
understanding of article 9 Rome I, this provision could play a role on the 
protection of other weaker contracting parties that do not enjoy a special 
protective conflict rule in the Rome I. This would be the case of commercial 
agents, for example. Also, in the cases of insurance contracts or contracts of 
carriage, since their special conflict rules do not insist on the application of 
mandatory rules, the broad understanding of article 9 Rome I could play a role, 
as the cumulative protection of the weaker party does not occur. 
However, there are some situations where article 6 Rome I is not applicable 
but still the interests of the consumer should be taken into account. For instance, 
imagine a case where a Dutch consumer purchases some goods in Germany. In 
this case, the Dutch consumer cannot expect that Dutch consumer law will be 
applicable. Instead, he can reasonably expect that German consumer law would 
apply to their contract. However, the contract might contain a choice of another 
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country law, which could provide a lower level of consumer protection. The 
Dutch consumer would be subject to a lower level of consumer protection than a 
German consumer operating in the German market (since the mandatory 
consumer protection of German law would still be ensured by article 3(3) Rome 
I as it is a purely internal situation), and than a Dutch consumer operating in the 
Dutch market. Another example would be the “holiday” consumer. Imagine the 
case where a company established in Morocco directs some of its activities to 
tourists in the south of Spain, organising tours together with sale events. A 
German consumer on holiday in Málaga (Spain) takes part of the tour and 
purchases some goods offered to him during the sales event. In this case, if the 
contract provides for a choice of Moroccan law, the German consumer would not 
be under the protection of article 6 Rome I, since the activities were not directed 
to his country of habitual residence, but to Spain. However, a Spanish tourist 
could rely on the protection of article 6 Rome I, and Spanish mandatory rules on 
consumer law would be applicable. The German tourist could only rely on the 
protection of article 6 Rome I if the Moroccan company was also targeting 
Germany (e.g. approaching them in German language, terms and conditions 
drafted in German, etc.), but it is not. The law applicable in absence of choice 
would be Moroccan law, and the German tourist operating within the EU internal 
market would be deprived of the mandatory protection provided by the EU 
consumer directives. This situation will be object of detailed analysis in the 
following Chapter.  
In these cases, when the interests of the consumer have not been taken into 
account since the consumer contract is excluded from the protective conflict rule 
of article 6 Rome I, article 9 Rome I could play a role. However, there is not an 
agreement regarding this subsidiary application of article 9 Rome I. Under the 
Rome Convention the situation was uncertain and different positions were taken. 
The Giuliano-Lagarde Report729 mentioned some rules on consumer protection 
as examples of rules which could be mandatory within the meaning of article 7(2) 
Rome Convention. This implied that there was no objection to apply these rules 
when the conditions of application of article 5 Rome Convention (predecessor of 
article 6 Rome I) were not met, although the Report was silent in this specific 
matter.730 In the Rome Convention Green Paper, the Commission expressed: 
“There are those who express doubts about the combination between the 
mandatory provisions of Article 5 and those of Article 7: they argue that Article 
5 is a special application of Article 7 as the two aim to displace the normally 
applicable law. Accordingly, when the conditions of Article 5 are not met, Article 
7 would also be inoperative. This interpretation would deprive a mobile 
consumer, who already does not enjoy the protection of Article 5, of the safety 
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valve offered by the public order acts.”731 Those against the application of article 
7 Rome Convention as a safety valve considered that article 5 Rome Convention 
regulated exhaustively the application of protective mandatory rules regarding 
consumer contracts, since this provision dealt specifically with the extent to 
which the mandatory rules of a law other than the objectively applicable law were 
to be applied to the contract, and additional application of mandatory rules of 
other law would be unjust.732 This restrictive view was supported in Germany. In 
the Gran Canaria cases, the Bundesgerichtshof held that, since the consumer 
contract had not been concluded in one of the circumstances required by article 
5, it was not possible to apply the mandatory rules of the forum, as article 5 Rome 
Convention was a lex specialis which ousted the potential application of article 7 
Rome Convention. The facts of these cases were similar to the example of the 
“holiday consumer” above: German tourists in Spain, targeted in Spain and not 
in their own country, and the contract containing a choice of Manx law. The 
German provisions allowing the consumer to withdraw from the contract (which 
were the implementation of a EU directive and thus also implemented into 
Spanish law) could not be invoked as mandatory rules of habitual place of 
residence of the consumer (since the contract was outside the circumstances of 
article 5 Rome Convention) but neither applicable as overriding mandatory rules 
of the forum (since the German court said it was not possible).733 In contrast, the 
Luxembourg court in Hames v Spaarkrediet734, in which article 5 Rome 
Convention was not applicable to the consumer contract in question, the court did 
not apply Luxembourg consumer law as overriding mandatory rules not because 
article 5 Rome Convention precluded that possibility, but because the consumer 
provisions in question were not considered as overriding mandatory rules, but 
internally mandatory.735  
However, I consider that this discussion, in the context of the Rome 
Convention, was dominated by the confusion existent between mandatory rules 
and overriding mandatory rules. In the current context, it seems that, when article 
6 Rome I is not applicable, mandatory consumer protection rules could be 
applicable as overriding mandatory rules of article 9 Rome I as long as the 
provision in question could be classified as overriding mandatory. Of course, not 
all the consumer protection provisions would be applicable, but guarantying some 
essential consumer mandatory protection as overriding mandatory rules would be 
a possibility, as long as the provisions fall within the definition of article 9 Rome 
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I and can be classified as essential for the safeguard of the interests of the country. 
Thus, the discussion would be more focused on the possibility of considering 
weaker party protection rules as overriding mandatory rules rather than article 6 
Rome I being lex specialis and ousting the potential application of article 9 Rome 
I. Article 6 Rome I operates in a different basis and concerns a different matter 
than article 9 Rome I, which does not make it look like lex specialis. Also, when 
article 9(2) starts with the wording “Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict…” 
in such a categorical affirmation, does not make it look like it is subordinated to 
article 6 Rome I neither.736 
Finally, it remains to clarify that overriding mandatory rules having other 
goals than protecting the consumer are applicable irrespective of the law 
applicable to the consumer contract (e.g. embargo measures, even if they affect a 
consumer contract).737 
 
3.3.2. The relationship between article 9 Rome I and article 8 Rome I: overriding 
mandatory provisions and individual employment contracts 
Article 8(1) Rome I provides that the choice of law by the parties to an individual 
employment contract is effective with the condition that provides or the same or 
more protection than the mandatory rules of the law that, in the absence of choice, 
would have been applicable pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this article. 
Article 8(2) Rome I states that, in absence of choice of law, the law applicable 
will be the law of the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee 
habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract. The country where 
the work is habitually carried out shall not be deemed to have changed if he is 
temporarily employed in another country. Article 8(3) Where the law applicable 
cannot be determined pursuant to paragraph 2, the contract shall be governed by 
the law of the country where the place of business through which the employee 
was engaged is situated. Article 8(4) Where it appears from the circumstances as 
a whole that the contract is more closely connected with a country other than that 
indicated.  
In the same manner as article 6 Rome I regarding consumer contracts, two 
situations can be distinguished regarding the interaction of article 8 Rome I 
regarding employment contracts and article 9 Rome I regarding overriding 
mandatory provisions.  
 Firstly, article 8 Rome I also leaves some gaps in employee protection. 
Specially, it leaves some gaps regarding posted workers. Article 8(2) Rome I 
provides that the habitual place of work does not change when the employee 
temporarily carries out his work in another country. Therefore, although the work 
is temporary carried out outside, the Member State of origin is still presumed to 
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be the country having the closest connection with the employment contract. 
However, this does not mean that the state to where the employee is posted does 
not have an essential interest (e.g. prevention of social dumping or fair 
competition) in the application of their labour law. Overriding mandatory rules 
can play a role in those cases. In fact, article 3(1) of the Posted Workers Directive 
requires the application of certain rules of the country of destination.738 Article 8 
and 9 Rome I are not intended to be exhaustive.739 The line of argument is the 
same as regarding article 6 and 9 Rome I in the context of consumer contracts 
discussed above: overriding mandatory rules can fill the gap left by article 8 
Rome I but exceptionally, when talking about provisions essential for public 
interests. 
Mandatory rules protecting the employee belonging to the law of habitual 
place of work, which is considered as the one having the closest connection and 
the biggest interest in its application, are already ensured by article 8 Rome I. 
Overriding mandatory provisions covered by article 9 Rome I are a much 
narrower category of mandatory rules within the mandatory law which would 
already be ensured through article 8 Rome I when the forum and the law 
objectively designated by article 8 Rome I are the same country. However, a 
second situation would consist in a real conflict between these provisions: article 
8 Rome I is applicable, and the forum thus has to ensure the application of the 
mandatory employment law of the country of habitual place of work, but at the 
same time it is required by the forum law to apply to the situation a mandatory 
rule of the forum (which provided for a lower level of protection). For this 
situation to happen, the law whose mandatory rules were designated by article 8 
Rome I has to be different than the lex fori and the lex fori rule would have to be 
classified as overriding mandatory. This seems like a very unlikely situation, 
especially since the Brussels I bis Regulation provisions determining jurisdiction 
and article 8 Rome I determining the law applicable are coordinated in this regard, 
leading to the same country. Like in the case of consumer contracts, in these type 
of situations, the application of overriding mandatory rules is hard to justify, since 
the mandatory protection offered by the country of habitual place of work is 
already given effect by article 8 Rome I, and there is no reason why a higher 
protection should be ensured by an overriding mandatory rule when the weaker 
position of the employee has already been compensated by the operation of article 
8 Rome I. However, the interest of the state plays a much higher role in 
employment contracts than consumer contracts, which means that the forum state 
can consider certain rules as overriding mandatory and be applicable superseding 
the provisions of the law determined by article 8 Rome I. Still, in this type of 
situation where the law designated by art. 8 Rome I provides for a higher 
protection than the overriding mandatory rule, in practice it is probable that the 
overriding mandatory rule would not result in the non-application of the foreign 
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more beneficial law. This is, in practice, both rules could be respected: e.g. an 
employee which employment contract is governed by law of country A is sent to 
work to country B, and, according to the law of country A, the minimum salary 
is the double than the minimum salary required by country B; even if the worker 
receives the amount for the minimum salary of country A, it does not mean that 
the overriding mandatory rule requiring the minimum salary of country B is being 
neglected. In such a case, both rules are being respected.740 
Again, in the case of overriding mandatory rules having other goal than 
protecting the employee are applicable irrespective of the law applicable to the 
employment contract (e.g. embargo measures). 
 
4. The protection clause of EU mandatory law in 
intra-EU situations: Article 3(4) Rome I 
Articles 3(3) and 3(4) Rome I ensure the application of the domestic and EU 
mandatory law, respectively, in the cases where all the relevant elements to the 
situation are located in a place other than the country whose law has been chosen. 
Both provisions constitute a limit on the freedom of choice of law by the parties 
and can serve as a mechanism of protection of weaker contracting parties. 
Article 3(3) Rome I Regulation, following its predecessor article 3(3) Rome 
Convention, provides for a limit on party autonomy intended to protect the 
domestic mandatory rules of contract law from being avoided in a purely 
domestic situation. Article 3(3) reads: “Where all other elements relevant to the 
situation at the time of the choice are located in a country other than the country 
whose law has been chosen, the choice of the parties shall not prejudice the 
application of provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be 
derogated from by agreement.” 
In addition to limit choice of law in purely domestic situations, the Rome I 
Regulation introduces a new provision under which the application of EU law is 
ensured in the case of purely intra-EU situations and, as a result, the protection 
provided by the provisions of EU law protecting weaker contracting parties can 
be ensured. This new provision is article 3(4) Rome I, which provides: “Where 
all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located 
in one or more Member States, the parties' choice of applicable law other than 
that of a Member State shall not prejudice the application of provisions of 
Community law, where appropriate as implemented in the Member State of the 
forum, which cannot be derogated from by agreement.” In other words, where 
the all the relevant elements of the contract are objectively connected with the 
Member States but yet the parties choose the law of a third State, that choice is 
valid and that law will be applicable to the contract although with one limit: it 
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cannot elude the application of the ‘provisions of Community law which cannot 
be derogated from by agreement’ that are applicable to the case. Since in our 
study we focus on the protection of weaker contracting parties at a EU level, I 
will focus on the analysis of article 3(4) Rome I, although similar reflexions can 
be made regarding article 3(3) Rome I at a domestic level. 
Article 3(4) Rome I is new on the Rome I Regulation, and it is the result of 
the increasing necessity of coordination between the general conflict of laws rules 
determining the law applicable to the contract with the EU secondary law, or, in 
broad words, the necessity of compatibility within the European legal system. 
The Rome Convention did not provide for any provision facing the situation of a 
choice of a foreign law in a purely intra-EU contract. Some authors defended an 
analogic application of article 3(3) Rome Convention, which provides that, in a 
purely internal situation where the contract is just connected with one single 
Member State, parties cannot elude the application of national mandatory rules 
of that Member State.741 Nevertheless, the EU did not consider sufficient that 
analogic application, as an ad hoc provision for intra-EU situations, whose 
requirements differed from those of article 3(3), was required.742 
Article 3(4) Rome I is intended to protect the interests of the EU and ensure 
the application and respect of mandatory EU law when all the relevant elements 
of the contractual relationship are located within one or several Member States 
(intra-EU situations), but the parties chose a third country law as law applicable 
to their contract.743 Therefore, it guarantees the application of the ‘provisions of 
Community law which cannot be derogated from by agreement’ –mandatory EU 
law- in situations where, due to the choice of law of the parties, those provisions 
could be eluded. Hence, article 3(4) Rome I is considered a mechanism for 
fighting abuse of law at a EU level.744 It seems completely justifiable that in an 
intra-EU contract parties should be prevented from avoiding the application of 
mandatory EU secondary law, which aims precisely to establish a common 
ground between market participants established in the EU.745 
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The respective EU mandatory law derived from directives would be applicable 
as implemented by the law of the Member State of the forum, rather than the 
closest connected law or the law applicable in absence of choice. This option, 
despite being more convenient for the judge, could derive in forum shopping and 
lead to less predictable results in cases where directives are of a minimum 
harmonisation nature and thus transposed differently among the Member 
States.746 However, since EU law regards the laws of the Member States as 
equivalent, the law of the forum, which results more pragmatic and reduces costs 
for the judge, was chosen over the other possible (and more coherent with the 
Rome I Regulation system) connecting factors.747 
Article 3(4) Rome I does not refer to the so called overriding mandatory 
provisions or lois de police of article 9 Rome I previously defined, but to the 
provisions of EU origin which mandatoriness is restricted to the internal scope of 
each Member State. Accordingly, the majority of the provisions contained in the 
EU directives aimed at the protection of weaker contracting parties fall under 
article 3(4) Rome I. The category of mandatory rules covered by article 3(4) 
Rome I is wider than the category of overriding mandatory rules of article 9 Rome 
I, the latter only covering those mandatory provisions whose application is 
essential for the safeguard of public interests such as the political, social or 
economic organisation of a country. As a result, provisions of EU directives 
regarding weaker parties that do not result applicable as a result of article 6, article 
8 or article 9 Rome I, can still be applicable according to article 3(4) Rome I. 
However, article 3(4) Rome I only becomes applicable when all relevant 
elements are located within the EU (purely intra-EU situations).748 But which 
elements are to be considered relevant in this regard? The silence of the legislator 
confers a wide margin of discretion, which at the same time may disturb the legal 
certainty. The Giuliano/Lagarde Report on the Rome Convention can be of 
guidance. The Report described the situations involving a conflict of laws as 
“situations which involve one or more elements foreign to the internal social 
system of a country (for example, the fact that one or all of the parties to the 
contract are foreign nationals or persons habitually resident abroad, the fact that 
the contract was made abroad the fact that one or more of the obligations of the 
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parties are to be performed in a foreign country, etc.)”.749 Similarly, some authors 
consider that the connecting factors determining the law applicable to the contract 
contained in the Rome I Regulation could be understood as relevant elements. 
Following this latter interpretation, when we contemplate the clauses referring to 
a “manifestly closest connection”, every element could be interpreted in this 
sense as relevant, which would not be feasible.750 The determination of the 
objective factors of the contract as relevant elements seems more feasible. Hence, 
the place of performance or the place of conclusion of the contract are definitely 
considered as relevant elements for the situation. In the same manner, the place 
of habitual residence of the parties shall also be considered as such.751 On the 
other hand, the nationality becomes less important to the situation. It should not 
be a relevant element for determining a situation as extra-EU, for example, a case 
where a consumer with non-EU nationality, but with habitual residence in a 
Member State for a long time, concludes a contract within the EU with a EU 
professional. It could become more relevant if both parties are non-EU 
nationals.752 Similarly, elements as the currency, or language of the contract, 
should not be considered as relevant to contemplate a contract as extra-EU. 
However, when several of these elements appear together within the same 
contractual relationship, they could justify a legitimate interest on a foreign 
choice of law.753 
Finally, it is required to pay special attention to the choice of court of the 
parties in the case they have chosen a non-EU Court as competent to solve their 
eventual disputes. Preamble 15 Rome I, in reference to article 3(3) Rome I, 
explains that the rule should be applicable regardless there is a choice of court or 
tribunal. Following the same interpretation, it should be understood in the context 
of article 3(4) Rome I that in a situation where all the relevant elements are 
located within the EU, a foreign choice of court clause should not transform an 
intra-EU situation in an extra-EU situation, as the choice of forum does not affect 
that the facts relevant for the substantive law are objectively connected with the 
EU, and accordingly the mandatory provisions of EU law should be applicable.754 
Accordingly, the existence of relevant elements outside the EU will be 
determined by the existence of a legitimate interest of the parties with regard to 
the foreign choice of law. In this manner, where none of the objective elements 
of the contract concur (e.g. habitual residence, place of performance…), that 
                                                     
749 Giuliano-Lagarde Report [1980] OJ C282/1, 10. 
750 Specifically, articles 4(3), 5(3), 7(2), 8(4) Rome I, which state that “where it is clear from all the 
circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country (…) 
the law of that other country shall apply”; Belohlávek (n 335) 703. 
751 Plender and Wilderspin (n 725) 164. 
752 Belohlávek (n 335) 703. 
753 Leible, ‘La Importancia de La Autonomía Conflictual Para El Futuro Del Derecho de Los 
Contratos Internacionales’ (n 333) 234–235; Plender and Wilderspin (n 725) 164. 
754 Garcimartín Alférez, ‘The Rome I Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing?’ (n 345) 65. 
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interest should be determined in a case-by-case basis, avoiding the non-
application of mandatory provisions of EU law when it is actually necessary. 
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CHAPTER IV - THE RELATIONSHIP AND 
COORDINATION BETWEEN EU 
CONSUMER DIRECTIVES AND THE ROME 
I REGULATION 
 
This chapter aims to clarify the incoordination existent between the Rome I 
Regulation and the EU consumer directives. Conflict of laws regarding consumer 
protection has been an object of debate among European private international law 
scholars during the last decades due to the several inconsistencies around it.755 
Besides the discussions regarding gaps and contradictions deriving from the 
interaction of those instruments, the arising of EU law has brought back basic 
conflict of laws questions, which in our specific case are translated in: when 
should EU consumer directives be applicable? Should the existent EU conflict 
rules –the Rome I Regulation- determine their applicability? Should instead the 
directives themselves determine their own applicability? How would then be their 
interaction with the existent conflict rules? It can be observed that the debate goes 
back to the eternal PIL dispute between a multilateral conflict of laws method and 
a unilateral conflict of laws approach. While the Rome I Regulation mainly 
follows a multilateral approach, containing in its majority multilateral conflict 
rules, plus some modern principles such as party autonomy, protection of weaker 
contracting parties, or the concept of overriding mandatory rules, the autonomous 
determination of the scope of application by the directives themselves would 
result in a unilateral approach, since they would indicate their own scope of 
application while ignoring the application of foreign law.  
  Regarding the existent gaps and inconsistencies relative to the conflict of 
laws on consumer contracts, these derive from different intended reaches between 
the Rome I Regulation and the EU consumer directives. On the one hand, the 
Rome I Regulation contains a protective conflict rule that determines the law 
applicable to consumer contracts: article 6 Rome I. This rule covers consumer 
                                                     
755 For example: Erik Jayme and Christian Kohler, ‘L’interaction Des Règles de Conflit Contenues 
Dans Le Droit Dérivé de La Communauté Européenne et Des Conventions de Bruxelles et de 
Rome’ (1995) 1 Revue critiqye de droit international privé 11; De la Rosa, La Protección de 
Consumidores En El Mercado Interior Europeo (n 420) 139 et seq.; Francq, L’Applicabilité Du 
Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au Regard Des Méthodes Du Droit International Privé (n 11); 
Stéphanie Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private 
International Law- or the Other Way Around?’, Yearbook of Private International Law (2006), vol 
8 (Sellier European Law Publishers & Swiss Institute of Comparative Law 2007); Fernando 
Esteban De la Rosa, ‘El Sistema Europeo Y Español de Ley Aplicable a Los Contratos de Consumo 
Transfronterizos: El Modelo de Dispersión Normativa Para El Derecho Privado de La Integración’ 
(2007) 13 Revista Agenda Internacional 409; Kramer (n 11). 
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contracts where the consumer is an individual acting outside its trade or 
profession (not acting for business purposes), the professional party acts in the 
course of its trade or profession and the contract must fall within the scope of the 
professional’s activities. Moreover, the contract will be regarded as a consumer 
contract under article 6 Rome I when the professional pursues his commercial or 
professional activities in the country where the consumer has his habitual 
residence, or by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several 
countries including that country. Also, some consumer contracts are explicitly 
excluded by article 6(4) Rome I. Thus, the protective conflict rule of article 6 
Rome I does not apply to all consumer contracts, but active and “mobile” 
consumers, as well as the consumers explicitly excluded, are outside its scope of 
application.756 Of course, there are situations in which a consumer could not 
reasonably expect the law of the country of his habitual residence apply, like in 
the case of active consumers: when a Dutch citizen goes on holiday to Mexico 
and purchases a souvenir in a souvenir shop of Mexico, he cannot reasonably 
expect that, in case of any conflict arising, Dutch consumer law would be 
applicable. 
On the other hand, EU consumer directives seem to intend to apply their 
standards of protection to more situations than covered by article 6 Rome I. In 
fact, several EU consumer directives contain a so-called scope rule that refers to 
the application of their standards; an example is article 6(2) Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive757: “Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure 
that the consumer does not lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue 
of the choice of law of a non-Member State as the law applicable to a contract if 
the latter has a closest connection with the territory of the Member States”. The 
only requirement of a close connection with the EU for the application of the 
standards of the directive covers more situations than those of article 6 Rome I. 
However, as it will be shown in this chapter, the existence of scope rules 
interferes with the Rome I Regulation system, since it uses a unilateral approach 
to determine the applicability of the instrument which determines the scope of the 
instrument without referring to foreign law, clashing with the multilateral nature 
of the Rome I Regulation. Furthermore, if the Rome I Regulation aims to unify 
the conflict of laws of the different Member States regarding contractual 
obligations, the fact that scope rules are spread around directives disrupts that 
aim. The consumer would probably be better protected in a coherent system 
which ensures legal certainty. Moreover, the broad drafting of scope rules gives 
place to different understandings when implementing these rules among the 
national laws of the Member States, which add more uncertainty to the situation.  
In addition, not all the EU consumer directives contain scope rules defining 
their application, but some refer the conflict of laws issue to the Rome I 
                                                     
756 For a deeper analysis of article 6 Rome I, see Chapter III. 
757 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ L 95/29) 
(Unfair Contract Terms Directive). 
Chapter IV - The relationship and coordination between EU consumer directives and 
the Rome I Regulation 
213 
Regulation. This seems to be the current trend followed by the European 
legislator; however, the existence of scope rules in other directives makes the 
whole system inconsistent. Also, if we were to follow this new trend, would the 
protection provided by the consumer directives be ensured in all situations the 
directives intend to cover? 
In this regard, it is important to have in mind that EU law and PIL have 
different starting points and aims. While EU consumer directives pursue the well-
functioning of the internal market and a consumer protection standard common 
in all Member States, PIL is based on different values. The traditional multilateral 
approach consists on solving a conflict of laws by bringing the legal relationship 
home, with a neutral conflict rule that would find the legal systems most closely 
connected to the legal relationship. In that manner, international harmony of 
decisions would be achieved, meaning that the outcome would be the same 
regardless the jurisdiction where the proceedings were brought, which would 
prevent limping legal relationships and would promote legal certainly for the 
parties involved. The EU PIL and the Rome I Regulation follow this approach, 
although some other values and principles are involved: in order to protect 
important social values of substantive law, such as consumer protection, conflict 
rules refer to the country which should have the strongest interest in the 
application of its law (e.g. article 6 Rome I referring to the law of habitual 
residence of the consumer); also, the principle of party autonomy has become 
increasingly accepted especially in the area of contract law, which means that 
another connecting factor is the one that refers to the law of the country the parties 
have chosen (which, in some cases such as consumer contracts, needs to be 
limited to avoid abuse).758 However, values regarding a single EU Area of Justice 
and functioning of the  EU internal market are not sufficiently reflected in the 
Regulation. Therefore, this can be the underlying problem regarding the 
incapacity of the Rome I Regulation to correctly designate the law applicable to 
consumer contracts when the application of the EU consumer directives is at 
stake. It may be that some conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation need to take 
into account the internal market objectives in order to ensure the coordination 
between PIL and EU law. 
Regarding the never ending debate between multilateralism and unilateralism, 
in this case relative to the scope of application of the EU consumer directives, the 
existence of scope rules in some of the directives has been interpreted in different 
manners from the PIL point of view and has brought back the traditional 
discussion.  On the one hand, those supporting a unilateralist method of PIL have 
defended that every act of EU law, and thus the EU consumer protection 
directives, determine, implicitly or explicitly, their own scope of application, and 
claim a return of the unilateralist approach.759 Below, it will be seen that a 
                                                     
758 De Boer (n 198) 279. 
759 For example, Stéphanie Francq in: Francq, L’Applicabilité Du Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au 
Regard Des Méthodes Du Droit International Privé (n 11); Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary 
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unilateral approach could be considered a more pragmatic solution to protect the 
EU objectives, with the big downside of probably becoming a protectionist 
system that imposes as a rule the application of its law over the foreign law.  
On the other hand, those defending the persistence of the multilateral approach 
try to fit the scope rules within the existent multilateral conflict of laws system of 
the Rome I Regulation and defend the new trend of the EU legislator of referring 
the conflict of laws issue to the rules of the Regulation.760 Under a PIL multilateral 
approach, a consumer contract between a Dutch consumer and a German 
professional is not different than a consumer contract between a Dutch consumer 
and a Brazilian professional. However, from the point of view of EU law, the 
situations completely differ from each other: while in the first case the application 
of the EU standards is generally ensured, in the second case there is the possibility 
that the EU standards are not applied when the EU intended to, disrupting the 
well-functioning of the internal market. In this intra-EU/extra-EU discussion, one 
reflexion has to be taken into account: when different legal systems share 
common or similar legal values, like in the case of the Member States, conflict of 
laws should definitely promote the equality between these different national legal 
systems through neutral conflict rules; however, when legal systems do not share 
similar legal values, and important interests are at stake, should the application 
of foreign law be decided by neutral conflict rules? 
Thus, considering rejecting the idea that PIL methodological purity, on the 
basis that it does not seem possible that a single method, neither multilateral nor 
unilateral, can solve all conflict of laws issues, and, secondly, taking into account 
the notion that the functioning of the internal market should be respected and thus 
the EU consumer protection should be ensured when necessary, a solution 
regarding the incoordination existent between the Rome I Regulation and the EU 
consumer directives should be achieved. 
In that context, this chapter will: 
- firstly, describe the existent inconsistencies and gaps regarding the 
relationship between EU consumer directives and the Rome I Regulation. The 
problems arising from the first generation of EU consumer directives, silent about 
their scope of application, and the second generation of consumer directives, 
containing a scope rule, in relation with the EU conflict of laws regime, will be 
discussed. Then, the final solution adopted by the Rome I Regulation and the 
current trends of the European legislator regarding EU consumer directives and 
                                                     
Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private International Law- or the Other Way 
Around?’ (n 750). Also, recognising the unilateralism existent in different EU instruments and the 
necessity of it: Andreas Bucher, La Dimension Sociale Du Droit International Privé : Cours 
Général (Brill 2011) 82 et seq.; Symeonides, ‘Accommodative Unilateralism as a Starting Premise 
in Choice of Law’ (n 20). 
760 Kuipers (n 11); Ragne Piir and Karin Sein, ‘Law Applicable to Consumer Contracts. Interaction 
of the Rome I Regulation and EU-Directive-Based Rules on Conflict of Laws’ (2016) 24 Juridica 
International 63. 
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conflict of laws will be described. Finally, the current chaotic situation regarding 
all the existent gaps will be analysed. 
- secondly, focus on the issues regarding intra-EU conflicts of law related with 
EU consumer directives. Two different issues will be discussed: on the one hand, 
the different understandings arising from the implementation of scope rules of 
the directives into the national law of the Member States, which bring more 
uncertainty to an already confusing system; on the other hand, whether, in the 
cases where forum law grants a better level of protection as a result of  the 
minimum harmonising nature of some of the directives, the forum law should 
impose its standards against the law of another Member State. 
-thirdly, focus on EU consumer directives and extra-EU conflicts of law, 
especially referring to the international scope of the EU consumer directives in 
PIL terms. Thus, the possibilities of fitting the scope rules of the EU consumer 
directives within the Rome I Regulation system, defending that conflict of laws 
regarding consumer contracts regulated by EU consumer directives should be 
solved through the Rome I Regulation, will be discussed. Moreover, a unilateral 
PIL approach in this regard will be debated, considering the advantages and 
disadvantages of determining the scope of application of EU consumer directives 
in an autonomous manner using a unilateral approach. Finally, some reflexions 
will be made regarding the application of foreign law, considering several issues 
influencing the use of a multilateral or unilateral method. 
-finally, suggest several modifications in the current system to coordinate the 
interaction of the Rome I Regulation and the EU consumer directives, taking into 
account all the considerations discussed in the chapter. 
 
1. The existence of scope rules in EU consumer 
directives and its relation with the Rome I 
Regulation 
During the eighties and nineties of the twentieth century, the EU started to enact 
consumer protection directives containing common standards of consumer 
contract law to be implemented among the national laws of the different Member 
States.761 At the same time, the notion of consumer protection was reflected in 
the private international law area of the EU: regarding the law applicable to 
consumer contracts, article 5 Rome Convention on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations762 provided for a special protective conflict rule regarding 
some consumer contracts.  
                                                     
761 Kramer (n 11) 261. 
762 Convention 80/934/EEC on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature 
in Rome on 19 June 1980 [1980] (OJ L 266). 
 216 
However, it was soon noticed that article 5 Rome Convention had been too 
narrowly considered, and did not respond to the necessities EU consumer 
directives required. The Gran Canaria cases, where some EU consumer protection 
provisions ought to be applicable but following the Rome Convention were not, 
proved some of the existing gaps in article 5 Rome Convention. As a solution to 
this problem, some EU consumer directives enacted since the nineties started to 
contain a so-called scope rule which ensured the applicability of the respective 
directive when the parties had chosen the law of a non-EU country. However, this 
technique proved to be disruptive for the conflict of laws system, since it led to 
inconsistencies regarding the regime of the Rome Convention, as well as different 
interpretations of these scope rules among the different national laws of the 
Member States.763 The Rome Convention was an international instrument 
inspired in the classical PIL multilateral approach with a view of the world 
divided in different states, without taking into account the specialties of the 
territory of the EU.764 
The conversion of the Rome Convention into the Rome I Regulation was the 
perfect opportunity to coordinate the EU consumer directives with the conflict 
rules regarding consumer protection. Several proposed solutions were considered 
during this process. However, the Rome I Regulation did not achieve this goal: 
article 6 Rome I and article 3(4) Rome I, even though they cover more situations 
than the Rome Convention, are still insufficient to ensure the application of the 
EU consumer directives in all the situations these directives intend to cover. 
Moreover, article 23 Rome I gives priority to conflict rules dealing with specific 
matters over the conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation. Thus, scope rules of the 
consumer protection directives could have priority over the conflict rules of the 
Regulation. On the other hand, the EU consumer directives most recently enacted 
do not contain any scope rule, but rather refer the conflict of laws issue to the 
Rome I Regulation. As a result, the current situation seems chaotic.765  
This section will describe the existent inconsistencies and gaps regarding the 
relationship between EU consumer directives and the Rome I Regulation. Firstly, 
the problems arising among the Rome Convention and the first generation of EU 
consumer directives (silent about their scope of application) and second 
generation of consumer directives (containing a scope rule) will be discussed. 
Secondly, the proposed solutions for this incoordination and the final solution 
adopted by the Rome I Regulation will be described. Then, the current trends of 
                                                     
763 Beatriz Añoveros Terradas, Los Contratos de Consumo Intracomunitarios (Marcial Pons 2003); 
De Miguel Asensio (n 10) 79,80. 
764 José Ignacio Paredes Pérez, ‘La Necesidad de Una Nueva Norma de Conflicto Bilateral Sobre 
Contratos de Consumo. Propuesta de Lege Ferenda’ (2006) 6 Anuario Español de Derecho 
Internacional Privado 87, 92. 
765 The situation of co-existence of these scope rules and article 6 Rome I has also been described 
as ‘unsatisfactory’, ‘confusing’, ‘irritating’ or ‘unnecessary’. Magnus (n 707) 23,24; Matthias 
Weller, ‘Article 23. Relationship with Other Provisions of Community Law’ in Gralf-Peter Calliess 
(ed), Rome Regulations. Commentary (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2015) 422,423. 
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the EU legislator regarding EU consumer directives and conflict of laws will be 
explained. Finally, the chaotic situation regarding all the existent inconsistencies 
and gaps will be summarised, in order to be able to understand the different 
possible interpretations and solutions from the private international law point of 
view in the following sections. 
 
1.1. The first and second generation of EU consumer 
directives: covering the insufficiencies of the Rome 
Convention regarding consumer protection 
During the eighties and nineties of the twentieth century, the EU increased its 
interest on consumer protection and took over the area of consumer law, as a part 
of the necessary measures to complete the internal market.766 As a result, a 
number of directives on consumer contracts were adopted establishing mandatory 
provisions regarding information requirements, right of withdrawal, etc., 
establishing a common consumer protection standard among all Member 
States.767   
Consumer protection directives pursue a double objective: on the one hand, to 
adapt to the specific needs of the internal market in order achieve the well-
functioning of the internal market; thus, it is required to approximate or 
harmonise the conditions of competition within the EU, while ensuring the 
fundamental freedoms, like the freedom of provision of services, are safeguarded. 
On the other hand, to protect the consumer, which is the weaker contracting party 
in this case.768 A minimum standard of protection of the consumer is to be 
safeguarded by the consumer directives. 
These minimum standards, in order to fulfil the purpose of the directives, need 
to be ensured not only in situations where all the elements are inside the EU, but 
also sometimes when the professional is located in a non-EU country, for 
example. The created consumer rights have to be protected when necessary in an 
international situation.769 They conform a minimum scope of protection. In those 
cases, conflict of laws enters into play, since if the law applicable to a consumer 
contract is not the law of a Member State, the minimum scope of protection of 
the directive would not be ensured; in the same manner, since many of the 
consumer protection directives are minimum harmonisation directives, the 
                                                     
766 The Maastricht Treaty (1992) introduced Article 129a, later Article 153 EC Treaty, and currently 
Article 169 TFEU, which provides that “in order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure 
a high level of consumer protection, the Union shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and 
economic interests of consumers as well as to promoting their right to information, education and 
to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests”. 
767 A more detailed description of this process can be found, for instance, in: Micklitz (n 204). 
768 Hilda Aguilar Grieder, ‘Desafíos Y Tendencias En El Actual Derecho Internacional Privado 
Europeo de Los Contractos’ (2012) 4 Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 23, 29,30. 
769 Micklitz (n 204) 76. 
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application of the law of a Member State might be more beneficial or detrimental 
to the consumer than the law of another Member State. 
Therefore, the approach of consumer protection was also present in the area 
of private international law (PIL), where it was first established by the 1968 
Brussels Convention770 (now Brussels I Regulation recast)771 concerning 
jurisdiction, and then followed regarding conflict of laws by Article 5 of the 1980 
Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations (now article 6 
Rome I Regulation). 
 
1.1.1. The first generation of EU consumer directives: silence regarding its 
scope of application 
The first generation of EU consumer directives enacted during the eighties 
include the Doorstep Selling Directive 85/577/ECC772, the Consumer Credit 
Directive 87/102/ECC773, and the Package Travel Directive 90/314/ECC.774 The 
Doorstep Selling Directive, now replaced by the Consumer Rights Directive775, 
set minimum standards of protection for the consumer in case of contracts 
concluded away from the business premises of the trader, for which it is frequent 
that the consumer is unprepared, unable to compare quality or price of the product 
with other offers, and as a result the element of surprise creates a disadvantage.776 
In these cases, the consumer was granted with a right of cancellation of at least 
seven days (article 5), which, as it was a minimum harmonisation directive, could 
be extended by the Member States in their national laws when implementing the 
Directive. On the other hand, the Consumer Credit Directive, replaced by 
Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2008 on credit agreements for consumers777, laid down minimum standards for 
                                                     
770 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (OJ 1972 L 299/32). 
771 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (OJ L 351/1). 
772 Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of 
contracts negotiated away from business premises (OJ 1985 L 372/31) (Doorstep Selling Directive). 
773 Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit (OJ 
1987 L 42/48) (Consumer Credit Directive).  
774 Council Directive 90/314/ECC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package 
tours (OJ 1990 L 158/59) (Package Travel Directive). 
775 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on 
consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 
97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, (OJ 2011 L 304/64) (Consumer Rights 
Directive). 
776 Recitals 4 and 5 of the Doorstep Selling Directive. 
777 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ 2008 L 133/66). 
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consumer credit arrangements within the EU, which consisted specially in 
information requirements. Again, the terms of a credit might result 
disadvantageous to the consumer, and therefore a better protection of consumers 
could be achieved by adopting certain requirements. This was also a minimum 
harmonisation directive, and Member States could decide for a better protection 
than the minimum required in the directive. The Package Travel Directive, now 
replaced by the new version (Directive 2015/2302/EU)778 aimed to approximate 
the laws of the Member States regarding packages sold or offered for sale in the 
territory of the Community (article 1), since tourism plays an essential role in the 
achievement of a complete internal market, and approximation of these issues 
would help the freedom of provision of services and avoid distortions on 
competition, as well as benefit consumer protection. 
The aforementioned directives were silent about the conflict of laws issue; 
they only regulated substantive law.779 In that moment, it was believed that the 
harmonisation process would eventually set aside PIL issues and, while that was 
not the case, the Rome Convention could ensure the protection of the consumers 
in the EU when necessary.780 However, as it will be explained below, these 
assumptions proved to be wrong.  
The role of determining the law applicable to cross-border consumer contracts 
was left to the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations. 
Article 5 Rome Convention contained a protective conflict rule for certain 
consumer contracts, which, in absence of choice of law, determined as applicable 
the law of the country in which the consumer has his habitual residence, and, in 
case parties chose the law applicable to the contract, the chosen law could not 
lead to the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by 
the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has his habitual 
residence.781  
                                                     
778 Directive 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on 
package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and 
Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 90/314/EEC (OJ 2015 L 326/1). 
779 Regarding the Package Travel Directive 90/314, some doubts existed in this regard, since in 
article 1 refers to the approximation of the laws in relation to "packages sold or offered for sale in 
the territory of the Community". Some authors have interpreted that reference as a scope rule 
determining that the directive determines its scope of application though a rigid connecting factor, 
and it is applicable when the conclusion of the contract takes place on the territory of the 
Community or when an offer was made in the Community. Marc Fallon and Stéphanie Francq, 
‘Towards Internationally Mandatory Directives for Consumer Contracts?’, Private Law in 
International Arena. Liber Amicorum K. Siehr (2000) 159–160.  
780 De la Rosa, La Protección de Consumidores En El Mercado Interior Europeo (n 420) 154. 
781 Article 5 Rome Convention, covering “certain consumer contracts” read: 
“1. This Article applies to a contract the object of which is the supply of goods or services 
to a person ('the consumer`) for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade 
or profession, or a contract for the provision of credit for that object. 
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Article 5 Rome Convention, as well as the other conflict rules of the 
instrument, aimed at creating legal certainty and security regarding cross-border 
transactions, avoiding forum shopping through the uniform conflict rules, 
enhanced in combination with the Brussels Convention. However, the solutions 
provided by the Convention were not oriented towards internal market 
integration.782 It was soon discovered that article 5 Rome Convention presented 
important deficiencies. Firstly, article 5 Rome Convention covered a narrow 
material scope. Article 5 Rome Convention covered certain consumer contracts 
the object of which was “the supply of goods or services to a person (‘the 
consumer’) for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or 
profession, or a person for the provision of credit for that object”. This definition 
was not only imprecise, but this material scope covered by the article led to 
several inconsistencies, which became more apparent with the generalisation of 
electronic commerce.783 Of course, it seems obvious that, since the Rome 
Convention was published in 1980, it focused on the traditional commercial 
models existing before the thriving of the internet. Also, several contracts 
regarding financial services were not included as a result of the reference to the 
supply of goods and services on the definition, as well as independent loans not 
                                                     
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, a choice of law made by the parties shall not 
have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory 
rules of the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence: 
- if in that country the conclusion of the contract was preceded by a specific invitation 
addressed to him or by advertising, and he had taken in that country all the steps 
necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract, or 
- if the other party or his agent received the consumer's order in that country, or 
- if the contract is for the sale of goods and the consumer travelled from that country to 
another country and there gave his order, provided that the consumer's journey was 
arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to buy. 
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, a contract to which this Article applies shall, 
in the absence of choice in accordance with Article 3, be governed by the law of the country 
in which the consumer has his habitual residence if it is entered into in the circumstances 
described in paragraph 2 of this Article. 
4. This Article shall not apply to: 
(a) a contract of carriage; 
(b) a contract for the supply of services where the services are to be supplied to the 
consumer exclusively in a country other than that in which he has his habitual residence. 
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4, this Article shall apply to a contract 
which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel and accommodation.” 
782 De la Rosa, La Protección de Consumidores En El Mercado Interior Europeo (n 420) 152–156; 
Fernando Esteban De la Rosa, ‘La Determinación Del Derecho Aplicable a Los Contratos de 
Consumo Transfronterizos: Perspectiva Europea Y Española’ in Fernando Esteban De la Rosa (ed), 
La Protección del Consumidor en Dos Espacios de Integración: Europa y América (Tirant lo 
Blanch 2015) 60. 
783 Christine Riefa, ‘Article 5 of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations of 19 June 1980 and Consumer E-Contracts: The Need for Reform’ (2004) 13 
Information and Communication Technology Law <Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1352426>. 
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connected to the purpose of financing the supply of goods or services, and 
timeshare agreements on immovable property.784 
Secondly, regarding its territorial scope, article 5 Rome Convention applied 
to contracts concluded in one or more of these three specific circumstances: when 
in the country of habitual residence of the consumer the conclusion of the contract 
was preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising, and he 
had taken in that country all the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of 
the contract; when the other party or his agent received the consumer’s order in 
the country of habitual residence of the consumer; or when, in the case of a 
contract for the sale of goods, the consumer travelled from his country of habitual 
residence to another country to place his order, provided that the consumer's 
journey was arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to 
buy. Therefore, article 5 Rome Convention did not protect the ‘active’ consumer, 
the consumer that has its own initiative to enter in a foreign market, but only the 
‘passive’ consumer, who is targeted in his home market by the principal. 
Moreover, specific connections with the country of habitual residence of the 
consumer were required.  However, by stipulating that all the necessary steps for 
the conclusion of the contract had to be taken in the country of habitual residence 
of the consumer, article 5 could be easily eluded by deliberately signing the 
contract in another country. 
As a result, the requirements of article 5 Rome Convention led to the exclusion 
of a big number of cross-border consumer contracts, which were then governed 
by the general conflict rules of the Convention, and therefore not protected 
against the possible choice of a less favourable law by the principal, or a non-
Member State law (which lacked the protection granted by the directives). The 
most important rule of the Rome Convention was the party autonomy principle 
(article 3 Rome Convention), which allowed the parties to choose the law 
applicable to their contract; in absence of choice, article 4 Rome Convention 
referred to the law of the country of habitual residence of the party executing the 
characteristic performance of the contract, which in case the contract is entered 
into in the course of that party's trade or profession, that country shall be the 
country in which the principal place of business is situated or, where under the 
terms of the contract the performance is to be effected through a place of business 
other than the principal place of business, the country in which that other place 
of business is situated. Thus, when a consumer contract felt outside the scope of 
application of article 5 Rome Convention, it was governed by the law defined by 
articles 3 or 4 Rome Convention.  
The consumer protection directives required more protection than provided by 
the Rome Convention. The well-known Gran Canaria cases decided on the 
                                                     
784 Stefan Leible, ‘Article 6 Rome I and Conflict of Laws in EU Directives’ (2015) 4 Journal of 
European Consumer and Market Law 39, 40; Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private 
International Law (n 587) 51; Stone (n 10) 344,345. 
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German courts constitute the perfect example of the deficiencies of article 5 
Rome Convention. In the first generation of the cases, German tourists on holiday 
in Canary Islands (Spain) were approached in German language to purchase 
household goods from a German firm acting through an agent in Spain. The 
contract, drafted in German language, was signed by the parties whilst their 
holiday in Spain. The firm was concluding transactions away from business 
premises and the goods were to be delivered to the German tourists once back in 
Germany. These consumers were to be protected by the minimum standards of 
the Doorstep Selling Directive, which granted them the right of cancellation. 
However, in most of the cases, the contract contained a choice of law clause 
designating Spanish law as applicable, and at the material time Spain had not 
transposed the Directive into its national law. The circumstances of these 
consumer contracts did not fall within the material and territorial requirements of 
article 5 Rome Convention, and therefore German mandatory provisions could 
not be applied (in case the situation would have felt within the scope of article 5 
Rome Convention, the chosen law could not have led to the result of depriving 
the consumer of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law 
of the country of his habitual residence). Spanish law was applicable as a result 
of the application of article 3 Rome Convention that allows party autonomy, and 
as Spanish law had not transposed the directive yet, the right of withdrawal was 
not guaranteed to the consumers.785 Thus, in these cases the Rome Convention 
failed to guarantee the application of the mandatory provisions of the directive 
when necessary. 
In the second generation of cases, German tourists also on holiday in Canary 
Islands (Spain) were persuaded to get into a contract for the acquisition of an 
interest in real property on a timeshare basis in Spain, from companies established 
in the Isle of Man. Upon their return to Germany, the tourists refused to pay and 
claimed that German law implementing the Doorstep Selling Directive granted 
them the right to withdraw from the contract. However, the contract contained a 
choice of law clause referring to Manx law. The contract did not fall within the 
requirements of article 5 Rome Convention, and therefore Manx law was 
applicable as a result of the general rule of freedom of choice of law of the Rome 
Convention (article 3 Rome Convention). As a result, when the buyers wished to 
cancel their contracts, this right ensured by the directive was not granted, as Manx 
law was applicable.786 If these consumer contracts would have been under the 
                                                     
785 Francq, L’Applicabilité Du Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au Regard Des Méthodes Du Droit 
International Privé (n 11) 336–339; Wilderspin (n 260) 484; Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary 
Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private International Law- or the Other Way 
Around?’ (n 750) 340,341; Jürgen Basedow, ‘Consumer Contracts and Insurance Contracts in a 
Future Rome I-Regulation’, Meeusen, J., Pertegás M. and Straetmans, G. (eds.), Enforcement of 
International Contracts in the European Union: Convergence and Divergence between Brussels I 
and Rome I (Intersentia 2004) 276–278. 
786 Wilderspin (n 260) 484; Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of the 
Methods of Private International Law- or the Other Way Around?’ (n 750) 340–341; Kuipers (n 
11) 212–214. 
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scope of application of article 5 Rome Convention, these right would have been 
ensured as implemented by German law, because the choice of law cannot 
deprive the consumer from the mandatory rules of his country of habitual 
residence.787 Again, the aim of the Directive was to protect the consumer from a 
Member State in this type of situations, and the protection was not granted.  
Therefore, it soon became apparent that the conflict rule designed for 
consumer protection of the Rome Convention had been narrowly conceived.788 
Article 5 Rome Convention was likely to apply to a small amount of cross-border 
consumer contracts initiated in the European Community, and as a result the 
protection provided by the consumer directives was easily circumvented because 
of the normal operation of the general conflict rules of the Rome Convention.  
 
1.1.2. The second generation of EU consumer directives: introduction of scope 
rules 
The lacunae revealed by the Gran Canaria cases, where German consumers that 
were approached to enter into consumer contracts in Spain could not enjoy the 
minimum protection granted by the Doorstep Selling Directive, was tackled by 
the European legislator in a peculiar manner. As the Rome Convention could not 
ensure the application of the national mandatory rules implementing the standards 
of the directives when necessary, the European Community introduced a different 
approach: since the early nineties, mainly in the area of consumer law, directives 
started specifically refer to their own territorial scope of application. Consumer 
protection directives introduced a specific ‘conflict rule’ defining the spatial 
scope of application of the instrument.789 The provisions differed in their drafting, 
but followed the same method: they determined the scope of application of the 
respective directive, while remaining silent about the application of foreign law. 
In the Netherlands, these provisions are called ‘scope rules’.790 
The first directive containing this type of rule was the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive.791 This Directive, still in force, approximates the laws of the Member 
States regarding unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier 
and the consumer (article 1), and it constitutes one of the pillars of consumer 
                                                     
787 Although other courts suggested to apply the mandatory consumer protection of German law, 
the Bundesgerichtshof, following the Rome Convention, rejected those attempts (BGH 19.3.1997, 
IPRspr. 1997 no. 34). Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law (n 
587) 53. 
788 CGJ Morse, ‘Consumer Contracts, Employment Contracts and the Rome Convention’ (1992) 
41 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 11; Leible, ‘Article 6 Rome I and Conflict 
of Laws in EU Directives’ (n 779) 39. 
789 Wilderspin (n 260) 485; Kuipers (n 11) 181 et seq. 
790 See below 3.1. for further explanation and definitions of ‘scope rules’. 
791 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ L 95/29) 
(Unfair Contract Terms Directive). 
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protection in the EU.792 Unfair terms in consumer contracts might cause a 
significant imbalance to the detriment of the consumer and are contrary to the 
requirement of fairness. Thus, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive stipulates that 
standard terms of consumer contracts (excluding the price and the subject matter) 
can be challenged as unfair by the consumers.793 Besides regulating substantive 
aspects, it introduces for the first time a rule determining its international scope 
of application. Article 6(2) provides that:  
“Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the 
consumer does not lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the 
choice of law of a non-Member State as the law applicable to a contract if the 
latter has a closest connection with the territory of the Member States”.  
This provision imposes the application of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
when the contract has a closest connection with one or more Member States, in 
order to ensure the protection provided to the consumer, when the parties chose 
the law of a third country as applicable. Thus, it aims at preventing the parties 
from circumventing the protection granted by the Directive by choosing the law 
of a non-Member State.  
Similar rules, with slightly different formulation, were provided in article 
12(2) Distance Selling Directive794 (now repealed by the Consumer Rights 
Directive795), article 7(2) Consumer Sales Directive796 (amended but not repealed 
by the Consumer Rights Directive), article 12(2) Distance Marketing of 
Consumer Financial Services Directive797 (amended but not repealed by Payment 
                                                     
792 Belohlávek (n 335) 1093. 
793 Regarding choice of law clauses and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, the ECJ in the 
Amazon case (C-191/15  Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Amazon EU Sàrl [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:612) concluded that art. 3(1) Unfair Contract Terms Directive should be 
interpreted “as meaning that a term in the general terms and conditions of a seller or supplier which 
has not been individually negotiated, under which the contract concluded with a consumer in the 
course of electronic commerce is to be governed by the law of the Member State in which the seller 
or supplier is established, is unfair in so far as it leads the consumer into error by giving him the 
impression that only the law of that Member State applies to the contract, without informing him 
that under Article 6(2) of Regulation No 593/2008 he also enjoys the protection of the mandatory 
provisions of the law that would be applicable in the absence of that term, this being for the national 
court to ascertain in the light of all the relevant circumstances.” 
794 Directive 1997/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the 
protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts (OJ 144/19) (Distance Selling Directive). 
795 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on 
consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 
97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, (OJ 2011 L 304/64) (Consumer Rights 
Directive 
796 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain 
aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (OJ L171/12) (Consumer Sales 
Directive). 
797 Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 
concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services and amending Council Directive 
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Services Directive 2015/2366798), and article 22(4) Consumer Credit Directive799. 
The Distance Selling Directive, aiming at approximating the consumer rules of 
the Member States regarding distance contracts between consumers and 
suppliers, contained minimum harmonisation rules regarding information duties, 
right of withdrawal and payment possibilities in the case of distance consumer 
sales contracts. The Consumer Sales Directives covers and harmonises parts of 
consumer contract law regarding the sale of goods that include legal guarantees 
and, in a lesser extent, commercial guarantees, ensuring, for example, that the 
goods comply with the description, quality, purpose, etc. expected, and ensuring 
the liability of the sellers to remedy the defects existent. Distance Marketing of 
Consumer Financial Services Directive includes rules for the marketing of 
financial services by suppliers to consumers within the EU, which impose pre-
contractual information obligations to the supplier, right of withdrawal from the 
contract within 14 days to the consumer and prevent abusive marketing practices. 
The Consumer Credit Directive (which repealed Council Directive 87/102/EEC 
that was silent about its scope of application) contains common rules regarding 
credit agreements for consumers, granting information rights, the right of 
withdrawal from the credit agreement within 14 days to the consumer, and 
granted the possibility of early payment of the credit at any time. As a 
commonality, these consumer protection directives contain a rule imposing the 
application of their standards of protection when in the consumer contract there 
is a choice of a non-Member State law and the situation has a close link with the 
territory of the Member States.  
The scope rules contained in the above-mentioned consumer protection 
directives do not specify which law should be applicable, meaning that they do 
not refer to the application of the standards of the directive as implemented by 
the law of the Member State of habitual residence of the consumer, the law of the 
forum, or whether one should just rely on the minimum standards of the directive, 
for example. Furthermore, these rules do not preclude the application of the third 
country law chosen by the parties when this law does not prevent the consumer 
from the protection granted by the directive.800 Moreover, they only cover cases 
where the application of non-Member State law is the result of a choice of law, 
which means that the consumer would not enjoy the protection of the directives 
                                                     
90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC (OJ L 271/16) (Distance Marketing of 
Consumer Financial Services Directive). 
798 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 
on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 
2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (OJ L 337/ 
35) (Payment Services Directive). 
799 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ L 133/66) (Consumer 
Credit Directive). 
800 Kuipers (n 11) 188,189. 
 226 
when he travels to another Member State and concludes a consumer contract there 
with a professional established in a third country.801 
On the other hand, the Timeshare Directive (Directive 2008/122/EC in the 
protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of time-share, long-term 
holiday product, resale and exchange contracts, replacing Directive 94/47/EC) 
includes a more specific scope rule. The Timeshare Directive establishes certain 
obligations regarding information requirements that the vendor of timeshare 
rights must comply with, and which the Member States must ensure, grants the 
right of withdrawal from timeshare contracts to the consumer within 14 days after 
signing the contract, and prohibits advance payments during that period to the 
consumer. 
Article 12(2) Timeshare Directive provides that:  
‘Where the applicable law is that of a third country, consumers shall not be 
deprived of the protection granted by this Directive, as implemented in the 
Member State of the forum if (1) any of the immovable properties concerned is 
situated within the territory of a Member State, or, (2) in the case of a contract 
not directly related to immovable property, the trader pursues commercial or 
professional activities in a Member State or, by any means, directs such activities 
to a Member State and the contract falls within the scope of such activities’. 
Unlike the other scope rules contained in the other consumer protection 
directives, this rule specifies which law should apply, referring to the law of the 
forum implementing the Directive, and it ensures the application of the protection 
granted by the Directive regardless the third country law is applicable as a result 
of a choice of law or of the connecting factors used in the absence of choice of 
law. The forum law would ensure the minimum mandatory protection provided 
by the Directive. 
Therefore, we can differentiate between two categories of directives in regard 
of their scope rules: those directives with scope rules which entail a flexible 
connection and those with scope rules that require a rigid connection. This is, the 
first set of directives that we referred to (Unfair Contract Terms Directive, 
Distance Sales Directive, etc.) have a scope rule with a flexible connection, since 
it does not require any specific connecting factor in the territory of a Member 
State. This type of scope rules only requires a ‘close connection’ to the territory 
of the Member States. On the contrary, the second type of scope rule, which is 
found in the Timeshare Directive, requires a rigid connection, since the scope rule 
specifies the element of the situation that needs to be in the territory of a Member 
State in order for the situation to fall under the scope of application of the 
directive.802 In the case of the Timeshare Directive, this is when ‘(1) any of the 
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immovable properties concerned is situated within the territory of a Member 
State, or, (2) in the case of a contract not directly related to immovable property, 
the trader pursues commercial or professional activities in a Member State or, 
by any means, directs such activities to a Member State and the contract falls 
within the scope of such activities’. 
 
1.1.3. Evaluation of the role and function of scope rules contained in EU 
consumer directives 
It has to be noticed that all the aforementioned scope rules contained in consumer 
protection directives were not enacted to solve a conflict of laws, but they merely 
aimed to ensure the application of the protection provided by the respective 
directive when a choice a non-Member State law could lead to the non-
application of the minimum standards of protection of the consumer when the 
situation is closely connected with the Community.803 Therefore, to avoid 
confusions, this type of rules are better referred to as ‘scope rules’, since they are 
special applicability rules trying to ensure the effective application of the 
respective instrument.804  
Scope rules did not intend to set aside the system of conflict rules established 
by the Rome Convention. However, they introduced a complementary complex 
system that required to consider both the Rome Convention and the national rules 
implementing the scope rules in order to determine the law applicable to 
consumer contracts. This leads to the existence of as many ways to determine the 
law applicable to consumer contracts as Member States are. Still, some justify the 
adequacy of a disperse model on the special needs derived of EU sectorial 
directives, considering it appropriate to reach the objective of EU market 
integration.805 The correct functioning of the internal market as an objective 
served as a justification for the introduction of scope rules. Sometimes, it is 
necessary that all market participants are subject to the same rules, which meant 
that EU secondary law should define its spatial scope of application.806  
                                                     
803 In the case Commission v. Spain (Case C-70/03 Commission v Spain [2004] ECR I-9657), para 
30, the ECJ said that: “As is clear from the 22nd recital of the preamble to Directive 93/13, that 
provision seeks to avert the risk that, in certain cases, the consumer may be deprived of Community 
protection by the designation of the law of a non-Member country as the law applicable to the 
contract. For that purpose, it provides that the protection granted by the directive to consumers in 
contractual relationships within the Community is to be maintained for contractual relationships 
involving non- Member countries, as long as the contract has close ties with the territory of the 
Member States.” 
804 See below Section 3 for a discussion regarding the nature of scope rules in PIL terms.  
805 De la Rosa, ‘El Sistema Europeo Y Español de Ley Aplicable a Los Contratos de Consumo 
Transfronterizos: El Modelo de Dispersión Normativa Para El Derecho Privado de La Integración’ 
(n 750) 415. 
806 ibid 411. 
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The specific purpose of these provisions was to complement the protective 
conflict rule of the Rome Convention by filling the gaps article 5 Rome 
Convention seemed to leave on consumer protection.807 As it was mentioned, the 
scope covered by the directives was wider that the scope covered by article 5 
Rome Convention, which meant that some situations where consumers were 
supposed to enjoy the protection provided in the directives were in fact not 
covered by article 5 Rome Convention, leading to the application of the general 
connecting factors of Rome Convention and, sometimes, to the application of a 
non-Member State law more detrimental for the consumer. For example, while 
the applicability requirements of article 5 Rome Convention refer to the activities 
of the professional taking place in (or addressed to) the country of habitual 
residence of the consumer, article 12(2) Timeshare Directive declares the 
protection of the directive applicable when the professional directs his activities 
to any Member State, not to the Member State of habitual residence of the 
consumer. Also, in Commission v. Spain808, where Spain was found accountable 
from failing to correctly implement article 6(2) Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
into national law, the Commission argued that “article 6(2) of the directive seeks 
to ensure that all consumers are protected under all contracts entered into with a 
seller or supplier, while Article 10a of amended Law 26/1984 [Spanish law] 
affords such protection only for certain types of contracts, that is to say those 
referred to in Article 5(1) of the Rome Convention, and only when certain 
conditions are satisfied, namely those laid down in Article 5(2). Those conditions 
are more restrictive than the sole requirement provided for in Article 6(2) of the 
directive that 'the [contract] has a close connection with the territory of the 
Member States'.”809 The ECJ agreed with the Commission that the term ‘close 
connection’ was deliberately vague in order to make it possible to adapt to the 
circumstances of the case, and, as a result, covered more situations than those 
referred to in article 5 Rome Convention.810 It is clear therefore that the protection 
intended by the directives went beyond the scope of application covered by article 
5 Rome Convention.811 
                                                     
807 Mário Tenreiro and Jens Karsten, ‘Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts : Uncertainties, 
Contradictions and Novelties of a Directive’, Schulte-Nölke, H. and Schulze, R. (eds.), Europäische 
Rechtsangleichung und nationale Privatrechte (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1999) 247–251. 
808 Case C-70/03 Commission v Spain [2004] ECR I-9657. 
809 Commission v Spain para. 28. 
810 The ECJ held that “as regards ties with the Community, Article 6(2) of the directive merely 
states that the contract is to have 'a close connection with the territory of the Member States'. That 
general expression seeks to make it possible to take account of various ties depending on the 
circumstances of the case.” The judgment continues: “Although concrete effect may be given to the 
deliberately vague term 'close connection' chosen by the Community legislature by means of 
presumptions, it cannot, on the other hand, be circumscribed by a combination of predetermined 
criteria for ties such as the cumulative conditions as to residence and conclusion of the contract 
referred to in Article 5 of the Rome Convention” (Commission v. Spain, paras. 22-23). 
811 See below 2.1.2 for a further commentary about this case. Also, in this regard: Paredes Pérez (n 
10) 97–100; Fernando Esteban De la Rosa, ‘La Inadecuación Del Sistema Español de Derecho 
Internacional Privado de Las Cláusulas Abusivas Al Derecho Comunitario: Claves Para Una Nueva 
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However, scope rules were not very welcomed.812 First of all, they were 
unrelated to the system of the Rome Convention.813 The connecting factor used 
by the scope rules contained in directives generally referred to a close connection 
with the territory of a Member State, which differed from the connecting factors 
contained in the Convention. Although the general expression was intended to 
make it possible to attend to several links depending on the circumstances of the 
case814, it was inconsistent with the specific connecting factors contained in the 
Rome Convention. Moreover, questions arise regarding when does a closest 
connection occur or which factors are to be taken into account (place of 
conclusion of the contract, habitual residence of the parties, place of performance 
of the contract, etc.): should a contract be subject to EU law whenever it has any 
type of connection with the EU? Could this connection be, for example, that the 
consumer is national of a Member State? Is it necessary to have a close 
connection that a company directs its activities to the Member States?815   
Such a vague term could also give rise to different implementations in the 
national law of the Member States, since, as long as it is according with the 
purposes of the directive, each Member State can implement the rule as they wish, 
which would naturally lead to inconsistencies.816 In this regard, Directives did not 
define the law of which Member State should be applicable: could Member States 
determine the law applicable to the consumer contract in those cases? Was it 
possible for the Member States to submit all consumer contracts with close 
connections with the EU to the law of the forum?817 It is also noticeable that the 
wording of the different scope rules of the directives, although similar, contained 
                                                     
Transposición Y Propuesta Legislativa’ (2005) 26 Diario La Ley. Unión Europea; Blanca Vilà 
Costa and Miguel Gardeñes Santiago, ‘Comentario Disposición Adicional 1a Tres’, Comentarios a 
la Ley sobre Condiciones Generales de la Contratación (Civitas 2002) 296–302.  
812 Ragno (n 553) 188,189; Jayme and Kohler (n 750). Even in the Commission’s Green Paper 
regarding the conversion of the Rome Convention into the Rome I Regulation, it was commented 
that the proliferation of these rules were a source of concern, referring to problems such as the 
transposition of the state or the dispersion of conflict rules among different instruments (Green 
Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations, COM (2002) 654 final, 17,18). 
813 For a more extensive explanation in this regard, see Jayme and Kohler (n 750). 
814 Commission v. Spain para. 32 
815 De la Rosa, ‘La Determinación Del Derecho Aplicable a Los Contratos de Consumo 
Transfronterizos: Perspectiva Europea Y Española’ (n 777) 61; Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary 
Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private International Law- or the Other Way 
Around?’ (n 750) 346,347. 
816 Which, in fact, it did. In this regard, see Section 2.1 referring to the implementation of scope 
rules in the national law of the Member States; also, Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and 
Private International Law (n 22) 13–14, referring, for further explanation in note 42, to Bitterich, 
Die Neuregelung des Internationalen Verbrauchervertragsrechts in Art. 29a EGBGB (2003), 522–
533; Klauer, Das europäische Kollisionsrecht der Verbraucherverträge zwischen Römer EVÜ und 
EG-Richtlinien (2002), 267– 330.  
817 De la Rosa, ‘La Determinación Del Derecho Aplicable a Los Contratos de Consumo 
Transfronterizos: Perspectiva Europea Y Española’ (n 777) 61. 
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some unnecessary terminological variants.818 For example, while some 
provisions referred to a close connection with the “territory of one or more 
Member States”819, others referred to the “territory of the Member States”820, 
creating the doubt whether the connexion with just one Member State is 
sufficient. On the other hand, it is true that the scope rule found in the Timeshare 
Directive, art. 12(2), does not lead to different implementations among the 
Member States, since it determines exactly in which circumstances the directive 
should apply and according to which law (the law of the forum).821 
Furthermore, the unilateral approach of the scope rules, determining the scope 
of the instrument without referring to foreign law, clashed with the multilateral 
nature of the Rome Convention. The Rome Convention mainly followed the 
traditional multilateral conflict of laws method, with conflict rules that designated 
the applicable law through connecting factors based on the abstract legal 
relationship, regardless the designated law was the law of the forum or a foreign 
law. The main exception to this multilateral method was through the application 
of overriding mandatory rules, which applied regardless the law applicable to the 
contract. Introducing an old-fashioned unilateral approach which did not fit 
within the system that only determined the scope of the instrument and ignored 
foreign law seemed disrupting for the normal operation of the conflict of laws 
system. 
Moreover, the relationship between the scope rules of the consumer protection 
directives and the Rome Convention also created doubts. It is commonly admitted 
that the application of the scope rules preceded the application of the Rome 
Convention, on the grounds that article 20 Rome Convention gave priority to the 
conflict rules “which are or will be contained in acts of the institutions of the 
European Communities or in national laws harmonized in implementation of such 
acts.” In fact, most considered this provision the reflexion of the maxim lex 
specialis derogat legi generali, which would lead to the same result.822 However, 
there was not agreement on this, remaining the doubt whether the conflict rules 
of Rome Convention should operate in advance, since the definition of these 
scope rules as conflict of law rules was not certain.823 
                                                     
818 De la Rosa, La Protección de Consumidores En El Mercado Interior Europeo (n 420) 136,137. 
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Also, the existence of scope rules in the directives troubled one of the aims of 
the Rome Convention, which was the unification of conflict of laws for 
contractual obligations, since Member States implemented the scope rules of the 
directives in their national laws in very diverse manners, tending to favour their 
own territory rather than the territory of the Community.824 If the aim is to unify 
the conflict rules among the EU countries, the existence of disperse and diverse 
scope rules among the Member States interrupts such objective.  Finally, it is 
necessary to mention the complication of the task of the legal practitioner that 
dispersed conflict rules entails. All these issues put in doubt whether the scope 
rules would fulfil their aim of enhancing consumer protection or rather all the 
complications deriving from their operation would at the end become detrimental 
for consumers. 
 
1.1.4. A new approach for the earlier directives lacking a scope rule: The 
Ingmar case 
Besides the specific conflict rules contained in consumer protection directives 
enacted since the nineties, judge-made scope rules were introduced by the ECJ, 
aiming to repair the deficiency from older directives that did not contain a scope 
rule. In the Ingmar case825, the ECJ introduced a scope rule for the Commercial 
Agents Directive, which was silent about its scope of application. Although that 
is not a consumer protection directive, the result could easily be extended to the 
consumer protection directives enacted before the nineties. 
The Ingmar case involved the claim of a commercial agent, Ingmar, domiciled 
in the UK, against its principal established in California, claiming some rights 
deriving from the termination of the contract on the basis of the English law 
transposing the Commercial Agents Directive.826 While Ingmar was performing 
its services exclusively in the UK and Ireland, there was a choice of law in the 
contract for Californian law. The ECJ was asked in a preliminary ruling to clarify 
whether some provisions of the Commercial Agents Directive were applicable 
when a commercial agent performs its activities within a Member State, 
regardless the establishment of the principal on a third state and the choice of a 
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825 Case C-381/98, Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc. [2000] ECR I-9305. 
Regarding the influence of Ingmar on the interpretation of overriding mandatory rules and weaker 
party protection, see Chapter III.3.1.1.b.; also, for a more extensive description of the judgment 
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826 For a general commentary regarding the Ingmar case, see: Albert Font i Segura, ‘Reparación 
Indemnizatoria Tras La Extinción Del Contrato Internacional de Agencia Comercial: Imperatividad 
Poliédrica O El Mito de Zagreo (STJCE de 9 de Noviembre de 2000, As. C-381/98, Ingmar Gb Ltd 
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third state law to govern their contract. The ECJ concluded that the purpose these 
provisions serve requires their application where the situation is closely 
connected with the Community, irrespective of the law chosen by the parties to 
govern their contract.827 According to the ECJ, a close link with the EU exists 
when the agent carries on his activity within one Member State, regardless the 
establishment of the principal in a third country and the choice of a third state 
law. The reasoning relied on the nature and purpose of the Commercial Agents 
Directive as decisive to determine its international scope of application, as in the 
event the situation is closely connected to the EU, the application of the 
provisions of the Directive become essential for the undistorted competition and 
the security of commercial transactions within the internal market.828  
From the ECJ ruling followed the idea that directives might implicitly 
determine their own scope of application.829 In the case of consumer protection 
directives, this approach would have affected the directives enacted before the 
nineties that did not contain a specific scope rule (i.e. the Doorstep Selling 
Directive, Consumer Credit Directive and Package Travel Directive). It was 
argued that these directives clearly covered some situations, e.g. contracts 
concluded between a consumer with habitual residence in a Member State, and a 
professional established in another Member State, while they clearly did not aim 
to cover other situations, e.g. a contract between a Mexican consumer and a 
Brazilian professional.830 These limitations on their scopes would mean, 
according to some authors, that the directives themselves delimit their own scope 
of application, even though they do not include an explicit scope rule.831    
However, besides the criticisms that the specific conflict rules existent in 
directives received, the existence of judge-made conflict rules and implicit scope 
rules in directives added the factor of the unknown and thus legal uncertainty to 
the already confusing system.832 As a result of the Ingmar case, the focus of the 
discussion was around the excessive mandatoriness of the provisions of EU 
secondary law against the application of a foreign non-EU law in extra-EU 
situations.833 However, the confusing scope of application of the consumer 
                                                     
827 Ingmar, para. 25. 
828 Ingmar, paras. 23 and 25. 
829 Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private 
International Law- or the Other Way Around?’ (n 750) 343. 
830 ibid 341. 
831 ibid; Laura Maria Van Bochove, ‘Overriding Mandatory Rules as a Vehicle for Weaker Party 
Protection in European Private International Law’ [2014] Erasmus Law Review 147, 154; Wulf-
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protection directives, and its difficult interaction with the Rome Convention, also 
needed to be redefined, which was expected to with the conversion of the Rome 
Convention into a Community instrument: the Rome I Regulation. 
 
1.2. From the Rome Convention to the Rome I 
Regulation: the expected solution to the problem?  
1.2.1. The long discussion and the multiple proposals regarding a new 
consumer contracts conflict rule in the Rome I Regulation and 
coordination with EU consumer directives 
The controversy surrounding article 5 Rome Convention, the protective conflict 
rule for consumer contracts, was evidenced by the many proposals the European 
Commission and private international law scholars suggested for the re-drafting 
of this provision during the conversion of the Rome Convention into the Rome I 
Regulation, which will be object of analysis below. Besides the change of legal 
nature to transform the Convention into a community instrument, the intention 
was to take advantage of this transformation and modernise its most controversial 
provisions. In fact, it has been affirmed that the most controversial provision 
contained in the Rome Convention was article 5 Rome Convention.834 Firstly, 
because of its narrow material and territorial scope, which leaves without 
protection situations in which a Member State consumer is supposed to be 
protected. The scope of article 5 Rome Convention is confined to certain types of 
contracts, concluded in very precise circumstances, which, for example, in most 
of the cases would not include mobile consumers (e.g. Gran Canaria cases). 
Secondly, and related with the previous reason, the controversy also arose 
because of the difficult relationship of the provision with EU consumer directives. 
Consumer protection directives, in order to remedy the insufficient protection of 
article 5 Rome Convention, started to include scope rules determining their own 
scope of application. The proliferation of these type of rules contained in sectoral 
instruments of Community secondary law was subject to extensive comments and 
criticism, mainly focused on the different nature of the scope rules compared with 
the traditional conflict rules, which may distort the conflict of laws system, and 
on the diverse transposition by the Member States of these scope rules, which 
sometimes were transposed as to delimit the scope of national law. 
As a result, the Commission in the Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome 
Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations into a 
Community instrument and its modernisation, after summarising the 
aforementioned issues regarding article 5 Rome Convention, developed a number 
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of alternatives for the new drafting of the provision to be subject to discussion.835 
Bearing in mind the general concerns regarding consumer protection and the 
balance of the interests of the parties, and aiming to develop clear, general and 
broad rules, the Green Paper considered eight different alternatives for the 
drafting of the new conflict rule on consumer contracts.836 The suggested options 
included:  
(1) Maintaining article 5 Rome Convention as it was, adding a clause 
guaranteeing the Community minimum standards. The clause that the 
Commission was referring to was a similar clause to art. 3(3) Rome Convention 
but for intra-EU cases. This is, a clause that provided that the parties cannot 
circumvent the minimum standards imposed by a directive by choosing as 
applicable the law of a third country for contracts purely internal to the 
Community. Even if this solution was not the one taken by the Rome I 
Regulation, since article 5 Rome Convention was modified, such a clause for 
intra-EU cases was eventually introduced in article 3(4) Rome I as a limit to party 
autonomy. However, this clause does not determine itself the applicable law, but 
only limits party autonomy. The mechanism is different than conflict rules. Also, 
it only ensures the application of EU directives when all the elements of the 
contract are located in the EU. 
(2) Maintaining article 5 but enlarging its scope in order to include mobile 
consumers and maybe the types of contracts excluded. However, this solution has 
as a starting point the adequacy of article 5 Rome Convention to determine the 
law applicable, and the only modification required is regarding the scope of 
application.    
(3) Generalisation of articles 3 and 4 Rome Convention (the general conflict 
rules) to consumer contracts, but combined with the application of the mandatory 
rules of the country of habitual residence of the consumer. This solution will 
result in the application of the law of the place where the business is established 
but combined with the application of the mandatory rules of protection of the law 
of the consumer’s habitual place of residence. Despite the foreseeability this 
option would bring, there are several practical downsides, such as the increase of 
the cases of depeçage of the contract. Also, would all the consumer contracts be 
included (i.e. also the ones including active consumers?). 
Both options (2) and (3) involve the task of identifying the mandatory 
provisions of the country of habitual residence of the consumer. 
(4) For matters harmonised at the Community level, apply the chosen law; for 
matters not harmonised, the consumer should not be deprived of the protection 
provided by the mandatory rules of the country of his habitual residence. Thus, 
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in matters harmonised by the EU directives, party autonomy is completely 
allowed. Such a solution is based on the grounds that a minimum mandatory 
standard of protection exists in all Member States, and therefore it does not matter 
that parties choose the law of another Member State since that minimum standard 
of protection is ensured. This solution would require however to difference 
between intra-EU cases, in which party autonomy is allowed, and extra-EU cases, 
where the choice of a third state law should be limited, in the same manner as it 
is limited regarding those areas that are not harmonised at a EU level. Although 
this option reflects the needs of the EU in consumer protection and regarding the 
application of EU directives, it seems very complicated at first sight. 
(5) Application of the law of the country of habitual residence of the 
consumer. This is, a complete exclusion of party autonomy in the case of a 
consumer contract falling under the scope of the specific rule. This option has 
been seriously taken into account, since several jurisdictions around the world 
exclude freedom of choice of law regarding consumer contracts (e.g. art. 120(2) 
of the Swiss Act on Private International Law).837 On the one hand, this solution 
would avoid the depeçage of the contract and avoid the difficulty of determining 
which are the mandatory rules that should apply. Thus, it enhances legal certainty 
and reduces litigation costs. In addition, it respects the expectations of the 
consumer of having his own law applied. On the other hand, the professional 
would find it more burdensome to trade among the different Member States, since 
he would have to adapt his business to every consumer law of every Member 
State. As a result, he would be more reluctant to conduct his business in a different 
Member State, and the additional effort of adapting to a foreign law can also be 
reflected in the costs and final price of the service or product. Besides the increase 
of the final cost, the exclusion of party autonomy also might affect the consumers, 
since they are deprived from the possible choice of law more beneficial for 
them.838 Even if the legislator considered this option, it would still be necessary 
to review the conditions of application of the conflict rule. 
(6) Follow the drafting of article 15 Brussels I Regulation (regarding the 
conditions of application of the rule). The consumer would be under the 
protective rule when the professional directs his professional activities to the 
country of habitual residence of the consumer. Most of the authors supported the 
implementation of a provision parallel to article 15 Brussels I Regulation in order 
to keep a parallelism between jurisdiction and applicable law.839 At this point, it 
has to be noticed that consumer claims are usually small claims, and therefore it 
would be exceedingly costly and inefficient for a judge to apply (systematically) 
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a foreign law; thus, the synchronisation between the rules on jurisdiction and 
applicable law seemed like the logical solution.840  
(7) Follow the drafting of article 15 Brussels I Regulation, adding the 
condition that the law of the country of habitual residence of the consumer could 
only be applicable if the supplier was or should have been aware of it.  
(8) A complete change of approach, making the rule applicable to all 
consumers but only allowing a very limited freedom of choice of law, such as 
only allowing the choice of the law of the country where the professional is 
established.841 Still, it would have to be proved that the consumer had made an 
informed choice (including information on all rights and obligations conferred on 
him by the law of the business’s habitual residence). Otherwise, the law 
applicable would be the law of the consumer’s habitual residence or the 
mandatory provisions of that law. This option would only be applicable to 
businesses domiciled in Member States, while those with domicile in a third 
country would be subject to the mandatory provisions of the country of habitual 
residence of the consumer when they choose another applicable law, since within 
the EU the minimum standards of protection are ensured. However, this option 
brings several downsides. First, it is complex to determine which information is 
necessary to provide, and, secondly, even if all the relevant information about 
consumer law was provided, it is still unlikely that consumers would read it or, 
in some cases, fully understand it. It does not seem reasonable to expect 
consumers to compare their own law with the chosen law.842   
The solution suggested in the Proposal for the Rome I Regulation was a 
combination of some of the aforementioned.843 The most surprising change was 
the complete exclusion of party autonomy. Instead of a restricted choice of law, 
article 5 Proposal Rome I did not consider that possibility at all. Instead, the law 
applicable to consumer contracts was systematically the law of the country of 
habitual residence of the consumer.844 As it has been previously explained, the 
complete elimination of party autonomy avoids the complications of the 
‘preferential law’ approach: the judge does not need to identify and compare the 
law chosen by the parties and the law of the habitual place of residence of the 
consumer, and the possible depeçage of the contract is avoided. It avoids the 
complex process of identifying the relevant mandatory rules and compare them, 
and promotes predictability. In addition, from an economic perspective, it seems 
more ‘fair’ that the internationalization costs of the contract are assumed by the 
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professional, since consumers only effectuate cross-border transactions a limited 
amount of times while professionals do it in a frequent basis. It seems more 
equitable that the cost of ‘internationalization’ is assumed by the professional, 
which effectuates more transactions and thus is able spread those costs.845 
Nevertheless, despite the advantages it brings, I already submitted that it brings 
several downsides: professionals could be more reluctant to cross-border trade,  
the final cost of the product could be incremented because of the effort of 
adapting to a foreign law, and the exclusion of party autonomy also might affect 
the consumers, since they are deprived from the possible choice of law more 
beneficial for them.846 In addition, such a solution does not take into account the 
harmonisaton efforts within the EU. Consumers are supposed to enjoy a 
minimum mandatory protection level within the EU, and thus it should not matter 
if the contract provides for a choice of law of another Member State, since 
consumers can only benefit from that.  
Regarding the scope covered by the provision, it included the targeted activity 
test, in the same manner the current article 6 Rome I provides, and thus it was 
parallel to article 15 Brussels I Regulation.847 Besides that, it included on 
paragraph 2 the ‘awareness test’ (“unless the professional did not know where the 
consumer had his habitual residence and this ignorance was not attributable to his 
negligence”), which, in fact, did not add any change to the provision, since in the 
cases the professional directs his activities to a Member State, it seems obvious 
he is aware that the consumer has his habitual place there.848 Finally, like the 
current provision, it included a list of excluded consumer contracts.849 Without 
any doubt, the scope covered by the provision was wider than article 5 Rome 
Convention. The definition of consumer and professional was clarified, the 
material scope covered all consumer contracts that complied with the definition 
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of consumer and professional, except the ones specified in the exceptions of 
paragraph 3, and the territorial scope was defined by the targeted activity test. 
The main criticism regarding its scope was that it only covered the consumers 
with habitual residence in a Member State, taking therefore a unilateral approach 
regarding consumer protection. As a result, a consumer with habitual residence 
in a non-Member State, contracting in the territory of the Community, even 
targeted by EU professionals, would not be protected by the special conflict rule 
of article 5 Proposal Rome I. That distinction between Member State consumers 
and non-Member State consumers was considered by the majority of authors as 
unjustified and discriminatory, since there was no background to deny consumers 
from outside the EU the protection granted to them by their own laws.850 Whether 
consumers from outside the EU should fall under the scope of the protective 
conflict rules of the EU must be subject of analysis. The protective rule of the 
Rome I Proposal only covered consumers with habitual residence in the EU 
which were targeted by a professional in order to enter in a consumer contract. 
Thus, active consumers with habitual residence in the EU and all types of 
consumers with no habitual residence in the EU (both purchasing actively or 
targeted by a professional) would be subject to the general rules. The law 
applicable to the latter cases would be the law of habitual residence of the 
professional or, in case of a choice of law clause, the law chosen. Consumers that 
contract on their own initiative are excluded regardless their place of habitual 
residence. Thus, in order to discern whether there is an unjustified and 
discriminatory treatment towards non-EU consumers, we need to focus on the 
non-EU consumer that is targeted by a professional in a Member State: 
The Rome instruments have a universal character (erga omnes) to determine 
the law applicable to a contract, according to which the conflict rules will design 
the law applicable to the contract regardless it is a law from a Member State or a 
third state. However, art. 5 Proposal Rome I introduces a unilateral approach. 
Instead of using a multilateral conflict rule such as ‘the law applicable to a 
consumer contract is the law of the place of habitual residence of the consumer’, 
regardless that is a law from a Member State or a third state, art. 5 Proposal Rome 
I provided something like ‘the law of the Member State of habitual residence of 
the consumer will be applicable when…’.851 Since consumers from outside the 
EU are receiving a different treatment, such differentiation should be justified in 
order to be compatible with the universal character of the instrument and its 
multilateral nature, as well as to not be considered discriminatory. Although the 
legislator did not provide for any explanation in this regard, the unilateral 
approach favouring EU consumers seems to have its basis on EU internal market 
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integration purposes.852 However, while EU integration purposes might justify 
different treatment in specific cases (e.g. when dealing with EU consumer 
directives a possible differentiation could be made between intra-EU and extra-
EU consumer contracts), it does not seem to justify the conflict rule of art. 5 
Proposal Rome I, under which the condition for application is the habitual 
residence of the consumer in a Member State. First, it is necessary to take into 
account that the specialty of the protective conflict rule for consumer contracts is 
based on the need of protection of the consumer against the normal operation of 
conflict rules to compensate his weaker position in the contract, and EU 
integration purposes should be an addition rather than the main purpose of the 
rule. Second, which is the EU objective that requires that non-EU consumers are 
excluded from the protective conflict rule? When the consumer is not resident in 
the EU and the professional is also from a non-EU country, the only link with the 
EU is probably that it was the place where the contracting took place. When the 
consumer’s habitual residence is not in a Member State but the professional that 
is targeting him is from a Member State, the EU professional sees himself 
benefited by the exclusion of the non-EU consumer from the protective conflict 
rule, since the law applicable would be the law of the place of the professional 
(i.e. a Member State law) or a maybe low consumer protection chosen law. The 
EU companies would not have to deal with a different or more protective 
consumer law from the country of habitual residence of the consumer. In addition, 
they would not have to deal with the extra information and adaptation costs to a 
foreign law.853 In this case, the protective conflict rule of art. 5 Rome I Proposal 
benefits EU companies over non-EU consumers. From a unilateral PIL approach, 
this technique is justified, since conflict of laws is solved from the point of view 
of the forum without taking into account foreign law. There is nothing that 
ensures that the conflict rules of a non-EU country provide that when a company 
of their country targets a consumer from a Member State, the law of the Member 
State of the consumer would be applicable by their courts. I consider that a 
unilateral approach is justified when important interests are at stake, and thus 
could even be justified in certain cases to ensure the application of the protection 
of EU consumer directives.854 Nevertheless, since the unilateral technique of art. 
5 Rome I Proposal only discriminates non-EU consumers while benefiting EU 
professionals, I do not think EU integration purposes, or legal certainty, justify 
that different treatment. A EU professional who is targeting consumers from a 
foreign market can reasonably predict and expect that the consumer law of the 
country of the consumer might apply to a possible claim. 
Still, the aforementioned scenario is not very likely to happen in practice. 
Imagine a US citizen going on holiday to Spain and targeted at the airport in the 
US by a Spanish company. If he wishes, the US citizen can sue the company in 
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Spanish courts. Brussels I Regulation (now Brussels I bis) cannot give judicial 
competence to courts of non-Member States, but it does not require for the 
consumer to have habitual residence in a Member State in order to point a 
Member State court as competent. A US citizen can sue a Spanish company in 
Spanish courts, since that is the place of habitual residence of the defendant. In 
practice, it seems more practical that the consumer with habitual residence in the 
US would sue the company back in the US, in the consumer’s home jurisdiction, 
but he has the option of starting proceedings in Spain.  
Regarding the relationship between the consumer conflict rules and the scope 
rules contained in some consumer protection directives, article 22 Proposal Rome 
I is of interest. Article 22 Proposal Rome I aimed to clarify the relationship 
between the Regulation and some European directives, giving specific conflict 
rules priority over the provisions of the Regulation, and referring to Annex I 
which included a list of directives containing conflict rules. However, only four 
directives were on the list of Annex I: Return of Cultural Objects Directive855; the 
Posted Workers Directive856; Second non-life insurance Directive857 and Second 
life assurance Directive858. Consumer protection directives were not listed. It is 
true that, since article 5 Proposal Rome I excluded party autonomy and the scope 
rules of directives only claimed application of the instrument when there was 
choice of law, the scope rules on consumer protection directives could turn 
irrelevant.859 However, the scope of consumer protection covered by the 
directives was still wider than the scope covered by article 5 Proposal Rome I, 
which meant that the situation remained unsolved.860  
Still, article 3(5) Proposal Rome I provided that when there was a choice of a 
non-Member State law, “that choice shall be without prejudice to the application 
of such mandatory rules of Community law as are applicable to the case.” This 
provision aimed to ensure the application of mandatory Community law when 
applicable to the case, and it would have covered the situations that claimed 
application according to the scope rules of the directives. However, instead of 
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achieving this conciliating aim, it would have caused more uncertainty to the 
situation because of all the problems its broad wording would have caused. For 
example, first of all, it would have covered intra-EU and extra-EU situations, 
without determining which is the connexion necessary in order to apply 
mandatory EU law in extra-EU situations. Thus, the scope rules of the consumer 
protection directives would still be necessary as to determine the connexion 
necessary with the EU. Moreover, article 3(5) Proposal Rome I did not clarify 
which law would be applicable for the application of the mandatory rules of 
Community law: the law most closely connected to the case, the law of the forum, 
the law applicable in absence of choice of law… Hence, this provision would not 
improve the situation regarding the scope of application of consumer protection 
directives, but rather would make the system more confusing due to its various 
possible interpretations.861 Legal certainty is not benefited from such approach. 
Therefore, we can say that the Proposal for Rome I, although improving the 
consumer protection on conflict of laws by extending the scope of the protective 
conflict rule, did not solve the problem regarding the relationship between the 
consumer protective conflict rules and the existent scope rules in consumer 
protection directives. 
 
1.2.2. The final solution: art. 6 Rome I, art. 3(4) Rome I and art. 23 Rome 
I as mechanisms of coordination between Rome I and scope rules on 
EU consumer directives 
Regarding the final draft of the Rome I Regulation, after the numerous 
suggestions, discussions and comments, the end result failed to solve one of its 
most controversial problems, in particular, the relationship between article 5 
Rome Convention (now article 6 Rome I) and the scope rules contained in some 
consumer protection directives. 
As it has been explained in the previous chapter, article 6 Rome I has brought 
a number of modifications compared with its predecessor, and without any doubt 
it improved consumer protection at the conflict of laws level.862 
                                                     
861 Hilda Aguilar Grieder, ‘La Voluntad de Conciliación Con Las Directivas Comunitarias 
Protectoras En La Propuesta Del Reglamento Roma I’, Calvo Caravaca, J.L and Castellanos Ruiz, 
E. (coord.), La Unión Europea ante el Derecho de la Globalización (Constitución y Leyes, 
COLEX, 2006) 58; Alina Oprea, ‘Le Article 3.4 Du Reglement Rome I Sur La Loi Applicable Aux 
Relations Contractuelles et Les Contrats Intracommunautaires’ (2010) 3 Babes-Bolyai Studia 
Jurisprudentia 4–7 <available in: SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1926661>; Max Planck Institute 
for Foreign Private and Private International Law (n 316) 240–243. 
862 Article 6 Rome I reads: 
“1.   Without prejudice to Articles 5 and 7, a contract concluded by a natural person for a purpose 
which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession (the consumer) with another person 
acting in the exercise of his trade or profession (the professional) shall be governed by the law of 
the country where the consumer has his habitual residence, provided that the professional: 
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First, unlike the Proposal Rome I, it provides protection to both EU and non-
EU consumers regardless the place of habitual residence of the parties (i.e. 
universal scope of application), and therefore all consumer contracts within its 
material and territorial scope of application are governed by the law determined 
by this provision, rather than by the general conflict rules of the Rome I (i.e. 
articles 3 and 4 Rome I). 
Regarding its material scope, the consumer must be an individual acting 
outside its trade or profession (not acting for business purposes); the professional 
party must be acting in the course of its trade or profession; and the contract must 
fall within the scope of the professional’s activities. Hence, the material scope is 
just determined by the definition of consumer and professional, rather than 
covering specific consumer contracts, making it wider. Contrarily, article 6(4) 
Rome I includes a list of excluded contracts.  
Regarding the territorial scope, it is defined by the targeted activity test and 
thus kept parallel to the Brussels I Regulation (now Brussels I recast). In order to 
ensure that the consumer is guaranteed with the protection offered by the law of 
his country of habitual residence only in cases where the contract or the supplier 
                                                     
(a) pursues his commercial or professional activities in the country where the consumer has his 
habitual residence, or 
(b) by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several countries including that 
country, 
and the contract falls within the scope of such activities. 
2.   Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the parties may choose the law applicable to a contract which 
fulfils the requirements of paragraph 1, in accordance with Article 3. Such a choice may not, 
however, have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by provisions 
that cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law which, in the absence of choice, 
would have been applicable on the basis of paragraph 1. 
3.   If the requirements in points (a) or (b) of paragraph 1 are not fulfilled, the law applicable to a 
contract between a consumer and a professional shall be determined pursuant to Articles 3 and 4. 
4.   Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to: 
(a) a contract for the supply of services where the services are to be supplied to the consumer 
exclusively in a country other than that in which he has his habitual residence; 
(b) a contract of carriage other than a contract relating to package travel within the meaning of 
Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and 
package tours (15); 
(c) a contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of immovable 
property other than a contract relating to the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare 
basis within the meaning of Directive 94/47/EC; 
(d) rights and obligations which constitute a financial instrument and rights and obligations 
constituting the terms and conditions governing the issuance or offer to the public and public 
take-over bids of transferable securities, and the subscription and redemption of units in 
collective investment undertakings in so far as these activities do not constitute provision of 
a financial service; 
(e) a contract concluded within the type of system falling within the scope of Article 4(1)(h).” 
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have a sufficient connection with that country, the contract will be regarded as a 
consumer contract under article 6 Rome I only when the professional pursues his 
commercial or professional activities in the country where the consumer has his 
habitual residence, or by any means, directs such activities to that country or to 
several countries including that country. This criterion of targeted activities 
allows to accommodate within the provision the specialties required by the 
electronic commerce.863 When the consumer contract falls within the above-
mentioned requirements, the applicable law in absence of choice of law would be 
the law of the country of habitual residence of the consumer. However, unlike the 
Proposal Rome I, this provision admits a restricted choice of law: article 6(2) 
provides that it is effective with the condition that the law chosen provides for the 
same or more protection than the mandatory rules of the country of habitual 
residence of the consumer (the so-called ‘preferential law’ approach). 
Therefore, article 6 Rome I extends its scope of application, covering more 
consumer contracts than its predecessor. However, the material and territorial 
scope of application is still narrow in comparison with the intended scope of 
application of the consumer protection directives. For example, the directives 
cover more consumer contract types than those covered by article 6 Rome I 
because of the exclusions provided in article 6(4) Rome I. Several contracts 
excluded by article 6(4) Rome I could fall within the definition of consumer 
contract under article 6(1) Rome I but instead they are excluded from the 
operation of the protective conflict rule contained in the provision; for example, 
contracts for the supply of services in which the service is exclusively provided 
in another country than the country of habitual residence of the consumer, 
contracts relating to a right in rem in immovable property or contracts of carriage 
(except for package travel contracts). 
Furthermore, for the purposes of Art. 6(1) Rome I, active consumers and 
mobile consumers (which move to another Member State on their own initiative 
and conclude there a contract with a professional from a third country that does 
not direct his activities to the Member State of habitual residence of the 
consumer) are not protected.  In the case of active consumers, the final solution 
does not seem completely satisfying from the EU consumer protection point of 
view. For example, in the case of a Dutch consumer travelling to Barcelona, and 
purchasing some items there in his own initiative, the Dutch consumer cannot 
expect that Dutch rules would apply to that transaction. However, since the 
consumer is acting within the EU internal market, wouldn’t he expect the 
minimum EU protection to be applicable?864 However, according to the Rome I 
Regulation, article 3 Rome I would allow the choice of any foreign law, and 
mandatory EU consumer protection would only be applicable if all the relevant 
elements of the situation are located in the EU (art. 3(4) Rome I). Although most 
probably all the relevant elements of the contract are located in Spain or the 
                                                     
863 Leible, ‘Article 6 Rome I and Conflict of Laws in EU Directives’ (n 779) 42. 
864 Lagarde (n 351) 317; Añoveros Terradas (n 845) 393. 
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Netherlands, if that is not the case, then the Dutch consumer could lose the EU 
consumer protection. 
The case of mobile consumers that are targeted by a professional in a Member 
State different than their Member State of their habitual residence is also not 
solved in the Rome I Regulation. For instance, imagine a case of where a 
company established in Morocco directs some of its activities to tourists in the 
south of Spain, organising tours together with sale events. A German consumer 
on holiday in Málaga (Spain) takes part of the tour and purchases some of the 
household appliances offered to him during the sales event. In this case, if the 
contract provides for a choice of Moroccan law, the German consumer would not 
be under the protection of article 6 Rome I, since the activities were not directed 
to his country of habitual residence, but to Spain. However, a Spanish tourist 
could rely on the protection of article 6 Rome I, and Spanish mandatory rules on 
consumer law would be applicable. The German tourist could only rely on the 
protection of article 6 Rome I if the Moroccan company was also targeting 
Germany (e.g. approaching them in German language, terms and conditions 
drafted in German, etc.). Thus, ‘holiday’ or ‘mobile’ consumers are excluded 
from the territorial scope of article 6 Rome I. When the consumer contract is not 
covered by article 6 Rome I, the law applicable is determined by articles 3 and 4 
Rome I. It can be said that the excluded consumer is treated in the same manner 
a professional would be treated, without any type of special protection 
whatsoever.865 According to article 3 Rome I, parties are free to choose the law 
applicable to the contract, and article 4 Rome I will normally, in absence of 
choice, determine as applicable the law of the country where the professional is 
established. Could that consumer with habitual residence in a Member State and 
contracting in another Member State after being targeted there by a professional 
legitimately expect a minimum level of EU consumer protection to be applicable 
to that consumer contract? Although, formally, this consumer is contracting 
outside his own country and could be considered an active consumer, he is still 
contracting with the EU market and has been targeted within the EU market.866 
The free movement of goods, services and people within the internal market, 
besides ensuring the right of a consumer to move to obtain a product or service, 
it also guarantees the consumer freedom to choose between the different offer of 
products and services among the Member States under the same conditions than 
the consumers habitual resident in the specific Member State.867 It is not 
compatible with the EU objectives to deny the EU consumer directives protection 
to a consumer from a Member State that acquired products or services in another 
Member State. Indeed, EU consumer directives aim to guarantee a standard of 
                                                     
865 Van Bochove (n 826) 151. 
866 Ángel Espiniella Menéndez, ‘Contratos de Consumo En El Tráfico Comercial UE- Terceros 
Estados’ (2014) 14–15 277, 298,299. 
867 Añoveros Terradas (n 845) 394. 
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consumer protection within the EU, which in this case art. 6 Rome I does not 
ensure.868 
On the other hand, some of the deficiencies of article 6 Rome I would be 
covered by article 3(4) Rome I when there is a choice of a non-Member State law 
and all the relevant elements of the situation are located within the Member 
States. Article 3(4) Rome I was introduced with the intention of helping the 
coordination between the general conflict of laws rules determining the law 
applicable to the contract with the specific rules of PIL contained on EU 
secondary law, or, in broad words, the necessity of compatibility within the 
European legal system. To the extent the rules of the consumer protection 
directives are mandatory, their application would be ensured against a choice of 
a non-Member State law when all the relevant elements are located within the 
EU. Three elements are essential for the application of art. 3(4) Rome I: a choice 
of law of a third country law, all elements located in the EU, and mandatory rules. 
However, even when not all the elements are located within the EU, the scope 
rules contained in the directives claim the application of their protection, since 
they only require a close connection with the EU. Hence, article 3(4) fails to 
coordinate article 6 Rome I and the scope rules of the directives, since the 
directives claim for a broader scope of application, and thus fails to guarantee the 
application of scope rules. 
Therefore, once it is clear the intended scope of application of the consumer 
protection directives is broader than the scope covered by the protective conflict 
rules available for consumer contracts in Rome I, it remains to clarify which of 
the rules would prevail. Following article 20 Rome Convention, article 23 Rome 
I provides that “with the exception of Article 7, this Regulation shall not prejudice 
the application of provisions of Community law which, in relation to particular 
matters, lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations.” 
Therefore, article 23 Rome I provides for the prevalence of the scope rules 
contained in the consumer protection directives upon the Rome I provisions, if 
we were to understand scope rules as conflict rules. 
The Rome I Regulation rejected to leave behind the existent scope rules of the 
directives, failing to solve the problem of coordination between the instruments 
involved. In fact, the recast of the Consumer Credit Directive, which was passed 
two months before the Rome I Regulation was enacted, did include a scope rule 
determining its scope of application. Some say that the reason for not repealing 
the scope rules contained in the consumer protection directives when enacting the 
Rome I Regulation is simply found in the distribution of internal competences 
inside the Commission; while the General Directorate Home and Justice is just 
responsible for the Rome I Regulation, the responsibility for consumer protection 
                                                     
868 It has sometimes been assumed that, in such a case, the Member State in question can ensure the 
application of the EU consumer protection deriving from EU directives as overriding mandatory 
rules through art. 9 Rome I. Espiniella Menéndez (n 861) 299. However, that is not –in most 
occasions- the case. See, in this regard, below in this Chapter 3.1, and Chapter III 3.1.1.b. 
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rests on the other General Directorates.869 Regardless of the reason behind, the 
result is that the Rome I Regulation failed to resolve one of the most controversial 
matters around the conflict rule on consumer protection, which is the coordination 
between article 6 Rome I and the scope rules contained in some of the consumer 
protection directives, leaving this issue as an object of debate among scholars.  
 
1.3. The most recent EU consumer directives: 
reconsidering the existence of scope rules 
Contrasting with the trend followed since the nineties, the most recently 
adopted consumer protection directives include a provision stating that they do 
not contain conflict rules and thus refer the conflict of laws issue regarding 
consumer contracts to the Rome I Regulation. This is the case of the Consumer 
Rights Directive (2011/83/EU)870 and the new Package Travel Directive 
(2015/2302/EU).871 This new trend raises the questions of whether the EU 
legislator is reconsidering his approach regarding scope rules in EU secondary 
law, and whether there is still a need or scope rules. 
The Consumer Rights Directive modernises the consumer law in the field of 
distance and off-premises contracts, and contracts including digital content on a 
non-tangible medium, and amends some aspects of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive and Consumer Sales Directive. It is a maximum harmonisation 
directive regulating information duties, rights of withdrawal and payment 
conditions in the aforementioned fields. Regarding its relationship with the 
conflict of laws process, recital 10 of the Consumer Rights Directive reads: “[t]his 
Directive should be without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I)”. Moreover, to dissipate any doubt, recital 58 
states that “[t]he consumer should not be deprived of the protection granted by 
this Directive. Where the law applicable to the contract is that of a third country, 
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 should apply, in order to determine whether the 
consumer retains the protection granted by this Directive”. Thus, any conflict of 
laws issue would be solved by the Rome I Regulation. The Consumer Rights 
                                                     
869 Peter Mankowski, ‘Article 23: Relationship with Other Provisions of Community Law’ in Ulrich 
Magnus and Peter Mankowski (eds), Rome I Regulation - Commentary (sellier european law 
publishers 2017) 847. 
870 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on 
consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 
97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, (OJ 2011 L 304/64) (‘Consumer Rights 
Directive’). 
871 Directive (EU) 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 
on package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and 
Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 90/314/EEC (OJ 2015 L 326/1) (‘Package Travel Directive’). 
Chapter IV - The relationship and coordination between EU consumer directives and 
the Rome I Regulation 
247 
Directive gives up the inclusion of scope rules interfering with PIL and relies on 
the Rome I Regulation.872 
The initial idea of the Consumer Rights Directive was to remedy the problems 
resulting from the different interpretations due to the minimum harmonisation 
nature of the Consumer Sales Directive, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, the 
Distance Selling Directive and the Doorstep Selling Directive. At the end, it only 
replaced the Distance Selling Directive and the Doorstep Selling Directive, and 
just modified certain aspects of the Consumer Sales Directive and Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive. Thus, the two last ones, with a minimum 
harmonisation nature and including scope rules, remain in force. As a result, the 
material scope covered by the Directive is not as broad as intended. EU consumer 
directives including scope rules and with a minimum harmonisation nature are 
still in the scene. 
Following the same maximum harmonisation principle, the new Package 
Travel Directive entered into force on 31 December 2015.873 It includes more 
information requirements, cancellation rights and clarity on liability and on 
consumer rights. In the same trend than the Consumer Rights Directive, it 
provides in recital 49 that “this Directive is without prejudice to rules on the 
protection of personal data laid down in Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and to the Union rules on private international law, 
including Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council [Rome I Regulation]”. Thus, it lacks a scope rule and refers the conflict 
of laws issues to the Rome I Regulation.  
Since the Consumer Rights Directive and the Package Travel Directive follow 
the principle of maximum harmonisation, intra-EU conflicts lose their importance 
in their context, as the same level of protection is guaranteed to the consumer 
throughout the EU. It is irrelevant therefore whether Spanish law or Dutch law is 
applicable, since they both would provide the same protection required by the 
Consumer Rights Directive and the Package Travel Directive. In intra-EU 
situations, regarding matters covered by maximum harmonisation directives, the 
fact that the parties choose the law of another Member State does not matter in 
practice: article 6(2) Rome I ensuring the application of the mandatory consumer 
protection offered to the consumer in his country of habitual residence when there 
is a choice of law is not relevant anymore for these type of situations.  
The absence of a scope rule (as well as, in this case, the fact that the directives 
have a maximum harmonisation nature) avoids the result of different 
interpretations and implementations into the national law of the Member States 
of such a rule which used to lead to inconsistencies and a forum-centred 
                                                     
872 Weller (n 760) 422. 
873 The Member States had to transpose it by 1 January 2018 and it has been applicable from 1 July 
2018. 
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regulation from some Member States.874 Moreover, in intra-EU conflicts, the 
debate around ‘gold-platting’ provisions is avoided. Gold-platting situations 
happen as a result of the minimum harmonisation nature of some EU consumer 
directives, which create a level-playing field allowing the Member States to 
improve the minimum standards set by the Directive when transposing it on its 
national law was created. Therefore, a Member State could either transpose in its 
national legal order the minimum standards of protection required by the 
Directive, or it could gradually improve the level of protection offered by it.875 
Since the Consumer Rights Directive and the Package Travel Directive require 
the implementation of its protection in the same manner among the Member 
States, this debate is avoided. 
Furthermore, the absence of scope rules and reference to the Rome I 
Regulation to resolve any conflict of laws issue helps to the coherence of the 
conflict of laws system of the Rome I Regulation, which is enacted aiming the 
unification of conflict of laws for contractual obligations. Dispersed conflict or 
scope rules around other instruments prejudice this aim.  
Nevertheless, regarding extra-EU situations, where the law of a third country 
could be applicable and threaten the protection provided by the directive, the 
question is whether the Rome I Regulation system itself would be sufficient in 
order to ensure the applicability of the mandatory rules of the directive when 
necessary, without the help of scope rules. The gaps on article 6 Rome I have 
been described, and it has also been submitted article 3(4) Rome I it is not 
sufficient since it only ensures the application of mandatory rules when all the 
elements of the situation are located in the EU. The Rome I Regulation does not 
ensure in all cases the protection intended by the directives, as it has been 
previously submitted, for example, regarding active consumers and mobile 
consumers. However, it might be overall more beneficial for consumer protection 
the absence of scope rules, since it avoids intra-EU problems and debates, and it 
enhances the coherence of the conflict of laws system and legal certainty. While 
some authors agree with this, this author included, I also believe there might be 
better solutions which ensure consumer protection while ensuring at the same 
time a coherent system of conflict of laws in the EU.876 
Thus, even if the EU seems to be reconsidering its approach towards the 
existence of scope rules on consumer protection directives, the still existent 
‘gaps’ of article 6 Rome I, covering a narrower scope than the one intended by 
the consumer directives, creates the doubt as to which approach should be better. 
                                                     
874 In this regard, see below 2.1. 
875 See below 2.2. 
876 On the view that scope rules are unnecessary and the Rome I Regulation system should prevail: 
Ragne Piir and Karin Sein, “Law Applicable to Consumer Contracts. Interaction of the Rome I 
Regulation and EU-Directive-Based Rules on Conflict of Laws,” Juridica International 24 (2016): 
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What it is clear is that the mixture between directives determining their scope of 
application and directives referring to Rome I are not the best option regarding 
clarity, legal certainty and, at the end, consumer protection and internal market 
objectives. 
 
1.4. The current situation regarding EU consumer 
directives and Rome I Regulation: inconsistencies, 
gaps and criticisms 
Since the multiple developments and approaches explained above make the 
present situation somehow chaotic, it seems necessary to summarise the current 
state of affairs regarding the relation between EU consumer directives and the 
Rome I Regulation: 
-Regarding the Rome I Regulation, article 6 Rome I is the protective conflict 
rule that determines the law applicable to consumer contracts. The main gaps that 
can derive from this provision are, regarding its material scope, the exclusions 
provided in article 6(4) Rome I. Regarding its territorial scope, active consumers 
and ‘holiday consumers’ also seem to be excluded from its application, since the 
provision incorporates the targeted activity test, and becomes applicable when the 
professional performs or directs his commercial activities to the country of 
habitual residence of the consumer. Article 3(4) Rome I was created to prevent 
abuse of law, and ensures the application of EU mandatory law (e.g. EU 
consumer directives) when all the relevant elements of the situation are located 
in the EU. However, it seems that in some situations EU consumer directives 
would need to be applicable even when not all the relevant elements are located 
in the EU.877 
-Regarding the consumer protection directives, there are, on the one hand, 
directives containing a conflict rule determining its scope of application, and, on 
the other hand, directives lacking a scope rule or directives referring directly the 
conflict of laws issue to the Rome I Regulation. Article 6(2) Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive, article 12(2) Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial 
Services Directive, article 7(2) of the Consumer Sales Directive and article 22(4) 
of the Consumer Credit Directive provide for the application of the protection of 
the respective rules when the contract is closely connected with the EU and 
parties chose the law of a non-Member State. Moreover, article 12(2) Timeshare 
Directive ensures the application of the protection granted by the Directive 
regardless the third country law is applicable as a result of a choice of law or of 
the connecting factors used in the absence of choice of law. Thus, these are the 
directives that contain a scope rule and are in force nowadays, and according to 
article 23 Rome I, prevail over the conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation.  
                                                     
877 See below section 4 of this chapter for a proposal regarding art. 3(4) Rome I. 
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The main criticisms arising from the existence of scope rules are, first of all, 
related to the uncertainty around them: scope rules contained in the above-
mentioned consumer protection directives do not stipulate which law should be 
applicable (the Directive as implemented by the law of the Member State of 
habitual residence of the consumer, the law of the forum, etc.), with the exception 
of the Timeshare Directive. Moreover, also with the exception of the latter, they 
only cover cases where the application of non-Member State law is the result of 
a choice of law, which means that the consumer would not enjoy the protection 
of the directives when he travels to another Member State and concludes a 
consumer contract there with a professional established in a third country. 
Furthermore, the implementation of scope rules into the national law of the 
different Member States creates different national implementations and 
understandings and thus adds more uncertainty to the system. Also, uncertainties 
and different possible interpretations arise regarding when does a close 
connection occur. 
Secondly, in their current drafting, scope rules are unrelated and disrupt the 
current conflict of laws system of the Rome I Regulation. Introducing the 
unilateral approach of the scope rules, which determine the scope of the 
instrument without referring to foreign law, clashes with the multilateral nature 
of the Rome I Regulation. In fact, it re-opened the debate among European private 
international law scholars regarding the adequacy of multilateralism or 
unilateralism resolving conflicts of laws.878 Furthermore, it has been submitted 
that if the Rome I Regulation tries to unify the conflict of laws of the different 
Member States in contractual obligations, the fact that scope rules are spread 
around directives and prevail over the Rome I Regulation disrupts that aim; the 
legal practitioner sees himself lost. The consumer would probably be better 
protected in a coherent system which ensures legal certainty. 
On the other hand, the most recent consumer directives give us the hint that 
the EU legislator might be changing his approach regarding the inclusion of scope 
rules. The Consumer Rights Directive and Package Travel Directive refer the 
conflict of laws issue to the Rome I Regulation. While this approach avoids all 
the aforementioned inconveniences arising from the existence of scope rules, it 
has to be assessed whether the conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation ensure the 
international applicability of the EU consumer directives when necessary, since 
there are indeed inconsistencies regarding consumer protection in the protective 
conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation.  
As a result, the whole situation regarding protection of consumers in EU 
conflict of laws seems at least chaotic, both in intra-EU and extra-EU situations. 
It has to be considered whether the scope rules of the consumer directives are still 
necessary in order to ensure the application of their mandatory protection, 
whether the Rome I Regulation should be the sole instrument dealing with 
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conflict of laws regarding consumer contracts, or whether a new approach 
balancing conflict of laws and internal market objectives should be determined. 
 
1.5. General remarks regarding the concepts of scope of 
application, mandatory character and conflict rules 
There is sometimes confusion regarding the concepts and the relationship 
between the application of a rule or statute, the mandatory character of a rule or 
statute and conflict of laws, which must be clarified.  
As it is known, conflict rules are legal provisions determining the law 
applicable to the legal relationship in question. According to the contemporary 
understanding of PIL in Europe, the application of a statute in an international 
situation is the result of the operation of the conflict rules applicable to the case. 
It has been suggested that the opposite view would be a mistake and a fall back 
in time to the medieval statutist thinking, according to which the applicability of 
a statute was determined by its own desirability to apply.879 In the current 
European PIL thinking, it is understood that if a legal system has been determined 
as applicable by the conflict rules, then the statutes of that legal system shall apply 
to the situation (as long as the situation falls within the scope of application of 
the statute in question). The judge will follow the forum conflict rules which will 
point to the applicable law, rather than applying a statute of the forum without 
previously resorting to the conflict rules. That is the starting point according to 
the multilateral conflict of laws method followed nowadays. Contrarily, from a 
unilateral theory point of view, every statute determines its own international 
scope of application; the statute is applicable because it has determined itself its 
applicability in an international situation.  
Originally, multilateral conflict rules identified the ‘seat’ of the legal 
relationship. Nowadays, it is generally considered that the ‘seat’ of the legal 
relationship leads to the legal order that is most closely connected to the legal 
relationship. Although in principle this process would take place regardless the 
substantive content of the designated law, some conflict rules contain connecting 
factors designed to complete certain substantive objectives (e.g. art. 6 Rome I). 
On the other hand, unilateralism implies that the content and aim of substantive 
rules determine their international applicability and take part in the conflict of 
laws process.880  
The mandatory character of a rule or a statute refers to the degree of intensity 
with which the rule or statute requires its application. Nowadays, we distinguish 
                                                     
879 Bisping refers to this as the ‘statutist trap’. Christopher Bisping, ‘Avoid the Statutist Trap: The 
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among dispositive rules, internal mandatory rules (or rules that cannot be 
derogated from by agreement) and overriding mandatory rules (that prevail over 
the designated applicable law). 881  From a current EU PIL perspective, in the 
context of the Rome I Regulation, the international applicability of a statute can 
only be imposed over the normal operation of conflict rules through the 
mechanism of overriding mandatory rules. International applicability can be 
related then to the international mandatory character of the provision. Only 
provisions considered as overriding mandatory can delimit their international 
scope of application and have a direct effect in the conflict of laws process. Other 
rules giving indications about their territorial scope of application but lacking an 
overriding mandatory character do not have a direct effect in the conflict of laws 
process. As a result, the existence of a scope rule does not imply the overriding 
mandatory character of a directive. 
The imperative character of the directives can be understood differently if we 
interpret it in a unilateral method or multilateral method context. According to 
the unilateral theory, rules determine their own scope of application; according 
to the multilateral theory, they do not. For our current PIL system, to establish 
internal mandatory character parties cannot derogate from the rule by choosing 
another law. However, in order to ensure the international applicability of a rule 
regardless the objectively law applicable, that rule has to have overriding 
mandatory character. EU directives containing scope rules cannot be understood 
as being conferred with overriding mandatory character. The EU legislator, 
aiming to achieve a specific social or economic aim, provides for ‘scope rules’ 
making a spontaneous and, to a certain extent, unintentional use of a unilateral 
method of PIL.882 Nowadays, I consider that scope rules should not be understood 
as directly conferring overriding mandatory character, or delimiting the 
international scope of application of a directive prevailing as a specific conflict 
rule over the Rome I Regulation, but rather as helping to establishing their degree 
of mandatory character.883 
It is necessary to clearly distinguish between overriding mandatory rules, 
unilateral conflict rules and scope rules. The mechanism of unilateral conflict 
rules and overriding mandatory rules can be comparable to a certain extent. On 
the one hand, overriding mandatory rules are the typical and more widespread 
example of unilateralism in contemporary PIL. As previously discussed in 
Chapter III and as defined by the ECJ (Arblade decision)884 and later codified in 
art. 9(1) Rome I, overriding mandatory rules are characterised by three elements: 
                                                     
881 Dispositive rules and internal mandatory rules are applicable because of the objective operation 
of connecting factors, the latter not being subject to be derogated from by a choice of a different 
law. 
882 Stéphanie Francq, ‘Unilateralism’ in Jürgen Basedow and others (eds), Encyclopedia of Private 
International Law, vol 2 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 1789,1790. 
883 In this regard, see the discussion below in Section 3. 
884 Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Criminal proceedings against Jean Claude Arblade and 
Arblade & Fils SARL and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL [1999] ECR I-8453 
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first, they fix their own scope of application (implicitly or explicitly); second, 
their application and scope derives from their purpose and nature, which is aiming 
at protecting essential public interests; and, third, that purpose justifies their 
overriding mandatory character and need to derogate from the general conflict 
rules. Thus, overriding mandatory rules constitute an expression of the link 
between the aim of a statute and its international scope of application.885 
Unilateral conflict rules delimit the scope of forum law, ensuring its 
application to the situations covered, without referring to the hypothesis of 
application of foreign law.886 Similarly, scope rules determine the scope of a 
specific set of rules, such as a domestic statute. The scope of an instrument has 
various elements (temporal, material, spatial). It is the spatial (or territorial) scope 
the one that can be relevant for PIL purposes. This (spatial) scope rule might 
identify the situations covered by the instrument regarding its connections with 
the country or legal system the rule belongs to.  It will determine when a specific 
statute applies to an international situation. Scope rules, if understood as defining 
the applicability of the statute in a conflict of laws situation, are unilateral conflict 
rules, but while the latter determine the hypothesis of application of an unlimited 
amount of provisions (such as provisions regarding divorce, for example), scope 
rules refer to a limited set of provisions (such as the provisions of a specific 
domestic statute). Also, it is necessary to distinguish between scope rules that can 
affect PIL (like the ones present in the EU consumer directives mentioned above) 
and ‘scope rules’ which are territorial scope rules that are only relevant after the 
law to which they belong has been determined as applicable in order to clarify 
the territorial scope of an instrument (e.g. art 1 (1) of the CISG (United Nations 
Convention of 11 April 1980 on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods), 
which states that the Convention applies to international sales contracts when the 
two parties are established in contracting States).887  
In a similar way to overriding mandatory rules, unilateral conflict rules 
delineate the scope of forum law and ensure its application to the situation 
covered, without deciding on the application of foreign law. However, the 
provisions designated by unilateral conflict rules do not necessarily have 
mandatory character or overriding mandatory character. In the same way, scope 
rules may determine the scope of mandatory provisions, overriding mandatory 
provisions or simply dispositive provisions.888  
                                                     
885 Francq, ‘Unilateralism’ (n 877) 1789. 
886 Normally, they will delimit the scope of unlimited amount of provisions (like the rules on 
divorce) of the forum law, rather than the scope of a specific statute. 
887 José Carlos Fernández Rozas and Sixto Sánchez Lorenzo, Derecho Internacional Privado, vol 
1 (Civitas 1999) 172,173. 
888 Guardans Cambó (n 369) 333. The confusion regarding these concepts was already object of 
study and matter of confusion among doctrine in the second half of the twentieth century with the 
arising of the doctrine of overriding mandatory rules. Authors debated about the scope of 
application of a rule and imperative or overriding imperative character, or the scope of application 
of a statute and conflict of laws; among others: ibid 328–359; Alan S Danson, ‘Territorialy Limited 
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The mandatory character of overriding mandatory rules, which makes these 
rules prevail over party autonomy and the objective applicable law, has 
sometimes led to confusion regarding scope rules. It has sometimes been 
assimilated that the existence of a scope rule directly brings overriding mandatory 
character to the provisions covered. 889  However, it is fundamental to distinguish 
between the scope of application of a statute and its (overriding) mandatory 
character.890 
 
2. EU consumer directives and intra-EU conflicts 
of laws 
Within the EU legal order, we can distinguish three types of situations regarding 
the existence of foreign elements: 1. the situation involves only one Member State 
(all the elements are located within the frontiers of one Member State); 2. the 
situation involves two or more Member States but still all the elements are located 
within the EU; 3. the situation involves one (or more) Member State(s) and also 
one (or more) third State(s). From a EU point of view, the two first situations 
would be characterised as internal and the third situation as international. The 
first situation is purely internal within a national legal order and the second one 
is internal within the EU (intra-EU). 
When talking about intra-EU conflicts of law, we refer to the situation where 
the application of the laws of two or more Member States is at stake. We refer to 
purely intra-EU situations where both the consumer and the professional party 
are located in the EU, and all the elements related with the consumer contract also 
take place in the EU. Relevant elements to be taken into account in this regard 
are the place of habitual residence of the parties, place of performance or 
conclusion of the contract, etc.891 
When talking about harmonised areas, such as consumer law harmonised by 
EU directives, there is no specific regime to deal with intra-EU conflicts, but, in 
the case of consumer contracts, the applicable law will be decided through the 
conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation.  
                                                     
Statutes and Choice of Law Process’ [1964] Harvard Journal on Legislation; Rodolfo De Nova, 
‘Conflict of Laws and Functionally Restricted Substantive Rules’ (66) 54 California Law Review 
1569; D St L Kelly, ‘Localising Rules and Differing Approaches to the Choice of Law Process’ 
(1969) 18 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 249. Nowadays, despite the confusion 
derived from the complexity of these concepts, the distinction among them is clear. Magnus (n 707) 
23–25. 
889 Andrea Bonomi, ‘Article 9 Rome I’ in Ulrich Magnus and Peter Mankowski (eds), European 
Commentaries on Private International Law. Commentary. Rome I Regulation., vol II (sellier 
european law publishers 2017) 616. 
890 Magnus (n 707) 23–25; Francq, L’Applicabilité Du Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au Regard 
Des Méthodes Du Droit International Privé (n 11) 575,576. 
891 See Chapter III.4 regarding the definition of relevant elements in relation with art. 3(4) Rome I. 
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Regarding conflict of laws between Member States related with EU consumer 
directives, two different issues arise, which will be dealt with within this section. 
Firstly, directives have to be implemented into the national law of the Member 
States; it follows that the scope rules contained in some of the EU consumer 
directives also have to be implemented. As a result, different national 
implementations of the already confusing scope rules arise among the different 
Member States, creating an uncertain system parallel to the Rome I Regulation 
system. The EU legislator obviates the fact that when introducing a scope rule on 
a EU directive, the national legislator is confronted with the difficulty of 
implementing this type of rules.892 Secondly, most of the EU consumer directives 
are minimum harmonisation directives, which allow Member States to improve 
the minimum standards required by the directive itself; as a result, different levels 
of protection exist among the Member States, which raises the question of 
whether, in this so-called gold-platting situations, the Member State of the forum 
which grants a better level of protection should impose its standards against the 
law of another Member State that, according to the normal operation of the Rome 
I Regulation, is applicable to the contract. 
 
2.1. The difficult implementation of the scope rules of 
EU consumer directives into the national law of the 
Member States 
One of the main practical inconveniences regarding scope rules contained in 
consumer directives regards its implementation into the national law of the 
different Member States. Since directives are not applicable as such, but have to 
be implemented by the Member States into their national law, the implementation 
of the scope rules will have an influence on the conflict of laws. In fact, several 
difficulties arise regarding the different implementations and interpretations of 
Member States of the scope rules, especially regarding the reference of the scope 
rules to the territory of the Member States and the term close connection: 
 
2.1.1. Reference to the territory of the Member States 
Scope rules provide for the application of the specific directive when the situation 
has a close link with the territory of the EU or the territory of a Member State. 
Such reference is difficult to implement correctly by a Member State. While it 
makes sense from the perspective of the EU that a EU directive is determining its 
own scope by referring to the frontiers of the EU legal system, this leads to 
national implementations focused instead on the territory of the own Member 
                                                     
892 Francq, L’Applicabilité Du Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au Regard Des Méthodes Du Droit 
International Privé (n 11) 422. 
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State, determining the applicability of the law of the forum while ignoring the 
law of other Member States.893  
For example, regarding the implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, in which article 6(2) provides that “Member States shall take the 
necessary measures to ensure that the consumer does not lose the protection 
granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of law of a non-Member State as 
the law applicable to a contract if the latter has a closest connection with the 
territory of the Member States”, German law provided for the application of 
German law when the contract had a close connection with Germany, without 
saying anything about a close connection with other Member States.894 Thus, as 
an implementation of a scope rule ensuring the standards of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive, there was a rule taking a unilateral approach ensuring the 
application of national law. This rule, although it ensured the minimum protection 
required by the directive by imposing the application of national law, it was 
unilaterally imposing the application of German law.895 
Also, there was controversy regarding the implementations of the scope rule 
contained in article 12(2) of the Timeshare Directive, which provides that: 
“[w]here the applicable law is that of a third country, consumers shall not be 
                                                     
893 Fallon and Francq (n 774) 166; Kuipers (n 11) 188. 
894 Law of 19 July 1996, BGBI. 1996, I, 1013, article 1: “Unterliegt ein Vertrag ausländischem 
Recht, so sind die Vorschriften dieses Gesetzes gleichwohl anzuwenden, wenn der Vertrag einen 
engen Zusammenhang mit dem Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland aufweist. Ein enger 
Zusammenhang ist insbesondere anzunehmen, wenn 1. der Vertrag auf Grund eines öffentlichen 
Angebots, einer öffentlichen Werbung oder einer ähnlichen im Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes 
entfalteten geschäftlichen Tätigkeit des Verwenders zustande kommt und 2. der andere Vertragsteil 
bei Abgabe seiner auf den Vertragsschluß gerichteten Erklärung seinen Wohnsitz oder 
gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt im Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes hat und seine Willenserklärung im 
Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes abgibt." [‘If a contract is subject to foreign law, then the provisions 
of this act are nevertheless applicable if the Contract has a close connection with the territory of the 
Federal Republic Germany. A close connection is to be assumed in particular if 1. the contract 
based on a public offer, a public offer Advertising or similar in scope this law unfolded business 
activity of the user comes about and 2. the other party to the contract on the conclusion of the 
contract residence or ordinary residence Stay within the scope of this law has and his declaration 
of intent within the scope of this law write’] (translation by author). 
895 Later on, by a Law of 27 June 2000, article 29a was introduced in the EGBGB (Introductory 
Law to the Civil Code), introducing a rule implementing art. 6(2) Unfair Contract Terms, art. 9 
Timeshare Directive and art. 12(2) Distance Sales Directive. Later it also included art. 7(2) 
Consumer Sales Directives and art. 12(3) Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services 
Directive. Art. 29a EGBGB followed the drafting of the scope rules of the Directives, and provided 
in paragraph 1 that if, as a result of a choice of law, a contract is not governed by the law of a 
Member State, but the contract has a close connection with the territory of one of those States, the 
national legislation of that Member State implementing the Consumer Protection Directives should 
apply (“Unterliegt ein Vertrag auf Grund einer Rechtswahl nicht dem Recht eines Mitgliedstaats 
der Europäischen Union oder eines anderen Vertragsstaats des Abkommens über den 
Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum, weist der Vertrag jedoch einen engen Zusammenhang mit dem 
Gebiet eines dieser Staaten auf, so sind die im Gebiet dieses Staats geltenden Bestimmungen zur 
Umsetzung der Verbraucherschutzrichtlinien gleichwohl anzuwenden”). This provision was later 
repealed when the Rome I Regulation entered into force in 2009. 
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deprived of the protection granted by this Directive, as implemented in the 
Member State of the forum if (1) any of the immovable properties concerned is 
situated within the territory of a Member State, or, (2) in the case of a contract 
not directly related to immovable property, the trader pursues commercial or 
professional activities in a Member State or, by any means, directs such activities 
to a Member State and the contract falls within the scope of such activities”. For 
example, German law implementing the Timeshare Directive896 provided for the 
applicability of German law when the immovable property was located on the 
territory of a Member State; therefore, a German court would apply German law 
to a contract between a Belgium consumer and a Dutch company regarding a 
property located in Spain.897 On the other hand, the French law implementing the 
Directive898 determined the law of the Member State where the immovable is 
located as applicable, indicating at the same time that French law would apply in 
the absence of implementation provisions in that law, ensuring therefore the 
minimum of protection of the Directive.  
The Italian implementation of scope rules is also interesting.899 To put an 
example, article 12(2) Distance Marketing of Financial Services Directive 
provides that: “Member States shall take the measures needed to ensure that the 
consumer does not lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the 
choice of the law of a non-member country as the law applicable to the contract, 
                                                     
896 Law of 20 December 1996, BGBI. 1996, I, P. 2154: “§ 8 Kollisionsregel. Unterliegt ein Vertrag 
über die Teilzeitnutzung von Wohngebäuden oder ein Vertrag zur Finanzierung des Erwerbs eines 
Teilzeitnutzungsrechts (§ 6) ausländischem Recht, so sind die Vorschriften dieses Gesetzes 
gleichwohl anzuwenden, wenn 1. das Wohngebäude im Hoheitsgebiet eines Mitgliedstaates der 
Europäischen Union oder eines Vertragsstaates des Abkommens über den Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsraum belegen ist oder 2. der Vertrag auf Grund eines öffentlichen Angebotes, einer 
öffentlichen Werbung oder einer ähnlichen geschäftlichen Tätigkeit zustandekommt, die der 
Veräußerer in einem Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Union oder in einem anderen Vertragsstaat 
des Abkommens über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum entfaltet, und wenn der Erwerber bei 
Abgabe seiner auf den Vertragsabschluß gerichteten Erklärung seinen Wohnsitz oder 
gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt in einem Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Union oder in einem anderen 
Vertragsstaat des Abkommens über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum hat.” [‘If a contract on the 
part-time use of residential buildings or a contract to finance the acquisition of a timeshare (§ 6) is 
governed by foreign law, the provisions of this Act shall nevertheless be applicable if: 1. the 
dwelling is located in the territory of a Member State of the European Union or of a Contracting 
State to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, or 2. the contract is concluded on the basis 
of a public offer, a public advertisement or a similar business activity which the transferor has in a 
Member State of the European Union or in another Contracting State to the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area and if the transferee, upon submission of his contract declaration of 
residence or habitual residence in a Member State of the European Union or in another Contracting 
State to the Agreement on the European Economic Area.’] (translation by author). 
897 Later on, art. 29 a EGBGB provided in paragraph 3 that the provisions of the Civil Code on 
timeshare contracts shall apply to a contract which is not governed by the law of a Member State 
of the European Union or of another Contracting State to the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area, if the dwelling is in the territory of one of these States. It did not change that approach.  
898 Law no 98-566 of 8 July 1998, JO(RF) 9 July 1998, p. 10486. 
899 For a more detailed explanation on the implementation of scope rules by Italian law, Ragno (n 
553) 159–161. 
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if this contract has a close link with the territory of one or more Member States”. 
However, the Italian provision provided for the applicability of Italian law to all 
cases in which the parties have chosen a different law.900 Moreover, one of the 
final provisions of the Italian Consumer Code (containing both substantive 
consumer law and conflict rules implementing scope rules), provided that if 
parties have chosen a law other than Italian law as applicable, the consumer 
should still enjoy the minimum protection provided by the Italian Consumer 
Code.901 
In the Spanish case, the implementation of directives was done in different 
texts, and, as a result, rules on consumer protection were disperse. Like in the 
previous cases, the implementation did not correspond with the drafting of the 
scope rules of the directives. For example, the implementation of art. 7(2) 
Consumer Sales Directive provided for the application of the Spanish protective 
rules regardless the law chosen by the parties.902 Also, the implementation of art. 
12(2) Distance Sales Directive provided for the application of the rights conferred 
by the act even when the law applicable was other than Spanish law.903 These 
rules impose the application of the Spanish consumer rules even when parties 
                                                     
900 Art. 67octiesdecies Italian Consumer Code paragraph 2 stated that when parties chose as 
applicable a law different that Italian law, the consumer would still receive the protection provided 
by the same section (which was the transposition of the rules of the Directive): “Ove le parti 
abbiano scelto di applicare al contratto una legislazione diversa da quella italiana, al consumatore 
devono comunque essere riconosciute le condizioni di tutela previste dalla presente sezione”. 
901 Art. 143(2) of the Italian Consumer Code: “Ove le parti abbiano scelto di applicare al contratto 
una legislazione diversa da quella italiana, al consumatore devono comunque essere riconosciute 
le condizioni minime di tutela previste dal codice.” [‘If the parties have chosen to apply a different 
legislation to the contract than the Italian one, the consumer must still be recognized the minimum 
conditions of protection provided by the code’] (translation by author). 
902 Law 23/2003 of 10 July 2003. Art. 13: “Las normas de protección de los consumidores 
contenidas en esta ley serán aplicables, cualquiera que sea la Ley elegida por las partes para regir 
el contenido cuando el bien haya de utilizarse, ejercitarse el derecho o realizarse la prestación en 
alguno de los Estados miembros de la unión Europea, o el contrato se hubiera celebrado total o 
parcialmente en cualquiera de ellos, o una de las partes sea ciudadano de un Estado miembro de 
la Unión Europea o presente el negocio jurídico cualquier otra conexión análoga o vínculo 
estrecho con el territorio de la Unión Europea.” [‘The rules of consumer protection contained in 
this law will be applicable, whatever the law chosen by the parties to govern the content is, when 
the good is to be used, the right to be exercised or  the service be performed in any of the Member 
States of the European Union, or the contract has been concluded in whole or in part in any of them, 
or one of the parties is a citizen of a Member State of the European Union or the legal transaction 
presents any other analogous connection or close link with the territory of the European Union’] 
(translation by author). 
903 Law 47/2002 of 19 December 2002, modifying Law 7/1996. Art. 48: “Cuando el comprador 
sea un consumidor (…), los derechos que el presente capítulo le reconoce serán irrenunciables y 
podrán ser ejercidos por los mismos aunque la legislación aplicable al contrato sea otra distinta 
de la española, si el contrato presenta un vínculo estrecho con el territorio de cualquier Estado 
miembro de la Unión Europea.” [‘When the buyer is a consumer (…) the rights granted to him by 
the present section cannot be derogated from and can be exercised despite the law applicable to the 
contract is other than Spanish law, if the contract presents a close link with the territory of any 
Member State of the European Union’] (translation by author). 
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choose the law of another Member State, or even when the law of another 
Member State is applicable.904 
Thus, in general, national rules transposing scope rules impose the application 
of the national consumer law with the objective of ensuring the application of the 
protection of the EU consumer directive in question, but they do it unilaterally 
imposing the application of national law even when the law of another Member 
State (which also ensures the minimum of the Directive) is applicable. 
The different implementations of the Member States regarding the territory 
covered by the rules derives in a kind of intra-EU conflict of laws system parallel 
to the Rome I Regulation. A big number of scope rules are implemented by the 
Member States as unilateral conflict rules, imposing the application of national 
law even against other Member States and thus preventing the consumer from 
benefit from a better protection provided by the law of another Member State. 
This parallel system interferes with article 6 Rome I; for example, when the 
consumer contract falls under the requirements of article 6 Rome I and parties 
chose the law of another Member State. According to article 23 Rome I, the 
provisions of the Regulation “shall not prejudice the application of provisions of 
Community law which, in relation to particular matters, lay down conflict-of-law 
rules relating to contractual obligations”. However, to the extent that these 
national conflict rules do not reflect the rationale behind the directives, which did 
not intend at any moment to impose the application of a national law over the law 
of other Member States, they should not prevail over the provisions of the Rome 
I.905 Also, it is submitted that the principle of minimum harmonisation of the 
majority of the EU consumer directives should only operate on a substantive law 
level, but not on a conflict of laws level, meaning that the Member States should 
implement the scope rules as provided for in the respective directive, and not 
extending or modifying their scope.906  
 
2.1.2. The term close connection 
The term ‘close connection’ seems to be included in the scope rules as a 
flexible concept, allowing the courts to interpret whether the consumer contract 
is closely connected to a Member State taken into account all the circumstances 
of the case. The notion of ‘close connection’ brings difficulties, since many 
elements can be taken into consideration in that regard. In the context of the EU, 
in the Rome Convention and Rome I Regulation, the concept of ‘closest 
connection’ is used as a connecting factor, either included in a ‘escape clause’ 
when the contract is most closely connected to a different one than the law 
                                                     
904 More about the Spanish implementation of ‘scope rules’ in: De la Rosa, ‘El Sistema Europeo Y 
Español de Ley Aplicable a Los Contratos de Consumo Transfronterizos: El Modelo de Dispersión 
Normativa Para El Derecho Privado de La Integración’ (n 750). 
905 In the same opinion, Ragno (n 553) 161. 
906 ibid 159. 
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designated, or when the law applicable cannot be determined by the other 
connecting factors (art. 4(3) and 4(4) Rome I). The legislator did not refer to a 
list of factors to take into account, and thus a catalogue of the specific relevant 
circumstances does not exist. Generally, doctrine agrees that the place of 
performance of the contract or common habitual residence of the parties are 
elements with some weight, while factors such as nationality, language or a 
choice of forum clause do not play a very important role.907 However, the 
understanding of the term in the context of article 4 Rome I differs from the one 
contained in the Directives. In the Rome I Regulation, ‘closest connection’ is used 
in an escape clause or in a subsidiary rule, and thus in an exceptional manner, and 
it is not applicable regarding consumer contracts falling under art. 6 Rome I. 
However, in the Directives the scope rule requires the application of the consumer 
protection rules contained in the respective Directive when there is a close 
connection with one or more Member States. Other authors suggested different 
possibilities. For example, seeking coordination and harmonisation between 
instruments, Jayme and Kohler suggested that close connection could be deemed 
to exist when the Rome Convention, in absence of choice of law, would have 
designated the law of a Member State as applicable to the consumer contract.908 
On the other hand, Esteban de la Rosa suggested that, since one of the objectives 
behind the EU consumer directives was, besides consumer protection, the 
effective functioning of the internal market and, therefore, avoid distortions of 
the competition existent in the market, a close connection with the market would 
be when the application of the directive is necessary in order to avoid a distortion 
on the competition within the internal market.909 
Regarding the implementation of the term ‘close connection’ contained in 
scope rules of the Directives within the national law of the Member States, we 
can difference two trends: 
The first one corresponds to a more rigid rule in which the national law 
determines when a close connection occurs. We find several examples: in French 
law, when implementing the Unfair Contact Terms Directive, the term ‘close 
connection’ was transposed as a reference to the residence of the consumer, when 
the offer was made in that state or the contract was concluded or performed in 
that state. In fact, the current French Consumer Code contains a rule (art. L231-
1) defining when does a close connection occur, followed by several rules 
indicating the applicability of some EU consumer directives when such a close 
connection with the EU occurs (arts. 232-1 to 5). Art. L231-1 French Consumer 
                                                     
907 Martin Gebauer, ‘Article 4. Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice’ in Gralf-Peter Calliess 
(ed), Rome Regulations. Commentary (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2015) 125,126. 
908 Jayme and Kohler (n 750) 20. 
909 De la Rosa, La Protección de Consumidores En El Mercado Interior Europeo (n 420) 158–168. 
Paredes Pérez is of the same opinion, considering that, rather than the habitual residence of the 
consumer in the EU or the professional directing activities to the EU, the relevant factor to consider 
there is a close connection is how the internal market is affected by the (non-)application of the 
directive. Paredes Pérez (n 759) 95,96. 
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Code establishes as factors indicating a close connection: the conclusion of the 
contract in the Member State of habitual residence of the consumer; the 
professional directing his activities towards the Member State of habitual 
residence of the consumer; a special offer or advertising preceding the contract 
and the acts performed by the consumer necessary for the conclusion of this 
contract taking place in a Member State; the conclusion of the contract in a 
Member State where the consumer has gave in to a proposal of travel or stay 
made, directly or indirectly, by the seller to encourage him to conclude the 
contract.910 
In the German law911, several factors were included as presumptions that 
might constitute a close connection, such as the residence of the consumer or 
elements of the contract covering an offer or advertisement, but without prejudice 
that the court could consider other circumstances of the case.912 While the French 
rule seems to be more rigid, stating the specific conditions, the German rule states 
some presumptions and leaves room for the court to consider more 
circumstances.913 
The Spanish transposition of the term close connection also included in some 
cases presumptions, such as in the rule implementing art. 7(2) Consumer Sales 
Directive, which provided that the provisions should be applicable (regardless the 
choice of law by the parties) when the good is to be used, the right is exercised 
or the service is performed in a Member State, or the contract has been concluded 
in a Member State, or any of the parties to the contract is a citizen of a Member 
State, or the legal relationship presents any analogous connection or close link 
with the territory of the EU.914 The current legal act dealing with consumer 
protection rules (including those transposing EU Directives) -Ley General para 
la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios- also provides for the application of 
                                                     
910 Art. L231-1 French Consumer Code: “un lien étroit avec le territoire d'un Etat membre est 
réputé établi notamment : 1° Si le contrat a été conclu dans l'Etat membre du lieu de résidence 
habituelle du consommateur ; 2° Si le professionnel dirige son activité vers le territoire de l'Etat 
membre où réside le consommateur, sous réserve que le contrat entre dans le cadre de cette activité 
; 3° Si le contrat a été précédé dans cet Etat membre d'une offre spécialement faite ou d'une 
publicité et des actes accomplis par le consommateur nécessaires à la conclusion de ce contrat ; 
4° Si le contrat a été conclu dans un Etat membre où le consommateur s'est rendu à la suite d'une 
proposition de voyage ou de séjour faite, directement ou indirectement, par le vendeur pour l'inciter 
à conclure ce contrat.” 
911 Law of 19 July 1996, BGBI. 1996, I, 1013. 
912 Later on, art. 29a EGBGB, regarding the scope of several consumer directives and now repealed 
since the Rome I Regulation entered into force, provided that “(2) A close connection is to be 
assumed in particular if 1.the contract is concluded on the basis of a public offer, a public 
advertisement or a similar business activity, which is carried out in a Member State of the European 
Union or another Member State of the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and 2.the other 
party has his habitual residence in a Member State of the European Union or another Contracting 
State to the Agreement on the European Economic Area when making his declaration for the 
purpose of the conclusion of the contract.” 
913 Fallon and Francq (n 774) 167–168. 
914 See above n 897. 
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the rules when there is a close connection with the territory of the EU, 
understanding that there is a close connection when the aforementioned 
circumstances take place.915 
The second trend consists on the interpretation of the ‘close connection’ term 
as having a direct effect, meaning that it would be the court that would decide in 
every specific case whether there is a close link with the territory attending to the 
circumstances of the case. For example, regarding the implementation of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive, Italy and Portugal followed this trend.916  
It is also interesting to mention that the first transposition of art. 6(2) Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive by Spanish law provided that the consumer protection 
rules against unfair contract terms were to be applicable, irrespective of the law 
chosen by the parties, under the conditions provided for in article 5 Rome 
Convention establishing the law applicable to consumer contracts.917  However, 
the ECJ in Commission v Spain918 ruled that Spain had failed to transpose art. 6(2) 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive and held that the term ‘close connection’, 
deliberately vague in order to make it possible to adapt to the circumstances of 
the case, covered more situations than those referred to in article 5 Rome 
                                                     
915 Art. 67(3) Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2007, de 16 de noviembre, por el que se aprueba el texto 
refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de los Consumidores y Usuarios y otras leyes 
complementarias: “(…) Se entenderá, en particular, que existe un vínculo estrecho cuando el bien 
haya de utilizarse, ejercitarse el derecho o realizarse la prestación en alguno de los Estados 
miembros de la Unión Europea, o el contrato se hubiera celebrado total o parcialmente en 
cualquiera de ellos, o una de las partes sea ciudadano de un Estado miembro de la Unión Europea 
o presente el negocio jurídico cualquier otra conexión análoga o vínculo estrecho con el territorio 
de la Unión Europea.” 
916 Law no 52 of 6 February 1996 (Gazz. Uffic., 10 February 1996); Law no 220/95 of 31 January 
1995 (Diario da Republica, 31 August 1995). Fallon and Francq (n 774) 168. Also, the Spanish 
transposition of art. 12 97/7/CE Distance Consumer Sales referred to a close connection with any 
Member State of the EU (art. 48 Law 7/1996 15 January 1996, introduced by law 47/2002 of 19 
December). 
917 Law 7/1998 of 13 April 1998 on general terms in contracts, Boletín Oficial del Estado No 89 of 
14 April 1998, p.12304 ('Law 7/1998'), amending General Law 26 of 19 July 1984 providing for 
consumer protection, Boletín Oficial del Estado No 176 of 24 July 1984, p. 21686 ('amended Law 
26/1984'), art. 10 bis 3: “Las normas de protección de los consumidores frente a las cláusulas 
abusivas serán aplicables, cualquiera que sea la Ley que las partes hayan elegido para regir el 
contrato, en los términos previstos en el artículo 5 del Convenio de Roma de 1980, sobre la Ley 
aplicable a las obligaciones contractuales”. 
918 Case C-70/03 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain [2004] ECR I-
9657. See above 1.1.3. 
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Convention.919 Nevertheless, the ECJ did not take this opportunity to clarify the 
doubts arising from the interpretation and transposition of scope rules.920  
Therefore, different rules deriving from the different national implementations 
exist among the different Member States, especially when Member States 
implement the term through a rigid rule with specific conditions, which leads 
again to inconsistencies among the different implementations and does not help 
to the achievement of a coherent and harmonised conflict of laws system. 
Besides the different existent national implementations, other issues arise 
from the term ‘close connection’ included in scope rules. The most obvious issue 
is the legal uncertainty derived from the fact that it is a term open to interpretation, 
created with the intention to cover the necessary circumstances of every case. 
While the vagueness of the concept is intentional as to cover the necessary 
situations in the specific case, it necessarily brings legal uncertainty to the conflict 
of laws process. Depending on which Member State court the claim is brought, 
this court might consider there is a close connection with the EU or not, and thus 
might apply the respective EU consumer protection rules or not, which promotes 
forum shopping. 
Furthermore, it is a requirement not familiar with the traditional PIL. 
According to article 6 Rome I, the consumer directives would be applicable when 
the consumer is approached by the professional in the country of habitual 
residence of the consumer. Moreover, it would not be possible to circumvent their 
protection through a choice of a third country law when the protection provided 
by them is more beneficial than the law chosen. In case the situation would be 
outside the scope of article 6 Rome I, in case of active or mobile consumers (or 
in case the situation is not covered by the material scope of article 6 Rome I 
neither), as a result from article 4 Rome I the directives would still be applicable 
when the professional is established in a Member State (test of characteristic 
performance) and no choice of law has been made. Furthermore, when all the 
relevant elements are located within the EU, the application of the consumer 
directives is ensured through article 3(4) Rome I. Also, it has been criticised that 
                                                     
919 The ECJ held that “as regards ties with the Community, Article 6(2) of the directive merely 
states that the contract is to have 'a close connection with the territory of the Member States'. That 
general expression seeks to make it possible to take account of various ties depending on the 
circumstances of the case.” The judgment continues: “Although concrete effect may be given to the 
deliberately vague term 'close connection' chosen by the Community legislature by means of 
presumptions, it cannot, on the other hand, be circumscribed by a combination of predetermined 
criteria for ties such as the cumulative conditions as to residence and conclusion of the contract 
referred to in Article 5 of the Rome Convention” (Commission v. Spain, paras. 22-23). In this 
regard: Paredes Pérez (n 759) 97–100; De la Rosa, ‘La Inadecuación Del Sistema Español de 
Derecho Internacional Privado de Las Cláusulas Abusivas Al Derecho Comunitario: Claves Para 
Una Nueva Transposición Y Porpouesta Legislativa’ (n 806). Also, in a previous commentary 
regarding the Spanish provision, the incompatibility confirmed by the ECJ was already predicted: 
Vilà Costa and Gardeñes Santiago (n 806) 296–302.  
920 Paredes Pérez (n 759) 100. 
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it is difficult to determine that a close connection between the contract and the 
territory of a Member State exists when the professional does not pursue or direct 
its commercial activity towards the Member State.921 That is true when the 
situation is covered by the material and territorial scope of article 6 Rome I; 
however, the close connection test was more intended to cover the gaps of that 
provision (the former article 5 Rome Convention). Still, it would have made more 
sense to include in the scope rules another more familiar connecting factor – such 
as the targeted activity test, for example- rather than the requirement of close 
connection.  
 
In conclusion, as a result from the implementation of the scope rules of EU 
consumer directives into the national law of the Member States: 
First, a parallel system to the Rome I Regulation appears regarding the scope 
of application of EU consumer directives in intra-EU situations. While scope 
rules refer to the application of the directive when the situation has a close link 
with the territory of the EU, some national laws refer instead to the application of 
the consumer law when the situation is closely connected to the territory of that 
country. Thus, they create a unilateral conflict rule that claims the application of 
national law, even in intra-EU situations (i.e. against the law of another Member 
State), without referring to the law of other Member States or any foreign law.  
Second, the different implementation rules regarding the requirement of the 
‘close connection’ bring even more uncertainty than the vague concept itself. 
Some Member States adopt rigid rules with specific requirements, which 
contradicts the purpose of the concept (i.e. to allow a case by case interpretation 
of the circumstances), as well as leading to different requirements depending on 
each Member State law. Moreover, the unfamiliarity of the ‘close connection’ 
requirement with the PIL connecting factors regarding consumer protection 
disturbs the conflict of laws system, bringing up the question of why a close 
connection rather than any other known requirement (such as the targeted activity 
test of article 6 Rome I, for instance). 
Finally, regarding intra-EU conflict of laws, it becomes obvious that scope 
rules bring more legal uncertainty and disturb the aim of the Rome I Regulation 
regarding the unification of conflict of laws in contractual obligations.  
 
2.2. Gold-platting situations: minimum harmonisation, 
maximum protection? 
Most of the EU consumer directives, except the most recent ones (Consumer 
Rights Directive and Package Travel Directive), have a minimum harmonising 
                                                     
921 Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law (n 587) 56. 
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nature. As a result, a level-playing field is created allowing the Member States to 
improve the minimum standards set by the directive when transposing it on its 
national law. Therefore, a Member State can either transpose in its national legal 
order the minimum standards of protection required by the directive, or it can 
gradually improve the level of protection offered by it –phenomenon known as 
gold-platting–.922  
When the consumer contract falls within the scope of article 6 Rome I, and a 
choice of another Member State law has been made, article 6(2) Rome I ensures 
that the most beneficial law for the consumer will be applicable, either the law of 
habitual residence of the consumer or the law chosen by the parties. Thus, 
according to this so-called ‘preferential law’ approach, the court should only 
apply the law chosen by the parties if the mandatory provisions of that law do not 
deprive the consumer from the protection offered by the mandatory provisions of 
the law of the country of habitual residence. The court shall identify the 
mandatory provisions of the law of the country of habitual residence of the 
consumer and compare them with the mandatory provisions of the law chosen by 
the parties. Although this approach imposes a burdensome task to the judge, it 
provides the consumer with the higher protection available while respecting party 
autonomy. Regarding gold-platting situations, the preferential law approach will 
lead to the application of the law that, when implementing the respective 
directive, improved more the standards of protection, being this the law of the 
Member State of habitual residence of the consumer or the Member State law 
chosen by the parties.  
In the cases excluded from the scope of article 6 Rome I, such as mobile and 
active consumers, or the specific material exceptions, it is already known that, 
generally, the law applicable will be determined by articles 3 and 4 Rome I, which 
will lead to the law chosen by the parties or, in absence of choice, to the law of 
the place of establishment of the professional party. The protection of the EU 
consumer directives as transposed by the lex fori is ensured against the choice of 
a third country law when all relevant elements are located within the EU (art. 3(4) 
Rome I). However, if parties choose as applicable the law of a Member State, 
what happens if the lex fori provides for a better protection than a Member State 
law chosen by the parties? Provided that the Member State has implemented the 
directive correctly, the minimum protection granted by it is ensured, but could 
the provisions of the law of the forum which provide for a better level of 
protection be applied? 
On the one hand, it is submitted that as the standards set by the directives are 
mandatory EU law, the “excessive” protection provided by a national law could 
in the same way be regarded as national mandatory law.923 In such a case, its 
application is only ensured when a situation is purely internal (article 3(3) Rome 
                                                     
922 Van Bochove (n 826) 155. 
923 Kramer (n 11) 267. 
 266 
I). As a result, under this line of reasoning, the application of the provisions of 
the law of the forum which exceed the level of protection of the respective 
directive would not prevail over the Member State law chosen by the parties, 
unless we are in a purely internal situation of article 3(3) Rome I. 
On the other hand, the opposite conclusion can be achieved by following the 
reasoning of the ECJ in the Unamar judgment.924 In this case, a preliminary ruling 
was referred to the ECJ asking whether the mandatory rules of the lex fori (in this 
case, the Belgium agency rules), that offered wider protection than the minimum 
laid down by the Commercial Agents Directive, could be applied even if the law 
chosen by the parties was the law of another Member State in which the minimum 
protection provided by the Directive had also been implemented (in the case, 
Bulgarian law). The ECJ concluded that despite the Commercial Agents 
Directive was correctly transposed in Bulgarian law, the Belgium Court had 
discretion to qualify its own national provisions as overriding mandatory rules in 
the sense of article 7 Rome Convention (now article 9 Rome I), and therefore 
apply them irrespective of the otherwise applicable law.925 Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to note that the Unamar case does not deal exactly with a gold-plating 
situation, since it concerns a type of agency contract not included in the 
Commercial Agents Directive (i.e. the Belgium provisions involved extended the 
scope of application of the provisions of the Directive, rather than improving the 
protecting standards).926  
In any case, such a broad interpretation of overriding mandatory rules can 
undermine the principle of party autonomy. Also, this interpretation would affect 
the harmonising effect of the directives, and legal certainty would result impaired, 
since it would be up to each national court to decide whether or not its gold-
plating provisions are to be regarded as overriding mandatory rules and 
applicable in any situation regardless the law chosen by the parties, which would 
lead again to an uncertain and uncoordinated situation.927  
                                                     
924 Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime 
Bulgare [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:663. 
925 The ECJ in Unamar concluded that: “Articles 3 and 7(2) of the Convention on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 must be interpreted as 
meaning that the law of a Member State of the European Union which meets the minimum 
protection requirements laid down by Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the 
coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents and 
which has been chosen by the parties to a commercial agency contract may be rejected by the court 
of another Member State before which the case has been brought in favour of the law of the forum, 
owing to the mandatory nature, in the legal order of that Member State, of the rules governing the 
situation of self-employed commercial agents, only if the court before which the case has been 
brought finds, on the basis of a detailed assessment, that, in the course of that transposition, the 
legislature of the State of the forum held it to be crucial, in the legal order concerned, to grant the 
commercial agent protection going beyond that provided for by that directive, taking account in 
that regard of the nature and of the objective of such mandatory provisions”. 
926 Van Bochove (n 826) 156. 
927 ibid. 
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Since the majority of the provisions of the directives are intended to be 
mandatory provisions, rather than overriding mandatory provisions, they should 
also be considered as such when implemented within the law of the Member 
States, respecting thus the intention and purpose of the directive.928 I consider 
that, in order to ensure the predictability of outcomes and respect as much as 
possible party autonomy, two possibilities arise: either the more protective 
provisions of the lex fori should be applied but according to a specific conflict 
rule designed to deal with intra-EU harmonised areas, or the Member State law 
chosen by the parties should be respected, since at the end that law ensures the 
minimum protection required by the respective directive . The first option entails 
that, if a preferential approach is going to be adopted within the system of the 
Rome I Regulation regarding gold-plating provisions of the lex fori, the 
complexity carried by these situations should be addressed by conflict of laws 
rules specialised in harmonised fields.929  
However, I do not consider such a preferential approach is necessary in intra-
EU situations: since at least the same minimum standards are shared, multilateral 
conflict rules should be promoted in intra-EU conflicts. It is inherent to our 
current PIL method that conflict rules should promote equality between the 
different legal systems. Of course, this is not completely possible when important 
interests or values are at stake, hence the existence of rules ensuring the 
applicability of mandatory rules and overriding mandatory rules when necessary. 
However, in intra-EU situations, EU consumer directives impose common legal 
standards among the Member States, which are mandatory at a EU level. 
Moreover, it has to be taken into account that the same situation happens in 
another areas of contract law (e.g. commercial agency contracts). This EU 
mandatory set of rules might need to be ensured against the application of a 
foreign law, but not against the law of Member States that share the same EU 
mandatory provisions. The situation can be understood as an inter-state conflict 
of laws.  
Therefore, I consider that the gold-platting provisions of a Member State 
should not be imposed against the choice of another Member State law, since 
both Member States share the mandatory EU provisions. I agree however with 
the idea that maybe conflict rules focused on EU harmonised areas could be 
included in the Rome I Regulation, in order to make possible to clearly 
differentiate between intra-EU and extra-EU situations. 
 
                                                     
928 See below 3.1. regarding the debate over the classification of the provisions of EU consumer 
directives as mandatory rules or overriding mandatory rules. 
929 In this opinion, see Sánchez Lorenzo, ‘Choice of Law and Overriding Mandatory Rules in 
International Contracts after Rome I’ (n 828) 76. 
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3. EU consumer directives and extra-EU conflicts 
of laws: the international scope of the EU 
consumer directives in PIL terms 
The EU has used several methods in order to determine the international 
applicability of EU consumer directives in extra-EU situations. where the 
eventual applicability of a foreign law might spoil the objectives of a consumer 
protection directive. Firstly, the first generation of consumer directives enacted 
during the eighties did not contain any scope rule; from the point of view of PIL, 
this method did not create any special problem, since the conflict of laws would 
have been solved by the PIL rules contained in the Rome I Regulation. Secondly, 
the second generation of consumer directives already introduced scope rules with 
the close connection requirement and covering just the cases where there is a 
choice of a non-Member State law. Moreover, the Timeshare Directive included 
a more rigid and specific scope rule, determining the law of the forum as 
applicable where the situation is closely connected with the EU, the applicable 
law is that of a third country, and the immovable property is located in the EU or 
the professional directed his activities towards a Member State. The two latter 
methods that come as a reaction of the gaps regarding consumer protection in the 
conflict rules of the Rome Convention, are the ones that interfere with the conflict 
of laws system regulated in these cases by the Rome I Regulation. Finally, the 
most recent method used by the EU regarding the international applicability of 
the consumer directives is the reference to the conflict rules of the Rome I 
Regulation, which, from the PIL point of view, seems ideal since it avoids any 
confusion. However, it is also necessary to find out which method could respect 
the aim of the conflict rules, and thus ensure legal certainty, and, at the same time, 
guarantee the application of the protection required by the EU consumer 
directives when necessary.  
As it is known, conflict of laws aims to determine the law applicable to 
international situations to ascertain which law a national judge will apply when 
cross-border elements are involved. The determination of the law applicable to a 
cross-border situation has been solved through history, in very general terms, 
with the application of two theories: unilateralism and multilateralism.930 The 
unilateral theory is historically the oldest and was used exclusively on its different 
variants until the nineteenth century. Substituted by the multilateral theory, the 
unilateral method is nowadays an exception in Europe and finds its principal 
expression through the existence of overriding mandatory rules. Is there a place 
for unilateralism in EU secondary law?  
The existence of scope rules in the EU consumer directives, as well as in other 
instruments of secondary EU law, has been understood in different manners from 
                                                     
930 See Chapter I for a more extensive explanation regarding the history of the conflict of laws 
methods. 
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the PIL point of view. On the one hand, those supporting a unilateralist method 
of PIL have defended that every act of EU law, and thus the EU consumer 
protection directives, determine, implicitly or explicitly, their own scope of 
application, and claim a return of the unilateralist approach. There is a thorough 
study that has exclusively aimed to explain that EU secondary law is a 
manifestation of a modern unilateralist theory of PIL (Francq, 2005).931 On the 
other hand, those defending the persistence of the multilateral approach deny the 
previous statement and try to fit the scope rules within the existent multilateral 
conflict of laws system of the Rome I Regulation. Therefore, the question would 
be how and where the applicability of the secondary EU law, and the EU 
consumer protection directives, is to be determined: through traditional conflict 
of laws mechanisms following the Rome I Regulation, or through the instruments 
themselves, depending on their nature and purpose, as it was done in the past 
before the prevalence of multilateralism. 
Thus, this section will firstly argue the possibilities of fitting the scope rules 
of the EU consumer directives within the Rome I Regulation system, preserving 
thus the point of view that also conflict of laws regarding consumer contracts 
regulated by EU consumer directives should be solved through the Rome I 
Regulation. Secondly, however, the opposite point of view will be analysed, 
describing the possibility of determining the scope of EU consumer directives 
autonomously using a unilateral approach, discussing its advantages and 
disadvantages. Finally, a general reflexion regarding the application of foreign 
law will be made, listing few issues to take into account regarding the use of a 
unilateral approach over a multilateral method to solve a conflict of laws. 
 
3.1. The scope of EU consumer directives according to the 
Rome I Regulation system and the prevalence of 
multilateralism 
If the scope rules of the directives are understood in the light of the traditional 
method of PIL and fit within the Rome I Regulation system, they should not be 
considered as general conflict of law rules, but merely as mechanisms to 
guarantee the application of mandatory EU secondary law. Conflict rules and 
scope rules fulfil different functions: conflict rules aim to determine the law 
applicable to an international situation, while scope rules aim to ensure that the 
mandatory protection provided by an instrument is not circumvented.932 At the 
same time, they both address the application of EU secondary law. According to 
Fallon and Francq, an ‘applicability rule’ – or as we call it, a scope rule- “aims 
only at defining the spatial scope of a set of substantive rules, the mandatory 
                                                     
931 Francq, L’Applicabilité Du Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au Regard Des Méthodes Du Droit 
International Privé (n 11). 
932 Kuipers (n 11) 221–223. 
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character of which requests them to be applied irrespective of the law designated 
by the choice of law rule”.933 According to Symeonides, ‘localizing rules’- scope 
rules- are rules that “expressly delineate the spatial reach of the particular statute 
so as to ensure its applicability to certain multistate cases”.934 In the Green Paper 
on the Conversion of the Rome Convention into the Rome I Regulation, the 
Commission referred to these rules as provisions that, although not being conflict 
rules, are “rules that determine the scope of territorial application of community 
law and therefore having an impact on the applicable law”.935 
As a result of the deficiencies of the Rome Convention, the EU legislator was 
forced to include scope rules in order to ensure that the minimum protection of 
the consumer protection directives was not avoided in situations the directive 
aimed to protect. It is true that they constitute a unilateral inroad, but should not 
be seen as unilateral conflict rules as such; they operate similarly to overriding 
mandatory rules, trying to ensure the application of other rules.  
In fact, the question whether rules contained in the consumer protection 
directives could be classified as overriding mandatory rules has been object of 
intense debate. Some authors have defended that scope rules determine the 
overriding mandatory character of the provisions contained in the EU consumer 
directives.936  If they were classified as such, the directive would be applicable 
according to article 9 Rome I (which ensures the applicability of overriding 
mandatory rules irrespective of the law applicable to the contract), and not 
through the scope rule and operation of article 23 Rome I. Thus, it would 
constitute a way to coordinate the existence of scope rules within the Rome I 
Regulation system. Overriding mandatory rules are the only mechanism the 
Rome I Regulation provides for rules that delimit their international scope of 
application and prevail over the normal operation of conflict rules. 
Overriding mandatory rules constitute a unilateral inroad within the mostly 
multilateral approach followed by the European PIL, including the Rome I 
Regulation. Even Savigny, when describing his multilateral PIL method, 
recognised the existence of some rules that require their applicability regardless 
the law applicable to the situation; the question was not which rule is applicable 
to a certain legal relationship, but rather whether a legal rule of the forum law 
should be applicable to a case involving foreign elements where foreign law is 
                                                     
933 Fallon and Francq (n 774) 156. 
934 Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law Around the World: An International Comparative 
Analysis (n 323) 294. 
935 Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernisation (COM(2002) 654 final), 
3.1.1.1. 
936 Plender and Wilderspin (n 10) 268, 377–379; Fallon and Francq (n 774) 156–157; Bonomi, 
‘Article 9: Overriding Mandatory Provisions’ (n 647) 616; Sánchez Lorenzo, ‘La Unificación Del 
Derecho Contractual Europeo Vista Desde El Derecho Internacional Privado’ (n 453) 374,375. 
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applicable.937 Nowadays, overriding mandatory rules are defined as rules crucial 
for the safeguard of public interests, such as the political, social or economic 
organisation of a country, and are applicable regardless of the law designated as 
applicable.938 
However, overriding mandatory rules should be used as an exception to the 
normal operation of the conflict of laws in order to avoid a situation where every 
country that has an interest in the situation would try to impose the application of 
their national rules through the mechanism of overriding mandatory rules. 
Therefore, not every provision contained in the consumer protection directives 
can be classified as crucial for the safeguard the political, social or economic 
organisation of the country.939 It is true that overriding mandatory rules are a 
matter of national law: each state decides which are overriding mandatory rules, 
since article 9(2) Rome I just states that the provisions of the Regulation do not 
restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the forum, and 
therefore it is the Member State of the forum who has to decide which national 
rules are overriding mandatory. However, when that national rules are rules 
implementing the same or better standards of the EU directives, a consistent 
interpretation towards the objectives of the directive must be followed. As a 
result, what is crucial for the EU should be determined by the EU.940 In this 
regard, it is true that the ECJ, especially concerning the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, has in some occasions referred to the protection of consumers as a 
purpose related to a ‘public interest’.941  However, none of the cases concern a 
private international law discussion about the overriding mandatory character of 
these rules in order to ensure their application, but mainly concern the procedural 
implications of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. Also, the ECJ refers in those 
cases to the objective of consumer law to balance the interest of the parties to the 
contract and to the weaker position of the consumer. In the context of PIL, and in 
the Rome I Regulation, to determine that a provision is related to a ‘public 
interest’ might have big implications, since it can determine the difference 
                                                     
937 Friedrich Karl von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts,. Bd. 8, Berlin, 1849 (see in 
English: Savigny, Private International Law. A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, And the Limits of 
Their Operation in Respect of Place and Time (Translated by William Guthrie) (n 107) 34–37.). 
See also Michael Sonnentag, ‘Savigny, Friedrich Carl Von’ in Jürgen Basedow and others (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Private International Law, vol 2 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 1609–1615. 
938 E.g. in the Rome I Regulation the definition of article 9 Rome I is: “Overriding mandatory 
provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding 
its public interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they 
are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable 
to the contract under this Regulation.” 
939  Regarding art. 9 Rome I as possible mechanism of protection of weaker contracting parties, see 
Chapter III.3. 
940 Kuipers (n 11) 203–204. 
941 For example, see cases C-168/05 Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL 
[2006] ECR I-10421, para 38; C-243/08 Pannon GSM Zrt. v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi [2009] ECR 
I- 04713 paras 25, 31; C-26/13 Árpád Kásler and Hajnalka Káslerné Rábai v OTP Jelzálogbank 
Zrt [2014] para 78. 
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between mandatory rules and overriding mandatory rules. A wide interpretation 
of what is an overriding mandatory rule would seriously damage the principles 
of party autonomy and decisional harmony of the Regulation.942 Although in 
some cases of consumer protection public interests are involved, a large part of 
consumer law provisions is mainly aimed at the protection of private interests. 
This is, provisions regarding contracting or control of contract terms are primarily 
aimed to protect the consumer as the weaker party to the contract; then, by 
regulating those contracts, the consumer market is also regulated.943  Thus, 
although the protection of consumers can be considered as related to a ‘public 
interest’, it should not generally be regarded as ‘crucial’ for the public interest of 
a country or the EU in terms of article 9 Rome I. In order to not completely 
exclude party autonomy, the difference between mandatory rules and overriding 
mandatory rules has to be kept in mind.  
If one were to interpret the rules of the directives as overriding mandatory, 
party autonomy would be completely excluded, they would be applicable 
regardless the law otherwise applicable, and it would not be relevant whether that 
applicable law resulted from the normal operation of the connecting factors or the 
choice of law by the parties. However, most of the scope rules contained in the 
EU consumer directives, with the exception of the Timeshare Directive, indicate 
that the provisions of the directive cannot be circumvented when a choice of the 
law of a non-Member State has been made and a close connection with the EU 
exists. This means that the rules of these directives are mandatory rules in the 
sense of article 6(2) Rome I and article 3(4) Rome I (or, as referred to in the latter 
article, “provisions of Community law which cannot be derogated from by 
agreement”), not overriding mandatory rules that are applicable in any case.944 
The only exception is the Timeshare Directive: while the scope rules of the other 
directives indicate that its rules cannot be avoided by a choice of a foreign law 
when a close link with the EU exists, article 12(2) Timeshare Directive states that 
                                                     
942 Christopher Bisping, European Consumer Protection - Theory and Practice (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 251. 
943 ibid. 
944 Symeonides, when explaining the existence of unilateral inroads within a multilateral system, 
divides the different types rules with unilateral inroads in four types of rules:  
“(1) “Localizing rules” contained in substantive statutes (other than choice-of-law codifications). 
These rules expressly delineate the spatial reach of the particular statute so as to ensure its 
applicability to certain multistate cases;  
(2) “Rules of immediate application” or “mandatory rules.” These rules have the same effect as 
localizing rules, even in the absence of such express language;  
(3) Unilateral choice-of-law rules contained in PIL codifications; and  
(4) Certain multilateral rules that, despite their multilaterality and resulting appearance of neutrality, 
are designed to lead to the application of the lex fori in the majority of cases and thus to ensure 
compliance with important public policies of the enacting state.”  
He later classifies the scope rules contained in the EU consumer directives as “localizing rules”, 
rather than in the second category that equals what we understand as overriding mandatory rules, 
supporting therefore the same position. Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law Around the World: 
An International Comparative Analysis (n 323) 294, 296. 
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the consumer cannot be deprived by the protection of the Directive regardless the 
law applicable when the immovable property is located in the EU or the 
professional directs is activities to the EU. 945 Thus, the rules of this Directive 
(specifically, the national rules implementing this directive) could be interpreted 
as overriding mandatory rules.946  
As a result, not all the EU consumer protection rules can be classified as 
overriding mandatory rules, since not all of them are crucial for the safeguard of 
public interests of the EU and intend to be applicable regardless the law otherwise 
applicable, but rather only intend to ensure they do not become circumvented as 
a result of a choice of a third country law.947  
Still, it is defended that the application of EU consumer directives should not 
be determined outside the system of the Rome I Regulation. The EU legislator, 
seeing that the Rome Convention contained gaps and was unable to accommodate 
to the EU needs regarding consumer protection, started to lay down criteria for 
the application of the consumer directives through scope rules. At the time, it was 
seen as the only mechanism for the EU to guarantee the application of mandatory 
EU law. Thus, rather than unilateral conflict rules, these rules should be 
understood as scope rules that, more that determining the applicability of the 
directives, they declare the level of mandatory nature of its provisions. They 
should be interpreted as rules facilitating the task of determining the degree of 
mandatoriness of the provisions of the instrument, and not as conflict rules as 
such. Some of them could prevail over the multilateral conflict rules of Rome I 
through article 9 Rome I if they are to be classified as overriding mandatory rules, 
which would not happen in most of the cases. However, they should not prevail 
through article 23 Rome I because they would not be considered as conflict of 
laws rules.948 
                                                     
945 Italics provided by the author.  
946 Kuipers (n 11) 223–224. 
947 In this regard, Basedow also claimed that the characterisation of these rules from a traditional 
PIL point of view as overriding mandatory rules would not fit with the fact that a choice of law is 
required for their application. However, he reasoned that the importance for the forum of an 
overriding mandatory rule depends on both the content and the connection of the situation with the 
forum country, being therefore possible that scope rules could have the character of overriding 
mandatory rules. Jürgen Basedow, ‘Conflicto de Leyes Y Armonización Del Derecho Privado 
Material En La UE’ (2006) 6 Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional Privado 141, 153. 
However, that being said, I still consider that not every directive on consumer protection can be 
classified as crucial for the safeguard the political, social or economic organisation of the EU, and 
the different drafting between article 12(2) Timeshare Directive and the rest of the scope rules, the 
former requiring application of the rules regardless the law applicable, evidences the different level 
of mandatoriness existent between the named directives. 
948 Kuipers (n 11) 224. On the contrary, considering scope rules prevail over the conflict rules of 
Rome I through article 23 Rome I since they are conflict rules of community origin, even though 
considering the situation as complex and unsatisfactory: Weller (n 760) 421–424; Mankowski (n 
864) 847. 
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If we follow this approach, the Rome I Regulation system is respected, and 
the advantages deriving from the use of a (mostly) multilateral system are 
safeguarded. A multilateral approach requires a choice between the different state 
laws by connecting the legal relationship to the law of a state according with 
objective criteria. With this approach, equality between the forum law and foreign 
law is promoted, as well as predictability and respect for the expectations of the 
parties involved. This approach aims to achieve uniformity of results. Since a 
system completely based on value-free conflict rules is not sufficient in order to 
protect certain values essential for the forum, the Rome I Regulation includes, for 
example, special protective conflict rules for weaker contracting parties, with 
protective connecting factors and limits on party autonomy, and the doctrine of 
overriding mandatory rules.  
However, this system is not able to differentiate between intra-EU situations 
and extra-EU situations. Under a PIL multilateral approach, a consumer contract 
between a Dutch consumer and a German professional is not different than a 
consumer contract between a Dutch consumer and a Brazilian professional. 
However, from the point of view of EU law, the situations completely differ from 
each other: while in the first case the application of the EU standards is ensured, 
in the second case there is the possibility that the EU standards are not applied 
when the EU intended to, disrupting the well-functioning of the internal market. 
The EU does not want that, as a result from the operation of conflict rules, 
difficulties to the functioning of the internal market are created, while the current 
PIL system does not properly reflect that desire, as it has been shown in this case 
regarding consumer protection.  
 
3.2. The scope of EU consumer directives according to 
a unilateral approach: the return of unilateralism? 
In contrast to multilateralism, which focuses on the legal relationship in order to 
determine the law applicable, unilateralism focuses on the legal acts themselves, 
and defends that each law determines its own scope of application. The first 
paradigm of unilateralism rests on the notion that laws prescribe their own scope 
of application, which derives from the content and purposes of the rule. As a 
result, the second paradigm of unilateralism is that each legal order would itself 
determine when and to which extend its rules would be applicable to international 
situations.949 Therefore, following a unilateral approach, every EU consumer 
protection directive determines its own international scope of application.  
It has been explained that only some consumer protection directives contain 
explicit scope rules which impose the application of the minimum standards of 
the directive when the situation is closely connected to the territory of the 
Member States and a choice of law of a non-Member State has been made. 
                                                     
949 See Chapter I for a historical development of the unilateral PIL approach. 
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However, following a unilateral approach, every directive, even implicitly, 
determines its scope of application.950 Francq defends that every act of EU 
secondary law fixes implicitly or explicitly its own scope of application in 
function of its objectives and substantive content.951 Even when a directive does 
not include an explicit scope rule, it does not mean that it does not determine its 
own scope of application. Its scope of application can be inferred from its nature 
and purpose, classical interpretation methods. In this sense, all the substantive 
provisions of the directive should be taken into account to determine the scope 
the directive aims to cover, as well as the recitals and preparatory works, which 
can be significant in order to ascertain the purpose of the directive. In fact, under 
this line of reasoning, even when the consumer protection directives contain an 
explicit scope rule, it could be necessary to take into account the purpose and 
nature of the instrument as well. For example, in order to interpret the vague term 
‘close connection’ that these scope rules contain, it might be necessary to interpret 
the provisions of the directive and ascertain when a specific situation could be 
considered as closely connected to the territory of the EU for the purposes of that 
directive.952 According to Francq, directives determine their own scope of 
application just because they are rules of law, and rules of law necessarily define 
their territorial scope of application.953 The author explains that the EU secondary 
law would adhere to the unilateralist theory of Quadri, according to which 
substantive rules always contain criteria of applicability because they are a 
manifestation of the will of the legislator.954 According to Quadri, rules should be 
understood as commands, and thus they would include the indication of its 
addressees. All rules, as a result of specific experiences, include their own limits 
of application, at least in an implicit way.955 Still, Francq states that the EU legal 
system conforms to the unilateralist theory, although it does not constitute a 
unilateral system.956 
                                                     
950 Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private 
International Law- or the Other Way Around?’ (n 750) 339. 
951 Francq, L’Applicabilité Du Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au Regard Des Méthodes Du Droit 
International Privé (n 11) 479. 
952 Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private 
International Law- or the Other Way Around?’ (n 750) 346–348. 
953 Francq, L’Applicabilité Du Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au Regard Des Méthodes Du Droit 
International Privé (n 11) 479. 
954 ibid. 
955 Quadri (n 153) 199. On the contrary, Mathieu (n 11) 78,79.: although recognising some 
legitimacy behind the statement that rules enacted by a legislator are a result of a sociological 
observation where the scope is limited to a given population, Mathieu has submitted that, firstly, 
the ‘cultural context’ is not capable of providing applicability criteria that are precise enough to be 
useful and, secondly, that sociological observations can remain relevant across the borders of a 
specific country. For example, the sociological observations behind the enactment of French and 
Belgian rules on contract law are not so different. 
956 Francq, L’Applicabilité Du Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au Regard Des Méthodes Du Droit 
International Privé (n 11) 599. In addition to Francq, several authors recognise the unilateralism 
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Those supporting a unilateral approach also find support on the reasoning of 
the ECJ in the previously mentioned Ingmar case.957 In this case, the ECJ, in order 
to determine the international scope of application of the Commercial Agency 
Directive, interpreted it in the light of its nature and purpose. The Commercial 
Agency Directive, as the consumer protection directives enacted during the 
eighties, was silent about its international scope of application. Because of the 
choice of a non-Member State law (Californian law) where the principal was 
established, the commercial agent established in the UK, and performing all his 
activities in the UK and Ireland, was losing the protection provided for in the 
Commercial Agency Directive. The ECJ referred in his reasoning to the purposes 
of the directive, which were “to eliminate restrictions on the carrying-on of the 
activities of commercial agents, to make the conditions of competition within the 
Community uniform and to increase the security of commercial transactions”.958 
Moreover, the ECJ also based his decision on the provisions of the directive at 
stake: articles 17 and 18 of the Commercial Agents Directive define the 
circumstances under which a commercial agent, upon termination of the contract, 
is entitled to claim compensation for the damages suffered because of the 
termination of the contractual relationship with the principal. At the same time, 
article 19 of the Directive states that “parties may not derogate from articles 17 
and 18 to the detriment of the agent before the agency contract expires”. The ECJ 
concluded that the nature and purpose that these provisions serve requires their 
application where the situation is closely connected with the Community, 
irrespective of the law chosen by the parties to govern their contract.959 Although 
the Ingmar decision only refers to articles 17 to 19 of the Commercial Agents 
Directive, a wider meaning could be inferred from its reasoning. The ECJ based 
its decision by referring to the freedom of establishment and undistorted 
competition within the internal market as the aim of these provisions, and as from 
the recitals of the Directive it is implied that these objectives are present in more 
provisions, those other provisions of the Directive could be regarded also as 
applicable irrespective of the law by which the parties intended the contract to be 
governed.960 Therefore, the ECJ determined that the Directive applies when the 
situation has a close connection with the EU, which is presumed when the agent 
carries out his activities in a Member State. It is observed that the ECJ determines 
the international scope of application of a directive which lacks an explicit scope 
rule based on the nature and purpose of the directive.  
Thus, following this reasoning, the criteria for applicability would always be 
included in the instrument itself, but they would not always be presented as 
                                                     
existent in EU instruments, and the necessity of such approach, such as: Bucher (n 754) 82 et seq.; 
Symeonides, ‘Accommodative Unilateralism as a Starting Premise in Choice of Law’ (n 20). 
957 Case C381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc. [2000] ECR I-9305. 
958 Ingmar, para. 23. 
959 Ingmar, para. 25. 
960 Ibid. 
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such.961 Inclusion of the criteria for territorial applicability in the instrument, and 
silence about the application of foreign law, are characteristics of the unilateral 
method. If we understood the EU is following a unilateral approach, the directives 
would always determine their own scope according to their purpose, while being 
silent about the application of foreign law. The existence of explicit scope rules 
would thus be justified, as rules helping to define the international scope of the 
directive, and the reasoning followed by the ECJ in the Ingmar case, which 
received many critics, would also be justified, as it follows traditional methods 
of interpretation in order to determine the scope of the Directive. Since article 23 
Rome I states that the provisions of the Rome I do not “prejudice the application 
of provisions of Community law which, in relation to particular matters, lay down 
conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations”, the unilateral conflict 
rules laid down in the directives would prevail over the conflict rules of the Rome 
I Regulation. Since this provision is the reflection of the principle lex specialis 
over lex generalis, and thus the special unilateral rules of the directives take 
precedence as a general principle, both explicit and implicit scope rules would 
prevail over the provisions of the Rome I Regulation.962 
If we were to accept the prevalence of unilateralism in the determination of 
the international scope of EU law, could the EU objectives be better achieved? 
Following the postulates of unilateralism developed during the twentieth century, 
headed in Europe by the writings of Jean-Paul Niboyet, Rolando Quadri or 
Alexander Pilenko, the reason why the determination of the scope of application 
of a law is an inherent part to it lays on the postulate laws are not universal (i.e. 
they are territorial), but they are created to fulfil specific aims of a society, and as 
such they have a specific reach.963 For example, according to Quadri’s view, a 
complete unilateralist thinker that rejected and attacked multilateralism and even 
the concept of conflict rules, rules always contain limits of their own efficiency, 
since they command the activities and actions of the individuals, and thus must 
identify its addressees as well. Laws are product of social experience.964 Then, a 
legal instrument, understood according to its purpose, would be considered as an 
instrument which regulates social and economic life, and thus enacted based on 
specific political or economic aims, or special needs of a society. Therefore, the 
modern unilateralist thinking would be based on the understanding of law as 
fulfilling the purposes of regulating specific social or economic needs of the 
society, rather than aiming neutrality or justice, and because of that it limits its 
                                                     
961 Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private 
International Law- or the Other Way Around?’ (n 750) 348. 
962 Following this line of reasoning, ibid 354,355. 
963 Jean-Paul Niboyet, ‘Territoriality and Universal Recognition of Rules of Conflict of Laws’ 
(1952) 65 Harvard Law Review 582; Quadri (n 153); Alexander Pilenko, ‘Droit Spatial et Droit 
International Privé’ (1954) 5 Ius Gentium 35. 
964 Quadri (n 153). 
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own application.965 EU law serves the social and economic needs of the EU, 
necessary to establish an internal market.966 The EU aims to maintaining and 
developing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and in order to achieve that 
aim it is necessary to regulate the economic activities that affect the market. Thus, 
EU law is created in order to achieve the ideal economic development of the 
market, taking into account the respect for certain social values. In the same 
manner, the consumer protection directives pursue specific economic and social 
objectives, necessary for the well-functioning of the internal market.967 The EU 
legislator, when making use of scope rules, is making sure those objectives are 
not spoiled. As a result, the use of a unilateral approach could be seen as a more 
pragmatic manner of ensuring the aims of the consumer protection directives are 
fulfilled. EU secondary law determining its own scope of application cannot be 
completely conformed to overriding mandatory rules, and therefore the EU 
legislator makes use of the unilateral method thinking in functional terms. The 
EU legislator aims to achieve specific social or economic objectives, and 
                                                     
965 In contrast, multilateralism differs in its conception of law. Both unilateral and multilateral 
theories, besides solving a conflict of laws, include a certain conception of the general nature of the 
rules of law. The majority of multilateral thinkers agree that rules of law are neutral and universal, 
since they are the result of rationality. They understand the law as a model of social conduct and an 
answer a judge gives when a certain behaviour is presented to him, and thus can be used by the 
judge to all the cases presented to him regardless of the place where the facts took place or where 
the persons come from. The rule of law is understood as the type of legal solution appropriate for 
when certain facts occur, and as such is virtually universal. Mathieu (n 11) 75; Francq, 
‘Unilateralism’ (n 877) 1786. 
966 Article 3(3) TEU explains the EU objectives, both economic and social: “The Union shall 
establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based 
on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological 
advance. 
 It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and 
protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection 
of the rights of the child.  
It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member 
States. 
It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural 
heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.” 
967 According to the European Parliament research service, “European consumer policy is a vital 
element of a well-functioning internal market. It aims to guarantee consumers rights vis-à-vis 
merchants and to provide additional protection, for example for vulnerable consumers. 
Empowering consumers and effectively protecting their safety and economic interests have become 
essential goals of European policy in the area of consumer protection. Research carried out for the 
European Parliament indicates that effective consumer protection policy is essential for an efficient 
and well-functioning European market. Improved transparency and better informed transactions 
resulting from well implemented consumer policy results in better solutions for consumers and 
greater market efficiency.” Mariusz Maciejewski and Sarabjeet Hayer, “Consumer policy: 
principles and instruments”, Fact sheets of the European Union, March 2017, available in: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.5.1.html. 
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indications on the international scope of the instrument are sometimes provided 
in order to ensure those objectives.968 
A priori, taking a unilateral approach results more attractive, even as a general 
PIL system for EU law, but several points are to be taken into account: 
The well-known major criticism of unilateralism is regarding the conflict 
created when two or more legal orders claim application to the situation, and 
when none of them does. Although at this stage every unilateral theory differs in 
their proposed solutions (e.g. Currie resorted to the forum non conveniens theory, 
some modern unilateralists resort to multilateralism at this stage, and others, like 
Quadri, searched for the law that in practice is more effective and corresponds to 
the expectation of the parties)969, this is known as the most problematic issue of 
unilateralism and no definitive solution has been generally accepted. Regarding 
the lacuna, when no legal order claims application, most have opted for the 
application of the lex fori, although different approaches can be found in this 
regard as well.970  
Also, if the decision needs to be recognised or enforced in a different country, 
that country would be more reluctant to recognise and enforce the foreign 
decision when the forum judge unilaterally applied the forum law to an 
international situation with no objective connections to the forum country.  
Moreover, since the unilateral approach only gives room to the application of 
foreign law once it is determined that the situation is not covered by the 
substantive forum law, it is considered as a forum centred approach. It would be 
inconsistent to maintain that EU law depends on its own applicability criteria and 
impose its application and to ignore at the same time that foreign law might do 
the same. One of the main PIL principles in our current PIL system is the equal 
treatment between forum law and foreign law, which unilateralism does not 
respect. While the principle of supremacy applies to relationships between 
national Member States law and EU law, when a foreign law comes into play the 
EU is not the sovereign. Since the EU legislator is not the sole legislator, it should 
not impose its law over foreign law.971   
It can also be added that legal certainty is not benefited from a unilateral 
approach: instead of defining the circumstances under which a Member State law 
applies and under which foreign law applies, it would only be determined when 
does EU law apply; moreover, the exercise of finding the purpose of the legal act 
                                                     
968 Francq, ‘Unilateralism’ (n 877) 1789.1790. 
969 ibid 1784,1785.  
970 ibid.  
971 Kuipers (n 11) 215. As Rühl explains, one of the principal characteristics of our modern PIL 
system is the openness to the application of a foreign law, rather than requiring courts to 
systematically apply law of the forum in cross-border situations. Giesela Rühl, ‘Private 
International Law, Foundations’ in Jürgen Basedow and others (eds), Enclyclopedia of Private 
International Law, vol 2 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 1383.  
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might be difficult and adds uncertainty to the process of determining the 
applicable law. In that sense, unilateralism might be seen more as an approach, 
rather than a specific PIL system.972 
To sum up, the advantages of following a unilateral approach regarding EU 
law in general are a more pragmatic and better protection of the EU objectives. 
However, this would result in a protectionist system that imposes the application 
of its law over foreign law, completely contradictory with the current PIL 
approach. In my opinion, a general unilateral approach should be rejected, 
although it will be discussed below whether, for specific sectors of EU law, such 
as consumer protection in this case, could be considered not as a general approach 
but as an exception to multilateralism. 
 
3.3. General reflexions regarding the application of 
foreign law by the EU PIL 
As a general reflexion, taking into account the PIL values, the need of protection 
of weaker contracting parties such as the consumers, and the special needs of the 
internal market, several points might be taken into account in terms of a future 
change of approach of EU PIL. In this regard, it has to be noticed that regarding 
the PIL method, methodological purity (i.e. purely multilateral method or 
unilateral method) is not realistic nor desirable; no contemporary conflict of laws 
system is purely multilateral or purely unilateral.973 Also, both methods should 
not be understood as opposite, but combined together might produce a better PIL 
system. Since European PIL history has shown us that a multilateral method 
brings more advantages than a unilateral method, we could then analyse which 
situations might require the introduction of a unilateral inroad: 
 
(1) Interrelationship among countries and similarity of legal values: 
The traditional approach of PIL since Savigny and until nowadays was to solve a 
conflict of laws from the point of view of the legal relationship, with a neutral 
conflict rule that would find the legal systems most closely connected to the legal 
relationship. In that manner, international harmony of decisions would be 
achieved, meaning that the outcome would be the same regardless the jurisdiction 
where the proceedings were brought, which would prevent limping legal 
relationships and would promote legal certainty.974  
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Having this in mind, one reflexion can be made: it makes sense that when 
different legal systems share common or similar legal values, conflict of laws 
rules should definitely promote the equality between these different national legal 
systems through neutral conflict rules; however, when legal systems do not share 
similar legal values, and important interests are at stake, should the application 
of foreign law be decided by neutral conflict rules? 
It has been suggested to understand the application of foreign law by 
imagining a sliding scale (‘scale of Ten Wolde’): on the one end of the scale, the 
states with which no basic values or principles are shared, against which the 
forum state would desire to apply his own law; on the other end of the scale, states 
which are so integrated with each other that share the same legal values and 
principles, and thus there would be neutrality regarding the application of the 
forum law or foreign law.975 Of course, it is difficult to imagine countries at the 
far end of the scale, which do not share basic values or legal principles whatsoever 
and do not have any interaction among other countries. On the other side of the 
scale we can have the EU Member States (depending on which area of law), or 
the American states, or the Spanish provinces, for example; they are completely 
interconnected societies which share the same or very similar legal values, and 
can therefore easily apply neutral conflict rules to solve the conflict of laws within 
them.976  
The interrelationship between the countries involved becomes one of the 
factors PIL should take into account in order to determine the application of 
foreign law. The more the countries are interrelated, the more legal values they 
would share and, therefore, the more eager would be to use neutral conflict rules. 
However, in the opposite case, the more the countries are on the other side of the 
scale, the more need for a unilateral approach ensuring the application of the 
forum law. 
 
(2) The mandatory character of the forum rules: 
The importance of the interconnection between countries and the legal values 
shared among them in order to determine the application of foreign law varies in 
the different areas of law. In contract law, a mostly value-free area where the free 
will of the parties prevails, the existence of common principles among the 
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countries involved does not seem to be so relevant as compared, for example, to 
family law, where the cultural differences among the countries are evident in the 
legal system of each country. Therefore, the use of a multilateral method should 
be more extended in more value-free areas of law, while in other areas of law it 
with a stronger mandatory character it would be required to introduce more 
unilateral inroads in order to ensure their legal values. 
Still, in the area of contract law there might be important values at stake, such 
as the protection of consumers, employees, etc. Therefore, it is necessary to 
differentiate between rules with an overriding mandatory character, rules with a 
mandatory character and rules with regulatory character. Then, in contract law, 
regarding rules with regulatory character (which are the majority of rules in this 
field), it makes sense that conflict rules promote neutrality between legal systems 
prevail, since relevant values are not at stake. When talking about rules with 
mandatory character, for example, in the areas of contract law that aim to protect 
contractual weaker parties (e.g. consumer law), the state needs to protect these 
values, and thus the conflict rules are not that neutral, but conditioned to ensure 
these values of the forum state when necessary. In the case of overriding 
mandatory rules, essential for the organisation of the state, the forum state would 
like to ensure the application of these rules unconditionally.977  
Even in a mostly value-free area such as contract law, the existence of 
mandatory rules and overriding mandatory rules can require to introduce, as an 
exception to multilateralism, some unilateral-based rules. Then, multilateralism 
would be the general rule, and unilateralism the exception. 
 
(3) The special situation of the European Union: 
In the case of the EU Member States, regarding intra-EU conflicts, we could place 
them almost at the end of the scale where the societies are so interconnected that 
almost share the same legal values. Again, this depends on which area of law, 
but, in general, multilateral conflict rules should prevail. 
Moreover, there are many fields that are harmonised among the EU. The more 
harmonised an area of law is, the less need for unilateral conflict rules, since all 
Member States would share the same (minimum) standards. 
In our case, regarding consumer protection, we can difference between 
minimum harmonisation directives and maximum harmonisation directives. 
While the first ones impose minimum protection standards that the Member 
States have to implement, and moreover improve, the latter impose the same 
standards among the Member States. Since at least the same minimum standards 
are shared, multilateral conflict rules should be used in intra-EU conflicts.  
                                                     
977 An extensive reflexion in this regard is found in: Marques dos Santos (n 167). 
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Regarding extra-EU situations, in harmonised areas of law such as consumer 
law, the Member States should be understood as a single legal order, in which 
sometimes, in order to defend its values, should require the application of EU 
mandatory rules against a foreign legal order and thus make use of a more 
unilateral approach when necessary, according to the circumstances described 
above. 
 
4. Achieving a better consumer protection in the 
EU while respecting PIL values: some 
proposals 
Some suggestions to coordinate the interaction of the Rome I Regulation and the 
EU consumer directives regarding their international scope will be submitted, on 
the basis of two starting points. First, on the basis of the idea that PIL 
methodological purity is rejected (and has been rejected in Europe for more than 
fifty years), since it does not seem possible that a single method, neither 
multilateral nor unilateral, can solve all conflict of laws issues.978 Second, on the 
basis of the notion that the EU Area of Justice and the correct functioning of the 
internal market should be respected and thus the EU consumer protection should 
be ensured when necessary. Indeed, the PIL method should respect and reflect 
the changing needs of the society. 
The Rome I Regulation includes a review clause in article 27 Rome I, 
according to which the Commission should have submitted a report on the 
application of the Regulation, including a study on the law applicable to insurance 
contracts and an evaluation on the application of article 6 Rome I, especially 
regarding its coherence with EU law in the area of consumer protection.979 While 
a report regarding insurance contracts was submitted980, a report regarding an 
explicit evaluation of article 6 Rome I and its interaction with the EU consumer 
directives has not been released until the date, even if it was due by mid-June 
2013. On the other hand, an extensive review of EU Consumer Law (Fitness 
                                                     
978 José Carlos Fernández Rozas, ‘Orientaciones de Derecho Internacional Privado En El Umbral 
Del Siglo XXI’ (2000) 9 Revista Mexicana de Derecho Internacional Privado 7; Jacquet (n 23) 36; 
Marques dos Santos (n 167); Batiffol (n 168). 
979 Article 27(1) Rome I provides that: “By 17 June 2013, the Commission shall submit to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee a report on 
the application of this Regulation. If appropriate, the report shall be accompanied by proposals to 
amend this Regulation. The report shall include: 
(a) a study on the law applicable to insurance contracts and an assessment of the impact of 
the provisions to be introduced, if any; and 
(b) an evaluation on the application of Article 6, in particular as regards the coherence of 
Community law in the field of consumer protection.” 
980 Final Report of the Commission Expert Group on European Insurance Contract Law, European 
Commission, Doctorate-General for Justice (2014), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/expert_groups/insurance/final_report_en.pdf 
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Check) took place in 2017, aiming to analyse aspects such as effectiveness, 
efficiency, coherence, relevance, and efficient achievement of objectives of 
several EU consumer directives; however, this Fitness Check explicitly excludes 
the evaluation of the Rome I Regulation, on the basis that “EU consumer law 
instruments are also without prejudice to the existing EU rules of private 
international law, in particular Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I) and Regulation (EC) No 1215/2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (recast). This Fitness Check does not, therefore, extend to 
these instruments.”981 While a report regarding the function of article 6 Rome I 
and the interaction of the Rome I Regulation with the EU consumer directives 
would be desirable, the exclusion of this topic from the Fitness Check, together 
with the most recently enacted directives, gives us a hint that the new pattern of 
the EU is to refer any conflict of laws issue deriving from the consumer protection 
directives to be solved by the Rome I Regulation.  
Considering the ‘new trend’ of the EU legislator is to dispense with the scope 
rules of the consumer directives and determine the law applicable to a consumer 
contract exclusively through the conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation, some 
improvements could be made regarding the Rome I Regulation system to 
accommodate it to the needs of the EU consumer protection: 
 
(1) Elimination of scope rules from EU consumer directives 
In my opinion, scope rules contained in EU consumer directives should be 
eliminated, since the uncertainty they create might be even prejudicial for the 
consumer they seek to protect: uncertainty around its nature and function, and 
regarding their interaction with the Rome I Regulation; vagueness in their 
drafting, causing a difficult and possible diverse implementation in the national 
law of the Member States; disruption of the EU conflict of laws system based on 
the Rome I Regulation regarding contractual obligations; and legal uncertainty 
when rules somehow affecting conflict of laws are dispersed in different 
instruments (in this regard, as recital 40 Rome I states, “a situation where conflict-
of-law rules are dispersed among several instruments and where there are 
differences between those rules should be avoided”).  
The possibility of including a list of EU consumer directives in the Annex of 
the Rome I Regulation as instruments including specific conflict rules prevailing 
over the general conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation has been considered 
during the transformation of the Rome Convention into the Rome I Regulation. 
                                                     
981 European Commission Evaluation and Fitness Check (FC) Roadmap (REFIT Fitness Check of 
consumer law) (December 2015), available in: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_just_023_evaluation_consumer_law_en.pdf 
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The Rome I Proposal included on Annex I a list of instruments laying down 
conflict rules relating to contractual obligations and which should prevail over 
the conflict rules of the Rome I (art. 22 Proposal Rome I). Although this list did 
not include the EU consumer directives, it was defended that, if the list of the 
Annex was to be in the final version of the Regulation, it should also include the 
scope rules of the consumer directives.982 This solution has been rejected, since 
that would impose a continuous necessity for adaptation in order to include new 
consumer directives.983 However, if directives were to keep including scope rules, 
and the legislator indeed aimed for them to prevail over the general conflict rules 
of the Rome I Regulation, the inclusion of such list would increase legal certainty 
and facilitate the task of the legal operator, and would constitute the only manner 
to coordinate the existence of such rules with the Rome I Regulation and at the 
same time allow each directive to design its own international scope. Still, in my 
opinion, such a solution would tip the balance excessively in favour of a unilateral 
method of PIL. 
 
(2) Protection of EU mobile consumers against a non-EU choice of law 
when necessary: distinguishing between intra-EU and extra-EU 
situations in article 6 Rome I 
‘Holiday consumers’ or mobile consumers (i.e. a consumer from Member State 
A, that while on a short stay in Member State B is approached by a non-Member 
State company that is targeting its activities to Member State A) are excluded 
from the protection of article 6 Rome I in case of a choice of a third country law, 
since article 6 Rome I requires that the professional directs his activity to the 
Member State of habitual residence of the consumer in order to ensure the 
application of the mandatory provisions of the law of the state of habitual 
residence of the consumer. It is not logical that a consumer from Member State 
A would lose the EU consumer law protection just because he is on holiday on 
Member State B, and at the same time not enjoying the protection of Member 
State B; it is more in line with the objectives of EU consumer protection and 
normal functioning of the internal market that, for example, a Dutch consumer 
travelling to Spain enjoys the same protection as a Spanish consumer vis-à-vis a 
non-EU professional, even when the latter does not target the Dutch market. The 
effectiveness of EU consumer protection directives would be threatened if a 
professional established in a non-Member state could target EU consumers that 
are temporarily staying in another Member State without being bound to the EU 
consumer requirements, being able to circumvent them by a simple choice of a 
third country law. Instead of solving this gap through scope rules contained in the 
                                                     
982 Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law (n 316) 339–344. 
983 For example, this option was completely rejected by the responses to the proposal in Magnus 
and Mankowski (n 818) 8; Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law 
(n 587) 15,16. 
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directives themselves, a novelty could be incorporated within article 6 Rome I: in 
the case of legislation implementing EU consumer directives, the different 
Member States could be seen as a single jurisdiction; the EU should be seen as a 
single state in this regard.984 Article 6 Rome I would be able to differentiate 
between intra-EU and extra-EU cases. 
It is true that until now article 6 Rome I is a protective conflict rule that does 
not discriminate or differentiate between forum law or foreign law, and in this 
case, between EU consumer law and non-EU consumer law. Following the basic 
notion of our current PIL, that legal orders should be treated equally, article 6 
Rome I provides for the application of the law of habitual residence of the 
consumer, and ensures the application of its mandatory provisions against a 
choice of law of another country, regardless the habitual residence of the 
consumer (and thus the law applicable) is in a Member State or in a third country. 
Although introducing a protective connecting factor favouring consumers, article 
6 Rome I is a multilateral conflict rule, non-discriminating with foreign law and 
respecting the legitimate expectations of the parties and legal certainty. 
Moreover, the fact that scope rules contained in directives took a unilateral 
approach and determined the scope of the directive ignoring the application of 
foreign law and the Rome I Regulation system has been criticised previously 
criticised in this chapter.985  
However, the proposed solution would consist on taking a unilateral inroad 
and favour EU consumer law: whenever a professional directs his activities to a 
Member State, the application of the minimum requirements of EU consumer 
directives should be ensured, regardless the Member State of habitual residence 
of the consumer. In my opinion, this little exception to the multilateral nature of 
the provision could be justified. First, the specific conflict of laws issue deriving 
from the international application of EU directives call for a special solution: it 
does not seem outrageous to consider the EU as a single jurisdiction for 
international cases when the mandatory provisions we are talking about are also 
EU made. The situation ‘EU mandatory law vs. foreign country law’ can be 
treated equal to ‘forum mandatory law vs. foreign country law’, and thus a choice 
of foreign law should not result in depriving the EU consumer from the protection 
granted by EU consumer law.  
This modification will mean a PIL adaptation to the EU requirements. For the 
EU, a conflict between a German consumer and a Spanish consumer is considered 
internal, while a conflict between a German consumer and a Moroccan 
professional is considered international; from the PIL point of view, both are 
international. By treating the EU as a ‘country’ in cases where the application of 
EU Directives is at the stake, the Rome I Regulation would be adapting to the EU 
necessities. Moreover, the legal expectations of the parties are better served, since 
                                                     
984 In the same opinion: Kuipers (n 11) 220. 
985 See in this Chapter section 1. Also, Magnus (n 707) 23,24; Weller (n 760) 422,433. 
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“holiday consumers” or mobile consumers would be protected, and, regarding the 
professional, it can be expected that, when targeting the EU market, the EU 
standards are to be applicable. This is, in harmonised areas, an intra-EU conflict 
of laws situation would be comparable to an intraregional conflict of laws 
situation. 
The Max Planck Institute, in its Comments on the Green Paper for the 
Conversion of the Rome Convention in the Rome I Regulation, already proposed 
a similar addition to the conflict rule on consumer contracts involving mobile 
consumers: “If a supplier residing in a non-Member State directs his business 
activities to one or more Member States, the choice of law of a non-Member State 
as the law applicable to a contract falling into the scope of such activities does 
not deprive a consumer who, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, is 
habitually resident in a Member State of the protection afforded by the relevant 
Directives; in this case, the provisions of the relevant Directives apply as 
implemented in the domestic law of the Member State in which the consumer 
concluded the contract.”986 
I propose that the same or a very similar rule, ensuring the application of the 
protection of the relevant EU consumer directives when a non-EU professional 
targets the EU market, should be included in article 6 Rome I following article 
6(3) Rome I. Article 6(3) Rome I provides: “If the requirements in points (a) or 
(b) of paragraph 1 are not fulfilled, the law applicable to a contract between a 
consumer and a professional shall be determined pursuant to Articles 3 and 4”. 
With the introduction of the new proposed provision, in cases where the territorial 
requirements of article 6(1) Rome I are not fulfilled, the choice of law resulting 
from the application of the general rule of article 3 Rome I should not deprive the 
consumer from the protection granted by the relevant EU consumer directives in 
the case that a non-EU professional directed his activities to the internal market. 
I consider the introduction of a similar provision as the better manner of ensuring 
the application of EU consumer directives, since it fulfils the function of scope 
rules (i.e. ensuring that the mandatory EU consumer protection is not 
circumvented by a foreign choice of law) but at the same time does not disrupt 
the whole EU conflict of laws system with dispersed conflict rules in different 
instruments, ensuring legal certainty, and respecting the legitimate expectations 
of the parties. The PIL values are respected, it only adapts the needs of EU law 
in PIL terms: in the same manner that the consumer protection provided by the 
country of habitual residence of the consumer cannot be circumvented by a choice 
of foreign law, the EU consumer protection provided by the EU Directives cannot 
be circumvented by a choice of law when a consumer has habitual residence in a 
Member State. 
 
                                                     
986 Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law (n 587) 15. 
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(3) Protection of some consumer contracts not covered by article 6 
Rome I: extending the scope of article 3(4) Rome I 
If we were to include the aforementioned provision in article 6 Rome I, it seems 
logical that the material exceptions contained in article 6(4) Rome I would still 
be applicable: article 6 Rome I only applies to consumer contracts not excluded 
by article 6(4) Rome I, and the number of contracts recognised by the EU 
consumer directives is more extensive. The most controversial exception is the 
first one, “(a) Contracts for the supply of services where the services are to be 
supplied to the consumer exclusively in a country other than that in which he has 
his habitual residence” (e.g. accommodation in a hotel, a language course, etc.). 
The rationale behind this exclusion is to respect the legitimate expectations of the 
professional, and since the contract is supposed to be more connected with the 
country where the service is supplied, the consumer could not reasonably expect 
the law of the country of his habitual residence would apply.987 However, because 
of this exclusion, the consumer is treated as if he were a professional, since there 
are no restrictions on the choice of law, meaning that he can also be deprived of 
the protection afforded to him by the law of the country where the services are 
provided. For example, the case where a French resident enters into a consumer 
contract for an English language course held in Ireland, and the contract contains 
a choice of a foreign law and he does not receive the protection of French law nor 
Irish law. The consumer could expect French mandatory law to not be applicable, 
since the English course is completely taking place in Ireland, but could he expect 
that other law is applicable this situation?  
If one were to keep the material exceptions of article 6(4) Rome I, since there 
is a rationale behind them, but still palliate the effects of some minor gaps 
resulting from the material scope limitations of article 6 Rome I, that might be 
sorted out by article 3(4) Rome I. Article 3(4) Rome I provides: “Where all other 
elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in one or 
more Member States, the parties' choice of applicable law other than that of a 
Member State shall not prejudice the application of provisions of Community law, 
where appropriate as implemented in the Member State of the forum, which 
cannot be derogated from by agreement.” This provision becomes applicable 
when all relevant elements are located within the EU (intra-EU situations).988 
However, in this case, we would require a provision that ensures the application 
of EU consumer directives even if not all the relevant elements are located in the 
EU, since, for instance, in the example above the professional might be a 
                                                     
987 Garcimartín Alférez, ‘The Rome I Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing?’ (n 345) 72. 
988 Article 3(4) Rome I cannot be used to justify the application of European provisions when all 
relevant elements are not located within the European Union. Article 3(4) Rome I has been 
questioned as it does not fulfil its purpose of coordination and protection against abuse of law, since 
it does not cover any extra-EU situation. EU mandatory law becomes applicable provided all the 
relevant elements are within the EU (but rather just require a close connection with the Member 
States). As a result, either article 3(4) is not adapted to the requirements of the EU secondary law, 
or the EU secondary law is not adapted to the Rome I Regulation system. 
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company established in China focused on Chinese nationals, but with habitual 
residence in a Member State. It could be considered the introduction of the close 
connection test that scope rules provided rather than the ‘all relevant elements to 
the situation’ requirement. It is true that ‘a close connection with the territory of 
one or more Member States’ is a vague term; however, maybe presumptions to 
facilitate its interpretation could be included. Moreover, this general expression 
was originally intended “to make it possible to take account of various ties 
depending on the circumstances of the case”.989 In the directives, this constituted 
legal uncertainty and inconsistencies, since directives are to be transposed into 
national law and might give rise to as many interpretations as Member States are. 
However, this would not be the case if we include this concept in article 3(4) 
Rome I. In the case of consumer contracts, it would be ensured that, in the case 
of consumer contracts not covered by article 6 Rome I, the consumer (for 
example, a consumer falling under the exception of article 6(4)(a)), is not treated 
as a professional, but the application of the EU consumer protection standards is 
ensured through this provision. Moreover, it does not preclude the application of 
foreign law, but only ensures the application of EU mandatory law when the 
situation is most closely connected with the EU.  
 
Finally, one reflexion regarding all the modifications suggested: even if they 
suppose a limitation in the exercise of party autonomy, they do not eliminate it. I 
consider that a systematic application of the law of habitual residence of the 
consumer, although it is true that avoids the task of analysing the applicable 
mandatory rules of the chosen law and the law of habitual residence of the 
consumer and brings some legal certainty, it would also mean that the protective 
rules of the consumer’s habitual residence would apply to any case (e.g. mobile 
consumers, active consumers, etc.), which might negatively affect the market and 
would not be according to the expectations of the parties.990 In my opinion, the 
advantages that party autonomy brings can be coordinated with the needs of 
consumer law and EU consumer law without completely setting aside party 
autonomy, but just limiting it. Also, in case of consumer directives that seem to 
require to be applicable irrespectively that a foreign law is applicable as a result 
of a choice of law or as a result of the normal operation of the connecting factors 
(i.e. the Timeshare Directive), its provisions, if they are to be regarded as essential 
for the organisation of the state (or of the EU) can be ensured through article 9 
                                                     
989 Commission v Spain (para. 32). 
990 The Max Planck Institute, in its comments to the Green Paper for the conversion of the Rome 
Convention, agreed with this statement. Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private 
International Law (n 587) 54. However, later on, when commenting the Rome I Proposal that 
eliminated party autonomy in this regard, embraced the modification on the basis that avoids the 
complicated interaction between choice of law and mandatory rules, bringing more legal certainty. 
Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law (n 316) 269,270.  
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Rome I, since the existence of overriding mandatory rules in EU consumer 
directives, rather than normal mandatory rules, seems exceptional.991  
 
 
5. Closing remarks 
In order to better understand the existent inconsistencies regarding the 
relationship between EU consumer directives and the Rome I Regulation, and the 
implications of this relationship in the EU conflict of laws system, several 
reflexions and conclusions can be highlighted from this chapter: 
-First, regarding the current inconsistencies, these derive from the different 
protective reach article 6 Rome I and the EU consumer directives intend to cover. 
With the enactment of the first generation of consumer directives in the eighties, 
it was evident that the protective conflict rule of the Rome Convention (article 5 
Rome Convention regarding some consumer contracts) left outside its scope 
many situations the directives intended to apply to. This became evident with the 
Gran Canaria cases, where a simply choice of a third country law set aside the 
EU mandatory consumer provisions in cases where they clearly should have been 
applicable. In order to avoid the circumvention of the application of EU 
mandatory consumer law, the EU legislator started to introduce in the second 
generation of consumer directives scope rules that provided for the application of 
the standards of the directive whenever there was a choice of a non-Member State 
law and the situation was closely connected with the EU. Although article 6 Rome 
I broadened its scope of application and covers more consumer contracts, there 
are still gaps on its regulation, such as ‘mobile consumers’.  
Thus, it is questioned whether there is still a need for scope rules in order to 
ensure the application of consumer directives when necessary. It is submitted that 
the existence of scope rules does more harm than good: first, their drafting is too 
broad; in general, they do not stipulate which law should be applicable (the 
directive as implemented by the law of the Member State of habitual residence of 
the consumer, the law of the forum, etc.) and the requirement of a close 
connection is difficult to interpret. As a result, the implementation of scope rules 
into the national law of the different Member States creates different 
interpretations and thus adds more uncertainty to the system; since Member 
States implement into their national law different drafting of the scope rules, 
sometimes even taking a unilateral approach ensuring the application of national 
law, a sort of parallel intra-EU conflict of laws system is created. Second, scope 
rules are unrelated and disrupt the current conflict of laws system of the Rome I 
                                                     
991 In a different opinion, Magnus and Mankowski consider that to distinguish between cases where 
a choice of law has been made and where no choice of law has been made would be unsuccessful, 
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Regulation. Introducing the unilateral approach of the scope rules, which 
determine the scope of the instrument without referring to foreign law, clashes 
with the multilateral nature of the Rome I Regulation. Moreover, if the Rome I 
Regulation tries to unify the conflict of laws of the different Member States in 
contractual obligations, scope rules disrupt that aim. The consumer is most 
certainly better protected in a coherent system which ensures legal certainty, and 
therefore a preference for an integrated Rome I approach is defended. Moreover, 
this seems to be the new trend followed by the EU legislator, since the most recent 
consumer directives refer the conflict of laws matter to the rules of the Rome I 
Regulation. 
-Second, it is debated whether the Rome I Regulation traditional approach is 
preferred to a change of approach towards a unilateral method in order to 
determine the scope of application of EU consumer directives. According to a 
unilateral approach, every directive determines its own scope of application; even 
if it does not contain an explicit scope rule, every directive, even implicitly, 
determines its own scope according to its purpose and nature. In fact, this point 
of view finds support in the Ingmar decision of the ECJ, in which the court 
determined the international applicability of the Commercial Agency Directive, 
which lacks an explicit scope rule, based on the nature and purpose of the 
directive. The unilateral thinking would justify the existence of scope rules of 
directives as well as the Ingmar decision. Since the modern unilateralist thinking 
is based on the understanding of law as fulfilling the purposes of regulating 
specific social or economic needs of the society, rather than aiming neutrality or 
justice as multilateralism defends, and EU law serves the social and economic 
needs of the EU necessary to establish an internal market, those objectives would 
be easily promoted by the use of a unilateralist approach. The use of a unilateral 
approach can be seen as a more pragmatic manner of ensuring the aims of the 
consumer protection directives are fulfilled.  Nevertheless, apart from the 
inherent problems to a unilateral approach (i.e. the conflict created when two or 
more legal orders claim application to the situation, and when none of them does, 
as well as being a forum centred approach that does not consider the application 
of foreign law), other disadvantages arise if we were to use this approach to 
determine the application of EU consumer directives autonomously. First, it 
would be inconsistent to maintain that EU law depends on its own applicability 
criteria and imposes its application and at the same time to ignore that foreign 
law might do the same; the principle of supremacy applies to relationships 
between national Member States law and EU law, but when a foreign law comes 
into play the EU is not the sovereign. It is submitted that the EU legislator should 
not impose its law over foreign law. Second, legal certainty is not benefited from 
a unilateral approach: instead of defining the circumstances under which a 
Member State law applies and under which foreign law applies, it would only be 
determined when does EU law apply; also, the exercise of finding the purpose of 
the legal act is a burdensome task and adds uncertainty to the process. Therefore, 
it is concluded that an autonomous approach consisting on the EU Directives 
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determining its own scope of application through a unilateral method would result 
in a protectionist system that imposes the application of its law over foreign law, 
contrary to the current PIL approach.  
On the other hand, according to the multilateral approach followed by the 
Rome I Regulation, a choice between the different state laws is made by 
connecting the legal relationship to the law of a state according with objective 
criteria. With this approach, equality between the forum law and foreign law is 
promoted, as well as predictability and respect for the expectations of the parties 
involved. This approach aims to achieve uniformity of results. Of course, since a 
system completely based on value-free conflict rules is not always sufficient in 
order to protect certain values essential to the forum, the Rome I Regulation 
includes in this case special protective conflict rules for weaker contracting 
parties, with protective connecting factors and limits on party autonomy, and the 
doctrine of overriding mandatory rules. The applicability of the EU consumer 
directives (as transposed to the national law of the Member States) is decided 
according to the conflict rules of the Regulation. According to this approach, the 
existent scope rules, rather than unilateral conflict rules, should be understood as 
rules that, more than solving a conflict of laws, they declare the level of 
mandatory nature of the provisions of the respective directive. They should be 
interpreted as rules facilitating the task of determining the degree of 
mandatoriness of the provisions of the instrument, and not as conflict of laws 
rules as such. In this regard, the provisions of the majority of EU consumer 
directives should not be understood as overriding mandatory rules essential for 
the safeguard the political, social or economic organisation of the country. 
Although overriding mandatory rules are a matter of national law, and it is the 
Member State of the forum who has to decide which national rules are overriding 
mandatory, when that national rules are rules implementing the standards of the 
EU directives, a consistent interpretation towards the objectives of the directive 
must be followed. As a result, what is crucial for the EU should be determined by 
the EU. Also, while overriding mandatory rules completely set aside party 
autonomy, most of the scope rules contained in the EU consumer directives, with 
the exception of the Timeshare Directive, indicate that the provisions of the 
directive cannot be circumvented when a choice of the law of a non-Member 
State has been made and a close connection with the EU exists. Thus, as a general 
consideration, the provisions of the EU consumer directives are, a priori, EU 
mandatory provisions and not overriding mandatory provisions. This means that, 
regarding the Rome I Regulation system, some exceptional provisions of EU 
consumer directives that should be considered as overriding mandatory rules 
would prevail over the law designated by the Regulation according to article 9 
Rome I; however, normally, since they are considered as EU mandatory law, they 
would not prevail over the law designated by the Rome I Regulation.  
As a disadvantage, the Rome I Regulation system is not able to differentiate 
between intra-EU situations and extra-EU situations. From the EU point of view, 
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in the first case the application of the EU standards is ensured, while in the second 
case there is the possibility that the EU standards are not applied when the EU 
intended to, disrupting the well-functioning of the internal market.  
As a result, both methods –multilateral and unilateral- have their advantages 
and disadvantages, and it is submitted that the intended objectives will be better 
achieved combining both, ensuring the prevalence of PIL values while adapting 
them to the internal market needs. Methodological purity in a modern PIL system 
is rejected. In this regard, several factors can be taken into account in order to 
understand the situations in which a unilateral approach is justified: when 
different legal systems share common or similar legal values, like in the case of 
the Member States, conflict of laws rules should definitely promote the equality 
between these different national legal systems through neutral conflict rules; 
however, when legal systems do not share similar legal values, and important 
interests are at stake, the rules determining the law applicable to an international 
situation shall not be that neutral. The interrelationship between the countries 
involved, and the mandatory nature of the applicable rules, are factors to be taken 
into account when building a conflict of laws system. In our specific case, we are 
dealing with EU mandatory rules common to the European Member States. 
Therefore, it should be necessary to differentiate between intra-EU conflicts of 
law and extra-EU conflicts of law. In intra-EU conflicts of law, the use of a 
multilateral method should be promoted regarding consumer contracts, since the 
same or similar standards are shared among the Member States, even in gold-
platting situations. However, in extra-EU conflict of laws the Member States 
could be understood as a single legal order which needs to ensure the application 
of its EU mandatory rules against a foreign legal order, and thus the use of a more 
unilateral approach when necessary can be justified and considered regarding 
future European PIL reforms. 
-Finally, some short-term improvements to coordinate the interaction of the 
Rome I Regulation and the EU consumer directives regarding their international 
scope are submitted. First, as it has been explained, scope rules spread around 
some EU consumer directives create more harm than good regarding consumer 
protection due to the uncertainty around their functioning, and therefore they 
should be eliminated.  
Second, article 6 Rome I should take a unilateral inroad and favour EU 
consumer law, being able thus to difference between intra-EU consumer contracts 
and extra-EU consumer contracts. Whenever a professional directs his activities 
to a Member State, the application of the minimum requirements of EU consumer 
directives should be ensured, regardless the Member State of habitual residence 
of the consumer. The situation “EU mandatory law vs. foreign country law” can 
be treated equal to “forum mandatory law vs. foreign country law”, and thus a 
choice of foreign law should not result in depriving the EU consumer from the 
protection granted by EU consumer law. A rule similar to the one suggested by 
The Max Planck Institute in its Comments on the Green Paper for the Conversion 
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of the Rome Convention in the Rome I Regulation should then be introduced, 
maybe following article 6(3) Rome I: “If a supplier residing in a non-Member 
State directs his business activities to one or more Member States, the choice of 
law of a non-Member State as the law applicable to a contract falling into the 
scope of such activities does not deprive a consumer who, at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, is habitually resident in a Member State of the 
protection afforded by the relevant Directives; in this case, the provisions of the 
relevant Directives apply as implemented in the domestic law of the Member State 
in which the consumer concluded the contract.”992   
Lastly, some consumers not covered by article 6 Rome I could still be better 
protected if the scope of article 3(4) Rome I was extended. Article 3(4) Rome I 
ensures the application of EU mandatory law against the choice of a non-Member 
State law but only when all relevant elements are located within the EU. The 
requirement of all relevant elements within the EU could be modified as to 
include, for example, the close connection test that scope rules provided. 
Although a close connection with the territory of one or more Member States is 
a vague term that might affect legal certainty as well as the legitimate 
expectations of the parties, presumptions to facilitate its interpretation could be 
included. Also, even a most favourable law approach like in article 6(2) Rome I, 
according to which the application of the provisions of EU mandatory law would 
only be applicable if they are more beneficial than the mandatory provisions of 
the chosen law, could be considered, not depriving then the consumer from a 
possible more favourable regime. 
Therefore, I consider the applicability EU consumer directives, as 
implemented by the national laws of the Member States, should be determined 
by the Rome I Regulation system, since legal certainty is better ensured by a 
unified EU conflict of laws regime. However, the Rome I Regulation needs to 
adapt to the EU requirements in order to promote the well-functioning of the 
internal market, and in that regard some unilateral inroads can be included in 
order to differentiate between intra-EU conflicts of law and extra-EU conflicts of 
law in consumer contracts, ensuring therefore the application of EU consumer 
mandatory law when necessary. 
 
                                                     
992 Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law (n 587) 15. 
Chapter V - The relationship and coordination between EU employment directives 
and the Rome I Regulation 
295 
 
CHAPTER V - THE RELATIONSHIP AND 
COORDINATION BETWEEN EU 
EMPLOYMENT DIRECTIVES AND THE 
ROME I REGULATION 
 
How does the Rome I Regulation relate to the application of EU directives 
regarding employment matters? Do the existent conflict rules respond to the 
needs of the EU employment directives? Can the analysis regarding the 
relationship between Rome I and EU consumer directives also apply to EU 
employment directives? This chapter aims to analyse the coordination between 
the Rome I Regulation and the application of EU directives in the context of 
individual employment matters. Since the same analysis has been conducted in 
the previous chapter with regard to EU consumer directives, it will be examined 
whether the same examination and conclusions can, to a certain extent, be applied 
regarding cross-border employment issues. 
Employment contracts with cross-border elements are very common 
nowadays, especially within the EU, where freedom of provision of services and 
freedom of movement of workers facilitates the access to the market of other 
Member States. Thus, within the EU, there are every time more situations 
involving cross-border employment relationships: workers commuting to a place 
of work in their neighbouring country, employers posting workers to another 
Member State, companies seeking out employees abroad, relocation after a cross-
border transfer of an undertaking, workers whose job is of a cross-border nature, 
etc. 
Article 8 Rome I regulates the law applicable to individual employment 
contracts in cross-border situations. Article 8 Rome I does not present the same 
type of problems as article 6 Rome I regarding consumer contracts, since article 
8 does not provide for specific requirements for its application, but applies to all 
individual employment contracts.993 Article 8(1) Rome I allows the parties to 
choose the law applicable to the contract as long as the provisions of the chosen 
law are not prejudicial for the employee in comparison to the mandatory 
provisions of the law objectively applicable. The law objectively applicable is 
generally the law of the place in which or from which the employee habitually 
works (article 8(2) Rome I); when the habitual place of work cannot be 
determined, the law of the country where the place of business through which the 
employee was engaged is situated will apply (article 8(3) Rome I). Article 8(4) 
Rome I contains an escape clause stating that if from the circumstances as a whole 
                                                     
993 Definition provided in Chapter II in 1.2.2. 
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the contract is more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in 
paragraphs 2 or 3, the law of that other country shall apply. Article 8 Rome I 
clarifies that the habitual place of work is not deemed to have changed if the 
employee is temporary posted to another country. As it is known, the Rome I 
Regulation has a universal scope of application, meaning that regardless the law 
designated by the conflict rule is the law of a Member State or the law of a third 
country, the Member State court will have to apply it. Article 8 Rome I ensures 
that as long as the habitual place of work of an employee is a Member State, then 
the law of that Member State, and, as a result, the protection provided by the EU 
directives applicable to the situation, applies, except when the contract is most 
closely connected to a non-Member State (art. 8(4) Rome I). Although article 8 
Rome I provides for several connecting factors, it has been determined in Chapter 
III that the majority of the times the law applicable in absence of choice will be 
the law of habitual place of work. The identification of the habitual place of work 
is easy in the majority of the cases, where the work is performed by the employee 
in one single place, like in the case of local employees or employees transferred 
to another country. Cases involving migrant workers, frontier workers or workers 
that are employed by a foreign employer do not normally bring special 
difficulties, since the work is typically performed in one country and thus the 
habitual place of work is easy to determine. The ECJ has made a very extensive 
interpretation of the term ‘habitual place of work’, which consequently reduces 
the role of the rule of article 8(3) Rome I to exceptional cases.994 
In the area of labour law, the EU, in accordance with article 153 TFUE, adopts 
directives that set minimum requirements regarding working and employment 
conditions, and informing and consulting of workers. Generally, EU directives 
dealing with employment matters are of a minimum harmonising nature. 
Therefore, Member States, when transposing into their national law the 
provisions of the corresponding directive, are able to provide a higher level of 
protection (e.g. the Working Time Directive995 entitles workers to an annual paid 
leave of 20 days, but several Member States have opted for a more beneficial 
regime). The existent diversity among the Member States regarding social and 
labour policies and realities constitutes an impediment against a unified EU social 
policy going beyond minimum standards accepted by all Member States.996 EU 
employment law just covers regulatory aspects of employment law and even in 
this regard there are central issues (such as unfair dismissal) that are regulated by 
national law. This is, EU employment law is quite fragmented and mainly 
composed by minimum harmonisation directives that complement the policies of 
Member States. Sometimes, they even leave a big amount of discretion with 
                                                     
994 Case C-29/10 Heiko Koelzsch v État du Grand Duchy of Luxemburg [2011] ECR I-01595 and 
Case C-384/10 Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA [2011] ECR I-13275; in that regard, Chapter III.2.2. 
995 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299/9). 
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regard to the minimum standard. Therefore, since national employment laws in 
the EU are still very disparate, PIL is still essential even in intra-EU scenarios.  
Regarding the relationship of the Rome I Regulation and the EU employment 
directives, it can already be anticipated that article 8 Rome I Regulation ensures 
most of the times the application of the mandatory employment provisions of the 
specific directives when necessary. This is because most EU employment 
directives do not interfere with PIL and just lay down a minimum substantive 
protection that Member States have to implement. However, there are some 
directives (Acquired Rights Directive997  and Posted Workers Directive998) that 
directly deal with cross-border employment situations and contain rules that 
interfere with PIL, which relationship with the Rome I Regulation requires 
specific attention. 
Thus, on the one hand, EU employment directives generally do not intend to 
deal with cross-border situations, but just lay down (minimum) substantive rights 
for employees that Member States have to implement into their national 
employment legislation. Workers in the EU enjoy that minimum protection. 
Every worker in the EU has certain minimum rights established by EU 
employment directives relating to health and safety at work, equal opportunities 
for women and men, protection against discrimination and working conditions 
regarding part-time work, fixed-term contracts, working hours or informing and 
consulting employees.999 Most of the directives in this regard do not create any 
special issue for PIL. As it was previously discussed, under our current PIL 
system and, specifically, under the Rome I Regulation, the conflict rules will 
determine which law is applicable to the case. The provisions of the specific 
directive will be applicable as implemented by the Member State law determined 
by the Rome I Regulation.  
On the other hand, we also find EU employment directives that directly 
involve cross-border situations. These are directives that involve situations where 
there is a change on the country of place of work of the employee, either 
permanent or temporary, due to a cross-border transfer of undertaking involving 
a relocation of the work force or a due to a temporary posting of workers. We 
refer to the Acquired Rights Directive and Posted Workers Directive. Both 
directives deserve a closer analysis. 
                                                     
997 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (OJ 2001 L 82/16). 
998 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (OJ L 1996 18/1); 
also: Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 
amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision 
of services (OJ 2018 L 173/16). 
999 For a comprehensive study on those topics, Riesenhuber (n 206). 
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The Acquired Rights Directive aims at preserving employees’ rights in the 
case of a transfer of undertaking, protecting a business' employees in the event of 
a change of employer; when the transfer is across the borders of the country, the 
habitual place of work of employees also changes, changing the law applicable 
to their contract. In addition, it contains a rule referring to its territorial scope that 
should be object of analysis in PIL terms.  Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive 
states that the “directive shall apply where and in so far as the undertaking, 
business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred is situated within 
the territorial scope of the Treaty”. How is this rule reconciled with the Rome I 
Regulation? Are the conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation enough to ensure the 
aims of the Acquired Rights Directive in a cross-border transfer of undertaking?  
Regarding the Posted Workers Directive, it is applicable to temporary cross-
border postings of workers in the context of an intra-EU provision of services. 
The Directive tries to promote the freedom of provision of services as well as to 
ensure the protection of workers who are temporary posted to other Member 
States. Although article 8 Rome I provides that the habitual place of work does 
not change upon a temporary posting, and thus the law of the Member State of 
habitual place of work remains applicable, article 3 of the Posted Workers 
Directive requires to extend the application of certain provisions of the law of the 
Member State of posting regarding certain areas to workers that are temporarily 
posted there. In addition, the revised version of the directive adds a provision 
requiring the application of all the applicable terms and conditions of 
employment of the law of the Member State of posting after 12 (or 18) months of 
posting. Are the requirements of the Posted Workers Directive ensured through 
the Rome I Regulation? The relationship between the Posted Workers Directive 
and the rules of the Rome I Regulation must be object of analysis. 
Thus, this Chapter will first analyse the coordination of the Rome I Regulation 
and the general EU employment directives that do not directly deal with cross-
border situations and do not interfere with the PIL rules. Second, it will focus on 
the interaction of the rules of the Rome I Regulation and the Acquired Rights 
Directive, which contains a ‘scope rule’ similarly to some of the EU consumer 
directives. A similar analysis to the one conducted in the previous chapter 
regarding the scope of consumer directives is conducted in the context of the 
Acquired Rights Directive. Finally, this chapter will deal with the law applicable 
to employment contracts in the context of a temporary posting of workers. The 
original Posted Workers Directive and the new Posted Workers Directive, as well 
as the Enforcement Directive, are object of brief analyses. Then, focus is on the 
issues deriving from the requirements of article 3 Posted Workers Directive and 
the provisions applicable to the posted worker. It can be advanced that article 9 
Rome I regarding overriding mandatory provisions plays an important role in that 
regard.  
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1. The Rome I Regulation and EU employment 
directives that do not directly interfere with PIL 
Most of the existent EU employment directives lay down minimum substantive 
provisions that Member States have to implement into their national employment 
law, with the opportunity to improve the protection required by the directive. The 
majority of the employment directives do not intend to deal with issues related to 
cross-border employment contracts, but just aim to ensure that workers in a 
Member State enjoy the minimum rights required by the respective directives. 
The most typical scenario is internal: a person working in a Member State with 
no international elements related to the employment contract. The national law, 
that has implemented the EU minimum employment standards, ensures that the 
worker enjoys that substantive rights provided by the directives. However, there 
are many cases that involve cross-border elements: employees transferred to 
another country, cases involving migrant workers, frontier workers or workers 
that are employed by a foreign employer, worker carrying out activities in more 
than one place, cases involving transnational occupations, etc. Therefore, the 
coordination between those directives and its applicability to individual 
employment contracts involving cross-border elements is discussed. 
Besides from Directives on health and safety (e.g. Directive 89/391/EEC on 
safety and health of workers at work1000) or on non-discrimination (e.g. Directive 
2000/43/EC against discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin1001, 
Directive 2000/78/EC against discrimination at work on grounds of religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation1002, Directive 2006/54/EC equal 
treatment for men and women in matters of employment and occupation1003, etc.), 
which are essential for the respect of EU fundamental rights, one of the main 
areas covered by EU employment law is working conditions. This comprises 
provisions regarding working time, part-time, and fixed-term work, temporary 
workers or the posting of workers. Directives such as the Directive 91/533/EEC 
employer's obligation to inform of the individual employment conditions1004, 
Directive 1999/70/EC on fixed-term work1005, Directive 97/81/EC on part-time 
                                                     
1000 Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work (OJ 1989 L 183/1). 
1001 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (OJ 2000 L180/22).  
1002 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303/16). 
1003 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation (recast) (OJ 2006 L 204/23). 
1004 Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an employer's obligation to inform 
employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship (OJ 1991 L 
28/32). 
1005 Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-
term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175/43). 
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work1006, Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work1007, Directive 
2003/88/EC on working time1008, etc. lay down provisions regarding the working 
conditions of employees in the EU. Member States must have implemented into 
their national law the minimum rights and conditions required by these directives. 
Besides the specific objectives of each directive in every area of employee 
protection, the EU employment directives generally aim to avoid social dumping 
and improve the conditions of the workers and life within the EU.1009  
These directives do not contain conflict rules or references to PIL. They do 
not deal with cross-border situations, but establish substantive rights and ensure 
that Member States apply minimum working protection to the workers working 
in that Member State. Therefore, the Directives will apply when the national law 
of a Member State is applicable because it is a purely internal situation or, in a 
cross-border situation, as a result of the conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation. 
In our current EU PIL approach, it is understood that if a law has been determined 
as applicable by the conflict rules, then the statutes of that legal system shall apply 
to the situation (as long as the situation falls within the scope of application of 
the statute in question). This is, the national judge, when a situation involves 
cross-border elements, is expected to follow the forum conflict rules which will 
point to the applicable law, rather than applying a statute of the forum without 
previously resorting to the conflict rules. In the case of an individual employment 
relationship with cross-border elements, when the case regards any of the areas 
regulated by a EU directive, the forum judge will determine the law applicable to 
the contract in accordance to article 8 Rome I. Then, the application of the EU 
directive is ensured through the application of the determined Member State law, 
which has implemented (and maybe improved) the terms and conditions required 
by the directive. 
EU employment directives establish terms and conditions regarding workers 
working within the EU. In such cases, the application of the mandatory provisions 
of the EU Directives are (mostly) ensured through the Rome I Regulation, since 
the main connecting factor of article 8 Rome I is the habitual place of work.1010  
In this sense, the EU employment directives and article 8 Rome I are 
coordinated. The directives lay down substantive law and the Rome I Regulation 
determines which national law will be applicable in a cross-border situation. The 
mandatory provisions of the habitual place of work are ensured by article 8 Rome 
                                                     
1006 Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on 
part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC - Annex : Framework agreement on 
part-time work (OJ 1998 L 14/9). 
1007 Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 
on temporary agency work (OJ 2008 L 327/9). 
1008 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299/9). 
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I, and if the habitual place of work is a Member State, then the provisions of the 
respective directive are ensured. The majority of these Directives, in general, do 
not have any interest on being applicable to workers outside the EU. The relevant 
criterion is therefore the place of work. None of the directives refer to factors 
such as nationality or place of residence.1011 Unlike the EU consumer directives, 
they do not make any reference to a ‘close connection to the Community’ or any 
other extra-EU elements. In general, they intend to improve the conditions of life 
and work within the EU. That aim can be inferred from their wording. Many 
directives refer specifically to the workers of the EU. For example, Directive 
89/391/EEC on safety and health of workers at work refers to the responsibility 
of Member States of promoting health and safety of the workers in their place of 
work.1012 Directive 2002/44/CE refers to “all Community workers”.1013 Directive 
2003/88/EC on working time is also directed to “Community workers”.1014 For 
example, the later Directive lays down minimum working time requirements that 
Member States have to implement into their national law. It does not include any 
PIL rules or scope rules interfering with PIL. Therefore, the provisions of the 
Directive regarding working time will apply when the law of a Member State 
applies as implemented by that national law. One of the objectives of the 
Directive is that Member States implement or improve the minimum 
requirements of the Directive and, as a result, all the workers working in all EU 
enjoy a minimum protection.  
Article 8(1) Rome I follows the preferential law approach when there is a 
choice of law. In terms of the protection provided by the Directive, this is relevant 
when the choice is a non-Member State law or when the choice is a less beneficial 
Member State law. Article 8(1) Rome I ensures the application of the mandatory 
provisions of the law otherwise applicable (in most scenarios, the law of habitual 
place of work) that are more beneficial for the employee in comparison with those 
of the law chosen. The provisions deriving from the EU employment directives, 
as provisions protecting the weaker party, entail mandatory character. They 
belong to a category of ‘provisions of Community law that cannot be derogated 
from by agreement’-or EU mandatory law- and these type of provisions are 
mandatory internally within the EU legal system. Provisions which mainly aim 
at protecting the weaker contracting party (in this case, employees) fall within 
that category.1015 As a result of article 8(1) Rome I, if parties have chosen the law 
                                                     
1011 Francq, L’Applicabilité Du Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au Regard Des Méthodes Du Droit 
International Privé (n 11) 384–386. 
1012 See for example recital 2 (“Whereas it is known that workers can be exposed to the effects of 
dangerous environmental factors at the work place during the course of their working life”) and 
recital 7 (“Whereas Member States have a responsibility to encourage improvements in the safety 
and health of workers on their territory”). 
1013 Recital 3 reads “(…) These measures are intended (…) also to create a minimum basis of 
protection for all Community workers in order to avoid possible distortions of competition”.  
1014 Recital 5 states that “(…) Community workers must be granted minimum daily, weekly and 
annual periods of rest and adequate breaks”. 
1015 In this regard, see discussion in Chapter III.3.1. 
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of a Member State that has just implemented the minimum protection required 
by the specific Directive, while the Member State of habitual place of work has 
improved the requirements of the Directive applicable to the specific case at hand, 
the more beneficial mandatory rules will be applicable.  
While in the majority of the cases the application of mandatory rules is 
ensured by article 8 Rome I, there might be situations in which that is not the 
case.1016 Although provisions of the EU employment directives are mainly aimed 
at the protection of the employee, it has to be taken into account that the interests 
of the state, and, in some cases, the interest of the EU, play a much higher role in 
employment contracts than in consumer contracts. Therefore, in some specific 
cases, the application of certain employment provisions can be so essential for 
the public interests of the EU or of a state that justify their application over the 
designated applicable law as overriding mandatory rules (article 9 Rome I).1017 
 
2. Coordination between the Acquired Rights 
Directive and the Rome I Regulation 
Cross-border transfers of undertakings comprise all the different elements of an 
undertaking being transferred (assets, contracts, employees, rights, etc.) from one 
country to another, which constitutes a complex and often uncertain process. 
Employees of the undertaking being transferred might be subject to a negative 
impact as a result of the agreement on the transfer, in which they have not 
participated. Employees are not the direct participants of this transaction, but 
might be the ones suffering the negative consequences if the labour conditions 
agreed by the former employer and the new employer are agreed with the 
intention to reduce the costs of the transfer. 
Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the 
event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses (‘Acquired Rights Directive’) is aimed at preserving employees’ 
rights in the case of a transfer of undertaking and thus protecting a business' 
employees in the event of a change of employer. It harmonises the national laws 
of the Member States in that regard in order to ensure comparable protection of 
employees' rights in the Member States and to approximate the obligations that 
the rules of protection place on undertakings in the EU. 
Acquired Rights Directive also covers cross-border transfers of undertakings. 
Any cross-border transfer from one Member State to another Member State is 
subject to the Directive. In addition, the Directive refers to the place of origin of 
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the business unit to be transferred, covering situations where the undertaking to 
be transferred is located in a Member State- even when it is transferred to outside 
the territory of the EU. However, the Directive does not directly deal with PIL 
issues nor refers to any PIL instrument for the cases of cross-border transfers of 
undertakings. The Commission Report1018 on the Directive in 2007 pointed out 
that some national transposition rules regarding cross-border transfers could give 
rise to problems for which the Directive did not provide a solution, since, 
contrarily to the Commission proposal of 1974, the Directive did not contain any 
provisions dealing with conflict of laws.  
The purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive consists on preserving acquired 
employment rights, ensuring, among other measures, that the transferee (new 
employer) has the same rights and obligations arising from an employment 
contract as the transferor (former employer). The laws of the Member States 
differ in the application of the Directive and they also differ regarding 
employment rights. How are these rights preserved in a cross-border transfer of 
the undertaking? For example, the law of the Member State of origin provides for 
the right of an employee to not be unfairly dismissed: how is that right preserved 
when employees are transferred from that Member State to a Member State with 
a different regulation regarding dismissal?  
According to the prevailing opinion, the transfer of undertakings can be 
classified within the conflict of laws category for individual employment 
contracts.1019 Issues such as whether the transferee automatically takes over the 
employment relationships of the employees concerned, dismissal or modification 
of contract terms and conditions are to be decided according to the law applicable 
to the employment contract.1020 Therefore, article 8 Rome I will apply. The 
applicable law is determined by the restricted choice of the parties (8(1) Rome I) 
and the habitual place of work (8(2) Rome I); more exceptionally, by the 
engaging place of business (8(3) Rome I) or the country to which the employment 
contract is more closely connected (8(4) Rome I). The habitual place of work, 
however, changes with the transfer of undertaking when the transfer involves a 
simultaneous or subsequent relocation of the undertaking and its employees. It is 
                                                     
1018 Commission Report on Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of 
transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [SEC(2007) 812] 
(COM/2007/0334 final). 
1019 However, there are different conflict of laws theories regarding the law applicable to a transfer 
of undertaking: there are opinions claiming for a separate category for transfer of undertakings, and 
opinions defending that each effect of a transfer of undertaking shall be judged separately and fall 
in different conflict of laws categories. This study will not focus on the classification of transfer of 
undertakings as a conflict of laws category.  The analysis of the Acquired Rights Directive will be 
done based on the prevailing opinion, i.e. the rights and obligations deriving from a transfer of 
undertaking are governed by the law that governs the individual contract of employment. For a 
discussion regarding the different perspectives in that regard: Henckel (n 677) 221–237.  
1020 CMS Employment Practice Area Group, Study on the Application of Directive 200/23/EC to 
Cross-border Transfer of Undertakings (2006) 64. 
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generally considered that, in the case of a cross-border transfer of undertaking, 
the law applicable normally changes because the habitual place of work of the 
affected employees changes.1021 The change in applicable law will affect those 
employees that are relocated to the new location of the undertaking in a different 
country, since only for those the habitual place of work actually changes.1022 As 
to the date relevant for the change on the applicable law, the CMS Study on the 
application of the Acquired Rights Directive refers to the date of the transfer 
agreement or the date on which the employee starts working on the new 
location.1023 
On the other hand, there is a provision in the Acquired Rights Directive that, 
although it is not a conflict rule as such, might affect PIL: Article 1(2) Acquired 
Rights Directive states that the “directive shall apply where and in so far as the 
undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred is 
situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty”. This is, the Directive 
establishes that it is applicable when the undertaking to be transferred is a 
Member State. This seems to be the territorial scope covered by the Directive. 
However, is article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive a scope rule affecting PIL? 
The way the provision is drafted and the different national implementations that 
Member States have made of this rule bring up that question. Most of the 
discussions regarding scope rules in a PIL context take place regarding EU 
consumer directives, probably because of the specialty of these scope rules, 
which are focused on preventing the strong party of the contract from abusing 
party autonomy to avoid the application of EU mandatory consumer protection. 
In my opinion, article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive has a different aim, which 
is clarifying the territorial scope of the Acquired Rights Directive. Scope rules of 
EU Consumer Directives refer to a close connection with the EU and to a 
limitation of party autonomy, while the rule of article 1(2) Acquired Rights 
Directive merely makes a reference to the territorial application of the instrument. 
However, the drafting of the rule brings doubts regarding its intention, since it 
could also be understood as intending to ensure that, in a conflict of laws 
situation, the provisions of the Directive are applicable whenever the undertaking 
to be transferred is located in the EU, fulfilling the function of a scope rule. The 
different national implementations by the Member States bring more uncertainty 
to the situation. What seemed to be a clarification of the territorial scope of the 
Directive has opened a debate as to the possible existence of a scope rule in PIL 
                                                     
1021 The change in the applicable law is not retroactive. This is, rights, obligations and facts 
occurring before the change of the habitual place of work shall be governed by the laws of the 
former place of work, while those occurring after the change in applicable law will be governed by 
the law of the new place of work. Claims arising from the continuing employment contract (leave, 
pension, etc.) are governed by the new law. Henckel (n 677) 270,271. 
1022 See Chapter III in 2.2.1 for an analysis of the connecting factor of habitual place of work of art. 
8(2) Rome I. 
1023 CMS Employment Practice Area Group, Study on the Application of Directive 200/23/EC to 
Cross-border Transfer of Undertakings (2006) 65. 
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terms. As a result, if so, the same questions as concerning scope rules in EU 
consumer directives arise in this case: how does this rule relate to the Rome I 
Regulation system? Shall it be considered as a separate conflict rule that takes 
precedence over the Rome I Regulation according to article 23 Rome I? Do 
Member States (adequately) transpose the scope rule into their national law? 
Does the scope rule require application of the protection of the Directive 
whenever the undertaking to be transferred is located in the territory of a Member 
State regardless the law applicable to the situation?  
To answer these questions, this section will first point out the inconsistencies 
existent in the national implementations of article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive, 
to then try to discern how is this rule reconciled with the conflict rules of the 
Rome I Regulation and whether the Rome I Regulation ensures the application 
of the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive when necessary.  
 
2.1. Implementation of article 1(2) Acquired Rights 
Directive into the national law of the Member 
States 
As it was previously argued regarding scope rules in the EU Consumer 
Directives, the implementation of ‘scope rules’ are problematic, since Member 
States take different approaches due to the minimum harmonisation nature of the 
Directive. While from the perspective of the EU it seems justified that a EU 
Directive determines its own territorial scope by referring to the frontiers of the 
EU legal system, this approach can result in different and inconsistent national 
implementations (e.g. implementations focused on the territory of the own 
Member State, determining the applicability of the law of the forum as a ‘scope 
rule’ while ignoring the law of other Member States).1024 That seems to be the 
case of the Acquired Rights Directive.  
Different ways to implement article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive can be 
observed among the Member States.1025 The first one consists on a literal 
transposition of the provision ensuring the application of the national acquired 
rights provisions when the undertaking to be transferred is located in a Member 
State (a). The second transposition provides only for the application of the 
national acquired rights provisions if the undertaking to be transferred is located 
in the territory of the Member State in question (b). Finally, some Member States 
do not transpose the scope rule into their national laws.1026 For example, the 
                                                     
1024 Fallon and Francq (n 774) 166; Kuipers (n 11) 188. 
1025 For an extensive study on the implementation of the Directive by the different Member States, 
see: Study on the Application of Directive 200/23/EC to Cross-border Transfer of Undertakings, 
CMS Employment Practice Area Group (2006) 
1026 Henckel (n 677) 318. 
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French1027 and Dutch1028 implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive do not 
require the undertaking to be established on their territories for their legislation 
to be applicable. As in the case of the majority of Member States, they do not 
contain an explicit rule implementing article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive.  
(a) Regarding those countries transposing article 1(2) Acquired Rights 
Directive, we find on the one hand implementations such as the Greek and 
Danish, which follow the first transposition mentioned in the above paragraph: 
they limit the application of their national acquired rights provisions to the 
transfer of an undertaking when the undertaking to be transferred is located within 
the territorial scope of the Treaty or within the area to which the Treaty 
establishing the EEA is applied.1029 This is, when the court of a Member State has 
jurisdiction over the case, the application of their provisions are ensured 
whenever the undertaking to be transferred is situated in the territory of a Member 
State. 
(b) On the other hand, the second transposition mentioned above is the more 
problematic, to the point that it has been argued whether it complied with the 
Acquired Rights Directive.1030 Where article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive 
states that the Directive “shall apply where and in so far as the undertaking, 
business or part of the undertaking or business to be transferred is situated in the 
territorial scope of the Treaty”, some Member States provide for the application 
of their national acquired rights provisions where and in so far as the undertaking, 
business or part of the undertaking and business to be transferred is situated 
within the territory of the Member State. For example, the UK had followed that 
type of transposition. The transposed scope rule focused on the territory of the 
own country. The scope rule becomes a unilateral rule determining the 
application of national law. For example, the Transfer of Undertakings 
Regulation1031 (the UK regulation that implemented the Acquired Rights 
Directive) expressly provided that it is applicable to a transfer of undertaking 
where the undertaking to be transferred is established in the UK. Also, the 
Regulation does not allow the parties to contract out the provisions. Outbound 
transfers, where the business being transferred is transferred from the UK to 
another state, are covered by the Regulation and the UK provisions on acquired 
rights are applicable. However, inbound transfers, where the business is 
transferred from another country to the UK, are not covered. In these type of 
cases, the protection provided by the Acquired Rights Directive would still be 
applicable when the business is transferred from a Member State, since the 
Member State of origin also implements the minimum protection required by the 
Acquired Rights Directive. 
                                                     
1027 L1224-1 – L1224-4 Code du Travail. 
1028 Arts. 7:662- 7:666 Dutch Civil Code. 
1029 Henckel (n 677) 318,319. 
1030 ibid 319. 
1031 The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, no 246. 
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Still, the existing differences in the national implementations of ‘scope rules’ 
could disturb the conflict of laws process. Including a rule such as article 1(2) 
Acquired Rights Directive in a directive has different consequences than the 
existence of a similar rule in a Treaty or even a Regulation. In the latter cases, a 
rule determining the territorial scope of the instrument will merely do so, and 
since the instruments are directly applicable as uniform law, there is no room for 
different national implementations of such a rule. However, in the case of 
directives, the existence of such a rule, especially when drafted as article 1(2) 
Acquired Rights Directive, can be implemented and understood differently 
depending on the Member State. In addition, from a PIL perspective, the 
existence of rules determining the territorial scope of a directive can logically be 
related to the existing debate regarding the relationship of scope rules in EU 
secondary law instruments and PIL instruments. A EU law expert might read and 
understand such rules in a different way than a PIL expert. The different national 
implementations of scope rules lead to the application of different national laws 
applying in different Member States, creating a parallel and non-harmonised 
intra-EU conflict of laws system. The purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive 
is to safeguard the rights of the employees in a transfer of undertaking through 
the harmonisation of minimum protection rules among Member States. Member 
States should ensure that the minimum protection is applicable in a cross-border 
transfer when the Directive requires so (i.e. whenever the undertaking to be 
transferred is situated in the territorial scope of the Treaty). However, that 
substantive protection will only be applicable when the relevant PIL rules 
determine that the law of a Member State is applicable to the situation.  
 
2.2. How is article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive 
reconciled with the Rome I Regulation? 
Although the national implementation of article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive 
is unclear, the rule unmistakably indicates that the acquired rights provisions of 
a Member State are applicable when the undertaking to be transferred is located 
within the territory of the Treaty. The objective connecting factor of article 8(2) 
Rome I leads to the application of the law of the habitual place of work of the 
employee. This is, the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive will generally 
apply as implemented by the law of the Member State of habitual place of work 
of the employee. Even if there is a choice of law of a non-Member State, the 
application of the mandatory provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive as 
implemented by the law of habitual place of work shall be ensured as provisions 
that cannot be derogated from by agreement (article 8(1) Rome I). However, 
problems can arise when the location of the place of establishment of the 
undertaking differs from the place where the employee habitually carries out his 
work, or when the employment contract is most closely connected to a country 
different than the country of habitual place of work. For example, the American 
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Pilots case1032 concerned a transfer of a Berlin based aviation business from Pan 
American World Airways to Berliner Lufthansa Airport. The undertaking 
transferred was located in Germany before and after the transfer, while the law 
applicable to the employment contract was the law of New York as the law 
chosen and as the law applicable in absence of choice because of being the law 
most closely connected to the contract. In such scenarios, the law applicable as a 
result of the operation of article 8 Rome I would not lead to the application of the 
Acquired Rights Directive, even when the undertaking to be transferred is located 
within the EU. Should article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive, as a scope rule, 
take precedence over article 8 Rome I? If so, how? Or should article 8 Rome I be 
applicable regardless the existence of the scope rule of article 1(2) Acquired 
Rights Directive? The existence of possible inconsistencies urges the necessity 
of clarifying the nature and relationship of scope rules of EU employment 
directives and the conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation. Such clarification is 
essential in order to know when and how the rules of a EU employment directive, 
and, in this specific case, the rules of the Acquired Rights Directive, are 
applicable. Different understandings are possible from a PIL point of view in this 
regard. On the one hand, a radical return to a unilateral conflict of laws approach 
to determine the scope of the directives would be a possibility if the scope rule of 
article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive is understood as a unilateral conflict rule. 
However, that would imply a turn in the current understanding of EU PIL and it 
does not necessarily lead to a more advantageous system. On the other hand, in 
coordination with the current Rome I Regulation system, article 8 Rome I 
determining the law applicable to the employment contract does not cover all the 
situations where article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive intends to apply. 
Therefore, it has to be determined whether other mechanisms of Rome I, such as 
article 9 regarding overriding mandatory rules, can ensure the application of the 
Acquired Rights Directive. 
 
2.2.1. Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive as a separate unilateral conflict 
rule? 
If article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive was considered as a separate unilateral 
conflict rule, it could prevail over article 8 Rome I by operation of article 23 
Rome I, which states that “(…) this Regulation shall not prejudice the application 
of provisions of Community law which, in relation to particular matters, lay down 
conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations”.  
Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive, if considered a conflict rule, would be 
one of a unilateral nature, since it determines the scope of the instrument itself 
rather than referring to the legal system where the legal relationship “belongs”. 
Contrarily to multilateralism, which determines the law applicable focusing on 
                                                     
1032 BAG 29 October 1992, in: IPRspr. 1992, pp. 142 et seq. 
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the legal relationship, unilateralism focuses on the legal acts themselves, and 
defends that each legal instrument determines its own scope of application. It has 
been previously mentioned that some have defended that the scope rules existent 
in the EU consumer directives are to be considered as unilateral conflict rules, 
and that the application of EU directives is or should be determined by a unilateral 
PIL method.1033 Although the ‘scope rule’ of article 1(2) Acquired Rights 
Directive differs from the scope rules of EU consumer directives, which are more 
involved with PIL rather than merely referring to the territorial scope of the 
directive, the discussion can be similar. 
According to a unilateral approach, every directive, even implicitly, 
determines its scope of application.1034 Francq defended that every act of EU 
secondary law fixes implicitly or explicitly its own scope of application according 
to its objectives and substantive content.1035 If we understood that the EU 
legislator is following a unilateral approach, the directives would always 
determine their own scope according to their nature and purpose, while being 
silent about the application of foreign law. The same reasoning regarding EU 
consumer directives is to be followed in this regard. In both cases we are dealing 
with the applicability of EU secondary law protecting weaker parties. In both 
cases the rules of the directives have to be transposed into national law and, in 
most of the times, Member States can choose to improve the minimum level 
required by the directive, resulting in diverse national rules among Member 
States.1036  
As discussed regarding EU consumer directives, the use of a unilateral method 
to determine the applicability of EU directives might seem attractive at first, since 
it ensures the applicability of the EU instrument and the protection provided by 
it in all the cases the EU instrument wishes to apply.1037 However, such a method 
in its purity is not desirable. The unilateral approach is obviously a forum-centred 
approach, which imposes the application of forum law and ignores the 
applicability of foreign law. The EU legislator cannot impose the application of 
all EU employment protection in every international situation. Moreover, legal 
certainty would be impaired if it is only determined the application of EU law 
                                                     
1033 Francq (n 18); Stéphanie Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of the 
Methods of Private International Law- or the Other Way Around?’, Yearbook of Private 
International Law, vol 8 (Sellier European Law Publishers & Swiss Institute of Comparative Law 
2006); Bucher (n 754) 82 et seq.; Symeonides, ‘Accommodative Unilateralism as a Starting 
Premise in Choice of Law’ (n 20); Marise Cremona and Hans-W Micklitz (eds), Private Law in the 
External Relations of the EU (Oxford University Press) 91. 
1034 Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private 
International Law- or the Other Way Around?’ (n 750) 339. 
1035 Francq, L’Applicabilité Du Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au Regard Des Méthodes Du Droit 
International Privé (n 11) 479. 
1036 Regarding the difficulties derived from the national implementation of this type of rules, see 
Chapter IV in 2.1 and 2.2.  
1037 The same reasoning regarding EU consumer directives and unilateralism applies. See Chapter 
IV in 3.2. 
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instead of defining the circumstances under which a Member State law applies 
and under which foreign law applies. In addition, the exercise of finding the 
purpose of the legal act might be difficult and adds uncertainty to the process of 
determining the applicable law. Finally, the advantage of having unified PIL rules 
codified in the Rome I Regulation would be lost, as well as the advantages 
deriving from the use of a (mostly) multilateral system. A multilateral approach 
requires a choice between the different state laws by connecting the legal 
relationship to the law of a state according with objective criteria. With this 
approach, equality between the forum law and foreign law is promoted, as well 
as predictability and respect for the expectations of the parties involved.1038 
Therefore, although the use of a unilateral conflict of laws approach in EU 
employment directives would ensure the applicability of their protection and, in 
this case, ensure the application of the Acquired Rights Directive whenever the 
undertaking to be transferred is located within the EU, the imposition of EU law 
over foreign law in a unilateral way is contradictory to the contemporary PIL 
approach and such a protectionist system should be rejected. It is possible, as we 
will see, to ensure the application of the protection of the EU employment 
directives in international situations following a different method. Ensuring the 
application of EU secondary law through unilateral conflict rules does not fit 
within the current EU PIL system of the Rome I Regulation, mainly conformed 
by multilateral conflict rules with the exception of the application of overriding 
mandatory rules.  
Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive should not be considered a unilateral 
conflict rule as such: first, it does not directly affect the conflict of laws; second, 
it does not even determine which law should apply (since the directive is to be 
transposed into national law); third, it is an ambiguous provision and Member 
States disagree on the way it should be transposed into national law, and only few 
Member States actually expressly translate article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive 
into their acquired rights provisions.1039 In the previous Chapter, the similarities 
and disparities between unilateral conflict rules, scope rules and overriding 
mandatory rules were discussed.1040 In few words, the application and scope of 
an overriding mandatory provision are based on its mandatory character, which 
derives from the purpose of the provision. Contrarily, unilateral conflict rules 
delineate the scope of forum law and ensure its application to the situation 
covered without referring to foreign law, but the provisions covered do not 
necessarily have mandatory character. Finally, scope rules may determine the 
scope of mandatory provisions, overriding mandatory provisions or dispositive 
provisions. However, we should distinguish between those scope rules in a PIL 
                                                     
1038 In this regard, see reflexion regarding PIL methods and directives in Chapter IV in 3.3. 
1039 Henckel (n 677) 329. 
1040 See Chapter IV in 1.5. In that regard, Francq, ‘Unilateralism’ (n 877) 1788,1789; Francq, ‘The 
Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private International Law- or 
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sense, which try to ensure the application of an instrument in an international 
situation (e.g. scope rules in some EU consumer directives)1041 and those rules 
that are only relevant after the law to which belong has been determined as 
applicable in order to clarify the territorial scope of an instrument. This latter 
category is very common in Treaties and International Conventions (e.g. article 
1(1) CISG provides that that the Convention applies to international sales 
contracts when the two parties are established in contracting States). Although 
article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive is indeed provided for in a directive, the 
intention of the EU legislator merely seems to have been to clarify the territorial 
scope of the directive, rather than have any influence on the cross-border 
application of the Directive from a PIL point of view. While article 1(2) Acquired 
Rights Directive is included under the heading ‘scope and definitions’, scope 
rules of EU Consumer Directives are under the headings of ‘binding nature’ 
(article 7(2) Consumer Sales Directive1042) or ‘imperative nature of this 
Directive’s provisions’ (e.g. article 12(2) Distance Marketing of Consumer 
Financial Services Directive1043, article 22(4) Consumer Credit Directive1044) or 
‘Imperative nature of the Directive and application in international cases’ (article 
12(2) Timeshare Directive)1045. 
 
2.2.2. Article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive in coordination with the Rome 
I Regulation system 
Article 8 Rome I generally determines the law applicable to a transfer of 
undertaking in relation to an individual employment contract. As it is known, the 
connecting factors of the rules contained in article 8 Rome I benefit the employee 
as the weaker contracting party, as well as limit party autonomy taking the so-
called preferential law approach. The application of the Acquired Rights 
Directive is ensured as long as the law applicable to the employment contract is 
the law of a Member State according to article 8 Rome I.1046 However, when that 
                                                     
1041 See Chapter VI in 1.1. 
1042 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain 
aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (OJ L171/12) (Consumer Sales 
Directive). 
1043 Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 
concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services and amending Council Directive 
90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC (OJ L 271/16) (Distance Marketing of 
Consumer Financial Services Directive). 
1044 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ L 133/66) (Consumer 
Credit Directive). 
1045 Directive 2008/122/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on 
the protection of consumers in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, 
resale and exchange contracts (OJ L 33/10) (Timeshare Directive). 
1046 On the basis of the majoritarian opinion that the rights and obligations deriving from a transfer 
of undertaking are governed by the law that governs the individual contract of employment, and 
thus, in our case, by article 8 Rome I. Henckel (n 677) 221–237. 
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is not the case but an undertaking is to be transferred to a Member State, article 8 
does not ensure the application of the Acquired Rights Directive. For example, if 
the habitual place of work is in the US and the undertaking is to be transferred to 
Germany, why would that situation involving the workers in the US and a US 
undertaking require the protection of Acquired Rights Directive? However, in 
cases similar to the above-mentioned American Pilots case, were the undertaking 
to be transferred is located in a Member State (and thus the habitual place of work 
of the employees was a Member State), but the law applicable to the employment 
contract as a result of the closest connection test is a non-Member State law, 
should the protection of the Acquired Rights Directive be applicable? The first 
example would fall outside the territorial scope of the Acquired Rights Directive 
according to article 1(2), since it covers undertakings to be transferred located in 
the EU. Indeed, trying to extend the application of acquired rights provisions to 
undertakings that are not even established in the territory of the EU would seem 
like a step too far from the EU legislator. Undertakings not established in the EU 
cannot predict the application of EU law. In addition, if the EU legislator imposes 
the application of the EU in an excessive extraterritorial way, it faces the risk that 
legislators from other countries would react in the same way, which would impair 
EU undertakings. However, the application of EU law is sometimes necessary for 
the sake of the EU workers. The second example includes an undertaking to be 
transferred located in the territory of the EU. The objective of the Directive seems 
to involve the protection of acquired rights to EU workers in the case of a transfer 
of undertakings. Since article 8 Rome I might not always ensure the application 
of the Acquired Rights Directive when necessary, does the Rome I Regulation 
provide for other mechanisms to ensure that application?:  
a. Article 3(4) Rome I 
Article 3(4) Rome I was introduced in the Regulation with the objective to 
ensure the application of mandatory provisions originated in EU instruments. 
When this article was drafted, it was done with the intention to deal with the 
necessity of coordination between EU secondary law instruments and the conflict 
rules of the Rome I Regulation. Article 3(4) provides that when all the relevant 
elements of the contractual relationship are located within one or several Member 
States (purely intra-EU situations), but the parties chose a non-Member State law 
as law applicable to their contract, the mandatory provisions deriving from EU 
instruments shall be applicable.1047 Therefore, it guarantees the application of the 
‘provisions of Community law which cannot be derogated from by agreement’ –
mandatory EU law- when, due to the choice of law of the parties, those provisions 
could be eluded. Article 3(4) Rome I only becomes applicable when all relevant 
elements are located within the EU (purely intra-EU situations), and thus cannot 
be used to justify the application of mandatory EU law when some of the elements 
                                                     
1047 Belohlávek (n 335) 707–711; Carrascosa González, Ley Aplicable a Los Contratos 
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of the situation are non-EU.1048 It does not cover any extra-EU situation, while 
numerous secondary EU law instruments with mandatory character intend to 
apply to certain extra-EU situations.  
Article 3(4) Rome I is not suitable to coordinate the scope of the Acquired 
Rights Directive with the Rome I Regulation. It would not cover the situation if 
the undertaking is to be transferred to another Member State, for example. Article 
3(4) Rome I ensures the application of mandatory EU instruments whenever there 
is a choice of a non-Member State law but only in purely intra-EU situations. 
Thus, in situations where article 8 Rome I would not lead to the application of a 
Member State law (and, as a result, to the Acquired Rights Directive protection), 
article 3(4) Rome I would not be applicable. Article 8 Rome I can only lead to 
the application of a non-Member State law in an extra-EU situation or when 
parties have chosen a non-Member State law as applicable, in which case, if it is 
a purely intra-EU situation, the law objectively applicable would be the law of a 
Member State and therefore the mandatory acquired rights provisions are already 
ensured as a result of article 8 Rome I. 
Thus, article 3(4) Rome I does not really succeed in the objective of 
coordinating EU secondary law instruments with the Rome I Regulation, and the 
application of the Acquired Rights Directive is not ensured through article 3(4) 
Rome I. 
 
b. Article 9 Rome I 
The ECJ, in the Ingmar judgment1049, although it did not address explicitly 
whether the provisions at stake were to be regarded as overriding mandatory rules 
in the sense of the Rome I Regulation, gave some guidelines for its determination 
as such. The Ingmar case regarded the application of some specific provisions of 
the Commercial Agents Directive. The ECJ concluded that the purpose those 
provisions served required their application where the situation is closely 
connected with the EU, irrespective of the law chosen by the parties to govern 
their contract.1050 Following the Ingmar judgment, the provisions of the 
Commercial Agents Directive were to be considered overriding mandatory and 
prevailed over the law applicable to the contract. The ECJ based its decision by 
referring to the freedom of establishment and undistorted competition within the 
internal market, rather than on weaker party protection objectives. As a result, 
many authors agree that a provisions protecting weaker parties, such as 
employees, can be considered as overriding mandatory provisions as long as  the 
provision also aims to promote a higher political, social or economic interest 
                                                     
1048 For a definition of relevant elements, see Chapter III.4. 
1049 Case C381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc. [2000] ECR I-9305. 
1050 Ingmar, para. 25. 
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which justifies the priority of this provision in an international scenario.1051 This 
is, the provisions of EU directives can be classified as overriding mandatory rules 
as long as they serve crucial EU interests.1052 
However, various important questions arise in this regard in relation to the 
Acquired Rights Directive. First, (i) does the existence of a scope rule directly 
give overriding effect to the provisions of the Directive? Second, (ii) do the 
provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive fall under the definition of overriding 
mandatory rules of article 9(1) Rome I and are as a result applicable irrespective 
of the objectively applicable law? Third, (iii) can the doctrine of overriding 
mandatory rules be applied in gold-platting situations? 
(i) Does the existence of article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive directly 
give overriding effect to the provisions of the Directive? 
If it is concluded that the existence of an explicit scope rule directly gives 
overriding effect to the provisions of the Directive, then there is no need to discuss 
whether these rules are to be classified as overriding mandatory under the 
definition of article 9(1) Rome I. This is, regardless of whether the provisions of 
the Directive (or, better said, the national implementation provisions of the 
Member States) are classified as overriding mandatory rules, they would prevail 
over the law applicable to the contract.  
Regarding EU consumer directives containing scope rules, some authors 
consider that scope rules have the immediate effect of conferring overriding 
mandatory character to the provisions of the directive itself.1053 The same could 
be said about article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive. With that assuming, the 
existence of scope rules is coordinated with the conflict of laws system of the 
Rome I Regulation. The provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive would be 
applicable whenever the undertaking to be transferred is located within the 
territory of the Treaty through the operation of article 9 Rome I, even when the 
law applicable to the employment contract is not the law of a Member State 
according to article 8 Rome I. 
Under Dutch private international law, for example, Dutch courts are obliged 
to apply Dutch law when a situation falls under the scope of a Dutch scope rule. 
This is, when an instrument of national law contains a scope rule and the situation 
falls under that scope, the provisions of that instrument should be applicable by 
                                                     
1051 For example, Kuipers (n 11) 200; Aguilar Grieder, ‘La Voluntad de Conciliación Con Las 
Directivas Comunitarias Protectoras En La Propuesta Del Reglamento Roma I’ (n 688) 53; 
Carrascosa González, ‘La Autonomía de La Voluntad Conflictual Y La Mano Invisible En La 
Contratación Internacional’ (n 336); Verhagen (n 320) 136.  
1052 Regarding a discussion over overriding mandatory rules as a possible mechanism of protection 
of weaker parties in the Rome I Regulation, see Chapter III.3. 
1053 Bonomi, ‘Article 9: Overriding Mandatory Provisions’ (n 647) 616; Fallon and Francq (n 774) 
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the Dutch court regardless whether a provision is considered overriding 
mandatory or not.1054  
If the same reasoning is followed regarding article 1(2) Acquired Rights 
Directive and article 9 Rome I, this would mean that every Member State court 
would apply their national acquired rights provisions whenever the situation falls 
within their scope irrespective of and without the determination of the law that 
would otherwise govern the situation. National acquired rights provisions would 
directly apply whenever the undertaking to be transferred was located in the 
territory of a Member State. In my opinion, this would not be the ideal scenario, 
since a sort of intra-EU parallel PIL system would be created, as it was criticized 
above regarding the consideration of the scope rule as a unilateral conflict rule. 
This reasoning ignores article 8 Rome I, which could (maybe as a result of the 
preferential law approach or the connecting factor of ‘most closely connected 
law’) point to an applicable law different than the forum law, and which 
transposition of acquired rights might be more beneficial for the employee. Also, 
in case that the overriding mandatory character of national acquired rights 
provisions derived directly from the scope rule of article 1(2) Acquired Rights 
Directive, that overriding mandatory character should then be limited to the 
minimum protection provided by the Directive. If national law provides for a 
better or wider protection, that extra-protection should then only be considered 
overriding mandatory if the provisions fall under the definition of overriding 
mandatory rules of article 9(1) Rome I (Unamar case)1055. 
However, article 9 Rome I was designed as a scape mechanism or exception 
to the normal operation of the multilateral conflict rules of the Rome I. If EU 
directives could impose the application of their rules through the mechanism of 
article 9 Rome I in any case, regardless falling under the definition of article 9(1) 
or not, then they would be adhering to the above mentioned unilateral approach 
and ignoring the functioning of our current PIL system. If one were to generally 
understand the rules of the directives protecting weaker parties as overriding 
mandatory, party autonomy would be completely excluded, the provisions of the 
directive would be applicable regardless the law otherwise applicable, and it 
would not be relevant whether that applicable law resulted from the normal 
operation of the connecting factors or the choice of law by the parties. 
Thus, in my understanding, scope rules should not generally be interpreted as 
asking Member States to apply the provisions of the respective directive as 
overriding mandatory provisions in every case.1056 It is essential to distinguish 
                                                     
1054  Explanatory Memorandum to the Dutch Code of Private International Law (Book 10 BW). 
Henckel (n 677) 312. 
1055 C-184/12 United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare 
[2013] EU:C:2013:663. 
1056 In the same opinion: Magnus (n 707) 23–25; Schmidt-Kessel (n 701) 331. 
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between the scope of application of a statute and its mandatory character.1057 The 
provisions designated by scope rules do not necessarily have mandatory character 
or overriding mandatory character, but may determine the scope of mandatory 
provisions, overriding mandatory provisions or simply dispositive provisions. 
This is, article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive should not be understood as 
automatically conferring overriding mandatory character to the protection 
provided by the directive. Instead, I consider that, for the provisions of the 
Acquired Rights Directive to be applied as overriding mandatory rules, they 
should fall under the definition of article 9(1) Rome I. 
 
(ii) do the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive fall under the 
definition of overriding mandatory rules of article 9(1) Rome I and 
are as a result applicable irrespective of the objectively applicable 
law? 
Besides the differences among the Member States regarding the doctrine of 
overriding mandatory rules and its role on the protection of weaker parties, it is 
generally agreed at a EU level, especially on the basis of the judgments of Ingmar 
and Unamar, that article 9(1) Rome I also covers those provisions that protect 
weaker parties as long as they mainly aim to protect higher interests which are so 
essential that its priority over the law applicable is justified.1058 This is, besides 
protecting weaker parties, the provisions have to be classified as “crucial by a 
country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or 
economic organization”. In the case of provisions stemming from a EU directive, 
they should protect interests crucial for the EU. Thus, even though article 9 Rome 
I refers to public interests, it does not lead a priori to the exclusion of all protective 
rules. For example, in the Arblade case and the Mazzoleni case, the ECJ used the 
notion ‘overriding mandatory rules’ in reference to national rules on employee 
protection. 
On the one hand, part of the doctrine considers that the rules of the acquired 
rights provisions are provisions that can fall under the concept of overriding 
mandatory rules, on the basis that they pursue a public interest related to the 
economic and social organisation of a state. Specifically, regarding the Acquired 
Rights Directive, the overriding mandatory character is defended.1059 The 
mandatory character of the Acquired Rights Directive has been recognised by the 
                                                     
1057 Magnus (n 707) 23–25; Francq, L’Applicabilité Du Droit Communautaire Dérivé Au Regard 
Des Méthodes Du Droit International Privé (n 11) 575,576. 
1058 See Chapter III.3.1 
1059 Marie-Ange Moreau and Gilles Trudeau, ‘Les Normes Du Droit Du Travail Confrontées À 
L’évolution de L’économie: De Nouveaux Enjeux Pour L’espace Régional’ (2000) 4 Journal de 
Droit International 915, 932,933; Mercedes Sabido Rodríguez, ‘Algunas Cuestiones Que Plantea 
En DIPR La Tutela de Los Trabajadores Afectados Por Reestructuraciones de Empresas’ (2010) 2 
Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 233, 253,254. 
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ECJ. In Celtec1060, the ECJ referred to the provisions of the predecessor of the 
current directive as mandatory, not being possible to derogate from them in a 
manner unfavourable to the employees.1061 In the same line, in Temco1062, the ECJ 
referred to the mandatory character of the acquired rights provisions and specified 
that “the implementation of the rights conferred on employees by the directive 
may not be made subject to the consent of either the transferor or the transferee 
nor the consent of the employees' representatives or the employees 
themselves”.1063 However, it does not look like the ECJ was referring to the 
overriding mandatory character of the provisions of the directive as applicable 
regardless the law otherwise applicable, but, in my opinion, looks more like it 
was referring to the mandatory character as provisions that cannot be derogated 
from by agreement (in this case, EU mandatory character). Doctrine and courts 
from certain jurisdictions have the tendency to interpret overriding mandatory 
rules in a more extensive manner, and thus could easily consider the acquired 
rights provisions, as well as other weaker party protection legislation, as 
overriding mandatory rules, even when the provision is not that crucial for the 
safeguard of a public interest.1064 It is up to every Member State to determine 
which national provisions are overriding mandatory, but in order to be considered 
as such, they should fall under the definition of article 9(1) Rome I. However, 
Member States should not make a too extensive interpretation of overriding 
mandatory rules, since it would undermine the meaning of article 9 Rome I. The 
complete freedom of deciding which are national overriding mandatory rules, but 
without justifying their application on the strict definition of article 9(1) Rome I, 
would be a danger for the legal security of the parties to the contract and for the 
legal predictability regarding the law applicable to a contract. In addition, the 
acceptance of such extensive interpretations as a general rule entails the risk of 
promoting a different PIL method in the determination of the law applicable by a 
Member State. This is, Member States usually resort to a ‘method of introvert 
unilateralism’1065, like in the case of article 27 of the Belgian Law of 13 April 
                                                     
1060 C-478/03 Celtec Ltd v John Astley and Others [2005] ECR I-04389. 
1061 Celtec, para 42: “the Court considered that to allow the transferor or transferee the possibility 
of choosing the date from which the contract of employment or employment relationship is 
transferred would amount to allowing employers to derogate, at least temporarily, from the 
provisions of Directive 77/187, whereas those provisions are mandatory, and it is thus not possible 
to derogate from them in a manner unfavourable to employees (Rotsart de Hertaing, paragraphs 17 
and 25).”   
1062 C-51/00 Temco Service Industries SA v Samir Imzilyen and Others [2002] ECR I-00969 
1063 Temco, para 35. 
1064 For example, countries such as France, Belgium or Spain. See for example: Moreau and 
Trudeau (n 1051); Sabido Rodríguez (n 1051); Fallon and Francq (n 774); Sánchez Lorenzo, ‘La 
Unificación Del Derecho Contractual Europeo Vista Desde El Derecho Internacional Privado’ (n 
453).  
1065 We find this concept in Alfonso Luis Calvo Caravaca and José María Carrascosa González, 
Derecho Internacional Privado, vol I (Comares, 2013) 328–330, as well as in María Asunción 
Cebrián Salvat, ‘Agencia Comercial, Leyes de Policía Y Derecho Internacional Privado Europeo’ 
(2014) 6 Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 357, 364, (“método del unilateralismo introverso”). 
These authors describe it as method according to which a country would establish the spatial scope 
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1995 on commercial agency contracts.1066 The judge of the forum could then 
apply the provisions protecting weaker contracting parties as overriding 
mandatory rules (not only regarding commercial agency but consumers, 
employees, distributors, franchisees, etc.), undermining all the Rome I Regulation 
system.  
In the EU level, for the Acquired Rights Directive to be considered as 
overriding mandatory, its application should be considered essential for the 
achievement of specific EU public interests. And that EU overriding mandatory 
character should only have effect regarding the application of a non-Member 
State law, since in an intra-EU conflict where the law of a different Member State 
is applicable, the minimum protection of the Directive (which would be the one 
considered EU overriding mandatory) would be ensured by the national 
transposition of the Member State. Regarding intra-EU situations, the national 
implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive that exceeds the minimum 
required by the Directive would have to be considered overriding mandatory for 
the Member State in question (at a national level, and not EU overriding 
mandatory) in order to prevail over the applicable law of another Member 
State.1067 
The provisions stemming from the Acquired Rights Directive mainly aim at 
preserving employees’ rights in the case of a transfer of undertaking. In addition, 
as most directives, especially those regarding employee protection, the Acquired 
Rights Directive is also based on the interest of the functioning of the internal 
market. In addition, it concerns the transfer of rights and obligations originated 
in collective agreements as well as preservation of the position of employee 
representatives. Still, it is very doubtful that the provisions of the Acquired Rights 
Directive would be determined as crucial for the safeguarding of essential EU 
interests, since the primary aim is not the protection of specific public interests 
but the protection of the rights of employees.1068 Internal market interests and 
collective employment considerations could be used to justify the overriding 
mandatory character of the Acquired Rights Directive, although I consider a 
stricter interpretation should be followed, since the main aim of the rules is the 
protection of employees. The rules of the Acquired Rights Directive seem to fall 
under the category of provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement (i.e. 
                                                     
of their substantive rules in a unilateral and independent manner. As a result, conflict rules would 
only cover the cases regulated by the substantive law of that country. This method is against the 
current understanding of PIL, since these type of unilateral rules would result in forum shopping 
and diversity in the private international law solutions of the countries (which is the opposite of 
what Rome I Regulation aims). 
1066 Article 27 reads: “Without prejudice to the application of international conventions to which 
Belgium is a party, any activity of a commercial agent whose principal place of business is in 
Belgium shall be governed by Belgian law and shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Belgian 
courts”. See Unamar, para 13.  
1067 See below in this section (iii) regarding gold-platting situations and art. 9 Rome I. 
1068 Henckel (n 677) 334. 
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mandatory rules) rather than overriding mandatory rules of article 9 Rome I.  In 
the American Pilots case1069, the Bundesgerichtshof, in the case of an employment 
contract governed by New York State law, indicated that they would have applied 
German employment legislation on acquired rights if it was regarded as 
overriding mandatory law, which was not the case.1070 However, other Member 
States, as previously mentioned, interpret overriding mandatory rules in a more 
extensive manner (e.g. France, Spain, Belgium, etc.) and an interpretation of the 
ECJ in this regard concerning the Acquired Rights Directive is yet to come.1071  
 
(iii) Gold-platting situations 
Due to the minimum harmonising character of the Acquired Rights Directive, 
a level-playing field is created allowing Member States to improve the minimum 
standards set by the directive when transposing it on its national law. Member 
States, when transposing the Directive into their national laws, can exceed the 
minimum protection afforded by the instrument by extending the material scope 
of the directive, by offering more protection or by implementing the optional 
provisions. The phenomenon is known as gold-platting.  
The issue regarding article 9 Rome I and gold-platting situations is that, when 
the lex fori provides for a better protection than the law applicable, the Member 
State of the forum might wish to apply its own national implementation of the 
Directive as overriding mandatory. In Unamar, the ECJ concluded that despite 
the Commercial Agents Directive was correctly transposed under Bulgarian law, 
the Belgian Court had discretion to qualify its own national provisions as 
overriding mandatory rules in the sense of article 7 Rome Convention (now 
article 9 Rome I), and apply them irrespective the otherwise applicable law. It 
follows from this judgment that Member State provisions that provide for a better 
protection than those in the Directive can be considered as overriding mandatory 
rules if they are essential for the public interests of the Member State in which 
they originate.1072 Since it goes over the minimum rules of the Directive, the 
national implementation rules that surpasses the minimum standard would have 
to justify its overriding mandatory character not only in EU law objectives but 
also national law objectives.  
Thus, the national implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive that 
exceeds the minimum required by the Directive would have to be considered 
                                                     
1069 BAG 29 October 1992, in: IPRspr. 1992, pp. 142 et seq. 
1070 Plender and Wilderspin (n 725) 353,354. 
1071 Although the ECJ in Ingmar and Unamar considered that the provisions of the Commercial 
Agents Directive were overriding mandatory because they aim at ensuring the freedom of 
establishment and undistorted competition of the internal market, it does not mean that the role of 
the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive is as crucial for internal market interests and 
collective employment considerations as to be considered overriding mandatory. 
1072 Unamar, para 50. 
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essential for the safeguarding of public interests of the Member State were they 
originate in order to be considered as overriding mandatory and apply over the 
law applicable to the employment contract. However, the determination of the 
provisions related with the Acquired Rights Directive as overriding mandatory 
rules, even when exceeding the minimum of the Directive, seems difficult. In a 
situation like this, where article 8 and article 9 Rome I “conflict”, the application 
of overriding mandatory rules is hard to justify, since the mandatory protection 
ensured by the Member State of habitual place of work, including the 
implementation of the minimum requirements of the Acquired Rights Directive, 
is already given effect by article 8 Rome I, and there is no reason why a higher 
protection should be ensured by an overriding mandatory rule when the weaker 
position of the employee has already been compensated by the operation of article 
8 Rome I. As explained above, provisions stemming from the Acquired Rights 
Directive mainly aim at preserving employees’ rights in the case of a transfer of 
undertakings. In the same manner that it seems very doubtful that they would be 
considered essential for the safeguarding of public interests of the EU, it also 
seems doubtful that the extra-protection would be considered essential for the 
safeguarding of public interests of a single Member State. If that was the case, 
the law of the forum Member State would most probably already be the law 
applicable according to article 8 Rome I. In addition, in any case, in order to 
justify the overriding character of the extra protection, it has to be noticed that it 
is not always easy to distinguish between national acquired rights provisions 
originated in the Directive and national acquired rights originated in national law 
exceeding the requirements of the directive.  
Although from the Unamar judgment is generally understood that national 
courts can consider as overriding mandatory rules the national provisions 
exceeding the minimum protection of a directive and thus apply them over the 
lex causae (which already provides for the minimum required by the directive), I 
consider that this decision should be understood in a very restrictive manner. Of 
course it is up to each national court to decide which national provisions are 
overriding mandatory, but it should be done according to the definition of article 
9(1) Rome I. Otherwise, an extensive interpretation would affect the harmonising 
effect of the directives, and legal certainty would result impaired, since it would 
be up to each national court to decide whether or not its gold-plating provisions 
are to be regarded as overriding mandatory rules and applicable in any situation 
regardless the law chosen by the parties, which would lead again to an uncertain 
and uncoordinated situation.1073 In a recent case (Republik Griechenland v 
Grigorios Nikiforidis)1074, the ECJ has emphasized that the protection offered by 
article 8 Rome I to the employee should not be prejudiced by the application of 
overriding mandatory rules. In reference to our discussion, it could be inferred a 
hint regarding the role of overriding mandatory rules and protection of 
                                                     
1073 Van Bochove (n 826) 156.  
1074 Case C-135/15 Republik Griechenland v Grigorios Nikiforidis [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:774. 
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employees. The ECJ, logically, attributes the protection of the employee to the 
mandatory rules of the law of habitual place of work. It follows that, since article 
8 Rome I is aimed at the protection of the private interests of employees, then 
article 9 Rome I cannot attend to the same kind of interests. However, the line 
between private and public is not always clear-cut, especially in the cases of our 
concern.1075 For example, the French Cour de Cassation, in a sentence of 30 
November 20071076, answered to the question of whether the provisions on 
subcontract were weaker party protection provisions or protected competition. 
The court opted for the second option. Similarly, the Dutch Supreme Court on 23 
October 19871077 answer whether the rules on termination of employment were 
protecting the interest of the employee or were essential for the Dutch labour 
market, opting also for the second option (and later confirmed in the decision of 
the Dutch Supreme Court on 24 February 2012).1078 This is, higher public 
interests can always be involved in contractual provisions, especially regarding 
employment law. That is why an extensive interpretation may lead to the 
argument that all weaker contracting party provisions protect public interests, and 
thus the application of national provisions through article 9 Rome I would always 
be justified.1079 That is not the intention of article 9 Rome I, which definition is 
more restrictive.1080 Again, national acquired rights provisions are most probably 
outside the definition of article 9(1) Rome I. 
As it was concluded in the previous chapter regarding gold-platting provisions 
of EU consumer directives, when at least the same minimum standards are shared, 
multilateral conflict rules should be promoted in intra-EU conflicts. In intra-EU 
situations, EU employment directives impose common legal standards among the 
Member States that are mandatory at a EU level. This EU mandatory set of rules 
might need to be ensured against the application of a foreign law, but not among 
the Member States that share the same EU mandatory provisions. Therefore, I 
consider that the gold-platting provisions of a Member State should not easily be 
                                                     
1075 Luis Francisco Carrillo Pozo, ‘El Tratamiento de Las Leyes de Policía de Terceros Estados. (A 
Propósito de La Sentencia Del TJUE de 18 de Octubre de 2016)’ [2017] Bitácora Millennium DIPr 
11,12; Kuipers (n 4) 112 et seq. 
1076 Cour de Cassation, 30 November 2007, 06-14006 (Agintis). 
1077 Hoge Raad 23 October 1987, NJ 1988/842 (Sorensen/Aramco). 
1078 Hoge Raad 24 February 2012, LJN BU8512 (Nuon Personeelsbeheer/X). 
1079 On that line of argument, Andrea Bonomi, ‘Le Régime Des Règles Impératives et Des Lois de 
Police Dans Le Règlement “Rome I” sur La Loi Applicable Aux Contrats’ in E Cashin Ritaine and 
A Bonomi (eds), Le Nouveau Règlement Européen ‘Rome I’ relatif à la Loi Applicable aux 
Obligations Contractuelles (Schulthess 2008) 230 et seq. 
1080 The reference to public interests in the definition of article 9(1) Rome I entails a restrictive 
interpretation of article 9 Rome I, under which not every mandatory rule can be applicable, but only 
those with overriding mandatory character that aim at the protection of public interests. This 
excludes those rules which are aimed mainly aimed at the protection of the weaker party in a 
contract, since article 9 Rome I is not designed to protect the employees, commercial agents, 
consumers, etc. Francisco J Garcimartín Alférez, Derecho Internacional Privado (Thomson 
Reuters 2012) 353. 
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imposed against the choice of another Member State law, since both Member 
States share the mandatory EU provisions.  
 
2.3. Reflexion 
It is submitted that the Acquired Rights Directive and the conflict rules of the 
Rome I Regulation are not always easy to reconcile: 
- First, article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive provides that the Directive “shall 
apply where and in so far as the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking 
or business to be transferred is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty”. 
The determination of the nature and function of this rule from a PIL point of view 
is conflicting. From a PIL perspective, the existence of rules determining the 
territorial scope of a directive can logically be related to the existing debate 
regarding the relationship of scope rules in EU secondary law instruments (such 
as the case of numerous EU consumer directives) and PIL instruments. The 
scholar debate has not reached an agreement on this regard. In my opinion, 
although article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive is included in a directive, the 
intention of the EU legislator in this case seems to have been to clarify the 
territorial scope of the directive, rather than have any influence on the cross-
border application of the Directive from a PIL point of view. The drafting of 
article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive and the drafting of the scope rules included 
in certain EU consumer directives clearly differs. However, the existence of this 
‘scope rule’ in the Acquired Rights Directive leads to confusion, especially 
regarding the national implementation of the provision and among PIL scholars. 
However, even if it was understood as a scope rule in the PIL sense, and in the 
same manner as described regarding scope rules of EU consumer directives, it 
can be considered that scope rules in EU secondary law instruments should not 
be considered as conflict rules as such, but as provisions that help to determine 
the level of mandatoriness that the provisions of the directive have.  
- Second, article 8 Rome I will most probably indicate the law of the habitual 
place of work as the law applicable to the employment contract. Even when 
parties choose another law as applicable, the mandatory provisions of the law of 
the habitual place of work are applicable if they offer a better protection to the 
employee. However, it is generally understood that when there is a cross-border 
transfer of undertaking, the habitual place of work changes and, as a result, the 
law applicable to the employment contract also changes. If the undertaking is 
relocated from a Member State to another Member State (intra-EU transfer) the 
application of the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive is ensured, since 
the law applicable is the law of a Member State. Also, when the undertaking is 
relocated from a Member State to a non-Member State, article 8 Rome I ensures 
the application of the (at least) minimum protection of Acquired Rights Directive 
before the employee moves to his or her new habitual place of work. However, 
when the law applicable to the employment contract is not a Member State law 
Chapter V - The relationship and coordination between EU employment directives 
and the Rome I Regulation 
323 
(e.g. the contract is most closely connected to a non-Member State), the 
application of the Acquired Rights Directive is not ensured, regardless whether 
the undertaking is located in the EU. In the mentioned American Pilots case, the 
situation involved a transfer of a Berlin based aviation business from Pan 
American World Airways to Berliner Lufthansa Airport. The undertaking 
transferred was located in Germany before and after the transfer. However, the 
law applicable to the employment contract was the law of New York as the law 
chosen and as the law applicable in absence of choice because of being the law 
most closely connected to the contract. In those cases, how can a Member State 
court ensure the application of the Acquired Rights Directive? 
- On the one hand, one could read article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive as a 
scope rule in the PIL sense and could consider that the Acquired Rights Directive 
determines its own unilateral application in accordance to that provision, which 
would be understood as unilateral conflict rule. If considered as a separate conflict 
rule, it could prevail over the rules of the Rome I Regulation through article 23 
Rome I. The solution would be to ignore altogether the current conflict of laws 
system provided in this case in the Rome I Regulation and adhere to a unilateral 
conflict of laws approach. The majoritarian opinion does not support this 
approach. Although it would ensure the application of the Directive, it brings 
more downsides than benefits. A return to a unilateral approach, besides the 
inherent disadvantages to a unilateral PIL system, it would be a return to the past 
that is not justified. inconsistent to maintain that EU law depends on its own 
applicability criteria and imposes its application and at the same time to ignore 
that foreign law might do the same. Under our current PIL thinking, neutrality 
between legal systems should be respected with only some exceptions. The EU 
legislator should not aim at imposing the application of the Directives without 
regard to the PIL system in force. Indeed, legal certainty is not benefited from 
such an approach, since a parallel conflict of laws would be created imposing the 
application of the rules of the Directive when determined by the scope rule, 
without even determining according to which national law is applicable. It seems 
more consistent that the EU legislator respects the current PIL thinking. 
Moreover, not all non-Member States would have a lack of protection of acquired 
rights that would “justify” the use of a unilateral approach, but, in fact, many non-
Member States have a very similar acquired rights regulation than the EU.1081 
Finally, in any way, article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive should not even be 
read in the same way as scope rules of EU Consumer Directives. The intention of 
the EU legislator seems to have been to clarify the territorial scope of the 
directive, rather than have any influence on the cross-border application of the 
Directive from a PIL point of view. In that regard, when drafting EU secondary 
                                                     
1081 For example, Switzerland, in article 333 Federal law concerning the Amendment to the Swiss 
Civil Code (Part Five: Code of Obligations) (Bundesgesetz betreffend die Ergänzung des 
Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches (Fünfter Teil: Obligationenrecht) or South Africa, in Section 
197 Labour Relations Act (No. 66 of 1995). Henckel (n 677) 342. 
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law instruments, regard should be payed to possible (and undesired) influences 
of the current PIL system. 
- On the other hand, respect for the current PIL system is sought and the 
application of the Acquired Rights Directive should be ensured through the other 
mechanisms available on the Rome I Regulation. Article 3(4) Rome I, aimed at 
coordinating the application of mandatory EU secondary law provisions with the 
Rome I Regulation, is not suitable to ensure the application of the provisions of 
the Acquired Rights Directive. Article 3(4) Rome I is only applicable to purely 
intra-EU situations and when the parties have chosen a non-Member State law. 
Those situations are already covered by article 8 Rome I.  
Article 9 Rome I could ensure the application of the provisions of the 
Acquired Rights Directive when required provided they are considered as 
overriding mandatory rules. If the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive 
are overriding mandatory rules, then they are applicable regardless the law 
applicable to the employment contract. However, it is submitted that it is highly 
doubtful that acquired rights provisions are essential for EU public interests; they 
might be important for internal market purposes, but are they essential? The 
doctrine of overriding mandatory rules is intended for provisions that protect 
public interests, while provisions protecting weaker parties are mainly intended 
to balance the interests of the parties to the contract. Although the Acquired 
Rights Directive has some function regarding the internal market, the main 
objective is to protect the interests of employees upon a transfer of undertaking.  
Another option consists on understanding that the ‘scope rule’ directly gives 
overriding effect to the provisions of the Directive. Regardless of whether the 
provisions of the Directive are classified as overriding mandatory rules according 
to the definition of article 9(1) Rome I, they would be considered as such as a 
result of the scope rule and they would prevail over the law applicable to the 
contract. Although such consideration would a priori ensure the application of the 
Acquired Rights Directive, it has to be kept in mind that it is the national 
implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive which has to be determined as 
overriding mandatory. However, Member States have implemented the scope 
rule of article 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive in different and contradicting ways, 
which would make very difficult the classification of the rules as overriding 
mandatory because of the scope rule. Also, this solution would not be much 
different than the first option (i.e. the unilateral approach). Overriding mandatory 
rules are the unilateral exception to our mainly multilateral PIL system. If used 
in such an extensive way, they would not be an exception anymore and the current 
PIL system becomes endangered. Moreover, regarding gold-platting situations, 
the scope rule would not give overriding mandatory character to the provisions 
exceeding the protection of the Directive, but that character would have to derive 
from the definition of article 9(1) Rome I. However, the difficulty separating the 
national provisions exceeding the minimum protection with those that don’t 
would make this distinction blurred and burdensome.  
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It can definitely be submitted that the Acquired Rights Directive and the 
conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation, according to the current drafting and 
above-mentioned understanding of the concepts and rules involved, are not 
entirely coordinated. As I stated regarding scope rules in EU consumer directives, 
the current drafting of scope rules and the existence of different national 
implementations and approaches in that regard brings more uncertainty to the 
system. If the issue of transfer of undertakings is to be classified under the 
category of conflict rules for individual employment contracts, then the law 
applicable is to be determined by article 8 Rome I, which already contains 
protective conflict rules in the benefit of employees. Article 8 Rome I will ensure, 
most of the times, the application of the mandatory provisions of the law of 
habitual place of work of the employee. Thus, an employee with habitual place 
of work in a Member State will have his rights protected according to the 
Acquired Rights Directive upon a transfer of undertaking. However, when the 
connecting factors of article 8 lead to a different law than the lex loci laboris, 
which happens to be a non-Member State law, Member States might still wish to 
apply the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive. A modification of art. 8(4) 
Rome I has been suggested, consisting on not only covering ‘closest connected’ 
situation but taking into account the protection of workers.1082 The modification 
would consist in adding the possibility of applying the most beneficial law for the 
worker as long as it has a close connection with the contract –even if it is not the 
closest connection-.1083 This rule would give a wide margin of interpretation to 
the judge, allowing him to consider all the relevant circumstances of the case and 
the need of protection of the worker. 
 However, it is true that, in most of the cases that article 8 Rome I leads to the 
application of a foreign law, that law would the most “interested” in being 
applicable to the employment contract. Indeed, there is generally no reason why 
EU law should be imposed to a transfer of a US undertaking and to his employees 
habitually carrying out their work in the US, even if they are eventually being 
transferred to a Member State. US law would be more interested in protecting (or 
not) the rights of the employees habitually carrying out their work in their 
territory. The imposition of the Acquired Rights Directive to such situations can 
be seen as an excessive imposition from the EU legislator. However, there are 
cases that are more involved with a Member State, such as the previously 
mentioned situation where the employees involved in the transfer habitually carry 
out their work in a Member State. Article 9 Rome I is the only possible 
mechanism to ensure the application of the Directive in such scenarios, but, as 
stated above, not an ideal mechanism. Many options have been suggested by 
                                                     
1082 Gardeñes Santiago, ‘La Regulación Conflictual Del Contrato de Trabajo En El Reglamento 
Roma I: Una Oportunidad Perdida’ (n 506) 415–418; Gardeñes Santiago, ‘Derecho Imperativo Y 
Contrato Internacional de Trabajo’ (n 657) 184. 
1083 Gardeñes Santiago, ‘La Regulación Conflictual Del Contrato de Trabajo En El Reglamento 
Roma I: Una Oportunidad Perdida’ (n 506) 417,418; Gardeñes Santiago, ‘Derecho Imperativo Y 
Contrato Internacional de Trabajo’ (n 657) 184. 
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different scholars in this regard.1084 For example, Henckel has suggested the 
introduction of a multilateral conflict rule to deal with cross-border transfer of 
undertakings that points to the law of the Member State in which the undertaking 
to be transferred is located as applicable.1085 Such a multilateral conflict rule 
would be in accordance with the requirements of article 1(2) Acquired Rights 
Directive. However, it also has to be submitted that would not come without 
complications, especially because of the difficulty regarding the categorisation 
and differentiation of the different situations that a transfer of undertakings 
involves.  
One final reflexion from the PIL point of view can be submitted. If article 8 
Rome I, which is the rule that Rome I provides for the law applicable to 
employment contracts and which favours the employee, leads to the application 
of a non-Member State law, that law is the one “interested” in having their 
mandatory rules applied to the situation. If article 8 does not lead to the law of a 
Member State, even when employees habitually carry out their work there, 
because the employment contract is more closely connected to a different legal 
system, then article 8 Rome I assumes that the law most closely connected to the 
contract is the one “interested” in applying its mandatory rules protecting the 
employee. Thus, in that scenario, the protection to the employee comes from the 
law most closely connected to the employment contract. The interest on the 
application of the law of the habitual place of work in that case should only be 
justified on the protection of essential public interests, not on the application of 
protective provisions to the employee. 
 
3. Temporary posting of workers in the EU: The 
Posted Workers Directive and the Rome I Regulation 
When a worker carries out work in the territory of another country (host country) 
where he usually works (home country) for a limited period of time is considered 
as a posted worker. Cases involving the posting of workers inevitably involve 
cross-border elements and therefore private international law issues. According 
to the Rome I Regulation, for applicable law purposes, the country where the 
work is habitually carried out shall not be deemed to have changed if the worker 
is temporarily employed in another country (article 8(2) Rome I). Employees will 
be covered by the law of the country where they habitually carry out their work, 
even when they are temporary posted to another country. As a consequence, 
without any correcting mechanism, the working conditions would differ among 
workers employed at the same place, since the local workers would be protected 
by the local provisions, while the posted workers would be protected according 
to the provisions of their home state. As a result, undertakings established in 
                                                     
1084 Some of the theories and solutions are discussed in Henckel (n 677) 337–357.  
1085 ibid 356. 
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“low-cost” countries would be at a comparative advantage, which could affect 
negatively the employment conditions in the host state (phenomenon known as 
social dumping). “High-cost” countries might want, given that situation, make 
applicable their employment protection rules to all labour performed within their 
territory.1086 On the other hand, the opposite solution consisting on the application 
of the law of the host state as a general rule would lead to a disadvantage to the 
home undertaking, which would be forced to fulfil both the standards of the host 
state and the standards of the home state, depriving it at the same time of the 
comparative advantage. Nowadays, both the rules of the Posted Workers 
Directive together with the Rome I Regulation aim at avoiding the 
aforementioned scenarios. 
When a service provider established in a Member State posts workers from 
one Member State to another Member State important interests become 
confronted. According to article 45 TFEU, the free movement of workers in 
ensured in the EU. A worker in one Member State is entitled to move to another 
Member State to work. A service provider posting workers to another Member 
State is exercising its freedom to provide services guaranteed by article 56 TFEU. 
Normally, this company intends to make use of its cheaper costs to provide 
services in another country. However, employee’s organisations of the host state 
would be afraid that local employees will be at disadvantage in comparison with 
posted workers. Also, local companies, which have to comply with the more 
restrictive employment law provisions, will consider that the competition with 
foreign companies posting workers is unfair, since not complying with the most 
restrictive rules is cheaper for a company. This situation could result in a ‘race to 
the bottom’ in which countries lower and lower their employment protection rules 
on the benefit of competition.1087 At the same time, the competitive advantage 
would be undermined if more restrictive employment provisions were applicable 
to the posted employees, potentially restricting the freedom of providing services. 
Thus, a balance is necessary between the protection of posted workers, fight 
against social dumping and equal treatment between local companies and 
companies from another Member States in the provision of services.  
In the well-known Rush Portuguesa case1088 the ECJ expressed its view 
regarding the freedom of provision of services and posted workers. When 
Portugal became a new Member of the EC on 1986, the Portuguese company 
Rush Portuguesa entered into a subcontract with a French company for the 
construction of a railway line in France. For that purpose, workers from Portugal 
were posted to France, which, due to the transitional arrangements for the 
accession of Portugal to the EC, were treated as third country nationals. French 
authorities established that Rush Portuguesa had not complied with the French 
                                                     
1086 Aukje AH Van Hoek, ‘Private International Law: An Appropriate Means to Regulate 
Transnational Employment in the European Union?’ (2014) 7 Erasmus Law Review 157, 166,167. 
1087 Merrett (n 308) 264. 
1088 Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Ldª v Office national d'immigration [1990] ECR I-01417. 
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requirements of the Labour Code for services performed by non-nationals in 
France. Answering to the question of whether it was compatible with EU law to 
impose conditions to the freedom of provision of services, the ECJ stated that the 
Treaty precluded a Member State from banning a service provider established in 
another Member State from moving freely on its territory, including its staff, and 
from making restrictions to the movement of the staff, such as a condition as to 
engagement in situ or an obligation to obtain a work permit. Such conditions 
discriminates against the service provider from another Member State in relation 
to the competitors of the host country, whose staff are not subject to 
restrictions.1089  However, the ECJ also added that EU law did not preclude a 
Member State from extending the national legislation to any person temporarily 
employed in their territory regardless in which country the employer is 
established.1090 
The judgment of Rush Portuguesa triggered in Member States that are usually 
host countries for posted workers the adoption of national legislation extending 
national employment standards to posted workers.1091 These Member States saw 
the necessity to safeguard their labour system and protect it against fair 
competition as well as to ensure decent working conditions for posted 
workers.1092 The Rush Portuguesa case and the reactions of the Member States 
eventually triggered the adoption of the Posted Workers Directive in 1996.1093 
 
3.1. The Posted Workers Directive, Enforcement Directive 
and the revised Posted Workers Directive 
The Posted Workers Directive (PWD) aims to promote the freedom of provision 
of services as well as to ensure the protection of posted workers.1094 The PWD is 
applicable to cross-border posting of workers in the context of an intra-EU 
provision of services. Thus, the PWD limits its own territorial scope of 
application to an intra-EU temporary posting of workers. Since the territorial 
scope of the Directive is limited to intra-EU situations, the previous problematic 
regarding the Acquired Rights Directive is mostly avoided. The PWD covers the 
situations involving undertakings established in a Member State which, in the 
                                                     
1089 Rush Portuguesa, para. 12. 
1090 Rush Portuguesa, para. 18. Miguel Gardeñes Santiago, ‘Le Détachement Transnational Des 
Travailleurs Dans Le Cadre Des Prestations de Services: Un Sujet Spécialement Difficile Pour Le 
Marché Intérieur’, Liber Amicorum: Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Joël Molinier (LGDJ 
2012) 257–259. 
1091 For example, Germany adopted the Posting of Workers Act (Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz) in 
1996.  
1092 Grusic (n 200) 263; Riesenhuber (n 206) 195. 
1093 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (OJ 1996 L 18/1). 
1094 Ulla Liukkunen, The Role of Mandatory Rules in International Labour Law- A Comparative 
Study in the Conflict of Laws (Talentum Media Oy 2004) 229. 
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framework of the transnational provision of services, post workers to another 
Member State (a) under a contract concluded between the undertaking making 
the posting and the party for whom the services are supplied; or (b) by posting 
them to an establishment or to an undertaking owned by the same group; or (c) 
posting by an employment agency.1095 Member States implement the provisions 
of the Directive within their national law. In an intra-EU posting of workers, the 
law of a Member State –or at least, the core mandatory provisions- are ensured 
by article 8 Rome I. Therefore, the application of the provisions of the PWD is 
also ensured if the conditions of application of the Directive are fulfilled.  
The PWD also provides that undertakings established in a non-Member State 
cannot be given a more favourable treatment than undertakings from Member 
States (article 1(4) PWD). A posted worker is defined as a worker that carries out 
his work in the territory of a Member State other than the State in which he 
normally works (article 2(1) PWD). For the purposes of the PWD, the definition 
of ‘worker’ is that one established by the law of the host Member State (article 
2(2) PWD), and thus no problem of classification arises from the PIL perspective. 
The core provision of the PWD is article 3 PWD, which imposes the obligation 
on the host Member State to extend its provisions in specific areas of labour law 
(listed on the article) to workers that are temporarily posted to their territory. The 
other articles of the directive relate to exchange of information, enforcement, 
implementation and review.  
The determination of what should be understood as a ‘temporary posting’ 
becomes relevant in order to prevent abusive and fraudulent practices involving 
the so-called letter-box companies, which do not have a real activity in the 
country of origin but just pretend so in order to avoid the application of the law 
of the ‘host’ country, and to differentiate between a permanent transfer and a 
temporary posting. While the original PWD remained silent in this regard, the 
Rome I Regulation gives special importance to the intentions of the employer and 
employee to resume working in the home country once the temporary posting 
abroad comes to an end. Recital 36 Rome I provides: “As regards individual 
employment contracts, work carried out in another country should be regarded as 
temporary if the employee is expected to resume working in the country of origin 
after carrying out his tasks abroad. The conclusion of a new contract of 
employment with the original employer or an employer belonging to the same 
group of companies as the original employer should not preclude the employee 
from being regarded as carrying out his work in another country temporarily.” 
The terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case can show those 
intentions.1096  
                                                     
1095 Article 1(3) Posted Workers Directive. 
1096 Employers are obliged to provide information regarding the posting to posted employees (article 
4 Council Directive 91/533/ECC), which can be especially useful to determine whether the posting 
is intended to be temporary or definitive, according to art. 4 Council Directive 91/533/ECC (OJ L 
288/22), which will be repealed from 1 August 2022 and substituted by  Directive (EU) 2019/1152 
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In order to avoid situations of abuse involving letter box companies and fake 
temporary postings, and with the objective of improving the practical application 
of the PWD, the Enforcement Directive on Posted Workers (Directive 
2014/67/EU)1097 was adopted in 2014. The Enforcement Directive includes a 
provision regarding the interpretation of temporary posting, according to which 
all factual elements characterising the work and the situation should be taken into 
account in order to assess whether a worker is temporarily posted to another 
Member State. The provision includes a non-exhaustive list of elements to take 
into account: work carried out for a limited period of time in another Member 
State; date of start of the posting; posting taking place in a country other than the 
habitual place of work according to the Rome I; the posted worker returns to or 
is expected to resume working in the home country after the completion of the 
work or tasks for which he was posted; nature of the activities; travel related 
expenses and accommodation provided or reimburses by the employer who posts 
the worker; previous periods during which the post was filled by the same or by 
another (posted) worker (article 4(3) Enforcement Directive).  
In order to complement the Enforcement Directive on Posted Workers, the 
Commission proposed a revision of the PWD. The new PWD (Directive 
2018/957/EU)1098 was adopted on 28 June 2018 and must be transposed into the 
national laws of the Member States by 30 July 2020, not being applicable before 
that date. In the same manner as the original PWD, the revision aims at facilitating 
the free movement of services while ensuring fair competition and the rights of 
posted workers. More specifically, the new PWD aims at ensuring fair wages and 
a level playing field in the host country between posting and local companies. 
Regarding the concept of a genuine posting and the interpretation of the term 
‘temporary posting’, the new PWD refers to the provision of the Enforcement 
Directive.1099 However, one of the relevant changes introduced by the new PWD 
regards the duration of the posting, extending the application of additional terms 
and conditions of the host country to postings lasting longer than 12 months or, 
                                                     
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent and predictable 
working conditions in the European Union (OJ L 186/105), also providing or the obligation of 
information to posted workers in art. 7. 
1097 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the 
enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative 
cooperation through the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’ ) [2014] OJ L 
159/11. 
1098 Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 
amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision 
of services (OJ 2018 L 173/16). 
1099 More regarding genuine posting and the concept of ‘temporary’ posting in; Francisco Javier 
Gómez Abelleira, ‘Desplazamiento Transnacional Laboral Genuino Y La Ley Aplicable Al 
Contrato de Trabajo’ (2018) 10 Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 213. 
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where applicable, 18 months.1100 However, those ‘longer’ postings are still 
considered temporary postings.  
The duration of the posting does not normally affect its consideration as 
temporary. Only a very long posting, together with the circumstances of the case, 
could lead to an exception.1101 
 
3.2. Article 3 PWD and the Rome I Regulation: Application 
of the core provisions of the law of the host Member State 
The heart of the PWD is article 3. This provision requires the host country to 
extend the application of the provisions of the law of the host state regarding 
certain areas to workers that are temporarily posted there.  
According to article 3(1) PWD, Member States must ensure that the 
undertakings of the host state guarantee to the posted workers to their territory 
certain terms and conditions of employment which are laid down in that Member 
State regarding:1102  
-maximum work periods and minimum rest periods; 
-minimum paid annual holidays; 
-the minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates (excluding 
supplementary occupational retirement pension schemes). The revised version of 
the PWD, however, refers to remuneration rather than to minimum rates of pay. 
At the moment, the employer is only obliged to comply with the minimum salary 
of the host country, but the revised version of the PWD requires that the 
remuneration of posted workers should be at the same level of the salary of the 
local workers, including the same additional salary elements such as bonuses or 
allowances (‘equal pay for equal work’). The inclusion of this provision responds 
to the needs exposed by the impact assessment conducted by the European 
Commission1103 regarding posting of workers and the need for an improvement 
in the legislation, which showed that, while the number of workers who are sent 
from one Member State to another Member State for a limited period of time had 
                                                     
1100 Article 3(1.a) and Recitals 9-11 of the new PWD. 
1101 In the Schlecker case (Case C-64/12 Anton Schlecker v Melitta Josefa Boedeker [2013] 
EU:C:2013:551), the Advocate General Wahl gave an example in which he referred to this situation 
and considered that a very long posting would be over 10 years. Case C-64/12 Anton Schlecker v. 
Melita Josefa Boedeker, Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 16 April 2013, para 43. 
1102 Laid down by law, regulation or administrative provision, and/or by collective agreements or 
arbitration awards universally applicable, in the host Member State. 
1103 European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services SWD (2016) 52 final. 
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extensively increased, these ‘posted workers’ often earned substantially less than 
local workers for the same work; 
-the conditions of hiring-out of workers, in particular the supply of workers 
by temporary employment undertakings; 
-health, safety and hygiene at work; 
-protective measures with regard to the terms and conditions of employment 
of pregnant women or women who have recently given birth, of children and of 
young people; 
-equality of treatment between men and women and other provisions on non-
discrimination.1104 
The revised version of the PWD adds two more areas to the list:  
- the conditions of workers’ accommodation where provided by the employer 
to workers away from their regular place of work;  
- and allowances or reimbursement of expenditure to cover travel, board and 
lodging expenses for workers away from home for professional reasons. 
However, article 3 PWD does not prevent the application of terms and 
conditions of employment which are more favourable to the employees (e.g. in 
the case the law of the home state as the law applicable to the employment 
contract provides for higher protection to the employee in the case at hand).1105 It 
ensures a minimum level of protection. It does not harmonise substantive law, 
but it provides that all areas of protection mentioned must be considered to apply 
to all workers posted to the territory. Therefore, the PWD lays down terms and 
conditions governing the employment relationship during a transnational 
provision of services, including a nucleus of mandatory rules of the host country 
law containing minimum protection for the workers that are temporary posted 
there. However, the ECJ has made a restrictive interpretation regarding article 3 
PWD that shall be object of brief analysis. Moreover, the relationship between 
article 3 PWD and the Rome I Regulation shall be discerned.  
 
3.2.1. Restrictive interpretation of the ECJ 
The PWD aims at promoting the provision of services within the EU in a context 
of fair competition and at the same time to guarantee the rights of employees 
involved in these cross-border situations. However, the balance between these 
objectives is not easy and it has been subject to ECJ interpretation several times. 
It is necessary to make a brief reference to the restrictive interpretation that the 
                                                     
1104 This list is non exhaustive, and Member States may extend it according to the conditions set in 
article 3(10). 
1105 Article 3(7) PWD. 
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ECJ makes of the Posted Workers Directive in defence of the freedom of 
provision of services of article 56 TFEU to fully understand the objectives of the 
directive. The principal cases in this regard are the well-known ECJ judgments 
Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg. The Viking case1106, dealing with 
freedom of establishment in the EU, is not directly related with the topic at hand 
and thus will not be object of analysis, although it is noteworthy to mention that 
it sets the principles on which the Laval case is built.1107    
The Laval case1108 involved Latvian workers posted to work temporarily in 
Swedish building sites, whose contract was governed by collective agreements 
between Laval and the Latvian trade union, and which earned 40% less than the 
Swedish workers. Following a collective action taken by the Latvian trade union, 
Laval commenced proceedings against the relevant trade union claiming that the 
collective action trying to force a foreign company to apply the Swedish 
collective agreement to posted workers breached article 56 TFEU. The main 
question referred to the ECJ was whether the collective action taken by the trade 
union in form of blockade breached article 56 TFEU on the freedom of provision 
of services.  In this case, the relevant collective agreement provided for more 
favourable conditions than those required by the PWD. The ECJ referred to the 
settled case law regarding the freedom of provision of services, which allows the 
host Member State to apply its legislation and collective agreements to a foreign 
service provider, provided that such rules are adequate for the protection of 
workers and do not go beyond what is required.1109 The ECJ considered that the 
implementation of the PWD in Sweden, under which the payment rates were 
established on a case by case basis rather than established by a general legislation, 
led to a climate of unfair competition between national workers and posted 
workers.1110 The ECJ concluded that the attempt of a trade union by means of 
collective action of forcing an undertaking from a Member State providing 
services in another Member State to sign a collective agreement with more 
favourable conditions than those required by the relevant legislative provision 
and including other terms not even referred to in article 3 PWD was not according 
with article 56 TFEU and article 3 PWD.1111 For the purposes of this study, it is 
                                                     
1106 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v 
Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2008] ECR I-10779. 
1107 Catherine Barnard, ‘Viking and Laval: An Introduction’ (2008) 10 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 463. 
1108 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-
11767. 
1109 Laval, para 56. 
1110 Laval, paras 70,71. 
1111 “In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first question must be that Article 49 EC and 
Directive 96/71 are to be interpreted as precluding a trade union, in a Member State in which the 
terms and conditions of employment covering the matters referred to in Article 3(1), first 
subparagraph, (a) to (g) of that directive are contained in legislative provisions, save for minimum 
rates of pay, from attempting, by means of collective action in the form of a blockade ('blockad') of 
sites such as that at issue in the main proceedings, to force a provider of services established in 
another Member State to enter into negotiations with it on the rates of pay for posted workers and 
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relevant that the ECJ claimed that the host Member State cannot go beyond the 
terms and conditions required by article 3 PWD- article 3 PWD is the minimum 
and maximum protection that the host Member State can apply to posted 
workers.1112 According to the AG of the case, a measure considered incompatible 
with the PWD would eventually be considered incompatible with article 56 
TFEU, since the PWD is intended to implement the terms of that article.1113 
A similar conclusion was reached by the ECJ in Rüffert.1114 The construction 
industry in Germany was governed by a collective agreement which provided for 
a general minimum wage (in accordance to article 3(1)(c) PWD). However, there 
were also more specific collective agreements within the construction industry in 
specific territories which also set wages (specifically, the case concerned a law 
from the German federal state of Lower Saxony (Land Niedersachsen) on the 
award of public contracts). In this case the legitimacy of requiring the compliance 
with such specific German law requiring higher wages was questioned. 
According to the ECJ, since the collective agreement at hand only covered public 
contracts (and did not include private contracts) and had not been declared 
universally applicable, it could not be considered as establishing a minimum rate 
of pay to be imposed in the context of a transnational provision of services 
involving posted workers within the meaning of Article 3(1)(c) PWD.1115 
Although article 3(7) PWD provides that the previous paragraphs of the provision 
do not prevent application of terms and conditions of employment which are more 
favourable to workers, the ECJ provides that this provision should not be 
interpreted as allowing the host Member State to require the observance of terms 
and conditions of employment that go beyond the mandatory rules for minimum 
protection for the provision of services in its territory. This is, article 3(1) PWD 
in (a) to (g) already lays down the degree of protection for posted workers the 
host Member State is entitled to require to foreign undertakings to observe.1116 
Again, the ECJ made clear that the terms indicated in article 3(1) PWD must be 
applied to posted workers but also constitute the limit of mandatory protection 
the host state can apply. The application of mandatory rules beyond the terms of 
article 3(1) PWD goes against the free movement of services.1117 Article 3(7), 
when providing that the previous paragraphs do not prevent application of terms 
and conditions of employment which are more favourable to workers, is referring 
to cases where posted workers already enjoy a more favourable protection from 
their home state, or result from the employers own accord.  
                                                     
to sign a collective agreement the terms of which lay down, as regards some of those matters, more 
favourable conditions than those resulting from the relevant legislative provisions, while other 
terms relate to matters not referred to in Article 3 of the directive”. Laval, para 111. 
1112 Laval, paras 80, 81. 
1113 Opinion Advocate General Mengozzi delivered on 23 May 2007, para 149. 
1114  Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-01989. 
1115 Rüffert, paras 29-31. 
1116 Rüffert, para 33. 
1117 Rüffert, para 34. 
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In Commission v Luxembourg1118 the ECJ examined the implementation of the 
PWD by Luxembourg. The Luxembourg implementation provided that all laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions and those resulting from collective 
agreements which have been declared universally applicable or an arbitration 
decision with a scope similar to that of universally applicable collective 
agreements regarding the matters listed in article 3(1) PWD plus other areas not 
covered by that provision or going beyond it, constituted mandatory provisions  
falling under national public policy in the sense of article 7 Rome Convention 
(now article 9 Rome I Regulation).  Luxembourg relied on the exception in article 
3(10) PWD allowing for the application of terms and conditions on matters going 
beyond the ones required in the case of public policy provisions. However, the 
ECJ, making reference to the Arblade case regarding the definition of overriding 
mandatory rules, held that such rules shall be deemed to be so crucial for the 
safeguard of the political, economic or social interests in the Member State 
concerned as to require their application Regarding article 3(10) PWD the ECJ 
clarified that it must be interpreted strictly, and the notion of public policy in a 
EU context can only be used when there is a genuine and serious threat to a 
fundamental interest of the society which shall be supported by appropriate 
evidence or by and analysis of the proportionality of the measure taken.1119 
These judgments were extensively commented by the doctrine and arose 
doubts regarding whether the PWD was achieving its mixed objectives, i.e. 
promoting the provision of services and at the same time guarantying fair 
competition and respect for the rights of workers.1120 The existence of abusive 
and fraudulent practices supported those doubts. Host Member States had 
problems with the application of the PWD related with the existence of the so-
called letter-box companies, which do not have a real activity in the country of 
origin, or of false self-employed persons. The Enforcement Directive and the new 
PWD aim at solving these issues by clarifying the concept of temporary posting 
and introducing new measures to avoid abusive practices and fake postings. 
 
3.2.2. Relationship between article 3 PWD and Rome I Regulation 
The interaction between article 3 PWD and the Rome I Regulation needs 
clarification. Article 3 PWD requires that the minimum provisions in the areas 
mentioned of the Member State where the worker is temporary working apply. 
The Rome I Regulation determines the law applicable to the employment 
contract, which will most probably be the law where the employee habitually 
                                                     
1118 Case C-319/06 Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg [2008] 
ECR I-04323. 
1119 Luxembourg, paras 50, 51. 
1120 Gardeñes Santiago, ‘Le Détachement Transnational Des Travailleurs Dans Le Cadre Des 
Prestations de Services: Un Sujet Spécialement Difficile Pour Le Marché Intérieur’ (n 1082) 255–
278. 
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carries out his work. How do the mechanisms of the Rome I Regulation ensure 
the application of the PWD requirements? As it has been previously discussed, 
article 23 Rome I provides a specific conflict rule stemming from EU law can 
take precedence over the conflict rules of the Regulation. Is article 3 PWD a 
specific conflict rule? The relationship of the PWD with article 8 Rome I will 
also be object of discussion, since article 8 Rome I determines the law applicable 
to the employment contract. The important role of article 9 Rome I and overriding 
mandatory rules will also be analysed. Finally, a reference to a novelty of the new 
PWD regarding posting exceeding 12 to 18 months will also be discussed, since 
it affects the relationship between the PWD and Rome I. 
 
a. Consideration of PWD as lex specialis 
Is article 3(1) PWD a separate conflict rule independent from the Rome I 
Regulation system? Recital 11 PWD makes reference to article 20 Rome 
Convention (predecessor of article 23 Rome I Regulation), which provided for 
the precedence of EU law over the Rome Convention. Article 23 Rome I states 
that “this Regulation shall not prejudice the application of provisions of 
Community law which, in relation to particular matters, lay down conflict-of-law 
rules relating to contractual obligations”. In the Proposal for Rome I, article 22 
referred to an Annex listing the EU instruments whose conflict rules took priority 
over those of the Regulation. The Annex included the Posted Workers Directive. 
Thus, article 3(1) PWD was understood as a separate conflict rule that took 
preference over the conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation.1121  
Difficulties arise in order to classify article 3(1) PWD as a conflict rule. Article 
3(1) PWD is not a multilateral conflict rule, since it does not contain a connecting 
factor designating a law applicable. It could then fall under the category of 
unilateral conflict rule, which establish the spatial scope of the instrument. 
However, what article 3(1) PWD does is requiring the host country to extend the 
application of the provisions of the host state regarding the specific listed areas. 
It would then have to fall under a third category of conflict rules, which are 
independent or substantive conflict rules, that rather than referring to a particular 
law or being a demarcation rule, regulate a particular question of law.1122  This is, 
a conflict rule that has substantive content. Thus, the specific conflict rule of the 
PWD would take precedence over the Rome I Regulation according to article 23 
Rome I.  
However, Recital 34 Rome I provides that “the rule on individual employment 
contracts should not prejudice the application of the overriding mandatory 
provisions of the country to which a worker is posted in accordance with 
Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
                                                     
1121 Weller (n 760) 419. 
1122 Regarding the types and structure of conflict rules: Ten Wolde and Henckel (n 4) 13–16. 
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16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services”. Following from this Recital, article 3 PWD would fall 
under article 9 Rome I regarding overriding mandatory provisions rather than 
under article 23 Rome I.  
The application of article 23 Rome I as a rule of precedence would only be 
necessary when a court has to decide whether applying the rules of the PWD or 
the rules of the Rome I. Thus, reference to article 23 Rome I would be 
unnecessary if article 3 PWD did not conflict with those of the Rome I Regulation 
and simply added a group of mandatory rules complementary to the ones in article 
8 Rome I.1123 In fact, the Preamble of the PWD refers to several articles of the 
Rome Convention, and thus it seems unreasonable to assume that the intention of 
the PWD is to deviate from the rules of the Regulation rather than complementing 
them.1124 Recital 10 PWD somehow refers to the rules laid down by the PWD as 
a form of overriding mandatory rule of article 7 Rome Convention (now article 9 
Rome I): “Whereas Article 7 of the said Convention lays down, subject to certain 
conditions, that effect may be given, concurrently with the law declared 
applicable, to the mandatory rules of the law of another country, in particular the 
law of the Member State within whose territory the worker is temporarily 
posted.”1125 In addition, recital 13 PWD refers to a nucleus of mandatory rules 
providing for a minimum protection that must be observed in the host country 
regarding posted workers.  
Thus, article 3 PWD should not be directly considered as a separate conflict 
rule or lex specialis taking precedence over the Rome I Regulation system.1126 On 
the contrary, the PWD shall be related to the rules of the Rome I Regulation. 
Article 23 Rome I provides that “this Regulation shall not prejudice the 
application of provisions of Community law which, in relation to particular 
matters, lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations”. 
However, it is submitted that the PWD does not lay down special conflict rules 
that conflict with the Rome I Regulation. The PWD requires the application of 
the core provisions of the host state irrespective of the law applicable to the 
contract, and provided they are not less favourable than the core provisions of the 
law determined by the Rome I Regulation. Recital 34 Rome I states that the 
provision regarding individual employment contracts should not prejudice of the 
overriding mandatory provisions of the country to which a worker is posted 
according to the Posted Workers Directive. Rather than laying down a specific 
conflict rule, it is helping to identify the core provisions of the law of the host 
state that require application. Still, both perspectives could be reconciled if article 
3(1) PWD is understood as a special substantive conflict rule of EU law giving 
                                                     
1123 Plender and Wilderspin (n 10) 335. 
1124 Liukkunen (n 1086) 231. See Recitals 7 to 10 PWD. 
1125 Emphasis added. 
1126 On the contrary, merely submitting that article 3 PWD prevails as conflict rule through article 
23 Rome I: Palao Moreno (n 504) 592; Riesenhuber (n 206). 
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overriding mandatory character to the set of rules listed, falling under article 9 
Rome I, if article 23 Rome I is not lex specialis.1127 
 
b. Relationship with article 8 Rome I 
Article 8(2) Rome I provides that the law applicable in absence of choice to 
an employment contract is the law of the country in which or from which the 
employee carries out his work (habitual place of work), and such place does not 
change when the worker is temporarily posted to another country. Article 8(1) 
Rome I allows the parties to choose the law of the employment contract as long 
as it does not deprive the employee from the protection provided by the 
mandatory rules of the law otherwise applicable. It follows that, in a situation 
where the worker is temporarily posted to another country, the application of the 
protection provided by the internal mandatory rules of employment of the country 
where the worker habitually works (the home country) are applicable. As it is 
already known, these internal mandatory rules or ‘provisions that cannot be 
derogated from by agreement’ are to be distinguished from the narrower category 
of overriding mandatory provisions of article 9 Rome I. Article 8(1) Rome I only 
refers to the provisions of the law objectively applicable that parties cannot 
exclude by agreement, and only those concerning the protection of the 
employee.1128 While labour legislation in most of the EU countries constitutes 
one of the most important sources of mandatory provisions and, in general, 
provisions against wrongful dismissal, protection of employees in a business 
transfer, etc. fall within that category, only provisions in very specific areas can 
fall within the narrower category of overriding mandatory provisions.1129 
Is article 3 PWD providing for the internal mandatory character of the host 
state core rules on employment protection in the sense of article 8(1) Rome I? 
Article 3(7) PWD contains a ‘most favourable law’ rule according to which 
article 3 PWD does not prevent the application of terms and conditions of 
employment which are more favourable to workers. Could it be understood in a 
similar way as the most favourable law rule in article 8(1) Rome I, according to 
which the choice of law may not have the result of depriving the employee of the 
protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement of the law objectively applicable?1130 In this regard, it has to be noticed 
that the PWD imposes the application of the core provisions of the host state, 
identifying the subject matter and restricting its extent to the matters listed in 
article 3(1) PWD, while article 8(1) Rome I does not identify the contents but just 
requires the application of all the mandatory employee provisions of the law 
otherwise applicable.   
                                                     
1127 Weller (n 760) 419. 
1128 Grusic (n 200) 145. 
1129 Franzen and Gröner (n 300) 224. 
1130 Liukkunen (n 1086) 231–233. 
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Also, Recital 34 Rome I provides that “the rule on individual employment 
contracts should not prejudice the application of the overriding mandatory 
provisions of the country to which a worker is posted in accordance with 
Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services”. Thus, it is making clear that rules in the areas listed in 
article 3(1) PWD can take precedence over article 8 Rome I as overriding 
mandatory provisions under article 9(2) Rome I.  The rules of the host state in the 
areas listed in article 3(1) PWD are given overriding mandatory character. Still, 
if the law applicable to the employment contract as a result of article 8 Rome I 
provides for better conditions to the employee than those provided by the law of 
the host country, the Directive does not prejudice those worker rights (article 3(7) 
PWD). 
Consequently, the situation might involve three potentially applicable laws: 
the chosen law by the parties (article 8(1) Rome I), the law objectively applicable 
(article 8(2), (3) or (4) Rome I), and the law of the host country where the 
employee is temporary posted (article 3 PWD and article 9 Rome I). For example, 
a situation where the contract contains a choice of law clause determining Dutch 
law as applicable, the employee habitual place of work is located in Spain and he 
is temporary posted to France would be a complex situation where three 
potentially applicable laws are involved. In such a scenario, the law applicable to 
the contract would be Dutch law as the law chosen by the parties, but without 
prejudice to the application of more beneficial national mandatory rules of the 
law otherwise applicable (Spanish law, which is the law of the country of habitual 
place of work), and without prejudice to the application of the overriding 
mandatory rules falling under the scope of article 3 PWD of French law, which 
is the law of the country where the employee is temporary posted to. The 
overriding mandatory provisions of French law should only be applicable if they 
are more beneficial to the employee (article 3(7) PWD). Contrarily to some 
suggestions by some authors, the law of the host country may apply in full when, 
for example, parties have chosen that law and the mandatory provisions of that 
law are more beneficial for the worker than the law of the home country.1131 This 
is, there is no home country control rule that submits the posted worker to the law 
where the employer is established, disallowing the application of more favourable 
provisions derived from article 8(1) Rome I.  
                                                     
1131 Some authors have understood the interpretation of the ECJ mentioned above in 3.2.1 regarding 
article 3(7) as a country of origin rule, drawing a parallel between this situation and the 
circumstances of the eDate decision of the CJEU 25 October 2011, C-509/09 and C-161/10. In that 
regard, Matteo Fornasier and Maarja Torga, ‘The Posting of Workers: Perspective of the Sending 
State’, 6 Europäische Zeitschrift Für Arbeitsrecht 356-65’, (2013) 6 Europäische Zeitschrift für 
Arbeitsrecht 356, 364. However, it is submitted that the situations are fundamentally different and 
the application of the country of origin rule does not make sense regarding the present situation. 
For a more extensive explanation: Van Hoek (n 1078) 168. 
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c. Relationship with article 9 Rome I 
Overriding mandatory rules are defined in article 9(1) Rome I as “provisions the 
respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public 
interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent 
that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope, irrespective of 
the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regulation”.  It is 
submitted that the mandatory rules of the host Member State in the areas of 
protection mentioned in article 3 PWD (minimum wage, non-discrimination, 
safety and health, maximum working time) must be considered as overriding 
mandatory rules that apply to all workers posted from another Member State to 
the territory of the host Member State.1132 The rules in the areas referred to in 
article 3 PWD do not only prevail over the chosen law (like in the case of national 
mandatory rules required by article 8(1) Rome I) but also over the objectively 
applicable law. Article 3 PWD is providing them with overriding mandatory 
character. 
However, do these rules concerning the protection of employees fall under the 
definition of article 9(1) Rome I? Are they essential for the safeguarding of the 
political, social or economic organisation of the host Member State where the 
employee is posed to? The position of the courts and doctrine of the different 
Member States differs regarding the inclusion on the definition of article 9 Rome 
I of certain provisions protecting the weaker contracting parties, as it has been 
previously discussed in Chapter III. Traditionally, German courts have been more 
reluctant to consider provisions concerning weaker party protection as overriding 
mandatory rules, contrary to the extensive French approach. However, following 
the interpretation of the ECJ in cases such as Ingmar or Unamar, we generally 
understand that article 9 Rome I also includes those provisions that, in addition 
to protect a structural weaker party, they mainly serve to protect higher interests 
which application is essential for the country. However, as previously stated, 
Member States have to restrain themselves and be cautious when they define their 
protective rules as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such 
as its political, social or economic organization, and justify its application.1133 
Article 3(1) PWD rule helps the conflict of laws process by clarifying the level 
of mandatoriness of certain rules. Overriding mandatory rules demand 
applicability in all circumstances falling within their scope because of their 
particular purpose and content. The overriding reach of a provision can be 
indicated by an express delimitation of its scope or it can result from its wording. 
However, very often, overriding mandatory provisions do not specifically refer 
to their overriding reach, or determine their own scope, but courts have to 
determine the provision’s scope by attending to the content and objectives of the 
                                                     
1132 Liukkunen (n 1086) 233–235; Weller (n 760) 419; McParland (n 277) 682; Garcimartín Alférez, 
‘The Rome I Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing?’ (n 345) 76; Gardeñes Santiago, ‘Derecho 
Imperativo Y Contrato Internacional de Trabajo’ (n 657) 167,168. 
1133 Chapter III.3.1.1. 
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rule.1134 In the case of the PWD, the EU legislator facilitates the process by 
providing in article 3(1) PWD the overriding mandatory character and scope of 
specific rules.1135 
The listed matters in article 3(1) PWD are maximum work periods and 
minimum rest periods; minimum annual holidays; minimum rate of pay 
(remuneration in the new PWD); conditions of hiring-out of workers; health, 
safety and hygiene at work; protective measures with regard to the terms and 
conditions of employment of pregnant women or women who have recently given 
birth, of children and of young people; non-discrimination; and, in the new PWD, 
conditions regarding accommodation and travel related expenses. However, 
relevant employment law matters such as unfair dismissal, sick pay (except 
regarding protection of special groups of workers listed in article 3(1)(g), e.g. 
pregnant woman) or minimum notice periods are excluded. The matters listed are 
considered of ‘immediate interest’ during the period of posting: they are essential 
to ensure fair competition and the fundamental freedom of provision of services. 
Thus, besides ensuring a minimum protection to posted workers, the application 
of the rules regarding the matters listed are crucial for the safeguard of public 
interests of the host Member State and, specially, of the EU. If, for example, 
posted workers were not ensured the same minimum pay rate as local workers, a 
situation of unfair competition would take place between local companies and 
companies from the host country since not complying with the most restrictive 
rules is cheaper for the latter. However, employment provisions not listed in 
article 3(1) PWD are primarily aimed at protecting the employee and are not 
essential for the safeguarding of public interests in the case of a temporary 
posting. 
Therefore, employment measures of the host Member State cannot be 
regarded in its entirety as overriding mandatory rules. In Commission v 
Luxembourg the ECJ made clear that the matters listed outside art 3(1) PWD, in 
order to be applicable as ‘public policy provisions’ provided by article 3(10) 
PWD, as an exception from the list of article 3(1) PWD and a derogation from 
the freedom of provision of services, had to be interpreted strictly and its scope 
could not be determined unilaterally by the Member States.1136 The ECJ 
restrictive interpretation shows that provisions regarding matters outside the list 
of article 3(1)PWD are most probably not falling under the exception of article 
3(10) PWD and thus cannot be applicable as overriding mandatory provisions.  
Article 9(2) Rome I provides for the application of the overriding mandatory 
provisions of the forum. However, the rules on jurisdiction of Brussels I bis, when 
the employee is the claimant, will usually point to the courts where the employer 
is domiciled or where the habitual place of work is. The country of origin, rather 
                                                     
1134 Unamar, para 50.  
1135 Gardeñes Santiago, ‘Derecho Imperativo Y Contrato Internacional de Trabajo’ (n 657) 167,168. 
1136 Commission v Luxembourg, paras 30,31. 
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than the host country, will generally be the forum. Therefore, the application of 
the host country overriding mandatory rules according to the Rome I Regulation 
can be through article 9(3) Rome I. Article 9(3) Rome I provides that “Effect may 
be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country where 
the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, in 
so far as those overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of the 
contract unlawful. In considering whether to give effect to those provisions, 
regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their 
application or non-application”. The host Member State falls under the 
requirements of the provision, since it is the country were the posted worker 
carries out the obligations arising from the employment contract. Also, article 6 
PWD gives jurisdiction to the host Member State in order to enforce the rights 
derived from article 3 PWD: “In order to enforce the right to the terms and 
conditions of employment guaranteed in Article 3, judicial proceedings may be 
instituted in the Member State in whose territory the worker is or was posted, 
without prejudice, where applicable, to the right, under existing international 
conventions on jurisdiction, to institute proceedings in another State”. 
 
d. Temporary posting exceeding 12 (or 18) months 
The new PWD introduces a new provision that affects the mandatory 
application of the terms and conditions of the host country when the posting 
exceeds 12 months: it provides that, in addition to the terms and conditions of 
employment referred to in the list of article 3(1) PWD, all the applicable terms 
and conditions of employment of the law of the host Member State shall be 
applicable after 12 (or 18) months of posting.1137 This is, after 12 (or 18) months 
of posting, all national mandatory labour law provisions of the host country where 
the employee is temporary working will be applicable (except the rules regarding 
the termination of the contract and supplementary occupational retirement 
pension schemes).1138 The new provision also clarifies that, in the case of the 
                                                     
1137 The period of 12 months can be extended to 18 months by the Member State where the service 
is provided where the service provider submits a motivated notification (3(1a) third subparagraph 
new PWD) 
1138 The new PWD adds the following provision in article3(1) PWD: “a. Where the effective 
duration of a posting exceeds 12 months, Member States shall ensure, irrespective of which law 
applies to the employment relationship, that undertakings as referred to in Article 1(1) guarantee, 
on the basis of equality of treatment, workers who are posted to their territory, in addition to the 
terms and conditions of employment referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, all the applicable 
terms and conditions of employment which are laid down in the Member State where the work is 
carried out: 
— by law, regulation or administrative provision, and/or 
— by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally 
applicable or otherwise apply in accordance with paragraph 8. 
The first subparagraph of this paragraph shall not apply to the following matters: 
(a) procedures, formalities and conditions of the conclusion and termination of the 
employment contract, including non-competition clauses  
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replacement of a posted worker by another posted worker performing the same 
task at the same place, the duration of the posting periods of both posted workers 
involved shall be cumulative for the purposes of the aforementioned provision.  
The new provision is one of the measures introduced by the new PWD in order 
to avoid abuses such as rotational posting or the practices of ‘letter-box 
companies’, which exploited loopholes of the original PWD to circumvent 
employment and social security legislation and engage in operations in other 
Member States. It can be said that the concept of ‘temporary posting’, as 
understood until now, is now limited to 12 (or 18) months. Companies posting 
workers for a long-term period shall comply with the mandatory employment law 
of the host country. 
The new clause is welcome since it aims at preventing abuse of law from the 
companies. However, this provision seems to conflict with the Rome I Regulation 
system. Article 8(2) Rome I provides that the law applicable to the contract does 
not change when the worker is temporary posted to another country (i.e. the 
habitual place of work does not change). According to article 8(1) and (2) Rome 
I, the law applicable to the employment contract is the law of habitual place of 
work, and parties can choose the law applicable but the mandatory protection of 
the habitual place of work is ensured. Then, the listed matters of article 3(1) PWD 
of the host country law apply as overriding mandatory provisions through article 
9 Rome I. However, the new clause requires the application of all internal 
mandatory employment protection of the host country to the worker. How do the 
mechanisms of the Rome I Regulation ensure that protection? 
- The first possibility would be through article 8 Rome I. It could be 
considered that the new provision of the PWD affects the meaning of temporary 
posting in a way that a posting exceeding 12 or 18 months is not a temporary 
posting anymore also in the light of article 8. This is, habitual place of work, after 
12 (or 18) months, would turn to be the country where the employee is posted. 
This option does not benefit transparency since such a change would then have 
to be made in article 8 Rome I. More importantly, this is not what the new 
provision of the PWD intends: first, the new article3(1) PWD already clarifies 
that some provisions of the law of the country of posting are not applicable (e.g. 
regarding termination of contract), implying that those provisions are applicable 
as a result of the law objectively applicable (most probably, the home state law). 
Second, it follows from the understanding of the PWD that workers that are 
posted longer than 12 (or 18) months can still be considered temporary posted 
workers, since they are not excluded from the protection provided by the 
provisions of the Directive. Finally, article 3(1)a clearly provides that “[W]here 
the effective duration of a posting exceeds 12 months, Member States shall 
ensure, irrespective of which law applies to the employment relationship(…)”1139, 
                                                     
(b) supplementary occupational retirement pension schemes. (…)” 
1139 Emphasis added. 
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making clear that the objective applicable law to the contract is not the law of the 
Member State of posting. 
- The other possible mechanism to ensure the application of the terms and 
conditions required by article 3(1)a of the new PWD is article 9 Rome I. 
However, the obvious impediment in that regard is that general employment 
terms and conditions of a national law are largely national mandatory provisions 
–or provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement. As provisions 
primarily aimed at protecting the weaker party, they do not fall under the 
definition of overriding mandatory provisions. Within the context of temporary 
posting of workers, it was considered that only those core provisions listed in 
article 3(1) PWD were considered overriding mandatory for the host state 
because of the higher interests involved. Provisions falling outside the categories 
listed in article3(1) PWD would generally just have internal mandatory character, 
and therefore cannot be applicable irrespective of the law applicable to the 
employment contract. Nevertheless, the new article 3(1).a PWD provides that the 
general terms and conditions of the country of posting shall be applicable 
irrespective of the law applicable to the contract when the posting exceeds 12 (or 
18) months. It could be considered that, because of the specific circumstances, 
the general terms and conditions that normally aim primarily to protect the 
employee, become essential for the protection of higher interests. Article 3.1.a. 
would then be suggesting that after 12 (or 18) months the general terms and 
conditions of the host country become applicable as overriding mandatory 
provisions in addition to the provisions derived from article 3(1). The essential 
higher interests to be protected could be found on the objective of preventing 
abuse of law within the EU and defending fair competition between the Member 
States. This is, the overriding mandatory character could be justified on the 
prevention of abusive and fraudulent practices involving letter-box companies 
and fake ‘temporary’ postings which affect negatively the correct functioning of 
the internal market. However, it can still be debatable whether such a specific 
objective can justify that every time that a posting exceeds 12 or 18 months most 
of the terms and conditions of the contract would have to be adapted to the law 
of the host country.  
 
3.3. Posting of workers in extra-EU situations 
The provisions of the PWD are only applicable to intra-EU posting of workers. 
In the case of an extra-EU posting (i.e. workers posted to a Member State from 
an undertaking established in a non-Member State, or vice versa) the rules of the 
PWD do not require application. Still, even though the situations mentioned 
below do not fall under the scope of PWD, I will make a brief reference to the 
posting of workers in extra-EU situations. 
When a worker is temporary posted from a Member State to a non-Member 
State, the Member State court will determine as applicable the law of habitual 
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place of work. The minimum EU mandatory protection is ensured. However, the 
provisions of the PWD are not applicable unless the Member State had extended 
in its national implementation of the Directive its application to extra-EU 
postings. 
From the internal labour market point of view of a Member State, the situation 
where a worker is posted from a non-EU country to temporarily work in a 
Member State is more interesting. In the case the Member State court claims 
jurisdiction over the dispute, the law applicable to the employment contract as a 
result of article 8 Rome I would most likely be the law of the habitual place of 
work (i.e. a non-Member State law). A foreign law does not necessarily provide 
for rules similar to those of the PWD, which provide for the application of core 
provisions of the host country. However, most certainly, the law of the Member 
State provides for the application of some national law employment provisions 
as overriding mandatory rules. Although it is a matter of national law to determine 
which labour legislation shall be considered as overriding mandatory in those 
cases of temporary posting, we can wonder whether the same restrictive 
interpretation deriving from the PWD should be applicable. This is, we can 
question whether the matters outside the list of article 3 PWD could and should 
be considered as overriding mandatory provisions and apply according to article 
9 Rome I. 
In the cases of intra-EU posting of workers, according to the ECJ, the PWD 
in combination with the provisions of the TFEU on freedom of provision of 
services preclude to the host state the imposition of non-listed matters of article 
3 PWD as overriding mandatory rules. However, that restrictive interpretation is 
on the basis of respect for the freedom of provision of services in the EU, and 
does not apply to an extra-EU posting. When workers are posted by a non-EU 
undertaking, the Member State where the worker is temporary posted to could 
impose the application of rules in other areas of individual employment law listed 
outside article 3 PWD, resulting in a different treatment between workers posted 
from a Member State and workers posted from outside the EU.1140 Such an 
outcome will depend on the interpretation of the concept of overriding mandatory 
rules by the Member State involved. Regarding the areas involved in individual 
employment law regarding posting of workers’ situations that can be regarded as 
overriding mandatory rules, in my opinion, it seems logical to follow the same 
restrictive interpretation of article 9 Rome I as regards the PWD, even when the 
situation follows outside its scope of application. Recital 37 Rome I also 
highlights the exceptional character of article 9 Rome I when stating that 
“considerations of public interest justify giving the courts of the Member States 
the possibility, in exceptional circumstances, of applying exceptions based on 
                                                     
1140 Grusic (n 200) 290. Grusic also submits that the different treatment between workers posted 
from a Member State and workers posted from outside the EU is in accordance with the intention 
of the Posted Workers Directive, which principal objective is to improve the operation of the 
internal market rather than protecting posted workers.  
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public policy and overriding mandatory provisions (…)”.  Also, the definition of 
article 9(1) Rome I of overriding mandatory provisions derives from the Arblade 
case. This case concerned derogations from the fundamental freedom of 
provision of services and from it is understood that the concept of overriding 
mandatory provisions is narrow. An extensive interpretation of the concept and 
an unrestricted application of employment legislation concerning other postings 
in the host country would undermine the conflict of laws process and the system 
of the Rome I Regulation, leading to less predictable and uniform results. The 
ECJ, in Unamar, stated that the national court has the discretion to qualify its own 
national provisions as overriding mandatory rules, but it has to do so on the basis 
of a detailed assessment showing the application of those provisions is crucial for 
the safeguard of public interests of the country. As previously stated, Member 
States have followed different interpretations of the concept of overriding 
mandatory rules, but, following the definition of article 9(1) Rome I and the ECJ, 
it should generally be considered that provisions protecting the weaker party, in 
order to be considered as overriding mandatory rules, should have to be essential 
for the protection of a public interest as well (e.g. the provisions listed in article 
3(1) PWD minimum pay: besides protecting the employee, the main objective is 
to avoid unfair competition). However, provisions regarding areas outside the list, 
such as unfair dismissal provisions, are generally not considered as crucial for the 
safeguarding of the political, social or economic organisation of a country, since, 
although important for it, they are primarily aimed at the protection of the 
employee.1141 However, it is indeed up to each national Member State legislator 




4. Closing remarks 
First, it is concluded that, in most of the cases, article 8 Rome I ensures the 
application of the EU employment directives when necessary. The area of EU 
employment law does not cover as many fields of national law as EU consumer 
law does. EU employment law is quite fragmented and mainly composed by 
minimum harmonisation directives that complement the policies of Member 
States. Therefore, the role of EU PIL is essential in this area. The majority of EU 
employment directives in the area of contract law do not contain rules interfering 
with PIL (except for the Acquired Rights Directive and Posted Workers 
Directive). In general, EU employment directives establish substantive rights 
trying to ensure that Member States apply the minimum working protection 
                                                     
1141 ibid 212–214. The German Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) refused to apply some 
German rules protecting employees against abusive dismissal based on a restrictive interpretation 
of article 7 Rome Convention (Bundesarbeitbericht, 29 October 1992, in: IPRax 1994, p. 123). 
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required by the instrument at hand. The provisions of the directives, when dealing 
with an individual employment contract, will apply when the national law of a 
Member State is applicable because it is a purely internal situation or, in a cross-
border situation, as a result of article 8 of the Rome I Regulation. In our current 
EU PIL approach, reflected in the Rome I Regulation, it is understood that if a 
law has been determined as applicable by the conflict rules, then the statutes of 
that legal system shall apply to the situation (as long as the situation falls within 
the scope of application of the statute in question), with the only exception of 
overriding mandatory provisions. Article 8(2) Rome I ensures that the protection 
provided by the mandatory rules of the place of habitual work is applied (unless 
the law chosen by the parties provides for a better protection). Therefore, when 
the place of habitual work is in a Member State, the application of the 
requirements lay down by the EU employment directives are ensured. It has been 
submitted that the majority of these directives do not have any interest on being 
applicable to workers outside the EU and indeed intend their protection to apply 
to workers working in the EU. As a result, the generality of EU employment 
directives and article 8 Rome I on the law applicable to individual employment 
contracts are coordinated, dealing separately with substantive issues and PIL 
issues and having as relevant criterion the place of work. 
However, there are exceptions to the previous statements. It is generally 
considered that a transfer of undertakings can be classified within the conflict of 
laws category for individual employment contracts. The Acquired Rights 
Directive, which aims at preserving employees’ rights in the case of a transfer of 
undertaking, covers also cross-border transfer of undertakings and contains a 
‘scope rule’ that could affect PIL. Article 1(2) provides that the directive “shall 
apply where and in so far as the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking 
or business to be transferred is situated within the territorial scope of the Treaty”. 
To a certain extent, the same analysis conducted regarding scope rules and EU 
consumer directives has been conducted. It has been considered whether this rule 
could be understood as a unilateral conflict rule taking precedence over the Rome 
I Regulation, and thus whether the directive establishes its own scope under a 
unilateral PIL approach. Similar to the conclusion reached regarding EU 
consumer directives, I consider that the EU legislator should not aim at imposing 
the application of the Directives without regard to the PIL system in force and 
should be careful with the inclusion of rules such as article 1(2) Acquired Rights 
Directive referring to the territorial scope of a directive in such a way that might 
lead to confusion from a PIL perspective. Legal certainty would be impaired by 
the creation of a parallel conflict of laws mechanism imposing the application of 
the rules of the Directive when determined by the scope rule, without even 
determining according to which national law is applicable, especially when the 
implementation of the Member States of the scope rule is so inconsistent. Thus, 
linking the application of the Acquired Rights Directive provisions to the Rome 
I Regulation is preferred. Article 8 Rome I ensures the application of the 
mandatory provisions of the law of habitual place of work of the employee. 
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However, the habitual place of work changes when the employee is transferred 
to the new location. Also, when the law applicable is the result of the closest 
connection escape mechanism (a situation like in the American Pilots case), the 
application of the Acquired Rights Directive is not ensured. Article 9 Rome I is 
the only possible mechanism to ensure the application of the Directive in such 
scenarios, although it has been concluded that it is not ideal. Although it could be 
understood that the ‘scope rule’ directly gives overriding mandatory character, I 
think that should not be the case because a similar parallel unilateral PIL system 
as the one described would be created and, more importantly, the provisions of 
the Acquired Rights Directive should not generally be considered as having 
overriding mandatory character, since they are mainly aimed at protecting the 
employee.  
The current formulation of scope rules in directives and the different national 
implementations and approaches in that regard create legal uncertainty from a 
PIL point of view. Regarding EU consumer directives, it was submitted that a 
solution would be to adapt article 6 Rome I to the needs of the EU directives. 
However, rather than concluding that article 8 Rome I should be adapted to the 
necessities of Acquired Rights Directive in this case, as it was concluded 
regarding article 6 Rome I and EU consumer directives, I consider that the 
application of the Acquired Rights Directive is ensured by article 8 Rome I when 
the employee requires that protection. When article 8 Rome I does not ensure the 
application of the directive because it designates a foreign law as applicable, the 
only manner that the Acquired Rights Directive would need to apply is not 
justifiable under employee protection reasons, but it would be because a public 
interest is at stake. 
Finally, the situation of temporary posting of workers to other Member States 
also deserved special attention. In this regard, the Posted Workers Directive, the 
Enforcement Directive and the revised version of the Posted Workers Directive 
aim to promote the freedom of provision of services and to ensure the protection 
of posted workers where an undertaking established in a Member State posts a 
worker to work to another Member State on a temporary basis. According to 
article 8 Rome I, the habitual place of work does not change when the posting to 
another country is temporary, and therefore the law applicable to the individual 
employment contract would continue to be the law of the country of habitual 
place of work (home country). However, article 3(1) of the Posted Workers 
Directive provides that Member States must ensure that the undertakings of the 
host state guarantee to the posted workers to their territory certain terms and 
conditions of employment which are laid down in that Member State regarding 
maximum work periods and minimum rest periods, remuneration, health and 
safety conditions, etc. The ECJ clarified that, in protection of the freedom of 
provision of services, the provisions of the country of posting in the areas listed 
in article 3(1) PWD must be applied to posted workers but also constitute the 
limit of mandatory protection the country of posting can apply. The matters listed 
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are considered of ‘immediate interest’ during the period of posting: they are 
essential to ensure fair competition and the fundamental freedom of provision of 
services. In relation with the rules of the Rome I Regulation, the provisions 
referred to in article 3(1) PWD, besides ensuring a minimum protection to posted 
workers, are considered crucial for the safeguard of public interests of the host 
Member State and of the EU and thus constitute overriding mandatory provisions 
of article 9 Rome I. Article 3(1) PWD determines the overriding mandatory 
character and scope of specific rules. Finally, it is also debated whether the new 
provision stating that, in addition to the terms and conditions of employment 
referred to in the list of article 3(1) PWD, all the applicable terms and conditions 
of employment of the law of the host Member State shall be applicable after 12 
(or 18) months of posting can also be applicable under article 9 Rome I. As 
provisions primarily aimed at protecting the weaker party, they do not fall under 
the definition of overriding mandatory provisions. However, it has been 
submitted that, because of the specific circumstances, the general terms and 
conditions that normally aim primarily to protect the employee, might become 
essential for the protection of higher interests. Article 3(1)(a) PWD would then 
be suggesting that after 12 (or 18) months the general terms and conditions of the 
host country become applicable as overriding mandatory provisions in addition 
to the provisions derived from article 3(1). The essential higher interests to be 
protected could be found on the objective of preventing abuse of law within the 
EU and defending fair competition between the Member States. However, 
reconciling the application of the new provision under the doctrine of overriding 
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CHAPTER VI - OTHER POSSIBLE WEAKER 
CONTRACTING PARTIES AND THE ROME 
I REGULATION 
 
Consumers and employees are the most characteristic but not the only possible 
weaker parties to a contract. Under EU PIL, consumers and employees constitute 
the paradigmatic example of structural weaker parties, and special protective 
conflict rules limit party autonomy and provide for special connecting factors in 
their benefit. However, to a lesser extent, EU PIL, and specifically the Rome I 
Regulation, extends the protection to passengers and some insurance 
policyholders. Moreover, even when special rules protecting weaker contracting 
parties in the Rome I Regulation only include consumers, employees, insurance 
policyholders (or other beneficiaries) and passengers (arts. 5-8 Rome I), other 
contractual parties can often have a weaker contracting position in their contract 
(such as franchisees, distributors or commercial agents). 
Contracts of carriage of passengers and contracts of insurance are excluded 
from the protection provided to consumer contracts in article 6 Rome I. 
According to Recital 32 Rome I, the particular nature of these contracts call for 
specific provisions ensuring an adequate level of protection of passengers and 
policyholders. The protection provided by article 5(2) Rome I to passengers and 
by article 7 Rome I to policyholders differs from the protection provided by 
articles 6 and 8 Rome I to consumers and employees respectively. Party 
autonomy is limited, but in a way that only allows the choice of a law that has 
some connection with the contract. The choice of law is limited to a number of 
legal systems which are connected to the contract or parties of the contract. The 
rationale behind it is that the weaker party is protected when a qualified link 
between the contract and the law chosen is required.1142 However, it is not ensured 
that the legal system chosen, even if connected with the contract, would have 
certain level of protection to the passenger or policyholder. In the context of the 
EU, there are several EU secondary law instruments that provide for substantive 
rules regarding contracts for the carriage of passengers and insurance contracts. 
Since the application of the minimum mandatory rules of the place of habitual 
residence of the weaker party in these cases is not ensured through the limitation 
of party autonomy (like in the case of consumers and employees), how are EU 
passengers and policyholders protected against a non-Member State choice of 
law? Does the protection of the directives and regulations need to apply in those 
cases? And, if so, how? An analysis of the relationship between the rules of the 
                                                     
1142 Marco López de Gonzalo, ‘Carriage of Passengers’ in Jürgen Basedow and others (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Private International Law, vol 1 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 269–270. 
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Rome I Regulation and the EU secondary law regarding insurance contracts and 
carriage of passengers contracts will be conducted in this Chapter in order to 
answer these questions. Since the same analysis has already been conducted 
regarding consumer and individual employment contracts, which are the most 
paradigmatic examples of contracts involving weaker parties and receive the most 
protection, the analysis regarding insurance contracts and contracts for the 
carriage of passengers will be brief. Also, since article 7 Rome I regarding 
insurance contracts has been introduced in order to unify the disperse conflict 
rules existent among the EU insurance directives, it will be analysed whether the 
technique used by this provision could be of use regarding the disperse scope 
rules among EU consumer directives. 
Party autonomy is not limited regarding other types of contracts. As we have 
seen, within the Rome I Regulation in the context of party autonomy we can 
differentiate between four special contracts involving presumable weaker parties 
(arts. 5-8 Rome I), which somehow limit the freedom of choice of law of the 
parties, and all other contracts, for which the general rule is party autonomy. 
Then, of course, party autonomy can always be limited by article 3(3) and 3(4) 
Rome I (when all the elements of the situation are located within one Member 
State or within the EU, and parties choose a foreign or a non-EU law, 
respectively), article 9 Rome I (application of overriding mandatory provisions) 
and article 21 (public policy exception). These exceptions to party autonomy are 
not designed to protect the weaker party of a contract, since already special 
protective provisions are laid down with that intention. Besides the four contracts 
involving presumable weaker parties recognised by the Rome I Regulation, there 
are other parties to a contract that find themselves often in a weaker contracting 
position. Franchisees, distributors or commercial agents usually have less 
bargaining and economic power and information than their counterparties, and 
can see themselves in a similar position than that of a consumer or an employee 
in respect of their counterparties. For example, the franchisee can be in a similar 
position to a consumer as regards their bargaining power: in a franchise contract 
between Dunkin Donuts, a US corporation based on Massachusetts (US), and an 
individual Dutch franchisee, the US big corporation could include in the contract 
a choice of law clause selecting the law of a third country with no consumer or 
franchisee protection and then include in the contract a clause allowing the 
franchisor to terminate the contract unilaterally under some circumstances which 
would have not been allowed under Massachusetts or Dutch law. In that case, the 
Rome I Regulation would find that the law governing the contract is the law 
chosen by the parties in the franchise contract.1143 In the case of a commercial 
agency contract, for example, the situation  of the agent can be in some occasions 
similar to the one of an employee: when a commercial agent is a natural person 
mainly depending on one principal, the principal can easily impose a foreign 
                                                     
1143 Symeonides, ‘Party Autonomy in Rome I and Rome II from a Comparative Perspective’ (n 16) 
534. 
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choice of law clause in the contract and then be able to terminate the contract 
unilaterally without having to compensate the commercial agent, for example. 
However, these parties are not always in a dependent position in which they have 
to accept the contractual provisions imposed by a big company, but can also be 
medium or big corporations with sufficient bargaining power and resources. 
Thus, the Rome I Regulation does not include special conflict rules limiting party 
autonomy for these type of contracts, despite the existence of substantive 
protection for them in many jurisdictions. It provides for specific connecting 
factors in absence of choice of law for franchise and distribution contracts (article 
4(1)(e) and 4(1)(f) Rome I), but it does it within the general rule of article 4, with 
presumably objectives of both weaker party protection and also legal certainty 
and closest connection.1144 At EU level, the Commercial Agents Directive 
provides for protection to commercial agents operating within the EU. Can this 
protection be circumvented with a choice of law of a non-Member State? Does 
the Rome I Regulation provide for mechanisms for the application of the 
Commercial Agents Directive when necessary? And if not, should it? The ECJ in 
the previously analysed Ingmar judgment has dealt with the applicability of the 
Commercial Agents Directive, although before the entering into force of the 
Rome I Regulation.  
This Chapter aims to analyse the interaction between special (and less 
protective) conflict rules and general conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation with 
the EU secondary law instruments that contain mandatory provisions protecting 
weaker parties other than consumers and employees. Does the Rome I Regulation 
provide for other mechanisms of protection for these weaker parties? On the other 
hand, as it has been described in previous chapters, several questions arise 
regarding the interaction and coordination of these different instruments: do the 
relevant EU secondary law instruments provide for specific conflict rules 
prevailing over the Rome I through article 23 Rome I? Do some other directives 
provide for scope rules like in the case of EU consumer directives? If so, what 
would be their role? Does article 9 Rome I (application of overriding mandatory 
rules) play a role on the application of these EU secondary law to compensate the 
effects of party autonomy? In order to answer these questions, it will first be 
analysed the interaction between the conflict rules protecting the weaker party, 
although to a lesser extent, of the Rome I Regulation, and the EU secondary law 
providing for the substantive protection. Since the same type of analysis has been 
conducted in the previous chapters, this chapter will only focus on the specialties 
that can be highlighted from the named contracts. Specifically, the special 
                                                     
1144 Laura García Gutiérrez, ‘Franchise Contracts and the Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable 
to International Contracts’ in Petar Sarcevic, Andrea Bonomi and Paul Volken (eds), Yearbook of 
Private International Law, vol 10 (sellier european law publishers and Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law 2008) 235; Marie-Elodie Ancel, ‘The Rome I Regulation and Distribution 
Contracts’ in Petar Sarcevic, Andrea Bonomi and Paul Volken (eds), Yearbook of Private 
International Law, vol 10 (Sellier European Law Publishers & Swiss Institute of Comparative Law 
2008) 226,227. Also, see below in this Chapter 2.1. 
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conflict rules of article 7 Rome I regarding insurance contracts will be described, 
to then briefly examine how are they coordinated with the EU insurance 
directives. In addition, it will be considered whether a provision with a similar 
technique would be suitable in the case of consumer contracts. Also, the special 
conflict rules regarding contracts of carriage of passengers of art. 5 Rome I will 
be studied, as well as their relationship with EU secondary law instruments 
providing for protection to passengers. Secondly, this chapter will deal with 
contracts where party autonomy is not limited through the Rome I Regulation 
(franchise, distribution and commercial agency contracts). Special attention will 
be paid to the commercial agency contract since the Commercial Agents 
Directive provides for substantive rights for commercial agents and the ECJ has 
reflected on the application of these rights and party autonomy. 
 
1. Other weaker parties of the Rome I Regulation: 
Insurance and carriage of passengers contracts 
and interaction with EU secondary law 
1.1. Law applicable to insurance contracts (article 7 
Rome I) and applicability of EU insurance directives 
Article 7 Rome I contains special conflict rules regarding insurance contracts. 
However, not all insurance policy holders are in the position of weaker 
contracting parties. EU PIL distinguishes between contracts where the 
policyholder needs special protection and contracts where there is no need for 
such protection.  
Article 7 Rome I provides for three different levels of protection based on 
limits to party autonomy and special conflict rules in absence of choice. First, in 
insurance contracts for large risks, parties enjoy complete party autonomy as 
provided by the general rule of article 3 Rome I (article 7(2) Rome I). Insurance 
contracts for large risks are mostly B2B contracts relating to large industrial or 
transport business operations.1145 The policyholder is not in a weaker position in 
that contract, since it is  a company with sufficient bargaining power, information 
and resources to negotiate the contract and the choice of law clause. In absence 
of choice of law, the law applicable is the law of the country of habitual residence 
of the insurer (article 7(2) Rome I). It is not a special protective connecting factor, 
                                                     
1145 The definition of large risks, according to article 7, is to be found in in Article 5(d) of the First 
Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 amended by Directive 2005/68/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2005 L 323/1), and now repealed by Directive 2009/138/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of 
the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (OJ 2009 L 335/1) (Solvency II), where large risks are 
defined now in article 13(27).  
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but follows the general approach referring to the country of habitual residence of 
the party effectuating the characteristic performance.  
Second, in insurance contracts that do not qualify as large risks, normally 
known as contracts for mass risks, article 7 (3) Rome I provides for more specific 
rules. These type of contracts are regulated by article 7 to the extent that the mass 
risks are located in the EU. This category might involve both B2C and B2B 
contracts. Customers insuring smaller risks are more likely to be small businesses 
or private persons, which find themselves in a weaker contractual position. Party 
autonomy is limited to several Member States connected with the insurance 
contract or the policyholder.1146 In absence of choice of law, the law applicable is 
the law of the Member State in which the risk is situated at the time of conclusion 
of the contract. 
Third, article 7(4) Rome I contains a special rule for mandatory insurance 
contracts, i.e. insurance contracts covering risks for which a Member State 
imposes an obligation to take out insurance. The insurance contract must comply 
with the specific provisions relating to that insurance laid down by the Member 
State that imposes the obligation (7(4)(a) Rome I) and, derogating from par. 2 
and 3, a Member State may impose that the insurance contract should be governed 
by the law of the Member State that imposes the obligation to take out insurance. 
Mandatory insurance contracts are therefore the most protected category by 
article 7, allowing Member States to completely derogate from party autonomy 
and imposing the application of the law of the Member State that imposes the 
obligation to take out insurance. Besides the interests of the policy holder, this 
rule aims at protecting the public interests of Member States underlying the 
decision of imposing a mandatory insurance.  
Regarding the relationship of the Rome I Regulation and insurance directives, 
the introduction of article 7 Rome I (as compared with the previous situation) is 
welcome, since, previously, the conflict rules regarding insurance contracts were 
not unified in the Rome Convention, but were dispersed over the different 
                                                     
1146 According to article 7(3) Rome I: “In the case of an insurance contract other than a contract 
falling within paragraph 2, only the following laws may be chosen by the parties in accordance with 
Article 3: 
(a) the law of any Member State where the risk is situated at the time of conclusion 
of the contract; 
(b) the law of the country where the policy holder has his habitual residence; 
(c) in the case of life assurance, the law of the Member State of which the policy 
holder is a national; 
(d) for insurance contracts covering risks limited to events occurring in one 
Member State other than the Member State where the risk is situated, the law of that 
Member State; 
(e) where the policy holder of a contract falling under this paragraph pursues a 
commercial or industrial activity or a liberal profession and the insurance contract covers 
two or more risks which relate to those activities and are situated in different Member 
States, the law of any of the Member States concerned or the law of the country of habitual 
residence of the policy holder.” 
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insurance directives and the Rome Convention. Basically, when the insured risk 
was located in the EU and covered by an EU insurer, the relevant insurance 
directives and its conflict rules would apply.1147 However, directives did not cover 
cases where the insured risk was located outside the EU. In those cases, the 
general conflict rules of the Rome Convention were applicable. The Rome 
Convention did not include a special provision for insurance contracts 
comparable to article 7 Rome I. There was even a third situation where neither 
the conflict rules of the insurance directives nor the ones of the Rome Convention 
were applicable, but national conflict rules of the Member States had to determine 
the applicable law. This was in cases were the risk was located in the EU but it 
was covered by an insurer not established in a Member State.1148 
Insurance directives contained actual conflict rules, not ‘scope rules’ as in 
consumer or employment directives. For example, article 7 of the Second Non-
life Insurance Directive (88/357/EEC)1149 or article 32 Directive on Life 
Assurance (2002/83/EC)1150 laid down diverse connecting factors to determine 
the law applicable to the insurance contract. These conflict rules laid down in 
directives were excessively complex. The law applicable depended on whether a 
contract concerned a life or non-life insurance and, in case of the latter, whether 
the risk was small or large, and whether the risk was located in the EU. In general, 
choice of law was possible depending on the Member State law applicable. 
Moreover, directives are subject to implementation by national law, leaving room 
for a diverse implementation. As a consequence, the conflict rules were not 
completely unified among the Member States.1151 As a result, the insurance 
conflict of laws regulation was fragmented and lacked transparency. The situation 
left room for gaps and inconsistencies. 
After intense discussions, the conflict rules of the insurance directives were 
incorporated in article 7 Rome I Regulation. Article 7 Rome I conceals and 
unifies the previously scattered conflict rules but it does not introduce significant 
changes. The provision has been subject of criticism due to the complexity of its 
                                                     
1147 The Rome Convention provided in article 1(3) and 1(4) that the Convention did not apply to 
insurance contracts, other than reinsurance, covering risks situated within the European 
Community. 
1148 Xandra E Kramer, ‘The New European Conflict of Law Rules on Insurance Contracts in Rome 
I: A Complex Compromise’ (2008) 6 The Icfai University Journal of Insurance Law 23, 25; Kuipers 
(n 11) 118,119. 
1149 Second Council Directive 88/357/EEC of 22 June 1988 on the coordination of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and laying down 
provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 
73/239/EEC (OJ 1988 L 172/1). 
1150 Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 
concerning life assurance (OJ 2002 L 345/1). 
1151 Kramer (n 1140) 24. For a thorough analysis of the implementation of conflict rules in Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and the UK, see: Marco Frigessi Di Rattalma (ed), 
The Implementation Provisions of the EC Choice of Law Rules For Insurance Contracts. A 
Commentary. (Kluwer Law International 2003). 
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conflict rules. During the negotiations for the introduction of a special rule for 
insurance contracts in the Rome I Regulation, several proposals were suggested 
and special consultations were conducted. Due to the difficulty of the issue, 
article 7 Rome I has been considered just a ‘complex compromise’.1152 However, 
it brings more legal certainty to the law applicable to insurance contracts. 
According to article 23 Rome I, article 7 Rome I supersedes the conflict of laws 
rules in the individual directives. Thus, conflict rules of the directives lost their 
relevance. Indeed, as stated by Recital 40, “[a] situation where conflict-of-law 
rules are dispersed among several instruments and where there are differences 
between those rules should be avoided (…)”. However, apparently, this statement 
only affects insurance contracts, since no difference was made regarding, for 
example, scope rules of consumer directives.1153 Regarding scope rules of EU 
consumer directives, we can wonder whether introducing a detailed provision 
with specific conflict rules as article 7 Rome I would have worked regarding 
consumer contracts. This is, whether the issue of coordination between the Rome 
I Regulation and the scope rules of consumer directives dealt with in Chapter IV 
could have been solved if article 6 Rome I incorporated the different scope rules 
as specific and detailed conflict rules in it. I do not think such a complex rule 
would be necessary regarding consumer contracts. First, scope rules of EU 
consumer directives do not point to a specific law applicable as insurance 
directives rules did. Second, scope rules of EU consumer directives refer to the 
same scope of application, sharing similar wording, instead of referring to 
different applicable laws as insurance directives did. This is, because of the 
differences in the protection necessary for the different insurance contracts, 
directives provided for different unilateral conflict rules; however, scope rules of 
directives refer to a similar scope, without distinguishing between different levels 
of protection. Generally, EU consumer directives claim the application of their 
provisions when the situation is closely connected with the EU (with the 
exception of art. 12(2) Directive 2008/122/EC in the protection of consumers in 
respect of certain aspects of time-share, long-term holiday product, resale and 
exchange contracts, replacing Directive 94/47/EC –Timeshare Directive-).1154 
The different existent level of protection for consumer contracts is provided by 
the Rome I Regulation itself, distinguishing between consumer contracts falling 
under the protective provision of art. 6 Rome I and consumer contracts that do 
not fall under that provision. No further distinctions, and hence no further specific 
conflict rules, seem to be required or specifically introduced in a single conflict 
rule.1155 Another option to follow the technique of article 7 Rome I would be to 
                                                     
1152 Kramer (n 1140) 41. 
1153 Although scope rules are not conflict rules, the debate they generated in the context of the Rome 
Convention and the drafting of the Rome I Regulation calls for some clarification or specific 
reference that the Rome I Regulation lacks.  
1154 Regarding the existent scope rules in EU consumer directives, see Chapter IV.1.1.2. 
1155  In fact, the suggested modifications (see Chapter IV.4) would already adequately coordinate 
EU consumer directives and Rome I Regulation, without the need of introducing a specific rigid 
provision. 
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introduce in article 6 Rome I a specific conflict rule for every consumer contract 
that now excludes from the specific protective conflict rule (e.g. active 
consumers, contract for the supply of services to be supplied entirely outside the 
consumer’s country of habitual residence, etc.), distinguishing between different 
levels of protection and limits on party autonomy. However, these contracts are 
already covered by the general rules of the Regulation (arts.3 and 4 Rome I), or 
by specific conflict rules because of their specialities (e.g. contracts for the 
carriage of passengers). These distinctions are justified and are not based on the 
requirements of EU consumer directives, but they are just considered to not need 
the special PIL protection of art. 6.1156 To include these distinctions within art. 6 
Rome I would be excessively complex, since they mostly can be covered by the 
general conflict rules of the Rome I. Also, they would not have any impact on the 
coordination of the scope rules of the Directives with the Rome I Regulation, 
which do not share the same distinctions.  
As regards the current situation with EU insurance directives, the Solvency II 
Directive1157 modified and repealed thirteen insurance directives, codifying in one 
instrument both general rules and rules specific for certain types of insurance. 
According to article 2(1) Solvency II Directive, it applies to direct life and non-
life insurance undertakings established in the territory of a Member State (or that 
wish to become established there), and to reinsurance undertakings conducting 
just reinsurance activities established in the territory of a Member State (or that 
wish to become established there). The instrument makes several references to 
the Rome I Regulation. Following from article 7 and article 23 Rome I, the law 
applicable to insurance contracts is determined by the Rome I Regulation. When 
the rules of the Rome I Regulation lead to the application of a Member State law, 
the protection of Solvency II Directive is ensured. When the policy holder is a 
private person in a weak contractual position comparable to a consumer, some 
general EU consumer law rules will also be applicable to that contract if the law 
applicable as a result of the Rome I Regulation is the law of a Member State. For 
example, in B2C insurance contracts, the general rules of consumer contract law 
of the Distance Marketing of Financial Services Directive and the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive can also be applicable. 
Party autonomy is not limited by article 7 Rome I in the same manner as in 
article 6 Rome I regarding consumer contracts. Policy holders in a weaker 
contractual provision do not enjoy the same protective conflict rules as consumers 
falling under article 6 Rome I. However, the type of contracts where the policy 
holder can be in a weaker contractual provision (i.e. mass risks) are regulated by 
article 7(3) only when the risk is located in the EU, which only allows the choice 
of several Member State laws related with the contract or the law of the country 
                                                     
1156 See Chapter III.1.1. 
1157 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (recast) 
(OJ 2009 L 335/1). 
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of habitual residence of the policy holder. Therefore, it offers enough protection 
to the policyholder in a weaker contractual position. In fact, it offers more 
protection than the (non)protection enjoyed by a consumer falling outside the 
scope of article 6 Rome I. In the case the risk is not located in a Member State, 
the general provisions of the Rome I Regulation apply (arts. 3, 4 and, 
exceptionally, 6 Rome I in the case of an insurance B2C contract falling under 
the requirements of article 6 Rome I). Article 3 or 4 Rome I can lead to the 
application of a non-Member State law, and thus in those cases it is considered 
that rules of directive do not need to apply. The rules are complex but 
coordinated. 
In the case of article 7(4) Rome I and mandatory insurance contracts, the 
provision is only applicable if the mandatory insurance contract covers a risk 
located within the EU. When the risk is located outside the EU, if the Member 
State imposing the obligation to take out insurance needs to apply these rules, it 
can be done under article 9 Rome I only if public interests are involved.1158 
 
1.2. Law applicable to contracts for the carriage of 
passengers (article 5(2) Rome I) and application of EU 
passenger regulations 
Article 5(2) Rome I contains a special provision determining the law applicable 
to contracts for the carriage of passengers. This rule was newly introduced by the 
Rome I Regulation. In the Rome Convention, contracts for the carriage of 
passengers were excluded from article 4(4) Rome Convention, which only 
applied to carriage of goods, and were also excluded from the special provision 
for consumer contracts (article 5(4)(a) Rome Convention). The general rule of 
party autonomy of article 3 Rome Convention and the general rule in absence of 
choice of law of article 4(2) Rome Convention determined the law applicable to 
contracts for the carriage of passengers. There was complete freedom of choice 
of law and, in its absence, article 4(2) would generally lead to the application of 
the law of habitual residence of the carrier. Passengers did not enjoy any special 
protection.1159  
The Rome I Regulation introduced article 5(2) Rome I as a compromise 
between the need of protection of the passengers as consumers and the interests 
of the carrier.1160 In absence of choice of law, the provision favours the 
                                                     
1158 Urs Peter Gruber, ‘Article 7. Insurance Contracts’ in Gralf-Peter Calliess (ed), Rome 
Regulations. Commentary (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2015) 199. 
1159 A more consumer friendly solution was desired, and the close connection exception was the 
only option to apply, in case of absence of choice, the law of the place of the passenger/consumer 
if possible.  
1160 For a general discussion, Plender and Wilderspin (n 10) 222–232; Fentiman (n 317); Reiner 
Schulze, ‘Article 5. Contracts of Carriage’ in Gralf-Peter Calliess (ed), Rome Regulations. 
Commentary (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2015) 127–153. 
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application of the law of the country of habitual residence of the passenger, as 
long as either the place of departure or the place of destination is located in that 
country. Otherwise, the law of the country of habitual residence of the carrier 
applies. When the contract is most closely connected to another country, the law 
of such country applies (article 5(3) Rome I). Choice of law is limited, but in a 
different manner than article 6 Rome I regarding consumer contracts. Parties can 
choose among the law of the country where: (a) the passenger has his habitual 
residence; (b) the carrier has his habitual residence; (c) the carrier has his place 
of central administration; (d) the place of departure is located; (e) the place of 
destination is located. The limitation of party autonomy ensures that the law 
chosen has some connection with the contract. On the side of the carrier, this 
provision allows the carrier to choose the law of his place of residence or central 
administration, avoiding the application of many different laws depending on the 
passengers. If the mandatory provisions of the law of habitual residence of every 
passenger were to be applicable, this would mean that an air carrier, for example, 
would have to apply a different regime for every flight passenger, which would 
be very burdensome and impractical. On the side of the passenger, the level of 
protection offered by the limit on party autonomy only ensures that the carrier 
does not deliberately choose a law with a very low level of consumer protection. 
However, the application of a minimum level of protection is not ensured. In 
addition, the carrier could choose to establish its place of habitual residence or 
central administration in a country with a poor level of consumer/passenger 
protection and then choose this law as applicable. Generally, contracts for the 
carriage of passengers contain a choice of law clause for the law of the country 
were the carrier has his habitual residence or place of central administration, 
which means that the passenger will rarely see the provisions of his place of 
habitual residence applied in accordance to article 5(2) Rome I.1161  
Contracts of carriage of passengers are excluded from the protection of article 
6 Rome I to consumers (article 6(4)(b) Rome I), even when the carrier directed 
his activities to the country of habitual residence of the passenger. If article 6 
Rome I would apply to contracts of carriage of passengers, there would be, for 
example, many consumers booking their flight, bus or train online that would 
have the protection of the mandatory provisions of their country applied to the 
contract.1162 Only contracts relating to package travel are included within article 
6 Rome I.1163 It is clear that the protection offered by article 6 Rome I is more 
                                                     
1161 Reinhard Steennot, ‘The Protection of Consumers in Cross-Border Airline’s Contracts of 
Carriage at the Level of Private International Law’, Liber Amicorum Johan Erauw (Intersentia 
2014) 2. 
1162 Many carrier’s websites contain information in different languages, show the prices in the 
consumer’s currency, allow to choose as place of departure the country of the consumer, etc. ibid 
6. 
1163 The definition of contract for package travel is to be found it article 3(2) Package Travel 
Directive (Directive (EU) 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 
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beneficial than article 5(2) Rome I. While the application of the mandatory 
provisions of the law of the country of habitual residence of the consumer are 
ensured by article 6 Rome I, article 5(2) Rome I, as described above, does not 
ensure the same protection for passengers. In the case of consumer contracts 
covered by article 6 Rome I, the reasoning underlying the application of the 
mandatory provisions of the country of habitual residence of the consumer is 
based on the targeted activities test: the professional directs its activities to a 
specific country, so he can expect the consumer protection of that country to be 
applicable to their residents. In the case of contracts for the carriage of passengers, 
there is no difference between passengers acting within the course of their 
commercial activities or outside the scope of their commercial activities (i.e. 
private purposes). In the latter case, there is no difference between a passenger 
actively purchasing a ticket from a foreign carrier and a passenger being targeted 
in his country of residence by a foreign carrier. The rule of article 5(2) Rome I 
was drafted in a ‘simple’ way. It would be very burdensome to make a difference 
between passengers buying a ticket acting within the scope of their commercial 
activities and passengers acting for private purposes, making the second 
distinction, on which article 6 Rome I is based, even more difficult. Still, 
curiously, passengers that would not fall under the conditions of article 6(2) 
                                                     
2006/2004 and Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing 
Council Directive 90/314/EEC (OJ 2015 L 326/1)):  
“‘package’ means a combination of at least two different types of travel services for the purpose of 
the same trip or holiday, if: 
(a) those services are combined by one trader, including at the request of or in 
accordance with the selection of the traveller, before a single contract on all services is 
concluded; or 
(b) irrespective of whether separate contracts are concluded with individual travel 
service providers, those services are: 
(i) purchased from a single point of sale and those services have been 
selected before the traveller agrees to pay, 
(ii) offered, sold or charged at an inclusive or total price, 
(iii) advertised or sold under the term ‘package’ or under a similar term, 
(iv) combined after the conclusion of a contract by which a trader entitles 
the traveller to choose among a selection of different types of travel services, 
or 
(v) purchased from separate traders through linked online booking 
processes where the traveller's name, payment details and e-mail address are 
transmitted from the trader with whom the first contract is concluded to another 
trader or traders and a contract with the latter trader or traders is concluded 
at the latest 24 hours after the confirmation of the booking of the first travel 
service. 
A combination of travel services where not more than one type of travel service as 
referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of point 1 is combined with one or more tourist services 
as referred to in point (d) of point 1 is not a package if the latter services: 
(a) do not account for a significant proportion of the value of the combination and 
are not advertised as and do not otherwise represent an essential feature of the 
combination; or 
(b) are selected and purchased only after the performance of a travel service as 
referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of point 1 has started.” 
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Rome I (‘targeted activities test’) enjoy more protection than consumers falling 
outside the scope of article 6(2) Rome I.1164 
Generally, it is submitted that international conventions on transport of 
passengers prevail over article 5(2) Rome I. The relevant conventions are 
incorporated into the national law and lay down uniform rules which are 
applicable by the law of the forum, eliminating any conflict of laws issue, since 
they are uniform law, and thus reducing the role of the Rome I Regulation.1165 
There are numerous Conventions in which the Member States are part (Athens 
Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 
Montreal Convention, International Convention Carriage of Passengers and 
Luggage by Rail (CIV), Convention on the Contract for International Carriage of 
Passengers and Luggage by Road (CVR 1973), etc.). When these conventions 
contain conflict rules, resulting on the existence of different conflict rules in the 
Member State to determine the law applicable to the transport contract (i.e. the 
conflict rule of the convention and art 5 Rome I), Article 25 Rome I establishes 
the precedence over Rome I of the application of international conventions to 
which one or more Member States are parties and which lay down conflict rules 
relating to contractual obligations. Thus, article 5 Rome I is to be displaced by 
numerous transport international conventions pursuant to article 25 Rome I when 
different conflict rules are into play.1166  
Regarding the relationship with EU secondary law, the majority of EU 
provisions regarding carriage of passengers are laid down by regulations rather 
than by directives. The provisions of EU regulations become applicable in a 
uniform way in all Member States. The existence of conflict rules in EU 
regulations is less problematic than in directives, since the risk of a different 
implementation by the different Member States due to the minimum harmonizing 
nature of the majority of the directives is avoided. In the case of a conflict rule 
laid down by a regulation, there is one uniform conflict rule for all Member 
States. Also, in intra-EU scenarios, it is not relevant which Member State law is 
applicable, since the protection offered by the regulation is applicable by all 
Member States laws. The level of protection offered by the conflict rules is 
relevant when there is a choice of law of a non-Member State or when the carrier 
is established in a non-Member State. Article 23 Rome I establishes the 
precedence of specific conflict rules laid down in EU instruments. Contrarily to 
the situation regarding insurance contracts, the provision on contracts for the 
carriage of passengers does not supersede the possible conflict rules laid down in 
EU instruments regarding the carriage of passengers. Do these instruments 
contain their own conflict rules and prevail over the Rome I Regulation through 
                                                     
1164 Consumer contracts not falling within the conditions of article 6(2) Rome I do not enjoy any 
special protection and are governed by the general conflict rules of the Rome I. 
1165 Plender and Wilderspin (n 10) 227; Schulze (n 1152) 140; Fentiman (n 317) 446. 
1166 Schulze (n 1152) 140. 
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article 23 Rome I? Do they merely contain scope rules similarly to consumer 
directives? Does article 5(2) Rome I ensure their application? 
The Regulation on Rail Passengers Rights and Obligations (1371/2007)1167 
aims to offer better protection to rail passengers. It establishes rules regarding 
information that rail operators must provide to passengers (about the conclusion 
of transport contracts or availability of tickets, for example); rules regarding 
liability of the rail operator in certain circumstances; rules regarding 
compensation (because of delays or cancellation); complaint mechanisms, etc.  
The Regulation implemented within the EU the provisions of the Uniform rules 
concerning the Contract for International Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by 
Rail (CIV) to the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) 
of 9 May 1980, as modified by the Protocol for the modification of the 
Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail of 3 June 1999 (1999 
Protocol).    
Article 2(1) provides that “[t]his Regulation shall apply to all rail journeys and 
services throughout the Community provided by one or more railway 
undertakings licensed in accordance with Council Directive 95/18/EC of 19 June 
1995 on the licensing of railway undertakings”. This rule seems to merely refer 
to the scope covered by the Regulation, with no intention to interfere with PIL, 
since it is contained in article 2 of the Regulation with the headline ‘scope’. The 
Regulation should apply to rail journeys within the EU. More importantly, article 
4 provides that the conclusion and performance of a transport contract and the 
provision of information and tickets shall be governed by the provisions of Title 
II and Title III of Annex I to the Regulation. Article 4 is a unilateral conflict rule, 
according to which the conclusion and performance of a transport contract is not 
to be decided according to the rules of a Member State according to external PIL 
rules, but it is to be decided according to the provisions of Title II and Title III of 
Annex I to the Regulation. The application of the provisions of the Regulation 
are mandatory and cannot be derogated from by agreement. 
European Regulation No 261/2004 (Airline Passengers Regulation)1168 
provides for rules with regard to airline passengers’ rights in the case of denied 
boarding, cancellation or delay. Article 3(1) provides that: “This Regulation shall 
apply: (a) to passengers departing from an airport located in the territory of a 
Member State to which the Treaty applies; (b) to passengers departing from an 
airport located in a third country to an airport situated in the territory of a Member 
State to which the Treaty applies, unless they received benefits or compensation 
and were given assistance in that third country, if the operating air carrier of the 
                                                     
1167 Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 
2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations (OJ 2007 L 315/14). 
1168 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 
2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of 
denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 
295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46/1). 
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flight concerned is a Community carrier.” This is, article 3(1) establishes 
territorial criteria for the application of the Airline Passengers Regulation: 
passengers departing from the airport of a Member States, and passengers 
departing to an airport located in a Member State when the air carrier is from a 
Member State. This rule falls under the category of scope rule rather than being 
considered as a conflict rule as such.1169 On the other hand, article 12 Airline 
Passengers Regulation establishes that the Regulation applies without prejudice 
to a passenger’s rights to further compensation. This is, if a third country 
applicable law provides for a better compensation, this should be granted to the 
passenger. The Airline Passengers Regulation is open to the possibility of 
application of a third law, which confirms that article 3(1) should not be read as 
a unilateral conflict rule but as a scope rule. 
According to article 15, “[o]bligations vis-à-vis passengers pursuant to this 
Regulation may not be limited or waived, notably by a derogation or restrictive 
clause in the contract of carriage”. In addition, in a similar way as the Posted 
Workers Directive, the Airline Passengers Regulation aims to ensure the 
application of some minimum standards to the passengers, but without prejudice 
of more beneficial standards available (art. 13). However, instead of referring to 
a situation where two (or more) Member States are involved, the Airline 
Passengers Regulation refers to a situation of EU standards versus third country 
law. I do not consider the Airline Passengers Regulation solves itself a conflict 
of laws, but rather contains a scope rule that tries to ensure that passengers with 
specific connections with the EU are protected. If we were to consider that the 
Regulation does not prevail over article 5 Rome I through article 23 Rome I, 
because it does not contain a conflict rule as such, then the only way to ensure 
the application of the Regulation in the scenarios defined by its scope rule is 
through article 9 Rome I. Member States would apply the rules of the Regulation 
regardless a choice of a non-Member State law in the transport contract on the 
basis of their overriding mandatory character. However, this view can also be 
controversial: is the application of the Passengers Rights Regulation essential for 
public interests of the EU? The Regulation intends to protect the passenger as a 
weaker party, but the protection of a public interest should also be at stake in 
order to determine the Regulation as overriding mandatory. There seems to be no 
debate regarding the possibility of a choice of law setting aside the application of 
the Regulation, and thus there is an agreement regarding the precedence of the 
provisions of the Passengers Rights Regulation over article 5(2) Rome I. Some 
assume that the Regulation prevails over article 5(2) Rome I through article 23 
Rome I, based on the existence of a scope rule, and thus article 5(2) only applies 
in situations outside the scope of the Regulation. For example, in the case of a 
flight departing from a third country with destiny in a Member State but operated 
by a foreign carrier, article 5(2) Rome I would be applicable, since the situation 
                                                     
1169 Kuipers (n 11) 240. This rule is placed under the heading of article 3: ‘scope’. 
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falls outside the scope described by article 3(1) Airline Passengers Regulation.1170 
On the other hand, those who not consider that the Regulation prevails through 
article 23 Rome I, submit it should apply through article 9 Rome I as overriding 
mandatory rules.1171 If the application of the Passengers Rights Regulation is to 
be considered essential for the protection of EU interests going beyond the 
protection of the passenger as a consumer,  I agree with that point of view.  
Finally, many EU consumer directives are relevant regarding the protection of 
passengers (e.g. Unfair Contract Terms Directive, Consumer Rights Directive, 
etc.). Even when the passenger is in the position of a consumer as defined by the 
Rome I Regulation, a valid choice of law according to article 5(2) Rome I can 
easily avoid the application of the mandatory provisions of the EU consumer 
directives.1172  
To conclude, it seems clear that article 5(2) Rome I, opposite to article 7 Rome 
I regarding insurance contracts, was not drafted in coordination with the different 
EU secondary instruments on carriage of passengers. The provision merely limits 
party autonomy, and the protection provided to the passengers can thus be 
criticised. On the other hand, it is not that relevant because it is agreed that a big 
number of international conventions and EU secondary law regarding the carriage 
of passengers precede the application of article 5(2) Rome I, either through article 
23 Rome I or article 9 Rome I. As a result, article 5(2) Rome I only applies when 
there is a gap not covered by those international conventions or EU regulations. 
 
2. Other “weaker” contracting parties with no 
special protection in Rome I: franchise, 
distribution and commercial agency contracts 
2.1. Franchise and distribution contracts: party 
autonomy and law applicable in the absence of choice 
National substantive rules and EU legal instruments harmonising or unifying 
substantive rules of private law provide for special protective rules to other 
contracting parties, such as franchisees, distributors, commercial agents, and even 
some small businesses.  
From a PIL perspective, the structural weaker contracting parties are 
consumers falling under the characteristics of article 6 Rome I and employees. 
To a lesser extent, the weaker position of passengers and policyholders is also 
                                                     
1170 Schulze (n 1152) 140. 
1171 Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson and Mazeaud (eds), European Contract Law: Materials for a 
Common Frame of Reference: Terminology, Guiding Principles, Model Rules (sellier european law 
publishers 2008) 116; Steennot (n 1153) 4. 
1172 See discussion in Chapter IV regarding the application of EU Consumer Directives. 
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recognised, since party autonomy is somehow limited in contracts for the carriage 
of passengers and insurance contracts. 
Franchise contracts and distribution contracts are classified in the Rome I 
Regulation as contracts for services (Recital 17 Rome I), but specific rules within 
the general provision in absence of choice of law, article 4 Rome I, are provided 
regarding the law applicable in the absence of choice. Since specific rules are 
provided, it can mean that more importance was placed in other factors rather 
than on the characteristic performance general rule of article 4 Rome I. 
Article 4(1)(e) Rome I establishes the law of habitual residence of the 
franchisee as the law applicable to the contract of franchise. The introduction of 
this specific rule puts an end to the previous debate regarding the law applicable 
to the franchise contract in absence of choice of law, since there was disagreement 
regarding who is the party carrying out the characteristic performance in that 
contract.1173 Therefore, one of the main objectives of this rule is to obtain legal 
certainty. According to recital 16 Rome I, conflict rules should be ‘highly 
foreseeable’. The choice for the place of habitual residence of the franchisee 
rather than the place of habitual residence of the franchisor has different 
justifications. Besides being considered by some as the place of characteristic 
performance, and as the ‘market affected by the contract’, reasons of weaker party 
protection seem to be behind this special rule.1174 Between the parties to a 
franchise agreement there are information and bargaining inequalities. Although 
the franchisee is a company in the same position as any other business of similar 
side, the relationship with a franchisor is characterised by the existence of a 
standard-form contract to which the franchisee has to agree with (almost) none 
negotiating margin.1175 It is true that the position of consumers or employees, in 
connection with their information and bargaining power, is weaker in comparison 
with the franchisee. However, recital 23 Rome I refers in general to the protection 
of weaker contracting parties by conflict rules, without specifically naming 
consumers and employees. Thus, there might be more conflict rules in the Rome 
I with that intention. Several legal instruments of substantive law recognise the 
weaker contractual position of franchisees, and this need is somehow reflected by 
article 4(1)(e) Rome I.1176 Still, this rule also refers to the habitual place of 
residence of the franchisee on the basis that it assumed as the habitual place where 
he carries out his activities, making it generally the law most closely connected 
to the contract.  
Even when article 4(1)(e) Rome I is beneficial to the franchisee, if parties have 
chosen the law applicable to the contract, article 3(1) Rome I applies and the law 
chosen by the parties would govern the contract. Franchisors can easily elude the 
application of the law of the place of the franchisee by choosing any other law, 
                                                     
1173 García Gutiérrez (n 1136) 235. 
1174 ibid 238; Gebauer (n 902) 116,117. 
1175 García Gutiérrez (n 1136) 239. 
1176 ibid 240. 
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related or not to the contract, as applicable. Therefore, substantive protective 
provisions of the law of the country of habitual residence of the franchisee 
enacted with the intention of protecting the franchisee can be circumvented by a 
choice of law. The only possible mechanisms that the Rome I Regulation 
provides for the protection of this national imperative provisions are arts. 3(3), 
3(4) and 9 Rome I. Arts. 3(3) and 3(4) Rome I would ensure the application of 
mandatory national or Community rules, respectively, only when all the relevant 
elements of the situation are located within the country of within the EU. The 
application of article 9 Rome I is only possible if the franchise contract provisions 
would fall under the definition of article 9(1) Rome I of overriding mandatory 
rules, which seems highly unlikely. 
Similarly, in the case of distribution contracts, article 4(1)(f) Rome I puts an 
end to the previous discussions regarding the law applicable to distribution 
contracts in absence of choice of law.1177 Article 4(1)(f) Rome I provides for the 
law of the habitual place of residence of the distributor as applicable. Again, legal 
certainty is the main aim of the rule, besides being considered as the law most 
closely connected to the distribution contract. The protection of the distributor as 
a weaker party in the contract can also behind the conflict rule, although it is 
questionable.1178 Like in the case of the franchisee (which in a general 
understanding of the concept of contract of distribution could be considered as a 
distributor), the distributor can be in a weaker bargaining position against the 
grantor of the merchandise. However, both the distributor and his counterparty 
are independent companies and the possible weaker position is not comparable to 
the one of the consumer or the employee. Some have questioned the weaker party 
argument and justify article 4(1)(e) on the grounds of predictability and closest 
connection to the contract of distribution.1179 In any way, the law of habitual place 
of the distributor might not be the most protective law, but it is the most familiar 
for the distributor. However, this law can be circumvented by the parties through 
article 3(1) Rome I. 
 
                                                     
1177 For an overview of this discussion under the Rome Convention, William Fernando Martínez 
Luna, ‘Applicable Law to Distribution Contracts in the European Regulation 593/2008 (Rome I)’ 
(2016) 28 International Law, Revista Colombiana Derecho Internacional 247, 258–268. 
1178 The weaker position of the distributor was mentioned in the Proposal for Rome I (COM (2005) 
650 final) as a justification for the introduction of the new rule, although this aim is not explicitly 
mentioned in the Recitals of Rome I and many authors have doubted that was the rationale behind 
the rule. Indeed, if the aim was to protect a weaker party, party autonomy should then be limited. 
Ancel (n 1136) 226,227; Lagarde (n 351) 339. 
1179 For example, Martínez Luna (n 1169); Ancel (n 1136). 
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2.2. Commercial agency contracts: interaction 
between the Rome I Regulation and the Commercial 
Agents Directive 
Finally, there is a type of contract involving a generally recognised weaker 
contracting party that does not enjoy any specific protective rule in the Rome I 
Regulation: the commercial agency contract. 
The introduction of a specific conflict rule for commercial agency contracts 
was suggested during the process of conversion of the Rome Convention into the 
Rome I Regulation. Even a rule limiting party autonomy in a similar way that 
was granted for employees was proposed.1180 Although this suggestion was 
rejected, the Rome I Proposal provided for a specific provision regarding 
commercial agents in a similar way to the current provisions on distribution and 
franchise contracts, under which party autonomy fully applied.1181 However, 
finally, no specific provision regulating the law applicable to commercial agency 
contracts was introduced in the final version of the Rome I Regulation. The law 
applicable to an agency contract is to be determined according to the general rules 
of the Rome I. Thus, the commercial agency contract shall be governed by the 
law chosen by the parties (article 3(1) Rome I) and, in absence of choice, article 
4(1) Rome I will generally lead to the law of the country of habitual residence of 
the agent. The agent enjoys a similar position than the distributor or franchisee: 
no limitation of party autonomy and, in absence of choice, the law of his country 
of habitual residence will generally be applied.  
On the other hand, the EU provides for protection to the commercial agent at 
the substantive level. The Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 
on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed 
commercial agents (Commercial Agents Directive)1182 harmonises the rules 
                                                     
1180 In Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law, ‘Comments on the 
European Commission’s Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations into a Community Instrument and Its Modernization’ 
(2004) 68 RabelsZ 1, the introduction of an extra paragraph in article 6 regarding employment 
contracts was suggested. The rationale behind it was that both commercial agents and employees 
were a weaker contracting party in a similar position towards their employer or principal. The 
proposal of article 6(4) read: “In an agency contract between a principal and a self-employed 
commercial agent, a choice of law made by the parties shall not have the effect of depriving the 
agent of the protection afforded to him by the internally mandatory rules of the law which would 
be applicable under Article 4”. 
1181 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I) (COM(2005) 650 final) [Proposal for Rome I], provided for an 
article 7 with the heading “Contracts concluded by an agent”, which stated: “In the absence of a 
choice under Article 3, a contract between principal and agent shall be governed  by the law of the 
country in which the agent has his habitual residence, unless the agent exercises or is to exercise 
his main activity in the country in which the principal has his habitual residence, in which case the 
law of that country shall apply”. 
1182 Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the 
Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents (OJ 1986 L 382/17). 
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regarding agency contracts in order to improve the conditions of competition 
while facilitating the conclusion and performance of these contracts across the 
borders. It was considered that the previously existent different levels of 
protection afforded by the different national laws within the EU to the agents 
might have resulted in a disadvantage to the business in some areas or in 
distortions of competition within the EU.1183 The Directive defines in article 1 the 
commercial agents as intermediaries with a permanent authorisation to negotiate 
the sale or purchase of goods in the name and on behalf of another person (the 
principal). The Commercial Agents Directive defines the rights and obligations 
of both commercial agents and their principals and establishes rules regarding the 
remuneration of the commercial agent and the conclusion and termination of the 
agency contract, with emphasis on the compensation of the agent.1184 It is a 
minimum harmonisation directive, leaving to the Member States the possibility 
of improving the minimum standards set.  
Besides the objective of harmonising the conditions of competence within the 
internal market, the Commercial Agents Directive also sets a minimum level of 
protection of the commercial agents operating in the EU. Still, the level of 
protection needed by commercial agents differs from the protection needed by 
consumers and employees. Agents are generally better informed and experienced, 
and it is common in the current international practice that they are organised as 
corporations having more than one principal. However, when the commercial 
agent is a natural person with only one principal, the contractual situation is 
comparable to that one between the employee and the employer.1185 There is often 
an imbalance on the bargaining power and information between the agent and the 
principal. The principal, aware of the legal diversity in this area, may wish to 
elude the national legislations which afford a level of protection to the agent, in 
order to be more economically efficient and become more competitive within its 
operating market. Therefore, the agency contract may contain a choice of law 
clause referring to a non-Member State law which does not set the minimum 
standards of protection in favour of the agent as the Commercial Agents Directive 
does. As a consequence of this behaviour, it can be considered that the internal 
market may suffer a negative impact, as it promotes distorted competition. 
Furthermore, the direct consequence would be for the commercial agents, as they 
will be unprotected against eventual abuses from their principal. These were 
precisely the negative effects the Commercial Agents Directive aimed to 
eradicate. 
The Commercial Agents Directive does not contain any conflict rule or scope 
rule, and thus the law applicable to the agency contract is supposed to be 
                                                     
1183 Fergus Randolph and Jonathan Davey, The European Law of Commercial Agency (3rd edn, 
Hart Publishing 2010) 1. 
1184 Aguilar Grieder, ‘El Impacto Del Reglamento Roma I En El Contrato Internacional de Agencia’ 
(n 736) 27. 
1185 Verhagen (n 320) 153; Kuipers (n 11) 217. 
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determined by the Rome I Regulation. However, the ECJ in the already 
mentioned Ingmar judgment1186 established the application of the Commercial 
Agents Directive in situations closely connected with the Community (i.e. when 
the commercial agent carries out his activity within a Member State) irrespective 
of the law by which the parties intended the contract to be governed According 
to the ECJ, “[t]he purpose served by the provisions in question requires that they 
be applied where the situation is closely connected with the Community (…) 
irrespective of the law by which the parties intended the contract to be 
governed”.1187  The phrasing is similar to the scope rules contained in EU 
consumer directives.  
This case involved the following situation: Ingmar, a commercial agent with 
domicile in the United Kingdom, which claim claimed Eaton, its principal 
established in California, the payment of a commission and the compensation of 
the damage caused because of the termination of their agency contract. Ingmar 
performed his obligations under the contract exclusively in the UK and Ireland. 
The contract included a choice of law clause determining Californian law as 
governing the agency contract. However, the claims of the agent were based on 
the Commercial Agents Regulation of 8 December 1993, the transposition in 
English law of the Commercial Agents Directive. The preliminary ruling 
requested from the ECJ asked whether articles 17 and 18 of the Commercial 
Agents Directive, on which the claims of the agent were based on, were 
applicable when the commercial agent performs its activities within a Member 
State, regardless the establishment of the principal on a third state and the choice 
of a third state law to govern their contract. Articles 17 and 18 of the Commercial 
Agents Directive define the circumstances under which a commercial agent, upon 
termination of the contract, is entitled to claim compensation for the damages 
suffered because of the termination of the contractual relationship with the 
principal. Article 19 of the Directive states that “parties may not derogate from 
articles 17 and 18 to the detriment of the agent before the agency contract 
expires”. The ECJ concluded that the purpose these provisions serve requires 
their application where the situation is closely connected with the Community, 
which is presumed when the commercial agent carries out his activity within a 
Member State, irrespective of the law chosen by the parties to govern their 
contract.1188  
The Commercial Agents Directive, besides protecting the private interests of 
commercial agents, aims at harmonising the conditions of competence within the 
internal market and contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market. 
The ECJ explained that the aim of arts. 17-19 of the Commercial Agents Directive 
is to protect the freedom of establishment and to circumvent distorted competition 
within the internal market, promoting at the same time the certainty of the 
                                                     
1186 Case C-381/98 Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc. [2000] ECR I-9305. 
1187 Ingmar, para. 25 
1188 Ingmar, para. 25. 
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commercial transactions.1189 From the recitals of the Directive it is implied that 
these objectives are present in more provisions, and thus those other provisions 
of the Directive could also be regarded as applicable irrespective of the law by 
which the parties intended the contract to be governed.1190 Companies, both 
European or international, which hire agents in order to commercialize their 
products within the EU must be aware and respect that they are trading in an 
internal market environment and, as a result, cannot benefit from a legal diversity 
that may distort the competence of the internal market.1191  
From the Ingmar judgment it follows that he ECJ determined the international 
application of the Commercial Agents Directive through a scope rule similar to 
those existing on some EU consumer directives, determining that whenever the 
situation is closely connected to the EU, the provisions of the Commercial Agents 
Directive cannot be circumvented by choosing a non-Member State law. In the 
moment that the ECJ ruled in this case (2000), the Rome I Regulation still did not 
exist and, although the provisions of the Rome Convention were similar to those 
of Rome I, they were not applicable because the contract felt outside the temporal 
scope of the Convention. However, rather than interpreting the directive on the 
light of the conflict rules of the Rome Convention seeking for coordination, the 
ECJ did not refer to any PIL instrument. The same inconsistencies than regarding 
the scope rules of the EU consumer directives arise regarding the Ingmar 
judgment and the Commercial Agents Directive. How does this judgment fit 
within the conflict of laws system of the Rome I Regulation? 
If the application of the rules of EU directives is going to be determined on 
the basis of the nature and purpose of the directive rather than on the basis of the 
Rome I Regulation, parties will not be able to choose the applicable law to the 
contract, since the provisions of the directive will become mandatory when the 
facts fall under its material scope.1192 In any case, it is still argued by some authors 
that Ingmar should be interpreted as establishing an implicit scope rule, which is 
aimed at determining the international scope of the provisions of the Commercial 
Agents Directive, and as such it should prevail over the Rome I Regulation 
according to article 23 Rome I.1193 In other words, the traditional conflict of laws 
mechanism should be ignored and the determination of the international scope of 
the Commercial Agents Directive is based upon a (implicit) unilateral conflict 
rule. But if we were to follow this reasoning, it would be inconsistent that, for 
                                                     
1189 Ingmar, paras. 23-24. In that respect, the Judgment of the Court of 30 April 1998, case C-
215/97, Barbara Bellone v. Yokohama SpA [1998] ECR I-2191, in regard to Recital 2 of the 
Commercial Agents Directive, referred to the objectives of protection of the internal market, 
freedom of establishment and circumvention of distorted competition of the Directive. 
1190Verhagen (n 320) 138. 
1191 Font i Segura (n 686) 265,266; Aguilar Grieder, La Protección Del Agente En El Derecho 
Comercial Europeo (n 686) 64,65.  
1192 Aguilar Grieder, La Protección Del Agente En El Derecho Comercial Europeo (n 686) 207. 
1193 van Bochove (n 352) 154; Francq, ‘The Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of 
the Methods of Private International Law- or the Other Way Around?’ (n 750) 354,355. 
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example, the scope of application of some European directives (e.g. E-Commerce 
Directive, Services Directive, etc.), which specifically state that they do not 
provide for special conflict of law rules and do not affect the application of Rome 
I Regulation, would be determined by the Rome I Regulation, while at the same 
time the application of directives silent about their scope of application, such as 
the Commercial Agents Directive, would be determined autonomously as laying 
down an implicit scope rule.1194 
On the contrary, the reasoning used in Ingmar can still fit within the Rome I 
Regulation through article 9 Rome I.1195 The application of the provisions of the 
Commercial Agency Directive whenever the situation is closely connected to the 
EU and parties have chosen the law of a non-Member State to govern their 
contract can be ensured through article 9 Rome I. For that, they should fall under 
the definition of overriding mandatory provisions of article 9(1) Rome I. 
Following the ECJ reasoning, the application of the provisions of the Commercial 
Agents Directive was based on the nature and purpose of the provisions, which 
consists on protecting the freedom of establishment and avoided distorted 
competition within the internal market. In order to be within the definition of 
article 9(1), the provisions have to be essential for the protection of those public 
interests, in this case EU interests. Besides protecting the commercial agent, the 
application of these rules is to be considered essential for the internal market.1196  
Although in this case the ECJ took the approach of applying the commercial 
agent provisions based on the purposes and nature of the provisions and the 
directive itself, it does not mean that implicit or explicit scope rules on EU 
directives are always applicable in that way or are directly considered as 
overriding mandatory rules. The existence of scope rules on directives was 
discussed during the drafting of the Rome I Regulation and, in case the EU 
legislator wanted that result, it could have easily have been achieved through a 
slightly different drafting of article 3(4) Rome I. Instead of ensuring the 
application of EU mandatory provisions in situations where all the relevant 
elements are located within the EU, the connecting factor could have been where 
there is a close connection with the EU. In fact, the drafting of the Rome I 
Proposal would have ensured the application of the directives against a choice of 
law: “Where the parties choose the law of a non-member State, that choice shall 
be without prejudice to the application of such mandatory rules of Community 
law as are applicable to the case” (art. 3(5) Rome I Proposal). However, the final 
                                                     
1194 Kuipers (n 11) 205. 
1195Although ECJ did not refer in its judgment to the Rome Convention (it was not temporary 
applicable), the Advocate General did refer to the Rome Convention as a guidance useful to 
supplement the interpretation of the Directive, which may be derived from its content. Opinion 
Advocate General on Ingmar, para. 64; Verhagen (n 320) 140. 
1196 In Chapter III, when discussing regarding overriding mandatory rules and provisions protecting 
the weaker parties, it was submitted that provisions protecting weaker parties can generally qualify 
as overriding mandatory rules as long as they mainly aim, at the same time, at protecting an essential 
public interest of the country were they originate.  
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version does not ensure the application of EU mandatory law where parties 
choose a non-Member State law in all situations, but only when all the elements 
of the situation are located within the EU. The non-coordination with the ECJ 
approach in Ingmar and with the scope rules of the Directives show the legislator 
did not intend to achieve that result with the Rome I Regulation. As it was 
previously discussed in this book, the majority of the provisions protecting 
weaker contracting parties have mandatory character but not overriding 
mandatory character.1197 The existence of a scope rule does not automatically give 
overriding mandatory character and immediate applicability to the provisions of 
a directive, but they have to fall under the definition of article 9(1) Rome I. The 
conclusion of the Ingmar case in the light of article 9 Rome I would then be that 
the ECJ considered the application of the provisions of the Commercial Agents 
Directive as essential to avoid distorted competition in the EU and ensure 
freedom of establishment (i.e. EU public interests) whenever the situation is 
closely connected to the EU. Even if the decision determining the international 
scope and applicability of the Commercial Agents Directive’ provisions can be 
fit within article 9 Rome I, it is criticised that the Ingmar decision is difficult to 
reconcile with the system of the Rome I Regulation.1198 According to some 
authors, the ECJ assumed too straightforwardly that the provisions of the 
Directive aimed the protection of such high interests, in a manner that even when 
the principal was established outside the EU, required application and party 
autonomy should be passed by.1199 The impact these rules have on fair 
competition and freedom of establishment is too indirect as to contravene the law 
chosen by the parties.1200 In this regard, I also consider that a more restrictive and 
careful interpretation of public interests should be conducted. 
However, this approach of the ECJ has been confirmed in the Unamar 
judgment1201, although in an intra-EU scenario and regarding the commercial 
agency provisions of a Member State. In this case, a preliminary ruling was 
referred to the ECJ asking whether the mandatory rules of the lex fori (in this 
case, the Belgium agency rules) that offer wider protection than the minimum 
laid down by the Commercial Agents Directive, could be applied even if the law 
chosen by the parties is the law of another Member State in which the minimum 
protection provided by the Directive has also been implemented (in the case, 
Bulgarian law). The ECJ concluded that despite the Commercial Agents 
Directive was correctly transposed in Bulgarian law, Belgium Court had 
discretion to qualify its own national provisions as overriding mandatory rules in 
the sense of article 7 Rome Convention (now article 9 Rome I), and therefore 
                                                     
1197 Chapter III.3.1 
1198 Verhagen (n 320) 151. 
1199 Kuipers (n 355) 1520; Verhagen (n 320) 148. 
1200 Verhagen (n 320) 148–150. 
1201 C-184/12 United Antwerp Maritime Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare 
[2013] EU:C:2013:663. 
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apply them irrespective the otherwise applicable law.1202 However, the provisions 
have to be essential for a public interest of the country in order to be applicable 
as overriding mandatory rules, and thus not be applicable merely because they 
offer a better protection to the commercial agent. 
Both Ingmar and Unamar have served as precedents for the application of the 
Commercial Agents Directive and national commercial agents legislation as 
overriding mandatory rules. Recently, for instance, the Austrian Supreme Court 
(Oberster Gerichtshof) ruled in March 2017 that claims under the Austrian 
Commercial Agents Act (Handelsvertretergesetz) could be brought before an 
Austrian court despite the existence of an arbitration clause in the agency 
contract, which was governed by the law of New York.1203 The Austrian Supreme 
court based its reasoning on the overriding mandatory character of the provisions 
of the Austrian Commercial Agents Act. However, the court just justified that 
overriding mandatory character on the basis of the reasoning of the ECJ that such 
provisions can be national overriding mandatory law when their application is 
crucial for the relevant legal order, but without further explanation. The 
introduction of a specific definition of overriding mandatory rules of article 9(1) 
Rome I aims at restricting the interpretation of national rules as overriding 
mandatory rules without measure. National EU courts should make a restrictive 
interpretation of this definition and justify the use of article 9 Rome I, in order to 
avoid the imposition of national rules against the party autonomy of the parties 
to a contract, which in that case it affected international arbitration but can also 
put in danger the functioning of the conflict of laws system of the Rome I 
Regulation.  
Finally, regarding the application of the Commercial Agents Directive, an 
opposite type of situation has been recently addressed by the ECJ and deserves a 
mention. The case Agro Foreign Trade&Agency Ltd v Petersime NV1204 involved 
a contract between an agent established in Turkey and a principal established in 
Belgium. Their contract contained a choice of law in favour of Belgian law. 
                                                     
1202 The ECJ in Unamar concluded that: “Articles 3 and 7(2) of the Convention on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 must be 
interpreted as meaning that the law of a Member State of the European Union which meets the 
minimum protection requirements laid down by Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 
1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial 
agents and which has been chosen by the parties to a commercial agency contract may be rejected 
by the court of another Member State before which the case has been brought in favour of the law 
of the forum, owing to the mandatory nature, in the legal order of that Member State, of the rules 
governing the situation of self-employed commercial agents, only if the court before which the case 
has been brought finds, on the basis of a detailed assessment, that, in the course of that 
transposition, the legislature of the State of the forum held it to be crucial, in the legal order 
concerned, to grant the commercial agent protection going beyond that provided for by that 
directive, taking account in that regard of the nature and of the objective of such mandatory 
provisions”. 
1203 OGH 1.3.2017, 5 Ob 72/16y. 
1204 Case C-507/15 Agro Foreign Trade&Agency Ltd v Petersime NV [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:129. 
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However, the Belgian legislation transposing the Commercial Agents Directive 
provides for a limited scope of application, restricting its territorial scope to 
agents operating in Belgium.1205 As a result, the Turkish agent could not enjoy 
the protection provided by Commercial Agents Directive, since, being outside the 
scope of the specific agency contracts legislation the default contract law rules of 
Belgian law applied to the contract. The preliminary question referred to the ECJ 
asked whether the Belgian law is in accordance with the Commercial Agents 
Directive when limiting its scope to commercial agents whose principal place of 
business is in Belgium, and therefore not applying when a principal established 
in Belgium and an agent established in Turkey have explicitly chosen Belgian 
law. The ECJ referred to the Ingmar case and confirmed that where a situation is 
closely connected with the EU, in particular where the commercial agent carries 
on his activity in the territory of a Member State, the provisions of the Directive 
cannot be circumvented.1206 However, the current situation involving an agent 
carrying out his activities outside the EU do not amount to a situation closely 
connected to the EU and, as a result, purposes of fair competition within the EU 
do not justify the application of the minimum protection of the Commercial 
Agents Directive. Since the commercial agent carrying out commercial activities 
in Turkey does not fall within the scope of application of the Directive, regardless 
of the fact that the principal is established in a Member State, it is not necessary 
that he benefits from the protection provided by that directive to commercial 
agents. Therefore, Belgian law is in accordance with the Commercial Agents 
Directive in that regard.1207 
Two important reflexions, that can be extended to situations involving EU 
consumer or employment directives as well, can be made following this 
judgment: first, the ECJ confirmed the Ingmar approach regarding the scope of 
application of the Commercial Agents Directive, which cannot be circumvented 
by a choice of law when the situation is closely connected with the EU. Again, 
no references to the Rome Convention or Rome I Regulation are made in this 
regard. Second, the technique used by the Belgian legislation, unilaterally 
determining its scope of application and limiting it to commercial agents whose 
principal place of business is in Belgium, although allowed by the ECJ, can be 
criticised. Besides the argument regarding the respect for the legitimate 
expectations of the parties -in this case, the Turkish agent- when choosing a 
Member State law, I would like to draw attention to what would be the situation 
if the commercial agent’s place of operation is another Member State and parties 
have chosen Belgian law as applicable. Falling outside the scope of application 
                                                     
1205 Wet betreffende de handelsagentuurovereenkomst (Law on commercial agency contracts) of 
13 April 1995 (Moniteur belge of 2 June 1995, p. 15621), provides in art. 27: ‘Without prejudice 
to the application of international conventions to which Belgium is a party, any activity of a 
commercial agent whose principal place of business is in Belgium shall be governed by Belgian 
law and shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Belgian courts.’ 
1206 Agro Foreign Trade, para 32. 
1207 Agro Foreign Trade, paras. 33-36. 
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of the specific Belgian legislation, but falling under the scope of application of 
the Commercial Agents Directive, according to which national law should the 
Commercial Agents Directive apply (Member State of habitual place of residence 
of commercial agent or Member State of chosen law?)? The protection of the 
Commercial Agents Directive needs to be applicable because the agent is 
carrying on his activity in a Member State, but should then the protection of the 
law of place of habitual residence of the agent apply according to art. 9 Rome I 
as overriding mandatory rules? The inconsistencies that can result from these type 
of rules such as this scope rule of Belgian law when implementing a EU directive 
are very disruptive to our current conflict of laws system, as it was previously 
discussed in Chapter IV and V regarding scope rules of EU consumer and 
employment directives. 
 
3. Closing remarks 
Party autonomy is the cornerstone of the Rome I Regulation and brings numerous 
advantages to the parties involved. Therefore, the limitations to party autonomy 
are restricted to situations where it is really necessary (protection of structural 
weaker parties, application of overriding mandatory rules, or avoiding abuse of 
law). Because of the specialties of insurance contracts and carriage of passengers 
contracts, party autonomy is restricted in a different manner than regarding 
consumer and employment contracts. In the case of insurance contracts, a 
complex provision was introduced in the Rome I Regulation in order to 
incorporate the conflict rules previously scattered in several EU insurance 
directives. Article 7 Rome I determines the law applicable to insurance contracts 
and, if the law applicable is the law of a Member State, then the national 
implementation of the relevant directive will, as a consequence, apply. The 
situation regarding contracts for the carriage of passengers differs. While the 
conflict rule is simple, allowing the choice of law from a series of legal systems 
related to the contract (article 5(2) Rome I), the application of the relevant EU 
Regulations is less obvious. It is widely agreed that the EU mandatory provisions 
protecting the passenger as a consumer are applicable as required by the 
regulations and regardless a choice of law. However, when the regulation does 
not contain a conflict rule but just a mere scope rule such as the Airline Passengers 
Regulation, it should not prevail over the conflict rules of the Rome I through 
article 23 Rome I. Thus, its applicability should be through article 9 Rome I, and 
then the provisions of the regulation should fall under the definition of overriding 
mandatory rules (i.e. essential for the safeguarding of a public interest (of the EU 
in this case)).  
While consumers and employees should be protected against an abuse of a 
choice of law, the need of protection of distributors, franchisees and commercial 
agents is far less obvious. Focusing on the latter, a commercial agent will 
generally be better informed and experienced in comparison with a consumer or 
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employee, since it is his professional activity. Still, his bargaining position can 
often be weaker in comparison with his counterparty, especially when the 
commercial agent is an individual working only for one principal. From the 
approach of the Rome I Regulation, parties to a commercial agency contract are 
free to choose the law applicable to their contract (article 3(1) Rome I). Thus, the 
protection provided to the agent as a weaker party by the Commercial Agents 
Directive can be circumvented through a choice of a non-Member State law. 
When concluding a contract with a choice of law clause for a non-Member State 
law, the commercial agent is giving up the protection provided by EU law. It is 
up to the commercial agent, on the basis of individual freedom and responsibility, 
to decide how to best protect its own interests as a professional.1208 Nevertheless, 
the application of the rights and obligations deriving from the Commercial 
Agents Directive whenever the agent is carrying out his activities within the EU 
has been required by the ECJ in Ingmar on the grounds of avoiding unfair 
competition and protecting freedom of establishment in the EU. This is, the 
application of the protective provisions of the directive were not justified on the 
need for protection of the commercial agent as a weaker party. In the context of 
the Rome I Regulation, the provisions of the directive were interpreted as 
overriding mandatory provisions of article 9 Rome I, and their scope of 
application was whenever the contract is closely connected with the EU (i.e. the 
commercial agent carries out his activities within the EU). While it might seem 
that the application of the directive provisions is not that essential to safeguard 
the objectives of avoiding unfair competition and protect freedom of 
establishment, it is up to every legal system (in this case, the EU) to decide which 
rules have the character of overriding mandatory rules. However, Member State 
courts should always justify the consideration of their national rules as overriding 
mandatory for the sake of party autonomy and the system of the Rome I 
Regulation.  
In relation with other directives, the Ingmar decision has had some 
consequences regarding the interaction between the Rome I Regulation and EU 
directives. Since the judgment, it has very often been assumed that the existence 
of a scope rule in a directive either works as a conflict rule and thus prevails over 
the conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation, or it directly gives overriding 
mandatory character to the directive. As it has been explained in the previous 
chapters, that is not the case.1209 First, the ECJ did not resolve the Ingmar case on 
the basis of the Rome I Regulation because it was before its entry into force, or 
on the basis of the Rome Convention because it was not temporarily applicable 
to the contract. Second, if we put the judgment in the context of the Rome system, 
and in coordination with it, the ECJ decided the application of the directive based 
on the essential public interests of the EU (overriding mandatory character), and 
                                                     
1208 Kuipers (n 11) 215. 
1209 See Chapter IV regarding EU consumer directives and Chapter V concerning EU employment 
directives. 
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then clarified when it should be applicable for the protection of those public 
interests with the scope rule. This is confirmed by the recent judgment Agro 
Foreign Trade & Agency Ltd v Petersime NV. This should not be distorted in that 
the overriding mandatory character follows from every scope rule of a directive; 
first, the provisions of the directive would have to fall under the definition of 
article 9(1) Rome I.  
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CHAPTER VII - CONCLUSION 
 
The interaction between the existent EU conflict rules and the EU directives on 
weaker contracting parties can be defined as, at least, complicated. As a result, in 
practice, consumers or employees might see themselves in situations where 
expected applicable rights derived from EU instruments are, in fact, not 
applicable to their cases. On the other side of the balance, the other party to the 
contract could see how unexpected obligations derived from EU instruments are 
imposed to him. For example, the case where a consumer from a Member State 
is temporarily in another Member State (e.g. on holiday) and gets targeted there 
by a foreign professional is not covered by the special protective conflict rules of 
art. 6 Rome I. Consequently, the application of the relevant provisions derived 
from EU consumer directives might not be ensured. Or, on the other side of the 
balance, in the case of employment contracts, an employer might have to comply 
with EU legislation in case of a transfer of undertakings even when art. 8 Rome 
I does not lead to the application of a Member State law, on the grounds of an 
extensive interpretation of art. 9 Rome I regarding overriding mandatory 
provisions. This study aimed at answering whether EU conflict rules and the EU 
directives on weaker contracting parties are well coordinated and, if not, how can 
they achieve a mutual understanding. In order to answer that question, three main 
inquiries were posed: (1) How do traditional principles of conflict of laws relate 
to the requirements of the internal market for the realisation of the EU objectives 
regarding the protection of weaker parties such as employees, consumers, etc.? 
(2) When and how should PIL ensure the applicability of EU directives on weaker 
party protection? (3) Are the current EU PIL conflict of laws rules and PIL 
method adequate to ensure the EU objectives regarding weaker contracting 
parties, or is there a call for a different PIL method? These questions have been 
tackled along this book. However, I will now specifically provide a reflexion and 
answer to them on the basis of the findings of this research: 
 
1. How do traditional principles of conflict of laws relate to the requirements 
of the internal market for the realisation of the EU objectives regarding the 
protection of weaker parties such as employees, consumers, etc.? 
Savingny’s multilateral PIL approach is the starting point of the European 
conflict of laws system as we understand it nowadays. EU choice of law rules 
generally contain abstract connecting factors which link the legal relationship to 
the jurisdiction to which is factually most closely connected (e.g. the place 
habitual residence of the parties, the location of the real property, etc.). While the 
original multilateral method is based on neutrality, composed by value-neutral 
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conflict rules, nowadays other principles and doctrines have been added to adapt 
it to our current legal context. The EU PIL method is defined as “eclectic method” 
or “methodpluralism”, since different doctrines and principles live together with 
the multilateral approach developed by Savigny. However, to which extent are 
EU objectives behind our current EU PIL approach? 
The most important principle regarding the law applicable to contractual 
obligations is nowadays party autonomy. Party autonomy is the cornerstone of 
the Rome I Regulation. However, party autonomy is limited in some cases.  
- One limitation is provided by article 3(4) Rome I on benefit of EU mandatory 
law. Article 3(4) Rome I limits party autonomy with the objective of ensuring the 
application of EU mandatory law. It is the only provision in the Rome I 
Regulation with a clear EU-focused objective. Article 3(4) Rome I was 
introduced with the aim of helping the coordination between the general conflict 
of laws rules determining the law applicable to the contract and the applicability 
of EU secondary law. This provision should be able to solve most of the problems 
encountered within this study regarding the application of EU directives 
protecting weaker contracting parties. However, it does not. As it has been 
described, article 3(4) Rome I just ensures the application of EU mandatory rules 
when parties have chosen the law of a third country law and all the relevant 
elements of the situation are located in the EU (purely intra-EU situations). It has 
been considered as insufficient to ensure the application of EU mandatory law 
protecting weaker parties. In the cases where article 6 Rome I does not ensure the 
application of EU consumer directives when necessary, or in the cases of EU 
directives regarding other weaker parties, article 3(4) Rome I does not 
complement those needs. In the case of consumer and employment contracts, if 
all the elements are located within the EU, the application of the directives is 
already ensured by the special provisions of articles 6 and 8 Rome I. However, 
the intended international scope of EU mandatory law is not always exclusively 
limited to purely intra-EU situations. For example, the scope rules contained in 
consumer directives or the interpretation of the ECJ in Ingmar regarding the 
Commercial Agents Directive ask for a broader scope of application (closest 
connection with the EU) of their provisions. Thus, article 3(4) Rome I limits party 
autonomy in the benefit of EU objectives, constituting a mechanism for fighting 
abuse of law at a EU level, but it is not sufficient to ensure the application of EU 
mandatory law, since it is limited to purely intra-EU situations. 
- Party autonomy, as well as the use of the general connecting factors, is also 
affected by the principle of weaker party protection. Articles 6 and 8 Rome I limit 
the choice of law of the parties to avoid a possible abuse from the stronger party 
to the contract. Instead of completely eliminating the possibility to choose the law 
applicable to the contract, they use the preferential law approach, under which 
the choice cannot deprive the consumer or employee of the protection provided 
by the mandatory provisions of the law applicable in absence of choice. The law 
applicable in absence of choice is, in the case of consumer contracts falling under 
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article 6 Rome I, the law of habitual residence of the consumer and, in case of 
individual employment contracts of article 8 Rome I, the law of the habitual place 
of work (or, if not possible to determine, the law of the country of the place of 
business through which the employee was engaged) or the law most closely 
connected to the employment contract. These articles, although making use of a 
connecting factor which favours the weaker contracting party, still make use of a 
multilateral PIL method, connecting the abstract legal relationship to a legal 
system through the connecting factor, regardless it points to the law of the forum 
or any foreign law. They do not differentiate between national or foreign law, or 
between Member State law and non-Member State law. Thus, although adapted 
to the principle of weaker party protection, they are not particularly concerned 
with EU internal market objectives. The aim of articles 6 and 8 is not ‘material’ 
justice, but avoiding a potential abuse from the stronger party and equilibrate the 
positions of the contract. However, indeed, when the law applicable in absence 
of choice of law is the law of a Member State, the application of EU mandatory 
provisions derived from EU consumer and employment directives is ensured 
through these articles. The problem lays where those articles do not ensure the 
application of EU mandatory provisions but these still should or intend to apply 
to the situation.  
In the case of consumer contracts, the main ‘gaps’ that can derive from article 
6 Rome I are, regarding its material scope, originated on the exceptions of art. 
6(4) Rome I and, regarding its territorial scope, ‘holiday’ consumers or mobile 
consumers (i.e. a consumer from Member State A that while on a short stay in 
Member State B is approached by a non-Member State company that is targeting 
its activities to Member State A).  The latter are excluded from the protection of 
article 6 Rome I in case of a choice of a third country law, since the provision 
incorporates the targeted activity test, and becomes applicable when the 
professional performs or directs his commercial activities to the country of 
habitual residence of the consumer. In those cases, the general conflict rules apply 
and the application of EU consumer directives is not ensured. However, it is not 
in line with the objectives of the EU on consumer protection and correct 
functioning of the internal market that a consumer from Member State A can lose 
all the EU consumer law protection just because he is on holiday on Member 
State B. This is, a Dutch consumer travelling to Spain should enjoy the same 
minimum EU consumer protection than a Spanish consumer vis-à-vis a non-EU 
professional, even when the latter does not target the Dutch market. It has been 
submitted that the effectiveness of EU consumer directives would be threatened 
if a professional established in a non-Member state could target EU consumers 
that are temporarily staying in another Member State without complying with EU 
consumer rights. Thus, instead of incorporating ‘scope rules’ in EU consumer 
directives, which bring legal uncertainty to our conflict of laws system, article 6 
Rome I should be adapted to the EU objectives involved. I suggest that, in the 
case of legislation implementing EU consumer directives, the different Member 
States should be seen as a single jurisdiction: the EU. The specific suggestion 
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involves including a unilateral PIL exception in favour of EU consumer law: 
whenever a professional directs his activities to a Member State, the application 
of the minimum requirements of EU consumer directives should be ensured, 
regardless the Member State of habitual residence of the consumer. This should 
be seen as an exception, justified by the importance that consumer law holds for 
the EU internal market. In my opinion, this exception to the multilateral nature of 
the provision in favour of an EU objective is justified, since the specific conflict 
of laws issue deriving from the international application of EU directives calls for 
a special solution. Since the mandatory provisions involved are of a EU origin, it 
follows that the EU can be considered as a single jurisdiction in international 
cases when referring to the international application of those provisions. The 
situation ‘EU mandatory law vs. foreign country law’ can be treated equal to 
‘forum mandatory law vs. foreign country law’, and thus a choice of foreign law 
should not result in depriving the EU consumer from the protection granted by 
EU consumer law. In addition, the legal expectations of the parties are better 
served, since ‘holiday consumers’ or mobile consumers would enjoy the expected 
protection when acting within the internal market and, at the same time, regarding 
the professional, it can be expected that the EU standards are to be applicable 
when targeting consumers acting within the EU market. 
Regarding the consumers intentionally excluded from article 6 by paragraph 
4, it has been discussed that there is a rationale behind this exclusion, according 
to which the consumer, in general, cannot reasonably expect to have the law of 
his country of habitual residence to apply. That is the case of active consumers, 
or of consumer contracts “for the supply of services where the services are to be 
supplied to the consumer exclusively in a country other than that in which he has 
his habitual residence” (e.g. accommodation in a hotel, a language course, etc.) 
–art. 6(4)(a)–. In these cases, the consumer is treated in the same way as the 
professional, since there are no restrictions on the choice of law. For example, the 
case where a Dutch resident enters into a consumer contract for a Spanish 
language course held in Spain, and the contract contains a choice of a foreign 
non-Member State law and he does not receive the protection of Spanish law nor 
Dutch law and, as a result, not of EU consumer law. In such a case, the consumer 
could expect Dutch mandatory law to not be applicable, since the Spanish course 
is completely taking place in Spain, but could he expect that other non-EU law is 
applicable this situation? Again, it can be expected that EU consumer protection 
is to be applicable when acting within the EU internal market in such cases. While 
keeping the material exceptions of article 6(4) Rome I, since there is a rationale 
behind them, a more EU-approach can be achieved in order to ensure the 
applicability of EU consumer directives when necessary. As previously 
explained, article 3(4) Rome I was the provision introduced to ensure the 
application of EU mandatory law when necessary. However, in the above-
mentioned example, it would only ensure the application of the relevant EU 
consumer provisions when all the elements of the situation are located within the 
EU. If the company offering the Spanish courses is not established in Spain, for 
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example, article 3(4) Rome I would not apply. If the EU legislator considers that 
EU directives should also apply to these type of cases, rather than resorting to the 
mechanism of scope rules in directives, or (mis-)using a posteriori the 
mechanism of overriding mandatory rules, it could be considered the introduction 
of the close connection test that scope rules provided rather than the ‘all relevant 
elements to the situation’ requirement in article 3(4) Rome I. This general 
expression was originally intended to make possible to take into account the 
different connections depending on the circumstances of the case.  In the 
directives, the expression ‘close connection’ or similar in scope rules brings legal 
uncertainty and inconsistencies, since directives are to be transposed into national 
law and might give rise to as many interpretations as Member States are. In 
addition, this modification of article 3(4) Rome I would not preclude the 
application of foreign law, but would only ensure the application of EU 
mandatory law when the situation is most closely connected to the EU, allowing 
the judge to take into account all the circumstances of the case. It is true that the 
term close connection is a vague term; however, this limit to party autonomy is 
just an exception to avoid situations of abuse of law in the detriment of EU 
mandatory law when the normal operation of the conflict rules of the Rome I 
Regulation fail to do so.  
In the case of individual employment contracts, article 8 Rome I ensures in 
most of the cases the application of the EU employment directives when 
necessary. Contrarily to article 6 Rome I, article 8 Rome I includes all individual 
employment contracts. When the place of habitual work is in a Member State, the 
application of the requirements laid down by the EU employment directives are 
ensured by article 8 Rome I, which primary connecting factor leads to the place 
of habitual work of the employee. EU employment directives do not have any 
interest on being applicable to workers working outside the EU and indeed intend 
their protection to apply to workers working in the EU. As a result, the generality 
of EU employment directives and article 8 Rome I on the law applicable to 
individual employment contracts are coordinated, dealing separately with 
substantive issues and PIL issues and having as relevant criterion the habitual 
place of work. The area of EU employment law does not cover as many fields of 
national law as EU consumer law does and is quite fragmented and mainly 
composed by minimum harmonisation directives that complement the policies of 
Member States. Although the majority of EU employment directives in the area 
of contract law do not contain rules interfering with PIL, it has been discussed 
during this study that that is not always the case and several issues regarding 
coordination of article 8 Rome I and EU employment directives still arise. The 
Acquired Rights Directive aims at preserving employees’ rights in the case of a 
transfer of undertaking and covers also cross-border transfer of undertakings. It 
contains a ‘scope rule’ that could affect PIL. However, the law applicable to the 
employment contract should be determined by the Rome I Regulation regardless 
the existence of that rule, which provides for the application of the directive 
whenever the undertaking, business or part of the undertaking or business to be 
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transferred is located within the EU. The EU legislator should not aim at imposing 
the application of the directives without regard to the PIL system in force and 
should be careful with the inclusion of rules such as article 1(2) Acquired Rights 
Directive referring to the territorial scope of a directive in such a way that might 
lead to confusion from a PIL perspective. Still, the suitability of article 8 Rome I 
has been object of discussion on the basis that the habitual place of work changes 
when the employee is transferred to the new location and, in addition, the fact 
that when the law applicable is the result of the closest connection escape 
mechanism of art. 8(4) Rome I, the application of the Acquired Rights Directive 
is not ensured. In this regard, rather than concluding that article 8 Rome I should 
be adapted to the necessities of Acquired Rights Directive similarly to the 
conclusion regarding consumer directives and art. 6 Rome I, I consider that the 
application of the Acquired Rights Directive is ensured by article 8 Rome I when 
the employee requires that protection. When article 8 Rome I does not ensure the 
application of the directive because it designates a foreign law as applicable –
either because the country of habitual place of work or the country most closely 
connected is a non-EU country-, the only manner that the Acquired Rights 
Directive would need to apply is not justifiable under employee protection 
reasons, but it would be because a public interest is at stake in the sense of article 
9 Rome I. 
Regarding the relationship between article 8 Rome I and the Posted Workers 
Directive, article 9 Rome I also plays a role. Article 8 Rome I provides that the 
habitual place of work is not deemed to have changed when the employee is 
temporarily posted to another country. In intra-EU postings, the Posted Workers 
Directive provides that Member States must ensure that the undertakings of the 
host state guarantee to the posted workers to their territory certain terms and 
conditions of employment which are laid down in that Member State regarding 
maximum work periods and minimum rest periods, remuneration, health and 
safety conditions, etc. (art. 3(1) PWD). The provisions referred to in article 3(1) 
PWD, besides ensuring a minimum protection to posted workers, are considered 
crucial for the safeguard of public interests of the host Member State and of the 
EU and constitute overriding mandatory provisions of article 9 Rome I. The 
referred terms and conditions are of immediate interest during the period of 
posting, since they are essential to ensure fair competition and the fundamental 
freedom of provision of services within the EU. Art. 3(1) PWD determines the 
overriding mandatory character and scope of specific rules. In the case of 
temporary posting of workers, articles 6 Rome I, 9 Rome I and the Posted 
Workers Directive complement each other to determine the law applicable to the 
employment contract. 
- Regarding other weaker contracting parties, article 5(2) Rome I regarding 
contracts for the carriage of passengers and article 7 Rome I regarding insurance 
contracts also limit party autonomy, but in a way that only allows the choice of a 
law that has some connection with the contract. In these contracts, the choice of 
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law is limited to a number of legal systems which are connected with the contract 
or parties of the contract, hence requiring the existence of a qualified link between 
the contract and the law chosen. In the case of art. 5(2) Rome I concerning 
contracts for the carriage of passengers, parties can choose among the law of the 
country where the passenger has his habitual residence, the carrier has his habitual 
residence, the carrier has his place of central administration, the place of 
departure is located or the place of destination is located. This provision allows 
the carrier to choose the law of his place of residence or central administration, 
avoiding the application of many different laws depending on the passengers, but 
the level of protection offered by the limit on party autonomy only ensures that 
the carrier does not deliberately choose a non-related law with a very low level 
of consumer protection. The application of a minimum level of protection to 
passengers is not ensured through this provision. Article 5(2) Rome I was not 
drafted in coordination with the different EU secondary instruments on carriage 
of passengers. However, it does not have such an impact since a big number of 
international conventions and EU Regulations regarding the carriage of 
passengers precede the application of article 5(2) Rome I. As a result, article 5(2) 
Rome I only applies when there is a gap not covered by those international 
conventions or EU regulations. Most of the EU legislation regarding carriage of 
passengers is laid down in regulations, and thus is applicable in a uniform way in 
all Member States. In intra-EU scenarios, it is not relevant which Member State 
law is applicable, since the unified protection offered by the regulation is 
applicable by all Member States laws. However, the level of protection offered 
by the conflict rules is relevant when there is a choice of law of a non-Member 
State or when the carrier is established in a non-Member State.  In the case of 
Regulation on Rail Passengers Rights and Obligations (1371/2007)1210, article 4 
contains a unilateral conflict rule, according to which the conclusion and 
performance of a transport contract is not to be decided according to the rules of 
a Member State according to external PIL rules, but it is to be decided according 
to the provisions of Title II and Title III of Annex I to the Regulation. This conflict 
rule prevails over article 5(2) Rome I according to article 23 Rome I. On the other 
hand, Airline Passengers Regulation (261/2004)1211 does not prevail over article 
5 Rome I through article 23 Rome I because it does not contain a conflict rule as 
such. Thus, the way to ensure the application of the Regulation in the scenarios 
defined by its scope rule is through article 9 Rome I, provided the provisions of 
the regulation fall under the definition of overriding mandatory rules (i.e. 
essential for the safeguarding of a public interest (of the EU in this case)).  
                                                     
1210 Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 
2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations (OJ 2007 L 315/14). 
1211 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 
2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of 
denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 
295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46/1). 
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In the case of insurance contracts, a complex provision was introduced in the 
Rome I Regulation in order to incorporate the conflict rules previously scattered 
in several EU insurance directives. Article 7 Rome I was drafted in coordination 
with the existent EU insurance directives, and prevails over the conflict rules of 
EU insurance directives. Article 7 Rome I provides for three different levels of 
protection with different limits to party autonomy and special conflict rules in 
absence of choice. For example, the type of contracts where the policy holder can 
be in a weaker contractual provision (i.e. mass risks, which are a category that 
might involve B2C as well as B2B contracts, since customers insuring smaller 
risks are more likely to be small business or private persons, which find 
themselves in a weaker contractual position) are regulated by article 7(3) only 
when the risk is located in the EU, which only allows the choice of several 
Member State laws related with the contract or the law of the country of habitual 
residence of the policy holder. Therefore, it offers enough protection to the 
policyholder in a weaker contractual position. In the case the risk is not located 
in a Member State, the general provisions of the Rome I Regulation apply (arts. 
3, 4 and, exceptionally, 6 Rome I in the case of an insurance B2C contract falling 
under the requirements of article 6 Rome I). Article 3 or 4 Rome I can lead to the 
application of a non-Member State law, and thus in those cases it is considered 
that rules of the respective directive do not need to apply. The rules are complex 
but coordinated. Despite article 7 Rome I has been subject to criticism due to the 
complexity of its conflict rules, the rule is the result of a ‘complex compromise’, 
reflecting the requirements of the EU directives and bringing more legal certainty 
to the law applicable to insurance contracts. 
- Another limit to party autonomy, and at the same time a big exception to the 
multilateral PIL system, is the already mentioned article 9 Rome I with the 
doctrine of overriding mandatory rules. The doctrine of overriding mandatory 
rules constitutes an expression of unilateralism in our PIL system: provisions 
qualified as overriding mandatory are applicable regardless the law chosen by the 
parties and regardless the law objectively applicable to the contract. Overriding 
mandatory rules are applicable according to their object and purpose. Based on 
their content and purpose, they unilaterally determine their own applicability. 
And their object and purpose, in order to be considered overriding mandatory, 
has to be regarded as essential by a country for the safeguard of its public 
interests, such as its political, social or economic organization. This is, first, 
overriding mandatory rules fix their own scope of application (implicitly or 
explicitly); second, their application and scope derives from their purpose and 
nature, which is aiming at protecting essential public interests; and, third, that 
purpose justifies their overriding mandatory character and need to derogate from 
the general conflict rules. Internal market objectives can be ensured through 
overriding mandatory rules when essential for the safeguard of EU public 
interests. The EU interest has to be regarded as essential for the safeguard of a 
public interest, such as the political, social or economic organisation of the EU.  
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However, EU objectives regarding the protection of weaker parties such as 
employees, consumers, etc. should not be ensured through article 9 Rome I.  
Doctrine and courts of the different Member States differ on their understanding 
of overriding mandatory rules. While countries such as Germany have 
traditionally followed a restrictive interpretation under which overriding 
mandatory rules deal exclusively with public interests and, as a result, rules 
protecting weaker parties are completely excluded from this category, other 
countries such as France follow the opposite trend under which rules protecting 
weaker parties can easily fall under the category of overriding mandatory 
rules.1212 However, it is submitted that regardless the different traditional 
understandings of the Member States, when talking about a EU interest, a 
common approach should be followed. Following the ECJ position, based on the 
decision in Ingmar, it can be understood that article 9 Rome I will also include 
those provisions that, although they protect a structural weaker party, they mainly 
serve to protect higher interests which are so essential that its priority over the 
law chosen by the parties is justified, including significant EU interests. 
Following this line of reasoning, a provision which only aims to protect a weaker 
party would not be considered as an overriding mandatory rule, but it definitely 
could be as long as it also aims to promote a higher political, social or economic 
interest which justifies the priority of this provision in an international 
scenario.1213 Therefore, although article 9 Rome I refers to public interests, it does 
not lead a priori to the exclusion of all protective rules. This view seems to be 
supported by the European legislator, which also provides overriding mandatory 
character to provisions protecting the weaker party in certain EU Directives (e.g. 
Posted of Workers Directive). Therefore, the tendency of the EU is to accept that 
rules aimed at the protection of weaker parties can also qualify as overriding 
mandatory rules. Nevertheless, again, this does not mean that all protective rules 
can have such a character, but only when it is regarded as crucial for the 
safeguarding of the country’s interests. The rule must have a dual purpose: the 
protection of weaker parties plus the promotion of public interests.  
This extensive approach for the meaning of article 9 Rome I leaves enough 
autonomy to the legislators and courts of the Member States to determine their 
own crucial interests. However, Member States have to restraint themselves when 
considering provisions as essential for a public interest. Otherwise, the meaning 
of article 9 Rome I would be undermined. For the sake of the legal security of the 
                                                     
1212 These two countries represent the two extremes in the position, and in the middle we find 
countries such as Spain or Belgium with a similar approach to the French, or the Netherlands with 
a more restrictive approach closer to the German view.  
1213 Many authors follow this position. For example, among others, Kuipers (n 11) 200; Aguilar 
Grieder, ‘La Voluntad de Conciliación Con Las Directivas Comunitarias Protectoras En La 
Propuesta Del Reglamento Roma I’ (n 688) 53; Carrascosa González, ‘La Autonomía de La 




parties to the contract and for the legal predictability regarding the law applicable 
to a contract, the application of overriding mandatory provisions has to be 
justified on the strict definition of article 9(1) Rome I.  In order to determine 
whether the provisions of a EU directive are aimed at protecting public interests 
a restrictive interpretation is defended since, to some extent, all EU legislation is 
aimed at the proper functioning of the internal market. Most of the provisions of 
EU consumer and employment directives are mandatory provisions, since they 
aim the protection of weaker parties, but not overriding mandatory norms, since 
they are not essential for the protection of a public EU interest. In addition, that 
overriding mandatory character should only have effect regarding the application 
of a non-Member State law, since in an intra-EU conflict where the law of a 
different Member State is applicable, the minimum protection of the directive 
(which would be the one considered overriding mandatory) would be ensured by 
the national transposition of the Member State.  
Therefore, article 9 Rome I is a mechanism Member States enjoy in order to 
ensure the application of national provisions or provisions originated in EU law 
and, as such, is a mechanism that serves the needs of the internal market in order 
to protect possible public interests involved. However, it is not a mechanism 
designed for the protection of weaker contracting parties. It can accidentally serve 
the objective of weaker party protection but only when the provision at stake is 
primarily aimed at serving a public interest (e.g. fair competition in the internal 
market, ensuring freedom of provision of services, etc.). It is concluded that 
provisions deriving from EU directives protecting weaker contracting parties do 
not have, as a general rule, overriding mandatory character. In my opinion, they 
usually have the character of provisions that cannot be derogated from by 
agreement in the sense of articles 3(3), 3(4), 6 or 8 Rome I. However, if 
exceptionally a specific (implemented) directive provision mainly serves public 
interests its qualification as overriding mandatory provision in the sense of article 
9 is not excluded.  
Finally, the Rome I Regulation provides in article 23 Rome I “with the 
exception of Article 7, this Regulation shall not prejudice the application of 
provisions of Community law which, in relation to particular matters, lay down 
conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations.” This provision intends 
to coordinate the Rome I Regulation with other EU law providing for conflict 
rules in particular matters, and establishes the priority of the existent specific 
conflict rules of EU law instruments on specific matters over those of the Rome 
I Regulation.  
 
2. When and how should PIL ensure the applicability of EU Directives on 
weaker party protection? 
During this study, the international applicability of EU directives on weaker party 
protection has been thoroughly discussed. EU directives are a different legal 
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instrument that to which PIL is traditionally used to, especially because, to be 
applicable, their provisions have to be transposed into the national law of the 
Member States, and due to the minimum harmonisation technique, this 
transposition differs from one Member State to another. Thus, there is a common 
EU standard vs. foreign law, and different Member State laws improving or just 
equalling that standard. Therefore, their international applicability has to be 
clarified. 
First, in order to answer when should PIL ensure the applicability of EU 
directives on weaker party protection, certain reflexions regarding the application 
of foreign law are made. The traditional approach of PIL since Savigny and until 
nowadays was to solve a conflict of laws from the point of view of the legal 
relationship, with a neutral conflict rule that would find the legal systems most 
closely connected to the legal relationship. In that manner, international harmony 
of decisions would be achieved, meaning that the outcome would be the same 
regardless the jurisdiction where the proceedings were brought, which would 
prevent limping legal relationships and would promote legal certainty. Nowadays 
the prevention of forum shopping seems to be a principal aim. Therefore, the 
application of foreign law by the forum results beneficial. Conflict rules should 
definitely promote the equality between the different national legal systems 
through neutral conflict rules. Neutral conflict rules, as well as the principle of 
party autonomy, generally respect the legal expectations of the parties and 
promote legal certainty. However, several aspects need to be taken into account 
regarding the application of foreign law: 
First, the more the countries are interrelated, the more legal values they would 
share and, therefore, the more eager they would be to use neutral conflict rules, 
regardless the law applicable is national law or a foreign law. However, in the 
opposite case, the more the countries do not share basic values or legal principles, 
the more the application of foreign law becomes difficult or undesirable (‘scale 
of Ten Wolde’).1214  
Second, the applicability of foreign law varies depending on the area of law. 
In our case, contract law is a mostly value-free area where the free will of the 
parties prevails and, as a result, the existence of common principles among the 
countries involved does not seem to be so relevant as compared to other fields of 
law such as family law. However, within contract law there are still values that 
the law of the forum might need to protect against the application of a foreign law 
(e.g. weaker party protective rules, or public interests). When talking about rules 
                                                     
1214 Ten Wolde compared this phenomenon to a sliding scale, where in one end of the scale the 
country would apply exclusively the forum law because the countries involved lacked relationship 
between them, while on the opposite end of the scale the countries would be neutral regarding the 
application of forum law or foreign law, since the relationship between the societies is so close that 
same or similar legal values are shared. Ten Wolde, ‘The Relativity of Legal Positions in Cross-
Border Situations: The Foundations of Private Interregional Law, Private Intra-Community Law 
and Private International Law’ (n 325) 576. 
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with mandatory character in the areas of contract law that aim to protect 
contractual weaker parties, the state needs to protect these values, and thus the 
state is more reluctant to the application of foreign law, aiming to ensure these 
values of the forum state when necessary. In the case of overriding mandatory 
rules, essential for the organisation of the state, the forum state would like to 
ensure the application of these rules unconditionally.  
Finally, the special situation of the EU must be taken into account. The EU 
needs to ensure the correct functioning of the internal market and achievement of 
the Area of Justice. While in intra-EU situations between Member States similar 
legal values are shared, especially in the harmonised areas covered by EU 
directives, the EU might want to ensure these common values against the 
application of a foreign (non-Member State) law.  
During this study, a separate analysis of the application of consumer, 
employment and other weaker parties’ directives has been conducted. Now, a 
common reflexion about their applicability will be made: 
First, I would like to make a brief reference to the introduction of scope rules 
in the directives to ensure their application in international situations. Only some 
specific EU consumer directives contain what we refer to as ‘scope rules’ from a 
PIL perspective. EU employment directives are mostly silent in this regard, while 
art. 1(2) Acquired Rights Directive is not the same type of scope rule –only refers 
to the territorial scope of the instrument-, and art. 3 Posted Workers Directive is 
a rule determining the overriding mandatory character of the provisions referred 
to in it. The rules contained in the insurance directives, over which art. 7 Rome I 
has now priority, were conflict rules as such. Of all of this type of rules, the most 
problematic from a PIL point of view are the so-called scope rules, as the ones 
contained in some EU consumer directives. The introduction of this type of rules 
was justified on the special needs derived of EU sectorial directives. The correct 
functioning of the internal market as an objective served as a justification for the 
introduction of scope rules as a mechanism to originally supplement and fill in 
the gaps of the Rome Convention in that regard. Sometimes, it is necessary that 
all market participants are subject to the same rules, which meant that EU 
secondary law should define its spatial scope of application. However, I have 
already discussed that the introduction of scope rules in directives is not desirable 
for our EU conflict of laws system. First, there is uncertainty around the specific 
nature and function of these rules, and regarding their interaction with the Rome 
I Regulation. Authors do not agree whether these rules prevail over the Rome I 
Regulation as conflict rules or not. Second, the fact that they have to be 
implemented into the different national laws of Member States might result in as 
many conflict of laws rules as Member States are. Vagueness in their drafting 
causes a difficult and possible diverse implementation in the national law of the 
Member States. Moreover, they result in a disruption of the EU conflict of laws 
system based on the Rome I Regulation regarding contractual obligations, 
affecting the existent unified system. Unified conflict rules prevent forum 
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shopping and enhance legal certainty within the EU. Legal uncertainty is 
promoted when rules somehow affecting conflict of laws are dispersed in 
different instruments (in this regard, as recital 40 Rome I states, “a situation where 
conflict-of-law rules are dispersed among several instruments and where there 
are differences between those rules should be avoided”). Thus, I consider scope 
rules in directives bring more disadvantages to our conflict of laws system and 
ultimately will not be serving the internal market, the Area of Justice and the 
interests of the weaker parties. In the case a directive, because of the speciality of 
the area covered by it, needs a specific conflict rule different that the ones 
provided in the Rome I Regulation, can exceptionally include a specific conflict 
rule that would prevail over the Rome I Regulation according to art. 23 Rome I. 
However, in general, the law applicable should be determined by the Rome I 
Regulation which, if necessary, should adapt its provisions to the special needs 
of the EU directives protecting weaker parties. 
Second, the possibility of determining the application of EU directives 
protecting weaker parties using a PIL unilateral approach has been repeatedly 
discussed during this study. The existence of scope rules in the consumer 
directives has brought back the discussion regarding the PIL method and the 
possibility of changing our current PIL method towards a unilateral approach 
regarding the applicability of EU directives. Since following a unilateral 
approach directives determine their own scope of application and international 
applicability, the application of their EU mandatory provisions would be ensured 
in an international situation. According to a unilateral PIL approach, the legal 
instrument, in this case the directive, determines its own territorial scope of 
application according to its purpose and nature. The use of a unilateral PIL 
approach can be seen as a more pragmatic manner of ensuring that the aims of 
the directives protecting weaker contracting parties are fulfilled, since their 
provisions are applicable in an international situation when required by the same 
directive. However, the directive would only determine its own application 
without referring to foreign law. A unilateral PIL method is a forum-centred 
approach that does not consider the application of foreign law. As a result, it can 
happen that conflicts are created when two or more legal orders claim application 
to the situation, and when none of them does. But besides the general 
disadvantages of a unilateral method, other drawbacks arise if we were to use this 
approach to determine the application of EU directives autonomously. First, the 
EU legislator should not systematically impose its law over foreign law. It is 
inconsistent to maintain that EU law depends on its own applicability criteria and 
imposes its application and at the same time to ignore that foreign law might do 
the same. While the principle of supremacy applies to relationships between 
national Member States law and EU law, when a foreign law comes into play the 
EU is not the only sovereign. Second, legal certainty is not promoted since, 
instead of defining the circumstances under which a Member State law applies 
and under which foreign law applies, it would only be determined when EU law 
applies. Also, the exercise of finding the purpose of the legal act is a burdensome 
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task and adds uncertainty to the process. In this regard, as previously explained, 
a multilateral approach promotes legal certainty and respects the legal 
expectations of the parties. In addition, the directive must be implemented in the 
national law of the Member States, leading to possible different understandings 
and interpretations regarding the scope of the instrument. In my opinion, 
determining the application of the EU directives protecting weaker contracting 
parties through a unilateral PIL approach systematically and individually would 
result in a protectionist system that imposes the application of its law over foreign 
law, contradictory with the current PIL approach, and which brings more 
disadvantages as compared to a multilateral approach. 
Following the current multilateral-eclectic EU PIL approach, directives are 
applicable when the national law of a Member State is applicable, either because 
it is a purely internal situation or, in a cross-border situation, as a result of the 
conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation. In our current EU PIL approach, it is 
understood that if a law has been determined as applicable by the conflict rules, 
then the statutes of that legal system apply to the situation when the situation at 
hand falls within the scope of application of the statute in question. This is, the 
national judge, when a situation involves cross-border elements, is expected to 
follow the forum conflict rules which will point to the applicable law, rather than 
applying a statute of the forum without previously resorting to the conflict rules. 
In the case of a cross-border consumer contract, individual employment contract 
or other contract involving a weaker party the forum judge will determine the law 
applicable to the contract in accordance to the provisions of the Rome I 
Regulation. Then, when the case regards any of the areas regulated by a EU 
directive, the application of the EU directive is ensured through the application 
of the determined Member State law, which has implemented (and maybe 
improved) the terms and conditions required by the directive. Since directives 
only become applicable when the Rome I Regulation determines as applicable 
the law of a Member State, the achievement of the objectives and international 
application of the directives depends on whether the Rome I Regulation is 
effectively coordinated with those EU objectives when necessary. Hence the 
importance of the interaction and coordination between these instruments.  
Therefore, I consider the application of the EU directives should be 
determined through the available conflict rules of the Rome I Regulation (subject 
to certain changes). 
 
3. Are the current EU PIL conflict of laws rules and PIL method adequate 
to ensure the EU objectives regarding weaker contracting parties, or is there 
a call for a different PIL method? 
As it is known, our current PIL method, as shown in the Rome I Regulation, is 
mostly based on multilateral conflict rules. The main unilateral exception is the 
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application of overriding mandatory rules. However, we have concluded that 
overriding mandatory provisions are not a tool per se for the protection of weaker 
contracting parties. While special conflict rules are provided for the protection of 
certain weaker parties, limiting party autonomy and providing for special 
connecting factors, they do not always ensure the application of EU directives 
when expected. That can be either because the specific conflict rule does not take 
into account the existence of EU mandatory law or because there are not special 
conflict rules for some specific weaker parties for which EU directives provide 
protection. As it has been described above in answer to the first question ‘how do 
traditional principles of conflict of laws relate to the requirements of the internal 
market for the realisation of the EU objectives regarding the protection of weaker 
parties such as employees, consumers, etc.?’, some changes should be introduced 
in order to ensure the application of the directives when necessary through the 
Rome I Regulation. In answer to the second research question above, it was 
indeed concluded that a mostly multilateral system and, specifically, the Rome I 
Regulation as a unified PIL instrument, is preferable to determine the 
applicability of the provisions of EU directives in comparison to a unilateral PIL 
approach. The main specific suggestions include:  
(1) Elimination of scope rules spread around some EU consumer directives, 
and refer the conflict of laws question to the Rome I Regulation. Also, avoid the 
inclusion of rules referring to the territorial scope of a directive drafted in a 
manner that can be confusing from a PIL point of view, such as art. 1(2) Acquired 
Rights Directives, since Member States might understand them and implement 
them in the same way as scope rules or conflict of laws rules.  
(2) The adaptation of art. 6 Rome I and art. 3(4) Rome I to the requirements 
of the EU legislator regarding the international application of the EU consumer 
directives.  
Article 6 Rome I shall provide that whenever a professional directs his 
activities to a Member State, the application of the minimum requirements of EU 
consumer directives should be ensured, regardless the Member State of habitual 
residence of the consumer. The text proposal regarding article 6 Rome I includes 
the addition of a new text placed following paragraph 3. The new paragraph 
would read: 
“(3) If the requirements in points (a) or (b) of paragraph 1 are not fulfilled, the 
law applicable to a contract between a consumer and a professional shall be 
determined pursuant to Articles 3 and 4. However, when a professional residing 
in a non-Member State directs his commercial or professional activities to one or 
more Member States, the choice of law of a non-Member State as the law 
applicable to a contract falling into the scope of such activities does not deprive 
a consumer habitually resident in a Member State of the protection afforded by 
the relevant Directive, which would be applicable as implemented by the law of 
the Member State in which the consumer concluded the contract”. 
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 In addition, if art. 3(4) Rome I is adapted as to include the ‘closest connection’ 
connecting factor similar to scope rules, it will also ensure the application of EU 
mandatory rules deriving from directives protecting other weaker contracting 
parties against the choice of a third country law, as required by scope rules. Such 
a rule would also reflect the ECJ decision in Ingmar regarding the scope of 
application of the Commercial Agents Directive, although that scope is justified 
on the overriding mandatory nature of the provisions rather than on the protection 
on weaker parties, and it would be the same without the modification of art. 3(4). 
The modification of art. 3(4) Rome I would only be necessary if the EU legislator 
still considers that the international application of EU directives protecting 
weaker parties should be ensured when the situation is closely connected to the 
EU, giving up some legal certainty to adapt to the specific circumstances of the 
case. It is an important adaptation of PIL towards EU objectives, since it involves 
the limitation of the important principle of party autonomy to ensure the 
application of EU mandatory provisions. Although it can be criticised as giving 
up some legal certainty of our PIL system, it is a better alternative than trying to 
use article 9 Rome I and the doctrine of overriding mandatory rules to ensure the 
application of these rules through a too extensive interpretation of public interests 
and overriding mandatory provisions.  
The text proposal includes a substitution of the current article 3(4) Rome I for 
the following text:  
“When the contract has a closest connection to the territory of the Member 
States, the parties' choice of applicable law other than that of a Member State 
shall not prejudice the application of provisions of Community law, where 
appropriate as implemented in the Member State of the forum, which cannot be 
derogated from by agreement.” 
(3) Article 9 Rome I includes a definition of overriding mandatory rules that 
should be respected and interpreted restrictively. Article 9 Rome I is an exception 
to all the other conflict rules of the Regulation when essential public interests of 
the Member State in question are at stake. Protection of weaker contracting 
parties is not a public interest as such, and Member States should not extend the 
interpretation of ‘public interest’ as to justify the application of weaker party 
protection provisions or other provisions they just wish to apply. Provisions 
protecting weaker parties can only be applicable through article 9 Rome I when 
the main purpose of the application of the provision is to protect a public interest 
of the country (e.g. in the case of the Posted Workers Directive, the application 
of the employment provisions referred to in art. 3 PWD are essential to ensure 
fair competition within the internal market).  
The suggested changes are a short term reflexion of the following proposed 
EU PIL approach: 
First, within the EU, the unification of EU PIL is desirable. By having 
common conflict rules determining the law applicable to cross-border contracts 
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codified in the Rome I Regulation, the success of the Area of Justice, the mutual 
recognition and enforcement of decisions within the EU, as well as decisional 
harmony and prevention of forum shopping, are promoted. Only when a EU 
instrument deals with a very specific area that requires the introduction of a very 
specific conflict rule then an exception can be made. 
Regarding the PIL method, the multilateral approach together with the party 
autonomy principle should be, and currently are, the basis. It has been submitted 
that, in general, a multilateral PIL method brings more advantages than a 
unilateral approach: legal certainty, legal expectations of the parties and 
prevention of forum shopping are better promoted though a multilateral PIL 
method. On the other hand, throughout party autonomy the parties create the 
appropriate legal framework for the development of their activities, endowing at 
the same time their legal relationship with legal certainty, predictability and 
economic efficiency, and adapting their behaviour to that chosen law. As a 
consequence, international trade becomes more attractive and international 
harmony of decisions, by making sure every court will decide upon the chosen 
law, is also promoted. 
However, methodological purity is not realistic nor desirable. In fact, 
contemporary conflict of laws systems are not purely multilateral or purely 
unilateral. Both methods should not be understood as opposite, but as a 
complement to each other, which combined together might produce a better PIL 
system. The question lays on how should this combination be and which 
principles or guidelines should be taken into account in order to design that 
combination. There are several situations that require the use of a unilateral 
approach and the limit of party autonomy. It has already been submitted that the 
main factors to take into account when restraining the application of foreign law 
involve the importance of the legal interests involved and the interrelationship 
between the countries. Regarding the legal interests involved, contract law is an 
area of law characterised by party autonomy, since it is a mostly value-free area. 
A multilateral approach is preferred, since the legal expectations of the parties 
and legal certainty should prevail over the country’s interest to have its own 
national law applied. However, in our case, we are dealing with contracts 
involving consumers, employees and other weaker parties. National instruments 
of consumer and employee protection are usually mandatory contract law (parties 
cannot change it by agreement, and thus freedom of contract is limited), and 
differs among states. When the national legislator enacts consumer law or 
employment law protecting consumers or employees from an abuse from 
contractual freedom, the substantive rights established in form of national 
mandatory law should also be protected in some cross-border situations.  
It has been previously said that the more the countries are interrelated, the 
more legal values they would share and, therefore, the more eager would be to 
use neutral conflict rules. Then, the use of a multilateral method is preferred. 
Since contract law is a mostly value-free area, the interrelationship between the 
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countries –and the legal values involved- loses importance and the use of a 
multilateral method is generally promoted. However, in the specific fields of 
consumers, employees and other weaker contracting parties’ protection, where 
there are national legal values involved, the interrelationship between the 
countries gains more importance. Thus, a neutral multilateral approach and party 
autonomy have to be restricted. The Rome I Regulation, so far, reflects this 
approach. 
However, the Rome I Regulation does not sufficiently take into account the 
specialties deriving from the existence of the EU and an internal market, both 
regarding the existence of EU legal values and EU mandatory law, and the 
interrelationship between Member States and non-Member States. The existence 
of the EU modifies the approach towards the legal values involved and 
interrelationship between the countries. Not only a national perspective towards 
the application of foreign law is to be followed but, in addition, a EU perspective 
towards application of non-EU law has to be added. Therefore, in addition to the 
current approach, a difference between intra-EU situations and extra-EU 
situations has to be reflected. Member States, especially in the areas harmonised 
by the EU directives, share the same legal values. For example, in the area of EU 
consumer law, Member States share the same minimum level of consumer 
protection. A multilateral approach is then promoted in an intra-EU scenario, 
although, since the majority of the directives on weaker party protection are of a 
minimum harmonising nature and small differences still exist between Member 
States, the neutral multilateral approach and party autonomy can be restricted to 
a certain point if desired to take into account national interests. In an extra-EU 
scenario, when the application of the EU mandatory law deriving from the 
relevant directives is at stake, the use of a unilateral approach and restriction of 
party autonomy can be justified. There are EU interests involved that the EU 
wishes to protect –although to a lesser extent than public interests– against the 
application of an eventual non-related and very different foreign law. 
 For example, in the area of consumer contracts, in which numerous EU 
directives conform the field of EU consumer law, a minimum EU consumer 
protection standard exists. EU consumer law is an important area for the EU 
internal market, and the application of its mandatory rules needs to be ensured in 
certain situations to ensure the well-functioning of the market, both at an 
economic and social level. A unilateral conflict rule would ensure the application 
of EU consumer directives when necessary, against the possible application of a 
foreign law with eventual different legal values (e.g. no consumer protection). As 
suggested above, a specific unilateral conflict rule regarding consumer directives 
and EU mandatory consumer law, in addition to the current protective multilateral 
rule, is necessary. The principal condition for the application of the protective 
conflict rule for consumers is when the professional directs its activities to the 
country of habitual residence of the consumer. At a EU level, therefore, it should 
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be added that when the professional directs its activities to one or more Member 
States, the application of the relevant EU consumer directives should be ensured.  
It is true that the area of EU consumer law is one of the most harmonised areas 
in the EU and hence is in need of special attention. Regarding other weaker 
parties, the same reasoning is to be followed, and a distinction between intra-EU 
and extra-EU situations, when the application of the relevant EU directives 
containing mandatory rules are at stake, should be reflected in the instrument. In 
the case of individual employment contracts, employment law in the EU is less 
harmonised than consumer law, and national values are still very important. The 
connecting factor used in the protective conflict rule leads to the law of the 
country of habitual place of employment of the employee. In an intra-EU 
situation, this protective multilateral conflict rule and the limit on party autonomy 
ensure the application of the mandatory rules of the national law interested in 
applying (i.e. country where the employee habitually works). If the habitual place 
of work is a Member State, regardless the existence of other non-EU elements, 
the application of the minimum EU employee protection provisions is generally 
ensured. Normally, EU employment provisions do not have any interest in 
applying to situations where the employee has its habitual place of work outside 
the EU, and, as a result, the existent protective conflict rule seems sufficient by 
now. 
Still, a unilateral approach similar than to the case of EU consumer directives 
could be included: when the worker has its habitual place of work within the EU, 
the application of EU mandatory law derived from EU employment directives 
should be ensured. The introduction of this rule would not change much the 
current situation. It would just have an impact on the cases where the employment 
contract is most closely connected to a non-Member State, but the employee still 
has its habitual place of work in a Member State. However, in such cases, it is 
doubtful that the EU would have a true interest in applying EU mandatory 
employment law. Another possibility would then ensure the applicability when 
the habitual place of work is in the EU and the contract is closely connected to 
the EU. Still, this rule, in the level of harmonisation of EU employment law we 
are now, does not seem necessary yet. 
Regarding other weaker parties which do not receive as much protection as 
consumers and employees, principally because they are not always in a weaker 
contracting position, but regarding which there are EU directives with EU 
mandatory provisions, a more general conflict rule with a unilateral approach to 
ensure their application in extra-EU situations can be provided. Thus, in order to 
ensure the application of EU mandatory law, such as the one deriving from other 
directives protecting other weaker parties, in extra-EU situations, a common 
general and more flexible conflict rule can be introduced. The suggested 
modification of article 3(4) Rome I, according to which the EU mandatory 
provisions deriving from EU secondary law are applicable if there is a closest 
connection with the territory of the Member States regardless the law chosen by 
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the parties, would ensure the protection of EU mandatory law protecting other 
weaker parties. This provision constitutes a unilateral inroad and a limit to party 
autonomy. This approach reflects the line followed by the EU legislator in the 
scope rules of EU consumer directives and by the ECJ in the Ingmar judgment.1215 
The possibility of making it applicable regardless the law otherwise applicable 
rather than just limiting its application to when there is a choice of law can also 
be considered. This second option would indeed constitute a more protective 
approach, and thus the choice depends on the intentions of the EU legislator. For 
example, in the case of a commercial agent with habitual residence in Turkey, 
which works for a Belgian principal, and performs its activities within the EU, 
the law applicable in absence of choice would be Turkish law. The protective 
provisions of the Commercial Agent Directive (setting aside for a moment the 
decision of the ECJ in Ingmar) would only apply in this case following the second 
option, since there is no choice of law. Or, in the case of an active consumer with 
habitual residence in a Member State contracting with a non-EU professional 
from a Member State, the law applicable to the contract would be a non-Member 
State law (e.g. a Dutch consumer finding some sport shoes in a Chinese website 
from a Chinese company and, with the help of a Chinese friend to translate and 
make the transaction, concludes a contract). If the EU legislator aims to apply EU 
mandatory law in those cases, then the second aforementioned option should be 
followed. However, in my opinion, that approach seems a step too far and the EU 
mandatory rules are more than sufficiently ensured in an international situation 
when they are applicable when the situation is closely connected to the EU and 
the parties have chosen a non-Member State law as applicable to their contract 
(but the law otherwise applicable would have ensured the application of the 
relevant EU mandatory law). 
Therefore, I conclude that a more EU-focused PIL method is necessary, but 
still respecting the current multilateral basis and party autonomy. To the current 
PIL approach followed by the Rome I Regulation, a difference between intra-EU 
and extra-EU situations regarding the application of EU directives protecting 
weaker contracting parties and involving EU mandatory law should be made. 
Regarding EU mandatory law on weaker party protection, in intra-EU situations 
a multilateral approach is promoted while, in extra-EU situations, the introduction 
of a unilateral inroad and limitation of party autonomy is justified. The more 
harmonised an area of law is, as well as mandatory, such as EU consumer law, 
the more necessary and evident should the differentiation be. 
 
 
                                                     
1215 Although in the Ingmar judgment the ECJ justified the application of the Commercial Agents 
Directive on the objectives of freedom of establishment and undistorted competition (EU public 
interests), falling under the category of overriding mandatory rules. 











EU law aims at developing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, for which 
the effective functioning of the internal market is essential, and in which EU PIL 
plays an important role. In the context of weaker contracting party protection, the 
EU has enacted numerous secondary law instruments, principally directives, 
providing for substantive rules regarding consumer and employment contracts, as 
well as regarding other contracts involving weaker parties (insurance, agency, 
etc.). On the other hand, EU PIL provides conflict rules that determine the law 
applicable to cross-border contracts (Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations), including consumer, employment, insurance, or carriage 
of passengers contracts. When, as a result of the conflict rules of the Rome I 
Regulation, a non-Member State law is applicable, the substantive protective 
rules of the respective EU directives are not applied. Therefore, both areas of law 
must be coordinated.  
In this context, the principal aim of this thesis is to answer whether EU conflict 
rules and EU secondary law are well coordinated regarding the protection of 
weaker contracting parties and, if not, how could they achieve a mutual 
understanding. This question is divided in three different enquiries: 
- How do traditional principles of conflict of laws relate to the requirements 
of the internal market for the realisation of the EU objectives regarding the 
protection of weaker parties such as employees, consumers, etc.? 
- When and how should PIL ensure the applicability of EU directives on 
weaker party protection? 
- Are the current EU PIL conflict of laws rules and PIL method adequate to 
ensure the EU objectives regarding weaker contracting parties, or is there a call 
for a different PIL method? 
Through a mixed methodology, combining the research legal methods of 
‘black letter’ or doctrinal methodology, legal historical method and comparative 
method, this study gives answer to the aforementioned questions in seven 
different Chapters: 
Chapter I describes the research questions, methodology, objectives and 
importance of this research. In addition, this chapter contains an overview of the 
historical evolution of PIL theory and methods, as well as of the Europeanisation 
process of PIL. In order to better understand the existing gaps and inconsistencies 
in the current EU PIL that this study aims to point out, the analysis of the 
historical circumstances and reasoning surrounding the different approaches to 
solve conflicts of laws developed through the history becomes of essential 
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importance. So far, no single PIL method –unilateral or multilateral- is perfect 
and able to solve all conflict problems, but combined may achieve a better system 
than either method itself in actual practice. The problem lays on achieving the 
most appropriate manner to combine them in order to ensure legal certainty and 
predictability of connection, together with finding the appropriate solutions to the 
particular situation. 
Chapter II analyses the rationale behind the protection of weaker contracting 
parties in the EU PIL. After identifying those ‘weaker contracting parties’, it is 
explained why are they in need of special protection both under substantive law 
and PIL. This chapter also argues why the general conflict rules do not respond 
to the specialities of consumer contracts and individual employment contracts, 
which are the main contracts involving weaker parties. In this regard, the need 
for limitations of the party autonomy principle and special connecting factors is 
discussed. In addition, the role of the EU regarding consumer and employee 
protection is studied to the extent that it affects the current EU PIL rules, 
including a discussion regarding the advantages and disadvantages of 
harmonisation of contract law at a EU level. In that regard, it is concluded that, 
in order to achieve a correct protection of consumers and employees within the 
EU internal market, both partial harmonisation and EU PIL rules play an 
important role. If EU PIL rules are sufficiently adapted to the objectives of the 
internal market and coordinated with EU substantive law, legal certainty and 
flexibility within the market would be achieved. Finally, a comparison of the 
existing possible mechanisms of protection of weaker parties in PIL is conducted, 
including different levels of limitation of party autonomy and use of diverse 
special connecting factors. 
Chapter III focuses on the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations and its mechanisms of protection of consumers and 
employees. Article 6 Rome I and article 8 Rome I, which determine the law 
applicable to consumer and individual employment contracts respectively are 
analysed, together with the relevant case law of the ECJ. In addition, article 9 
Rome I regarding overriding mandatory rules is studied, with special emphasis 
on the possible role of overriding mandatory rules as mechanisms of protection 
of weaker contracting parties. Although neither authors nor case law among 
Member States share a common approach regarding the inclusion on the 
definition of article 9 Rome I of certain provisions protecting the weaker 
contracting parties, it is concluded that the tendency of the EU is to accept that 
rules aimed at the protection of weaker parties can also qualify as overriding 
mandatory rules. Nevertheless, this does not mean that all protective rules can 
have such a character, but only when its application is regarded as crucial for the 
safeguarding of the country’s public interests. The rule must have a dual purpose: 
the promotion of public interests and, complementarily, the protection of a 
weaker party. Finally, the functioning of article 3(4) Rome I as the provision 
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introduced in order to avoid the circumvention of application of EU mandatory 
law by a choice of law of a third country law is also object of study. 
Chapter IV regards the relationship and coordination between the EU 
consumer directives and the Rome I Regulation. First, the current inconsistencies 
derived from the intended scope of EU consumer directives and the conflict rules 
determining the law applicable to consumer contracts are pointed out. On the one 
hand, article 6 Rome I determines the law applicable to consumer contracts; 
however, certain consumer contracts are excluded from its scope, such as 
contracts involving ‘mobile consumers’ (i.e. a consumer from a Member State 
who is temporarily in another Member State and enters into a contract after being 
targeted by a professional in that other Member State). On the other hand, some 
EU consumer directives include ‘scope rules’ which differ with the rule of article 
6 Rome I and disrupt the current conflict of laws system. Second, in the context 
of intra-EU situations, the difficult implementation into national law of scope 
rules included in EU consumer directives is discussed, as well as gold-platting 
situations between Member States. Difficulties arise regarding the different 
implementations and interpretations of Member States of the scope rules. Also, it 
is concluded that the gold-platting provisions of a Member State –those which 
improve the minimum protection provided by a directive- should not be imposed 
as overriding mandatory provisions against another Member State law which 
provides for the minimum required protection, since both Member States share 
the minimum mandatory EU provisions. Third, in the context of extra-EU 
situations, the international scope of the EU consumer directives in PIL terms is 
analysed, studying the possible PIL methods to determine the applicability of EU 
consumer directives in international situations. While the prevalence of the 
multilateral method is defended, the use of a unilateral PIL approach is justified 
on grounds of the existent interrelationship between the countries involved and 
similarity or disparity of legal values (and, in our case, the special situation of the 
EU in that regard), and the mandatory character of the forum rules at stake. 
Finally, this Chapter includes several proposals on how to achieve a better 
consumer protection in the EU while respecting PIL values, including the 
elimination of scope rules from EU consumer directives and adaptation of article 
6 Rome I to the needs of EU consumer directives by protecting EU mobile 
consumers against a non-EU choice of law when necessary. 
Chapter V concerns the relationship and coordination between the EU 
employment directives and the Rome I Regulation, taking into account the 
analysis and reflexions made in the previous Chapter. First, the coordination 
between the Rome I Regulation and the EU employment directives that do not 
directly interfere with PIL is briefly described. Then, the interaction of the 
Acquired Rights Directive and the Rome I Regulation is analysed in terms of its 
international scope and application. The main debate regarding the Acquired 
Rights Directive is its possible overriding mandatory character, on which it is 
concluded that its provisions should not generally be considered as having 
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overriding mandatory character, since they are mainly aimed at protecting the 
employee. In addition, this Chapter includes a study of the law applicable to 
employment contracts in the context of a temporary posting of workers, analysing 
the interaction between the Posted Workers Directive and the Rome I Regulation, 
with special focus on the role of overriding mandatory rules in this regard. Again, 
the available PIL methods and their convenience are discussed. The provisions 
referred to in article 3(1) Posted Workers Directive, besides ensuring a minimum 
protection to posted workers, are considered crucial for the safeguard of public 
interests of the host Member State and of the EU and thus constitute overriding 
mandatory provisions according to the definition of article 9 Rome I, since they 
are essential to ensure fair competition and the fundamental freedom of provision 
of services. 
Chapter VI, on the basis of the findings of the two previous chapters, analyses 
the mechanisms of protection of other weaker contracting parties in the Rome I 
Regulation and its interaction with the respective EU directives. The Rome I 
Regulation provides for special conflict rules regarding contracts for the carriage 
of passengers and some insurance policyholders, including a certain limitation on 
party autonomy. In addition, other contractual parties can often have a weaker 
contracting position in their contract (such as franchisees, distributors or 
commercial agents). This Chapter aims to analyse the interaction between the 
conflict rules that determine the law applicable to these other ‘weaker’ 
contracting parties in the Rome I Regulation and the EU secondary law 
instruments that contain mandatory provisions protecting weaker parties other 
than consumers and employees.  
Finally, Chapter VII includes the reflexions and conclusions resulting from 
this research, answering to the research questions posed. The study concludes 
with a call for a more EU-focused PIL method, but still respecting the current 
multilateral basis and the party autonomy principle. A difference between intra-
EU and extra-EU situations regarding the application of EU directives protecting 
weaker contracting parties and involving EU mandatory law should be made in 
the Rome I Regulation. Regarding EU mandatory law on weaker party protection, 
in intra-EU situations a multilateral approach is promoted while, in extra-EU 
situations, the introduction of a unilateral inroad and limitation of party autonomy 
is justified. The more harmonised an area of law is, as well as mandatory, such 
as EU consumer law, the more necessary and evident should the differentiation 
be. A text proposal is made in this regard, suggesting modifications on articles 
3(4) Rome I and 6 Rome I Regulation; also, a restrictive interpretation of the 






Het doel van Europees recht is om een gemeenschappelijke ruimte van vrijheid, 
veiligheid en recht te creëren. Hiervoor is het functioneren van de interne markt 
essentieel en is er een grote rol weggelegd voor Europees internationaal 
privaatrecht (hierna EU ipr). In de context van de bescherming van zwakkere 
partijen heeft de EU veel secundair unierecht, met name richtlijnen, in het leven 
geroepen. De richtlijnen geven materiële regels voor contracten met 
consumenten, werknemers en andere zwakkere partijen bij contracten zoals 
verzekeringspolissen of agentuurovereenkomsten. Aan de andere kant zijn er EU 
ipr conflictregels die het toepasselijke recht op internationale contracten bepalen 
(Rome I Verordening inzake het recht dat van toepassing is op verbintenissen uit 
overeenkomst) waaronder consumenten-, arbeids-, verzekerings- en 
personenvervoercontracten. Het aanwenden van de regels van Rome I kan er 
echter toe leiden dat op deze contracten het recht van een derde land wordt 
toegepast waar de materiële bescherming van de Europese richtlijnen niet geldt. 
Daarom moeten de Richtlijnen en het EU ipr op elkaar worden afgestemd. 
Binnen dit kader beoogt dit proefschrift de vraag te beantwoorden of de 
Europese conflictregels en het secundaire unierecht zijn gecoördineerd waar het 
de bescherming van zwakkere partijen bij contracten betreft en zo nee, hoe ze 
zich tot elkaar kunnen verhouden. Deze vraag is opgedeeld in drie deelvragen: 
-  Hoe verhouden de traditionele beginselen van het conflictenrecht zich 
tot de vereisten van de interne markt in het kader van de Europese doelen voor de 
bescherming van zwakkere partijen zoals werknemers, consumenten, etc.? 
- Onder welke omstandigheden moet het Europees ipr de toepasselijkheid 
van de EU richtlijnen inzake de bescherming van zwakkere partijen garanderen 
en hoe? 
- Zijn de huidige conflictregels in het EU ipr geschikt voor het behalen van 
de Europese doelen met betrekking tot de bescherming van zwakkere partijen of 
is het nodig een andere ipr methode te ontwikkelen?  
Door het combineren van verschillende onderzoeksmethoden zoals juridisch 
dogmatisch onderzoek, rechtshistorisch onderzoek en rechtsvergelijking geeft 
deze studie antwoord op de voornoemde vragen in zeven Hoofdstukken: 
Hoofdstuk I beschrijft de onderzoeksvragen, methodiek, doelen en het belang 
van dit onderzoek. Verder geeft dit Hoofdstuk zowel een overzicht van de 
historische ontwikkeling van ipr theorie en methoden als van het 
Europeaniseringsproces van ipr. De bestudering van de historische achtergrond 
en de theoretische grondslagen van de verschillende ipr methoden is essentieel 
voor de analyse van de hiaten en inconsistenties in het huidige EU ipr. Tot op 
heden is er geen enkele ipr methode – unilateraal of multilateraal – die alle 
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problemen van het conflictenrecht adequaat op kan lossen; een combinatie van 
de verschillende methoden zal in de praktijk veeleer leiden tot een beter systeem. 
Dit roept de vraag op hoe de methoden optimaal gecombineerd kunnen worden 
om de rechtszekerheid, voorspelbaarheid van aanknoping en een rechtvaardige 
oplossing van concrete situaties te vinden. 
Hoofdstuk II analyseert de ratio achter de bescherming van zwakkere partijen 
bij contracten in het EU ipr. Nadat deze ‘zwakkere partijen’ zijn geïdentificeerd 
zijn wordt uitgelegd waarom ze speciale bescherming behoeven onder zowel 
materieel recht als het ipr. In dit Hoofdstuk wordt tevens beargumenteerd waarom 
de algemene conflictregels niet adequaat zijn voor het reguleren van 
consumentenovereenkomsten en individuele arbeidsovereenkomsten. Deze twee 
categorieën overeenkomsten met zwakkere partijen doen zich het vaakst voor. 
Verder bestudeert dit Hoofdstuk de rol van de EU met betrekking tot 
consumentenbescherming en de bescherming van werknemers in zoverre als deze 
invloed heeft op de huidige regels van het EU ipr. Daarbij wordt aandacht besteed 
aan de voor- en nadelen van de harmonisatie van overeenkomstenrecht op 
Europees niveau. In dit kader wordt de conclusie getrokken dat zowel 
gedeeltelijke harmonisatie als EU ipr een belangrijke rol spelen bij de adequate 
bescherming van consumenten en werknemers op de Interne Markt. Als de regels 
van het EU ipr voldoende aangepast worden aan de doelen van de interne markt 
en afgestemd worden op materieel Europees recht dan zouden rechtszekerheid en 
flexibiliteit bereikt worden. Tot slot bevat Hoofdstuk II een vergelijking van de 
bestaande beschermingsmechanismen in het ipr, waarbij wordt ingegaan op 
verschillende niveaus van de begrenzing van partijautonomie en verscheidene 
bijzondere aanknopingspunten. 
Hoofdstuk III handelt over de Rome I Verordening inzake het recht dat van 
toepassing is op verbintenissen uit overeenkomst en de daarin opgenomen 
consumenten- en werknemersbeschermingsmechanismen. De artikelen 6 en 8 
Rome I zien respectievelijk op het toepasselijke recht op consumenten- en 
individuele arbeidsovereenkomsten en worden samen met de relevante 
rechtspraak van het Europees Hof van Justitie geanalyseerd. Vervolgens wordt 
artikel 9 Rome I inzake voorrangsregels bestudeerd. Deze analyse spitst zich toe 
op de mogelijkheden van voorrangsregels als mechanismen ter bescherming van 
zwakkere partijen. Hoewel er tussen de Lidstaten geen consensus bestaat over de 
beste handelwijze wordt er geconcludeerd dat de EU geneigd is om regels van 
consumenten- en werknemersbescherming te kwalificeren als voorrangsregels. 
Dit betekend overigens niet dat alle beschermingsbepalingen ook voorrangsregels 
zijn, daarvoor is verder vereist dat de toepassing van de beschermingsregel kritiek 
is voor de handhaving van ’s lands publieke belangen. De regel moet een dubbel 
karakter hebben: het bevorderen van publieke belangen en, aanvullend, de 
bescherming van zwakke partijen. Afsluitend volgt een analyse van de werking 
van artikel 3 lid 4 Rome I. Krachtens dit artikel is het niet mogelijk om dwingend 
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recht van Europese oorsprong te omzeilen door middel van een rechtskeuze voor 
een derde land.  
Hoofdstuk IV ziet op de verhouding tussen en coördinatie van de EU 
consumentenrichtlijnen en de Rome I Verordening. Allereerst worden de 
bestaande inconsistenties uitgediept die voortvloeien uit de beoogde reikwijdte 
van  de consumentenrichtlijnen en van de conflictregels die het toepasselijk recht 
op consumentenovereenkomsten bepalen. Aan de ene kant bepaalt artikel 6 Rome 
I het toepasselijke recht op dergelijke overeenkomsten en sluit het specifieke 
categorieën consumentencontracten uit van deze regel. Bijvoorbeeld 
consumenten die zich tijdelijk in een andere Lidstaat bevinden en een 
consumentenovereenkomst sluiten nadat een ‘professional’ zich op hen gericht 
heeft in die andere Lidstaat. Aan de andere kant bevatten sommige 
consumentenrichtlijnen reikwijdtebepalingen die afwijken van artikel 6 Rome I 
en die het huidige conflictrecht ontwrichten. Ten tweede wordt ingegaan op de 
moeizame implementatie van de reikwijdtebepalingen binnen de EU. Vaak is dit 
lastig voor de Lidstaten of wordt de nationale regel strenger gemaakt dan de 
Europese bepaling (ook wel aangeduid als ‘gold-platting’). Hierdoor ontstaan 
moeilijkheden met het interpreteren van verschillende en afwijkende 
implementatiewetgeving. Er wordt geconcludeerd dat de gold-platting 
bepalingen die verder gaan dan de minimumbescherming van de richtlijnen niet 
tegen andere Lidstaten mogen worden ingeroepen als voorrangsregels omdat 
andere Lidstaten het Europese minimale beschermingsniveau handhaven. Ten 
derde wordt ten opzichte van derde landen de reikwijdte van de Europese 
consumentenrichtlijnen in ipr termen besproken. Hierbij worden de verschillende 
ipr-methoden bestudeerd om de toepasselijkheid van de richtlijnen in 
internationale (EU externe) situaties. Hoewel de methode van de meerzijdige 
conflictregel het vaakst voor komt en in dit Hoofdstuk wordt verdedigd, kan het 
gebruik van een eenzijdige ipr regel gerechtvaardigd zijn op basis van de 
bestaande relatie tussen betrokken landen, de verschillen en overeenkomsten in 
de rechtscultuur (en specifiek die van de EU) en voorrangsregels van het forum. 
Dit Hoofdstuk wordt afgesloten met verscheidene voorstellen voor betere 
consumentenbescherming in de EU die geen afbreuk doen aan de belangen die 
het ipr behartigd. Dit omvat bijvoorbeeld de verwijdering van 
reikwijdtebepalingen uit de consumentenrichtlijnen en de aanpassing van artikel 
6 Rome I aan de consumentenrichtlijnen door ‘mobile consumers’ wanneer nodig 
te beschermen tegen een rechtskeuze voor het recht van een derde land. 
Hoofdstuk V gaat over de verhouding tussen en coördinatie van de EU 
werknemersrichtlijnen en de Rome I Verordening, waarbij rekening wordt 
gehouden met de analyse en reflecties uit het vorige Hoofdstuk. Ten eerste wordt 
kort de coördinatie van de Rome I Verordening en de werknemersrichtlijnen die 
geen impact hebben op het ipr beschreven. Vervolgens wordt de interactie tussen 
de Richtlijn Overgang van Ondernemingen en de Rome I Verordening 
geanalyseerd in het kader van het internationaal toepassingsbereik en de 
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uitvoering. De discussie over de Richtlijn Overgang van Ondernemingen spitst 
zich voornamelijk toe op het mogelijke voorrangsrechtelijke karakter van diens 
bepalingen, waarbij tot de conclusie wordt gekomen dat zij niet in hun 
algemeenheid als zodanig beschouwd kunnen worden omdat de regels zich 
hoofdzakelijk richten op de bescherming van werknemers. Verder bevat dit 
Hoofdstuk een studie naar het recht dat van toepassing is op 
arbeidsovereenkomsten in verband met tijdelijke detachering van werknemers, 
waarbij de interactie tussen de Detacheringsrichtlijn en de Rome I Verordening 
wordt geanalyseerd en bijzondere aandacht wordt besteed aan de rol van 
voorrangsregels. Ook hier worden de beschikbare methoden van ipr en hun 
geschiktheid besproken. De bepalingen waar artikel 3 lid 1 Detacheringsrichtlijn 
aan refereert garanderen niet alleen minimumbescherming voor werknemers 
maar worden ook geacht van wezenlijk belang te zijn voor de handhaving van de 
publieke belangen van de ontvangende Lidstaat en de EU en kwalificeren 
derhalve als voorrangsregels ingevolge artikel 9 Rome I omdat ze essentieel zijn 
voor het garanderen van eerlijke concurrentie en de fundamentele vrijheid van 
diensten.  
Hoofdstuk VI behelst een analyse van de twee voorgaande Hoofdstukken die 
zich richt op hoe de  mechanismen voor de bescherming van zwakkere partijen 
in de Rome I Verordening zich verhouden tot de Europese richtlijnen. De Rome 
I Verordening voorziet in speciale conflictregels voor contracten inzake 
passagiersvervoer en sommige polishouders waaronder een zekere beperking van 
partijautonomie. Verder zijn er ook andere contractspartijen die vaak een 
zwakkere onderhandelingspositie kunnen hebben (zoals franchisenemers, 
distributeurs of handelsvertegenwoordigers). Dit Hoofdstuk beoogt de interactie 
te analyseren tussen de toepasselijke conflictregels op deze ‘zwakkere’ 
contractspartijen in de Rome I Verordening en secundair Unierecht dat 
voorrangsregels bevat voor de bescherming van andere zwakkere partijen dan 
consumenten en werknemers. 
Tot slot worden in Hoofdstuk VII de reflecties en conclusies uiteengezet die 
voortvloeien uit dit onderzoek en worden de onderzoeksvragen beantwoord. De 
studie wordt afgesloten met een oproep tot een meer EU-centrische ipr methode 
die de huidige multilaterale methode en het beginsel van partijautonomie 
respecteert. Er moet daarbij onderscheid gemaakt worden in de Rome I 
Verordening tussen intra-Europese en extra-Europese situaties met het oog op de 
toepassing van de Europese Richtlijnen en EU voorrangsregels die zwakkere 
contractspartijen beschermen. Inzake de Europese voorrangsregels wordt voor 
intra-Europese situaties een multilaterale methode geadviseerd terwijl voor extra-
Europese situaties een unilaterale aanpak en een beperking van partijautonomie 
wordt voorgesteld. Hoe meer een rechtsgebied geharmoniseerd is en een 
verplichtend karakter heeft, bijvoorbeeld EU consumentenrecht, hoe meer 
gedifferentieerd moet worden. Er wordt een voorstel gedaan voor een bepaling 
waarbij aanpassingen worden voorgesteld voor artikel 3 lid 4 en artikel 6 Rome I 
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Verordening; ook wordt opgeroepen om het concept van voorrangsregels in 
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